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Mongolia’s historical, geographical, political, and economic circumstances seem 
to be closest to those of the Central Asian states.  Yet, unlike these states, Mongolia was 
able to successfully transition to a democratic political regime and introduce far-reaching 
economic reforms.  This dissertation analyzes this puzzle by focusing on the early 
transition period in Mongolia.  The dissertation provides detailed account of political and 
economic processes during the ten years from 1987 to 1996.  The account of events is 
based on primary data drawn from government and party documents, cabinet minutes, 
daily newspaper accounts, memoirs of the participants, and detailed interviews with the 
participants of the events.   
 
In addition to the detailed description, the dissertation provides alternative 
theoretical frameworks – as opposed to the structural explanations provided thus far – 
which could be useful in explaining why things happened the way they did in Mongolia.  
  
Namely, the dissertation brings in two groups of political economy theories – institutions 
and constitutional design and special interest and collective action theories –and attempts 
to explain the events in Mongolia through the lens of these theoretical arguments.   
 
The first chapter provides a comprehensive literature review on Mongolia’s 
political and economic transition and places it in a comparative perspective.  The second 
chapter describes and analyzes the nature and extent of the partial economic and political 
reforms that were implemented in the late communist period.  The third chapter describes 
in detail the political events that led to the collapse of the long-standing communist 
regime and the subsequent radical political changes that took place following the peaceful 
“democratic revolution”.  The fourth chapter deals in detail with the economic shock the 
country faced with the withdrawal of the Soviet financial assistance, the first policy 
response, and the overall politics of economic decision making.  I pay special attention to 
privatization, the cornerstone of early reform attempts. The last chapter summarizes, 
classifies, and prioritizes the variety of factors – historical, external, political, 
institutional, and cultural – that were identified as having contributed to the successful 
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When communism – as an economic system and political doctrine – collapsed in 
1989-1990, (almost) all post-communist countries envisaged themselves to become 
liberal democracies with a free market economy.  However, the transition path proved to 
be difficult.  After twenty years of transition we observe a diversity of political and 
economic regimes.    
 
Ultimately, all Central and Eastern European countries became democracies.  
However, the political transformation took very different paths in different countries: 
negotiated transition in Poland and Hungary, popular revolt in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, and communist coups in Bulgaria and Romania.  The paths and the 
emerging regimes in the former Soviet Union are even more diverse, from the 
determination to the democratic and radical economic changes in the Baltic States to the 
continuation of the authoritarian rule in Belarus and some Central Asian republics.  
 
It is commonly argued that the initial conditions and policy choices determined 
the transition path outcomes.  Such factors as the initial level of income, degree of 
economic and political dependence on the Soviet Union and the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA)1 trade regime, longevity of the regime, geography 
(proximity to EU), size of the private sector, prior experience with the market economy 
and others have been identified as contributing factors to the outcomes.  As the EBRD 
                                                
1CMEA, sometimes abbreviated as COMECON (1949–1991), was an economic organization under the 
leadership of the Soviet Union comprising the countries of the Eastern Bloc along with a number of 




Transition Report claims, approximately half of thevariation could be explained by these 
initial conditions (EBRD 1999).   
 
On the other hand, it was argued that policy choices also had major influence on 
the performance of transition economies.  Some countries opted for early and radical 
reforms while others delayed reforms and/or implemented them only half-heartedly.  
Those countries which adopted early and swift reforms were generally more successful in 
restoring output and curtailing high inflation.  Usually these countries were also the ones 
that opted for a radical democratic political change.   
 
Mongolia’s initial conditions were very similar to hose of the non-European 
Soviet Republics.  Many observers of Mongolia noted that it was a de facto “sixteenth 
republic of the Soviet Union”.  In particular, Mongolia’s initial conditions were probably 
closest to the Central Asian republics.  Mongolia was the second country in the world to 
adopt communism.  Mongolia was a net recipient of financial resources and its economic 
dependence on the Soviet Union and the CMEA trade was the highest among the member 
countries.  It never had a history of democracy or ma ket economy and was the poorest 
among the group.  One would expect that the transitio  path and the outcomes would be 
quite similar to those of the former Soviet Republics and most notably Central Asia.  
However, in the early 1990s Mongolia opted for very rapid democratic political changes 
and far-reaching economic reforms.  In terms of economic performance, Mongolia’s 
output fall was significantly less and lasted shorter than in the former Soviet Union and 





This dissertation attempts to deal with this puzzle.  Mongolia’s transition drew 
some interest from the scholarly community in economics, political science, and to a 
lesser extent anthropology and sociology.  However, it often falls through the cracks of 
comparative research, when scholars discuss any combination of Eastern European, 
former Soviet Union, or Central Asian transitions.  One of the reasons is its relatively 
small size and hence perceived insignificance.  Secondly, Mongolia does not easily fit 
into any of the paths taken by different groups of countries, therefore conveniently left 
out from comparative or other analysis.  The few studies that do deal with Mongolia’s 
political and economic transition are often general and do not provide sufficient details.  
The feeling is that Mongolia deserves more focused attention.  This dissertation aims to 
fill this gap.  
 
The dissertation is organized as follows.  I start with describing Mongolia’s 
political and economic transition efforts and outcomes by placing it in a comparative 
perspective, mostly with the republics of Central Asia but also other transition countries 
in Eastern Europe and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS2).  I 
do an (almost) exhaustive literature review on both political and economic transition in 
Mongolia and identify the gaps.  Based on this, I describe my research methodology, data 
sources used in the analysis, and significance of this research.   
 
                                                
2 CIS was established in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Currently, it includes 11 countries (9 
official and 2 unofficial members).  Out of the 15 former Soviet Republics, the three Baltic States did not 




In the second chapter I provide a brief history anddescribe the characteristics of 
the central plan in Mongolia and the nature of the economic and political reform efforts 
undertaken in the late communist period.  This chapter rovides a useful background for 
understanding the peculiarities of the central plan in Mongolia and its political situation 
by the end of the communist regime. The next two chapters constitute the core of the 
dissertation.  They describe in great detail the sudden political developments in the early 
1990 and the subsequent radical political and economic changes that took place following 
the peaceful “democratic revolution”.  I give special attention to privatization, the 
cornerstone of early reform attempts.  In describing the events, outcomes, and policies I 
mostly rely on the historical facts that are drawn from interviews with the participants of 
the events, archives of government documents, and newspaper information, and memoirs 
of the participants.  I also make references to the secondary sources where available.  
 
The two chapters attempt to shed some light on explaining the policy choices 
made by the country’s leadership and their outcomes by employing selected theoretical 
frameworks.  In particular, I apply two sets of political economy theories – constitutional 
design and institutional theories as well as special interest and collective action theories.  
The limited explanations of rapid political and economic changes that took place in 
Mongolia usually focus on the conjuncture of structural and historical factors.  The actor-
centric approach of the above political economy theories helps to explain the decisions 
and events from the perspective of the players, their pr ferences and strategies, thus 





The last chapter summarizes and classifies the varity of factors – historical, 
external, political, institutional, and cultural – that were identified earlier in the 
dissertation as having contributed to the successful democratic and market economic 
transition.  Among the multiplicity of factors, I attempt to identify those which were most 
important in the sense that their existence was sufficient for successful democratization 










The chapter gives a background of Mongolia’s transition by placing it in a 
comparative perspective.  In this chapter I show that Mongolia’s transition – political and 
economic – has been relatively successful by providing statistical and other data.  I 
compare Mongolia’s transition to that of some Central Asian republics and other 
transition economies.  The main purpose of this chapter is to: (i) provide some evidence 
on relative performance of Mongolia compared to other postcommunist transition 
countries on such dimensions as political democratization, macroeconomic performance, 
structural reform efforts and progress in institution building; (ii) look, in a comparative 
perspective, at the initial conditions and policy choi es made by the Mongolian 
government; (iii) review the existing literature onMongolia’s democratic political 
transition and critically analyze the arguments that attempt to explain such a transition; 
(iv) review and critically analyze the existing literature on economic reforms in Mongolia 
and particularly privatization highlighting the major contributions made and identifying 
the gaps; and finally (v) place my own research within he existing literature and 
highlight its significance.   
 
The literature on democratic political transition in Mongolia is extremely scarce.  
There are only a handful of articles on political tr nsition, e.g. Fish (1998, 2001), Fritz 
(2002, 2008), and a book by Rossabi (2005) which describes in more detail the processes 
that went on during the early-to-mid transition period.  There are a few studies by the 




The dominant argument of these studies, with some exc ption for Rossabi’s, is that 
Mongolia’s political transition has been unexpectedly successful, given the unfavorable 
initial conditions.  Some authors (e.g., two articles of Fish) try to look at the structural 
and historical factors that contributed to the democratic transition and consolidation.  
However, they do not contain much detail about the processes and the players.  Rossabi’s 
outlook is quite different.  He argues that Mongolia’s democracy is facing some troubles 
and challenges.  His study goes against the dominant argument of relative success and 
focuses on the negative aspects of the democratization process such as corruption, etc.  
One advantage of the book is that it contains much more detailed description of the 
processes (and therefore is considered valuable by the reviewers) while at the same time 
it has been criticized for taking a biased outlook and relying on too few primary sources 
and few participants of the events who had only margin l influence on the policies.   
 
Literature on economic reforms and privatization is more extensive although not 
abundant, partially because of the direct interest and involvement of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) in economic policies.  The bulk of literature on economic 
policies is produced by the IFIs, including several comparative studies on transition 
economies.  For instance, there are two major reports roduced by the World Bank and 
European Bank of Restructuring and Development (EBRD) on economic transition in 
post-socialist countries (e.g., de Melo et al 1996).  As for Mongolia specific studies, there 
are few articles on macroeconomic policies by Yusuf and Burki (1992), Hahm (1995), 
Boone (1994), Cheng (2003), Black (2001), and Slok (2001) in addition to the country 




and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  Rossabi argues in his book that the economic 
policies pursued by the Mongolian government in the 1990s were imposed by the IFIs 
and were largely wrong.  A similar but not as strong f an argument is raised in a 
descriptive book by Nixson et al (2000).   
 
Privatization issues have been studied in more detail by Denizer and Gelb (1992), 
Anderson, Korsun, Lee, and Murrell (various years).  They provide more detailed account 
of the privatization policies and examine the performance of privatized enterprises.  
Nixson and Walters (2006) examine the distributional aspects of privatization.   
 
The chapter provides an (almost) exhaustive review of the existing literature on 
political and economic transition in Mongolia. 
 
1.1. Relative Political and Economic Performance of Monglia 
 
Mongolia is considered a fast reformer, both in terms of political changes and 
economic reforms.  This section provides some evidence on the country’s political and 
economic performance by putting it in a comparative perspective.  
 
Mongolia’s 1989 geopolitical status was categorized as “nominally independent 
of the Soviet Union but … the de facto sixteenth republic” (Murrell 1996, 26).  Cross-
country studies conducted by the World Bank and others classify Mongolia in the former 




the USSR.  The group of countries that Mongolia is most close and could be compared 
with are the less developed Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.  The 
reasons for classifying Mongolia in this group are multiple.  First, the Central Asian 
republics and Mongolia adopted the communist regime in the early 1920s, the first 
countries to follow in this path.  While most other countries in the Baltic region and 
Eastern Europe had only four decades of communist experience, the Central Asia region 
endured the communist regime far longer.  Second, Mongolia and other Central Asian 
republics are post-communist countries with the lowest income levels3, with the 
exception of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.  Average PPP per capita GDP during 1990-
2000 was US$1,448 in Mongolia (the lowest), US$1,462 in Tajikistan, US$2,179 in 
Uzbekistan, and US$2,580 in Kyrgyz Republic.  In Kazakhstan per capita income stood 
on average at US$5,169 and Turkmenistan at US$6,5704 during the same period.  Income 
levels make Mongolia and most Central Asian republics low-income countries and the 
poorest among the group.   
 
Third, in terms of the shock experienced by the demis  of the CMEA system and 
breakdown of the Soviet Union Mongolia is quite similar to these countries.  Mongolia 
depended on large transfers from the Soviet Union.  The Central Asian republics were 
also net recipients within the Soviet Union.  Mongolia’s trade overwhelmingly depended 
on the CMEA arrangements.  There are other similarities as well, including lower level of 
industrialization, lack of market experience, and geo raphical proximity.  However, 
Mongolia’s political and economic transition divergd vastly from that of Central Asia.   
                                                
3 The comparison group does not include China and Vietnam.  





1.1.1 Political Freedom and Democracy 
 
Table 1.1 below provides the political rights and civil liberties freedom indices for 
selected comparative countries.  The scores represent an average of each country’s 
ratings on ‘political rights’ and ‘civil liberties’, and the scores range from 1 (most free) to 
7 (least free).  Mongolia, classified as a least free country in 1989 partially gained 
political freedom in 1990 as a result of the resignation of the politburo and free elections.  
In 1991, it was classified as ‘free’.  However, all countries in the Central Asia region 
performed relatively poorly and some slipped from ‘partially free’ status in the early 
1990s back to ‘not free’ status.  In the 1999–2000 survey, Mongolia was the only 
postcommunist country outside of East Europe to receiv  a rating that entitled it to 
classification as a ‘free’ polity (a score of 2.5 or better).  All of Mongolia’s neighbors 
were designated as ‘partly free’ (scores of 3–5) or ‘n t free’ (scores of 5.5–7).  For 
comparison, the table provides data for the some of the best performers in the post-
communist region, Poland and Estonia, and medium performers such as Russia and 
Ukraine.  
 
Table 1.1 Freedom House Freedom of the World Index, selected countries, 1989-
2010 (1=most free, 7=least free) 
 







  PR CL  Status PR CL  Status PR CL  Status PR CL  Status PR CL  Status 
Mongolia 7 7 NF 4 4 PF 2.2 2.8 F 2.0 3.0 F 2 2.2 F 
Tajikistan 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 6.4 6.4 NF 6.2 6.2 NF 6.0 5.4 NF 
Turkmenistan 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 6.8 6.4 NF 7.0 7.0 NF 7.0 7.0 NF 
Ukraine 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 3.2 3.6 PF 3.2 4.0 PF 3.4 2.8 PF 




Kyrgyzstan 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 4.4 3.2 PF 4.8 4.6 PF 5.4 4.6 PF 
Kazakhstan 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 5.6 4.6 PF 6.0 5.0 NF 6.0 5.0 NF 
Russia 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 3.0 3.8 PF 3.8 4.4 PF 5.7 5.0 PF 
Estonia 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 2.6 2.4 F 1.0 2.0 F 1.0 1.3 F 
Poland 4 3 PF 2 2 F 1.8 2.0 F 1.0 2.0 F 1.0 1.3 F 
China 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 7.0 7.0 NF 7.0 6.4 NF 7.0 6.0 NF 
Source: Freedom House dataset, www.freedomhouse.org 
Notes: Data for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
Estonia for 1989 and 1990 reflect those of the USSR.   
 PR – Political Rights, CL – Civil Liberties, NF – Not Free, PF – Partially Free, F - Free 
 
 
In terms of the freedom of press index which is also produced by the Freedom 
House, Mongolia scored 40 (out 100 points, lower sco es representing greater freedom) 
in 1993 and gradually reduced its score down to 28 in 2000.  In 1999-2000 survey, 
Mongolia ranked seventh out of the 28 countries of the post-communist region.  Only the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States scored better than 
Mongolia.  In contrast, Turkmenistan scored 89 points i  1993 and remained at this level, 
while Kyrgyzstan’s and Russia’s performance deteriorated during this decade, from the 
40s up to 60 (the Freedom House dataset)5.  In 2000, Mongolia became the only post-
communist country rated as a consolidated democracy which is not a candidate for 
accession to the EU and which is located east of the line from the Baltic States to 
Romania (Freedom House in Fritz, 2002, 75).  Mongolia maintained its “free” status 
since 1991, while performance of some countries such as Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Russia has worsened throughout the 2000s.   
 
                                                
5Unfortunately, Freedom House’s more detailed “Nations in Transit” report which provides comprehensive, 
comparative, and multidimensional study of reform in the post-communist states of Europe and Eurasia and 





1.1.2 Macroeconomic Performance 
 
Some literature provides evidence on how Mongolia’s macroeconomic 
performance compares with those of other transition economies (de Melo et al 1996, 
Cheng 2003, Black 2001, World Bank 1996, EBRD 1999, and IMF 2005).  Like many 
other former socialist economies, Mongolia suffered great output losses and 
hyperinflation at the outset of its transition, whic  was followed by subsequent economic 
recovery and gradual price stabilization.  Three consecutive years of economic decline 
were followed by a modest recovery in 1994.  The initial output loss was relatively small 
(IMF 2005).   
 
“Compared with other transition economies, Mongolia’s adjustment process has 
been relatively smooth.While Mongolia’s output recovery was more sluggish than in the 
best- performing countries in Central and Eastern Europe, its growth performance during 
the transition, in general, has been better than those of the Baltic States, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) except for Uzbekistan, and the poorer 
performers of Central and Eastern Europe”6 (Cheng 2003, 13, see Figure 1.1 below). 
While the Baltic States and the CIS suffered a cumulative output loss averaging 38.1 and 
49.6 percent, respectively, until their initial recovery (Havrylyshyn et al 1999), 
Mongolia’s cumulative output decline was about 20 percent.  Mongolia has shown steady 
growth throughout the 2000s, while growth also picked up in almost all countries in the 
region.  Mongolia’s growth rates have been most impressive during 2004-2009, due to 
                                                
6 Havrylyshyn et al (1999) and Cheng (2003) warn that e data need to be interpreted with caution in light 




the surge of world prices of major commodities, which also boosted growth in resource-
rich transition economies such as Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.  Mongolia is 
expected to become one of the world’s fastest growing economies in the next decade due 
to the exploitation of newly found mineral resources (IMF 2011).   
 




Source: World Bank data and IMF World Economic Outlook 
Notes:   
1. CIS – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan 
2. Baltics – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania  
3. CEE (low growth) – Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia FYR, and Romania 
4.CEE (high growth) – Albania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia  
 
Inflation, measured by the average annual percentag change in consumer prices 
(see Table 1.2 below) and peaked at more than 250 percent in 1993, “proved harder to 














compared with other transition economies, performance has been equal or better” (IMF 
2005, 5).  Throughout the 2000s, Mongolia depicted higher inflation than some transition 
countries – particularly since 2005 – mainly due to the high growth rates and 
expansionary fiscal policies.  Inflation is proving to be a continuous challenge under the 
circumstances of an overheated economy owing to the recent mining boom (IMF 2011).  
 
Table 1.2 Inflation, annual average rate, percent (1991-2010) 
 
 







Caucasus 94.8 874.8 2662.3 7514.6 276.4 25.9 8.2 3.8 3.8 1.7 4.6 7.8 
Central Asia 111.8 933.0 1797.2 1049.9 428.4 307.2 56.7 21.3 24.9 19.6 10.5 10.2 
Other CIS 107.4 1202.0 1897.1 937.3 328.4 51.0 26.6 29.7 110.4 62.2 16.3 11.0 
Baltics 186.6 1013.6 202.9 51.9 31.1 21.8 9.4 5.8 2.1 2.6 2.3 4.2 
Poland 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.9 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 10.1 2.8 2.7 
Hungary 34.2 23.0 22.5 18.9 28.3 23.4 18.3 14.2 10.0 9.8 5.9 5.4 
Mongolia 20.2 202.5 268.4 87.6 56.8 46.8 36.6 9.4 7.6 11.6 6.5 11.2 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 
Note: Caucasus includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; Other CIS include Belarus, Moldova, Russia, 
and Ukraine; the Baltics include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
 
Some attribute relative economic performance of Mongolia to the speed and depth 
of reforms (e.g., Cheng 2003, de Melo et al 1996).  Cheng (2003) argues that Mongolia’s 
relatively smooth transition was “probably due to the combined effects of its relatively 
underindustrialized economy prior to the transition, a peaceful and relatively stable social 
and political environment, and sound economic policies” (4).  However, this observation 
explains little about the reasons for successful transition, because “a peaceful and 




and not an independent variable.  The more important question is why Mongolia had 
“sound economic policies”, which needs to be explained.   
 
1.1.3 Economic Reform Measures 
 
Mongolia was a relatively fast reformer in terms of economic policy changes.  
The World Bank and other international financial organizations (e.g., EBRD) undertook 
assessments of the pre-transition period and the process of transition itself.  For instance, 
a study by de Melo et al (1996) analyzed the factors that determine the relative 
performance of transition countries.  Their argument is that the success of economic 
reforms is usually measured by the pace and depth of economic liberalization.  De Melo 
et al construct the so-called Liberalization Index7 that accounts for the governments’ 
efforts in liberalizing the domestic markets and foreign trade and changing the ownership 
structure.   
 
De Melo et al categorize 28 transition countries by their Cumulative 
Liberalization Index (CLI) which is a sum of LIs over the period of 1989-1994 (see 
Appendix 4 for the indices of individual countries).  They divide all countries into four 
categories: advanced performers with CLI of 3 and above, high intermediate reformers 
(2<CLI<3), low intermediate reformers (1.3<CLI<2), and slow reformers with CLI less 
than 1.3 points.  Mongolia (CLI=2.27) is categorized as a high intermediate reformer and 
                                                
7The Liberalization Index (LI) consists of the weighted sum of the three components: internal markets 
(price liberalization and elimination of state trading companies), external markets (trade and foreign 
exchange liberalization), and private sector entry (p ivatization and banking reforms).  The index of 0 





grouped together with the Baltic States and selected ountries in South-Eastern Europe.  
Central Asian countries in the comparison group fall either into low intermediate 
(Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) or slow reformers (the ot r three republics).  Some have 
argued that the CLI is rather flawed, as, firstly, it does not adjust for when the transition 
began, which was a little earlier in Mongolia than in Central Asia.  Secondly, the 
cumulative index in not a measure of reform but rather of the level of cumulated policy, 
therefore it absorbs the results from the 1980s reforms.  Babecky and Campos (2011) find 
that using the World Bank CLI as a measure of reform tends to increase the probability of 
finding a positive and significant effect of reform on growth, compared to the EBRD 
transition index (148), which points to the inflated nature of the index.   
 
EBRD developed its own set of transition indices which measures the level of 
small and large-scale privatization; enterprise reform; price, trade and exchange rate 
liberalization; competition policy; and financial sector and infrastructure reforms.  
Mongolia was not included in the EBRD Transition Reports until 2006.  However, the 
transition indices for Mongolia were backdated for the entire transition period since 1989, 
which provides a reliable source for comparative analysis.  These are cumulative 
indicators that measure the reform efforts in (almost) all postcommunist countries since 
the late 1980s.  The EBRD transition indices – general and sector specific8 – on various 
dimensions range from 1 (little or change from a centrally planned economy) to 4+ 
(standards and performance typical of advanced market economies.)    
                                                
8 There are 6 general indices: 3 indices related to en erprises and 3 to markets and trade.  There are also 
sector specific scores on financial sector, legal reform, infrastructure, and energy sector reforms.  Some of 










Source: EBRD Transition Reports 1994, 1995, and 1996 and transition indicators dataset 
Notes:  -  The columns represent the average scores att ibuted to a particular group of countries for 
progress along the specified dimensions of reforms.  
- Countries at advanced stages include the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia, Croatia, and the three Baltic Republics.   
- Countries at intermediate stages include Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia FYR, Romania, 
Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan 
- Countries at early stages Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan 
 
On most indicators, Mongolia’s performance is better than the countries at early 
stages of reforms.   In terms of price and trade lib ralization, Mongolia’s performance is 
quite similar to the countries at intermediate stages, while it lagged behind these countries 
in terms of privatization and privatization and enterprise restructuring.  Overall, 
Mongolia’s early reform performance is moderate by the EBRD indicators.     
 
Variance in reform indices lessens with time, when the ‘laggards’ finally 
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Eastern European transition countries achieved the 3+ to 4+ indices on most dimensions 
and others also caught up with the reforms.  The average transition index reached 2.8 
(with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus included) in 2000 and 3.0 without these 
three countries (EBRD 2001).   By 2010, most of core reforms were completed with basic 
transitions scores (6 core indicators) reaching 3.4 in Mongolia, 3.1 in Kazakhstan, 3.2 in 
Russia, 1.7 in Turkmenistan, 4.05 in Estonia, and 3.9 in Poland (EBRD 2011).  However, 
Mongolia performs relatively poorly (as most other lower income transition countries) in 
terms of more sophisticated indicators of financial m rkets, infrastructure reforms, energy 
and corporate sector reforms (ibid).   
 
1.1.4 Governance and Institution Building 
 
Other studies have looked at the comparative institutional dimensions of 
transition.  The World Bank governance indicators are widely used to estimate the quality 
of governance.  The six composite indicators – ranging from -2.5 (the worst) to +2.5 (the 
best), with mean zero – are drawn from about 30 existing data sources that report the 
views and experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs, and experts on the quality of various 
aspects of governance.  Mongolia fared relatively well in terms of political stability and 
absence of violence, while still experiencing major problems in the areas of government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of crruption.   
 
The data show that throughout 1996-2010 Mongolia fared better than most 




long way to go to catch up with some advanced performers in Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic region (Figure 1.3).  Black (2001) concludes that Mongolia “has made relatively 
good progress towards reforming its government and institutions and making a transition 
to a market economy, as compared to the poor showing of most Asian members of the 
CIS” (15).  
 
Figure 1.3 All governance indicators, rankings for selected transition countries, 
percentile (averages for 1996-2010) 
 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset, th World Bank  
Notes:  EST – Estonia, POL – Poland, MON – Mongolia, RUS – Russia, KYR – Kyrgyzstan, 
KAZ – Kazakhstan, UZB – Uzbekistan;  
VA – Voice and Accountability, PS – Political Stability/No Violence, GE – Government 
Effectiveness, RQ – Regulatory Quality, RL – Rule of Law, CC – Control of Corruption. 
  
 
The figures below (Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5) show the dynamics of two 
indicators, Voice and Accountability where Mongolia fares better than at least half of the 
countries in the world, and Control of Corruption index where Mongolia’s performance is 























Figure 1.4 Voice and Accountability Index, world rankings of selected transition 




Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset, th World Bank 
 
Both indicators show some decline in rankings, while Control of Corruption 
worsened significantly since a modest ranking of the 57th percentile in 2002 down to the 
23rd percentile in 2009.   The issues of increasing corruption have been noted by many 





























Figure 1.5 Control of Corruption Index, world rankings of selected transition 
countries (in percentile), 1996-2010 
 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset, th World Bank 
 
To sum up the above discussion, there is a broad consensus among the scholars 
and international observers that Mongolia has been r latively successful in transitioning 
to democracy and markets, especially in the initial st ge of transition this dissertation is 
concerned with.  During the later period of transition, the differences among transition 
countries in terms of democratization, liberalization and macroeconomic performance 
became less profound, with the exception of few non-reformers such as Uzbekistan and 
Belarus.  After the initial profound (and unexpected) breakthrough, Mongolia started 
experiencing some difficulties in sustaining and deepening its earlier success.  For 
instance, there is a recurring issue of inflation and worsening of some governance 
indicators.  Although Mongolia’s performance is better han the baseline group of Central 
Asian countries, it should be noted some of these countries are among the worst 






















institutions.  Simultaneously, the gap between Mongolia and other well performing 
transition countries on institutional dimensions hawidened in the past decade or so.  
 
1.1.5 Initial Conditions and Policy Choices 
 
The analysis of relative performance of transition economies centered around two 
groups of factors that potentially explain the diverging economic performance: initial 
conditions and policy choices (e.g., World Bank 1996, EBRD 1999, de Melo et al 2001).   
It was argued that there is a range of structural, political and geographical factors 
that distinguish the transition economies from each other.  “A variety of factors – 
including the degree of industrialization, the geographical orientation of trade, the extent 
of initial macroeconomic imbalances and the legacy of state institutions – determine a 
country’s starting position in the transition” (EBRD 1999, 27).  These factors could 
influence the subsequent development in many ways.  Countries with greater 
macroeconomic imbalances were likely to delay impleenting reforms because of the 
larger adjustment costs.  Governments inheriting weak state institutions and facing a 
legacy of rigorous central planning can find it more difficult to implement reforms.  
Countries close to the European Union can benefit from the process of regional 
integration (ibid).  
De Melo et al (2001) analyze the role of initial conditions and their interaction 
with policy choice and economic performance during the transition period in 28 
countries, which includes Mongolia as well as China a d Vietnam.  A total of 11 




principal components analysis.  The first cluster masures macroeconomic imbalance and 
unfamiliarity with market processes (market distortions), while the second cluster 
represents the level of socialist development and its associated structural distortions 
(overindustrialization) (ibid, 9-10).   
 
Based on these first two principal components, countries are clustered into four 
broad groups.  “Those in the FSU9 all started from deep market distortions, but the Slavic 
countries were far more developed than those in Central Asia, and had more serious 
structural distortions. Countries in CEE10 had lesser market distortions but, being 
relatively more developed, had severe structural distortions” (de Melo et al 2001, 26).  
Mongolia’s situation is similar to that of Central Asia, where it starts with greater market 
distortions but lesser structural distortions due to its lower development.  However, in 
accordance with de Melo et al, Mongolia’s market dis ortions were less severe than in 
Central Asia and close to those in the Baltic States (ibid, figure on page 12).  
 
De Melo et al use the principal factors in multiple regression analysis to 
determine the extent to which they influence the reform process and economic 
performance.  Comparing actual and predicted economic liberalization, “Mongolia and 
the Kyrgyz Republic reformed more rapidly than would have been expected given their 
initial conditions; Bulgaria and Romania reformed more slowly” (ibid, 26).  The paper 
concludes that policy is still the most important factor determining growth differences 
while initial conditions dominate in the inflation equation. Political reform emerged as 
                                                
9 The FSU stands for Former Soviet Union. 




the single most important determinant of the speed and comprehensiveness of economic 
liberalization (ibid, 27).    
Thus, while initial conditions have been important, they are not solely responsible 
for the pattern of reform.  Most of the countries prformed as expected by the initial 
conditions.  However, there are cases where countries w th similar backgrounds 
performed differently.  In Mongolia’s case the reforms were faster than indicated by 
initial conditions.  Search for additional clues to the diverging performance brought the 
analysts to the importance of policy choices and the reform process.  Among the reforms, 
EBRD distinguishes between liberalization and privatization which can be implemented 
relatively quickly, and institution building which takes more time.  Countries have 
typically focused first on liberalization and privatization and institutional reforms 
accelerated only once these reforms had been comprehensively implemented (EBRD 
1999,29).   
The 1999 EBRD report uses the dataset developed by de Melo et al (cited above) 
and largely builds on its analysis.  However, their construction of the principal 
components differs in that overindustrialization is measured by employment rather than 
by GDP shares and pre-transition growth is measured for the five years prior to market 
reforms, i.e., 1985-89 for CEE but 1987-91 for CIS countries.  As a result, overall 
differences in the factor weights are not very large across dimensions.  Rather, the 
different starting positions across the region reflect differences across the whole range of 
dimensions considered in the report.  This result stands in contrast to that of de Melo et 
al, which found stronger differences in factor weights between macroeconomic 




The 1999 EBRD report revealed large differences in patterns of reform both 
across countries and across the various aspects of reform.  Variation in liberalization and 
privatization remains considerable even after the first decade of market-oriented reforms, 
while the differences in progress in institutional reform across the transition economies 
are even greater.  These differences can be attributed partly to differing initial conditions, 
but policy choices have also had a significant impact.  “Regarding the development of 
institutions that support markets and private enterprise, … countries that have achieved 
sustained progress in liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, small-scale 
privatization, and openness to foreign trade and investment have also advanced steadily 
in the development of market institutions.  However, the process of institutional change is 
shaped by many other factors, including the power of the state, legal traditions and 
foreign assistance” (ibid, 38). 
In a recent paper Babecky and Campos (2011) look at the impact of structural 
reforms on economic growth, with emphasis on the experience of the transition 
economies.  Using the data of 46 studies done in this area – including de Melo et al above 
– and employing a meta-regression analysis, they explain the main reasons why a given 
variable (or set of variables) is more or less robustly related to economic growth. They 
found that short-term costs of reforms are non-negligible and their growth effects are 
negative, while in the longer run reforms tend to pr duce positive and substantially larger 
effect on growth (ibid,140).  Thus, countries which mplemented early painful reforms, 





Accounting for the initial conditions and institutions helps to explain the variance 
in growth among different countries.  Using these variables in the model reduces the 
positive and significant effect of the reforms on growth (ibid, 149).  Among the policies 
themselves, Babecky and Campos find that external liberalization – trade and foreign 
exchange liberalization – seem to have the most significant and positive impact on 
growth, while, somewhat surprisingly, internal liberalization (of prices etc) and 
privatization seem to have negative effect on growth, albeit the effect is not robust.  Thus, 
external liberalization plays a dominant role in driving up the long-run effect of structural 
reform on economic growth (ibid, 148).   
Based on the above deliberations, I summarize the factors that were favorable or 
not favorable for Mongolia’s transition to democracy and market economy in the table 
below (Table 1.3).  
Table 1.3 Initial conditions and historical coincidences in Mongolia 
 





1. Degree of centralization and 
plan coverage  
High degree of centralization, universal 
coverage of plan, the most centralized plan 
Negative 
2. Dependence on CMEA 
arrangements – the less 
dependent the more 
successful 
High dependence on CMEA and particularly 
the Soviet Union, probably the highest among 
the group 
Negative 
3. Degree of economic shock  Extreme shock, due to high dependence on the 







4. Level of development, 
industrialization (role of 
agriculture), and income 
Semi-industrialized (lower level of 
industrialization), large share of agriculture, 
agriculture is resilient  
Positive 
5. Citizens’ attitude towards 
the Soviet Union and the 
regime and the legacy of 
pre-communist democracy 
and markets  
Less negative attitude compared to other 
socialist countries, therefore greater 
attachment to the previous regime; no 
experience of living in a democracy or market 
economy 
Negative 
6. Geography – closeness to 
Western Europe and 
prospects of joining the EU 
No pressure to join the EU, geographical 
proximity to China, large authoritarian state 
Negative 
7. Institutional legacies – the 
need to build new political 
and market institutions, 
some starting with a clean 
slate which could be easier, 
more recent history of 
markets 
No recent history of markets, market 
institutions absent; but no need to build a 
national state from scratch (there was a 
sovereign state with homogenous population) 
The former 
is negative 
and the latter 
is positive 
HISTORICAL COINCIDENCES (DEVELOPMENTS) 
8. Strong political 
breakthrough – exceptional 
leaders 
Radical reformist Prime Minister (although 
from the old communist party) and coalition 
government during 1990-1992, which gave the 
reformist opposition greater power 
Positive 
9. Political reforms precede 
economic reforms – 
weakening of the traditional 
bastions of power: the 
ministries and SOEs, few 
new interest groups are 
formed to make claims 
Political reforms took place swiftly, early first 
free elections in 1990, proportional 
representation in the legislature, weak special 
interest groups (little evidence of devolution 
of power to the lower level bureaucrats and 
SOEs), weak ministerial lobbies; no prominent 
conservative ruler (potential autocrat) 
Positive 
Source: Author’s judgment, the factors in the first column are taken from World Bank 1996 and EBRD 
1999 and summarized.  
 
Mongolia’s relative performance is puzzling given that most initial conditions – 




surprisingly, Mongolia’s pattern of growth and recovery resembles more those in the 
high-growth Central and Eastern European countries, which are very different from 
Mongolia in terms of geography and history, and have had a somewhat shorter-lived 
experience under a Soviet-style system of central planning” (Cheng 2003, 14).  Cheng 
points out a relatively rudimentary economic structure which likely to have reduced the 
complexity of the market reforms, facilitating price liberalization and early enterprise 
restructuring.  However, he argues that the early adoption of appropriate adjustment 
policies and market-based reforms is likely to have be n instrumental in promoting 
sustainable growth (ibid).   
Thus, the agreement is that initial structural and historical conditions were not 
favorable for Mongolia and its relative success is largely due to the reform policies.  
However, why such policies were adopted is not studied in the literature which deals with 
Mongolia’s economic transition.  
 
1.2. Political Democratization: Literature Review 
 
This and the next sections will review the existing literature on describing and 
explaining the democratic and economic changes.   
1.2.1 Structural Factors of Democratization 
 
Political events in Mongolia drew some interest from the international scholarly 




such as the long duration and extent of sovietization, absence of democratic tradition, 
lowest standard of living, highest economic dependence, and severe geographic isolation, 
as well as greater initial political continuity (of the old party) did not afford any 
conditions that were favorable for democratic transition.  At the same time, there were a 
handful of structural or cultural preconditions that might have favored democratization in 
Mongolia, such its small size in terms of population, near-universal literacy, ethnic 
homogeneity, and “individualism” fostered by their country’s hardy nomadic traditions.  
However, Fish argues that these preconditions do not add up to a convincing explanation 
(127-128).  So, the puzzle is “How did a country that “should have” ended up at the level 
of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in terms of democratic achievement find its way into 
company with Hungary and Poland?” (129).   
 
 Fish attempts to explain the democratization process in the light of the events and 
processes – and the main political players and their convictions – in 1990-1992 that 
determined the subsequent institutional framework that proved to be critical for 
deepening the democratic transition.  Faced with power challenge from the democratic 
opposition, the old party leadership – much divided an  after significant in-party battle – 
decided to accommodate the opposition and call for first-ever open national elections in 
July 1990.  Moreover, Fish notes that even after thy won the first elections, they decided 
to invite some of the opposition leaders into the government.  This latter decision, Fish 
argues, was, at least partially, motivated by the desire of the ruling party to share the 
blame with the democratic opposition for the country’s economic distress.  Likewise, the 




first democratic constitution in 1992.  However, it still remains somewhat mystical that 
the transition process was quick but smooth and accommodating.  The desire to share 
blame could not possibly explain such a process.  One way to shed some light would 
perhaps be to look into the underlying ethnic and cultural aspects of the revolutionary 
change.    
 
Fish (1998) further argues that the constitution, which “emerged out of a process 
of genuine deliberation and struggle within the national legislature”, was a product of 
compromise and therefore considered highly legitimate (ibid, 130).  The constitution 
determined the new democratic regime type which is defined as “a semi-presidential 
regime in which parliament dominates” (ibid, 133).  It was not a pure parliamentary 
system as in Slovakia or presidentialism as in Kazakhstan.  The proposed regime 
distributed power among the state organs in such a way that neither the president (head of 
the state with more ceremonial duties) nor the prime minister (chief executive) would 
have absolute executive power, a system closest to the ne in Poland (ibid, 132-133).  
Broad consensus still exists on the merits of the new political order.  However, again, the 
adoption of the new state structure begs the question why such a form was chosen for the 
constitution.   
 
Other crucial institutions such as the election law proved to be less durable, with 
rules changing with every election.  However, in Fish’s opinion, the provision that only 
political parties – and not movements, associations, r enterprises – could nominate 




political parties in Mongolia were remarkably strong and the country developed a mature 
political party system relatively early (ibid, 135-136).  This argument was made by Fish 
following the successful consolidation of the previously disarrayed democratic forces in 
1995-1996 which led to their victory in the 1996 parliamentary elections.  However, the 
subsequent developments within the parties showed that the trend was not sustained (e.g., 
Fritz 2002).  Another important feature of the Monglian politics was its vibrant civil 
society.  Fish in particular mentions two types – free media and women’s associations – 
that contributed to strengthening the democratic transition (ibid, 136-137).    
 
In a related article, Fish advances his argument about Mongolia’s uniqueness in 
terms of democratic reforms (Fish 2001).  Fish attempts to explain Mongolia’s 
comparative success from a different angle.  Previously, Fish explored the factors that 
facilitated Mongolia’s democratization.  In this article – argument of which is consistent 
with the previous one – Fish looks at the lack of the factors that inhibit democratization.  
Fish argues that some of the factors that are widely regarded as blessings for democracy 
upon closer, comparative examination in the Central Asian context turn out to be curses.  
Unlike most of the Central Asian countries and several other former Soviet Republics 
elsewhere, Mongolia lacked these factors which may have contributed to the 
democratization process in this country.    
 
It is often considered that natural endowment brings about economic growth and 
therefore helps democracy.  However, Fish argues that “Natural superabundance often 




sales of natural resources.  This game corrupts the political class and distorts state 
apparatus.  These pathologies are evident … virtually everywhere in the postcommunist 
and developing worlds”, with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Azerbaijan being 
cases to the point (Fish 2001, 325).  Fish further argues that Mongolia’s “relatively 
modest natural endowment – or at least the modest mans that it has to exploit such an 
endowment as it has – has spared the country the enormous impediment to political 
development and to democratization in particular” (ibid).  However, it should be noted 
that some countries which opted for a totalitarian egime – e.g., Belarus – have very 
modest means, which goes against Fish’s argument. Moreover, the mining sector has 
been a major economic sector and Mongolia possesses larg  deposits of various minerals 
and recently embarked on two world-scale mining projects.  However, the fact that 
Mongolia operated only one big copper mine – Erdenet – jointly with the Russians at the 
time democratization was taking root and information about the resource endowment was 
limited, perhaps supports Fish’s argument.  Along this argument, the newly found 
mineral wealth could pose a threat to democracy and integrity of state institutions in 
Mongolia.   
 
Fish continues that others factors, such as geostrategic importance and existence 
of an external patronage also may seem important for advancing democracy in 
postcommunist countries.  Countries of geopolitical mportance usually receive great 
attention from external players who have certain agenda and if they happen to be 
democratic, then this creates advantages for promoting democracy in the recipient 




financial and military backing from various external powers – be it Russia or Western 
countries.  Nazarbayev and Lukashenko were supported by Russia while Akayev in 
Kyrgyzstan, Eltsin in Russia, and Berisha in Albania were supported by the U.S. and 
other Western countries.  What is more, in each case ertain leaders received massive and 
often unconditional external patronage.  And the very same leaders, although many of 
them championed the initial democratic opening and national independence, subsequently 
led the country to greater authoritarianism.   
 
Fish argues that, on the other hand, Mongolia did not have great geopolitical 
importance and none of the Mongolia’s leaders enjoyed great external patronage.  
However, it should be noted that foreign powers did attach some significance to 
Mongolia due to its geopolitical location and perhaps it enjoyed at least as much attention 
as some of the Central Asian republics, e.g., the Kyrgyz Republic.  Moreover, Japan and 
the United States – the two largest bilateral donors – played a significant role in 
providing financial and technical assistance, thus promoting, at least indirectly if not 
more aggressively, democratic values.  Pomfret (2000) argues that “Mongolia’s apparent 
liberalism and geostrategic location made it a favored aid recipient, especially when aid is 
measured on a per capita basis” (151).  But, consistent with Fish’s argument, no 
executive was singled out as a champion of democratic t nsformation, as it happened in 
Central Asia, thus allowing him to rise to greater authoritarianism.  Support was provided 





Two more factors, or, rather, lack of thereof – existence of a national father figure 
and concentration of central power – are considered by Fish to be of vital importance for 
relatively successful democratic transition in Monglia.  Most of Central Asian countries 
did have a father figure – Karimov, Niyazov, and Nazarbayev, to name a few – which, 
combined with superpresidentialism proved to be catastrophic (Fish 2001, 329-330).  
Some of the “founding fathers” were democrats in addition to nationalists, e.g., Eltsin, 
Akayev, or Ter Petrosian in Armenia, while others were not the champions of the 
democratic change.  However, even many of the initially democratic leaders slipped back 
to authoritarianism.  This was at least partially conditioned by the political system of 
power concentration in these countries.  Evidence suggests that “democratization has 
been more robust in countries with constitutions that disperse central power” (ibid, 331).   
 
In contrast with the countries described above, Mongolia did not have a single 
dominant leader at the time of regime change.  “No single person was regarded at the 
nation’s founder of independence and/or democracy” (ibid, 330).  Fish argues that the old 
communist leadership was relatively liberal and collegial – this was probably true by the 
end of the regime, but it was not certainly the case when the country was ruled by 
Choibalsan and Tsedenbal from the 1940s to the mid-1980s – while the new democratic 
forces were dispersed and often in conflict with each other.    “Mongolia had a number of 
forceful politicians of many political stripes at the time of transition, but no one politician 
who enjoyed such matchless prestige” (ibid, 335).  Moreover, Mongolia’s choice of 
semipresidential system with strong parliament has been a boon to democracy.  The 




independence against possible efforts on the part of China or Russia to compromise the 
country’s sovereignty.  It was argued that dispersing power among many players – 
president and the parliament – would be less threatening for the sovereignty.  Perhaps, the 
recent history of a single ruler who was considered to be a puppet of the Soviet Union 
was still fresh in people’s minds.  
 
To sum up, Fish’s arguments concerning the absence of foreign patronage and 
lack of natural resources as contributing structural factors to the democratization of 
Mongolia seem to be less convincing, because the country did have resources and is 
largely dependent on foreign aid.  Moreover, some of the authoritarian regimes emerged 
despite lack of mineral wealth.  At the same time, his arguments about the absence of a 
father figure and constitutional design seem to be more compelling and backed by strong 
regional evidence.   
 
Fritz (2002) called Mongolia one of “the most remarkable outliers in the post-
communist universe as regards democratization” (75).  In this article, Fritz analyzes why 
democratization occurred in Mongolia by applying various theoretical approaches.  She 
argues that the so-called “preconditions school” which emphasizes the importance of 
some preexisting conditions that favor democratic transition clearly does not explain the 
outlier case of Mongolia.  Along the lines of Fish, e argues that almost all 
preconditions, including economic, geographical, and historical, were unfavorable in 
Mongolia.  Fritz also explores what she calls “the mode of transition school”.  




democracy.  First, the old and new elites could agree on certain rules of the game and 
extend mutual guarantees; these are called ‘pacted transitions’ and are auspicious for 
establishing and consolidating democracy.  Some of the Southern Europe and Latin 
America followed this path.  The other approach – te so-called ‘regime-controlled 
transition’ – is based on evidence from Eastern Europe.  The idea is that the shift of 
power occurs as a result of the first free elections a d the new elites more decisively 
break up with the old regime, thus leading to democratization (Fritz 2002, 79).   
 
Fritz argues that while Poland and Hungary opted for negotiated or pacted 
transitions, Mongolia’s transition, like that of Bulgaria, has been more regime controlled, 
although there were some elements of a pact.  The old ruling elite – the Mongolian 
People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) – took the lead an  called for free elections, thus 
allowing the new opposition to contest them openly.  It is generally assumed that pacted 
transitions are more advantageous for democratic trnsition and subsequent 
consolidation, while elite-controlled transitions are less promising (ibid).  Nonetheless, 
Mongolia was successful both in transitioning to democracy and later consolidating it.  
Therefore, in Fritz’s view, these theoretical approaches offer little in explaining the 
events in Mongolia.   
 
Fritz’s own central argument is one of “dependent democracy” meaning that 
Mongolia always was highly dependent on external forces, be it the Soviet Union or 
Western multinational and bilateral organizations.  Fritz distinguishes several stages in 




important role, although the conjuncture of circumstances and events differed at every 
stage.  First, the very breakdown of the old regime was triggered from outside.  Mass 
protests designed after those in Eastern Europe and the failure of the Soviet Union forced 
the old elite to step down and agree to the first democratic changes.  By 1988 – with 
withdrawal of Soviet troops and decline in financial assistance – it was becoming clear 
that the Soviet Union would not back up the communist regime.  The process was 
peaceful as both sides were committed to non-violence.  The “founding elections” of 
1990 led to re-installment of the old party in power, but with democratic means.  The 
opposition was far weaker and poorly organized, therefore no meaningful ‘pact’ could be 
reached between the old elite and the opposition.  Thus, the very first phase was 
dominated by the old elite.   
 
Fritz further argues that at the second stage – approval of the new constitution and 
first economic reforms – the MPRP decided to co-opt s me of the leaders of the 
opposition, mostly for two reasons: they wanted to use the knowledge of the younger 
generation and share the responsibility for the looming economic crisis (ibid, 87-88).  
The constitution which was broadly debated among the political parties established a new 
political order with a rather weak presidency.  Fritz maintains that from a comparative 
perspective, this was auspicious for further democratization and argues that adoption of a 
semi-presidential system with a strong legislature was probably influenced by the 
political systems that were being adopted in Eastern Europe.  At the time of this 
important political change in Mongolia, the Soviet Union still existed.  After the collapse 




second stage was also dominated by the old rulers which allowed extensive participation 
from the opposition.  Although external factors undoubtedly were important in the 
political changes that took place in Mongolia in the early 1990s, they could not explain 
why Mongolia decided to follow the Eastern European xample rather than the (former) 
Soviet Union, as the latter was much closer – historically, geographically, etc. – to 
Mongolia.  I believe, in addition to the external fctors, domestic interplay of forces and 
beliefs of the main political players also were important in building the new political 
system.  
 
The third stage, when a conservative wing within the MPRP came to power, 
danger to democracy persisted.  However, Fritz argues that the conservative MPRP 
government was kept on track by the influence of donors who were providing financial 
assistance which was essential for dealing with the economic shock the country was 
experiencing following withdrawal of the Soviet aid.  Mongolia became one of the “most 
heavily donored countries in the world” (ibid, 90).  Foreign players not only advised on 
economic issues but also promoted – although not officially – democratic changes.  
Consistent with Fritz’s argument, foreign aid increas d substantially since 1993 and 
equaled on average to about 19 percent of GDP until the end of the 1990s.  However, as it 
will be shown later, the more conservative MPRP government was guided by domestic 
political constraints rather than pressures from the IFIs, often pursuing policies contrary 
to what was advised.  It is true that foreign party foundations – namely the American 
International Republican Institute and the German Ko rad Adenauer Foundation – were 




contest effectively the 1996 parliamentary elections.  However, this again does not 
explain why the MPRP government was committed to democratic changes during its rule 
in 1992-1996.   
 
In general, Fritz’s argument that a conjuncture of various factors where foreign 
actors played an important role facilitated democrati  transition and consolidation in 
Mongolia is substantiated by facts and processes, although it seems to understate the 
interaction of domestic actors and their viewpoints and strategies.   
 
A subsequent article by Fritz (2008) analyzes the democratization process beyond 
the initial successful transition.  Moreover, unlike the previous article it provides some 
detail about the political events that took place in 1990-2007, including the approval of 
the constitution in 1992, victory of the democratic opposition in 1996, and building up of 
social and governance issues such as corruption in the period since 1997.  Fritz argues 
that Mongolia democratized “against all odds” and elective democracy became the “only 
game in town” by the end of the 1990s.  Mongolia benefited from “a benign combination 
of supporting factors as well as the absence of obstacles that have plagued potential 
transitions elsewhere” (Fritz 2008, 766).   
 
However, Fritz justly notes that the economic and social development has been 
more volatile during this period than in established d mocracies, which put some 
pressure on the stability of political institutions.  Swings in the outcomes of parliamentary 




related emergence of new external players created fertile ground for corruption and rent 
seeking thus putting pressure on governance structures.  “When a democratic system fails 
to deliver benefits in terms of good governance and shared prosperity, rather than 
concentrating wealth and creating corruption, it may (over time) also chip away at its 
minimalist foundation” (ibid, 780).  Fritz concludes with a well-grounded argument that 
“democracy in Mongolia endures, but it is troubled” (ibid, 766).  
 
In a ‘lightweight’ article, Persson (2010) compares the Mongolia’s democratic 
transition to that of Turkmenistan.  The two countries shared several common features at 
the time of the Soviet collapse; yet, Mongolia became a democracy while Turkmenistan 
became one of the most authoritarian regimes in the world.  Persson consults some of the 
theories concerning the process of democratic transi io  from communism.  McFaul 
(2001)argued that the outcome of transition in post-communist countries – democratic or 
otherwise – depended on the balance of power within the new states. An unequal 
distribution of power assured a more stable transition, and the dominant ideology decided 
the outcome: democracy or dictatorship.  This approach explains why Turkmenistan with 
its absent opposition and civil society fell into an uthoritarian path (Persson 2010, 53).  
Mongolia, however, with its more vibrant civil society and stronger but not dominant 
opposition is an exception among post-communist state .  An equal distribution 
(relatively speaking) of political power Mongolia resulted in peaceful transition to 





  Persson brings in other structural factors such as Mongolia already being a 
sovereign state before the transition and lack (at least at the time of early transition) of 
natural resources.  These are the two contrasting factors that distinguish it from 
Turkmenistan, where President Niyazov relied on extreme personality cult in order to 
gain legitimacy in a newly independent state and where natural resources such as gas 
were abundant at the onset of transition, making Turkmenistan’s resource constraint less 
severe compared to Mongolia (ibid, 53-54).    
 
1.2.2 Anthropological Views 
 
 
Alternative explanations of the democratic changes w re provided by two 
anthropologists, Sabloff and Kaplonski.  Sabloff (200 ) offers an anthropological/cultural 
explanation of the rise of democracy in Mongolia.  She argues that Mongolia’s 
democratization defies the popular arguments about the importance of political culture, 
the latter being defined in terms of the traditions f Western Christianity.  In particular, 
she argues that the prevalent Mongolian culture of liberal democracy, rather than being 
imposed by the Western influence, in fact has its roots in the country’s history and 
Genghis Khan’s rule in the 13th century.  Genghis Khan is credited with establishing the 
rule of law, participatory government such as the mass assembly the Great Khural and 
Council of Wise Men, introducing meritocracy, and tolerating freedom of religion.  
Moreover, pastoral nomadism naturally encourages personal freedom (Sabloff 2002, 27-





Sabloff’s argument is based on the results of a survey she conducted among the 
residents of the capital city and Khovd aimag (province) in the far west.  She found that 
Genghis Khan’s governance and ‘democratic’ principles had a strong legacy for the 
current generation of Mongolians.  The democratic principles – personal freedom, 
representative government, rule of law, and equality – the respondents consider as 
important characteristics of a democratic society coincided with the values of liberal 
democracy (defined by Diamond).  Moreover, modern Mongolians credit Genghis Khan 
with instituting similar principles to the ones they think are high priority in a modern 
democracy (ibid, 32).  The study implies that “Monglians’ political culture comes not 
only from the West but also from Mongolians’ collective memory of their great leader, 
Genghis Khan” (ibid, 33).  However, the study is les than convincing in the sense that 
the survey results may reflect not a strong legacy of Genghis Khan’s democratic political 
values but rather the rising nationalistic sentiments among the modern Mongolians which 
associate some positive qualities with their great kh n.  Alternatively, they could be an 
indication of wider historical and cultural values that generally favor more or less 
egalitarian principles.   
 
Another anthropologist Kaplonski (2004) examines the issues of social memory, 
culture and identity in the context of the collapse of socialist rule in Mongolia.  
Kaplonski’s account of the democratization process is focused around the issue of history 
and how its interpretations had influenced the course of democratic transition.  Kaplonski 
argues that although there was great distortion and suppression of historical truth during 




that were (both intentionally and unintentionally) propagated and preserved during these 
years due to the reminiscent nature of the official h storical texts (Kaplonski 2004, 11-
14).   
 
For instance, images and interpretations of Chinggis Khaan11 and other main 
historical figures as well as some events of the communist past (e.g., the period of 
collectivization of the 1950s) were such that, in spite of following the Soviets and official 
party, they often contained evocative transcripts that helped to sustain an “underground” 
unofficial interpretation.  These interpretations helped to forge social memories which 
had major influence on the national identity – who is the “true mongol” – and later helped 
to formulate the framework for the democratic changes in the early 1990s.  Some 
portions of the book described the critical events i  January-March 1990 from a social 
memory, historical truth and national identity perspective (Chapter 3).  The subsequent 
analysis (Chapter 4) focuses on the symbols of democracy as derived from the 
perceptions about the historical past and national identity as framed by the collective 
social memory.  Although an interesting study, I find t less relevant to the subject matter 
of my research.  
1.2.3 Democratic Consolidation 
 
Several more recent studies focused on the next stage of democratic development, 
consolidation of democracy.  In a comparative study of six East Asian countries – Japan, 
                                                
11 There are different ways of spelling the name of the Mongolian emperor.  The conventional way used for 
long time in the West is Genghis Khan.  However, the more recent studies and particularly of those whoare 
engaged in the field work in Mongolia often started spelling the emperor’s name as Chinggis Khaan which 
reflects the original Mongolian pronunciation.  I refer to the name as it was spelled in the original works I 




South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, andMongolia – Shin and Wells (2005) 
attempt to determine to what extent these democracies are consolidated.  They employ 
Linz and Stepan’s (1996) definition of democratic consolidation being a state where 
democracy “is the only game in town”.  Citizens must not only accept democracy but also 
reject its alternatives.  They also must “show a preference for democracy both as a regime 
and as a set of political practices (Shin and Wells 2005, 89-90).  Using the East Asia 
Barometer data compiled annually by conducting face-to-face interviews with randomly 
selected voters, the authors find that all six countries demonstrate high level of support 
for democracy, with at least three quarters preferring democracy as a regime (ibid, 94-
95).  In terms of the democratic processes, 72 percent of Mongolian voters express 
attachment to a non-democratic practice of censorship, while other types of practices – 
judicial dependence or disrespect for law – did not receive majority approval.  
 
The bottom-line conclusion Shin and Wells make is that democracy is fully 
consolidated in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, as their voters support both democratic regime 
and democratic practices, while Thailand, the Philipp nes, and Mongolia are still not yet 
consolidated democracies with some preference for non-democratic practices (ibid, 98).  
 
Analyzing the same data, Ganbat (2004) reaches similar conclusions.  In his 
views, Mongolian democracy is “far from being a cons lidated democracy” (32).  A 
substantial majority of the citizenry is not capable of understanding the liberal or 
substantive notion of democracy and an equally large majority is not yet fully detached 




the national and local governments as corrupt, yet this majority remains, by and large, 
satisfied with the way the current regime performs as a democracy.  Such uncritical 
citizen views of Mongolian democracy coupled with a large dose of optimism about its 
future can create “an equilibrium in which a low level of public demand for democracy 
accompanies an equally low level of elite supply of it.  Such a low-level democratic 
equilibrium may pose Mongolia’s biggest obstacle to its further development into a 
complete democracy” (ibid).   
 
A State of Democracy Desk Study conducted by Landman et al (2005) apparently 
uses different set of criteria in assessing democracy.  The methodology was developed by 
the International Institute of for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and 
organized around the so-called four pillars of (i) citizenship, law, and rights; (ii) 
representative and accountable government; (iii) civ l society and popular participation; 
and (iv) democracy beyond the state (Landman et al 2005, 2).  The authors conclude that 
Mongolia appears to have had consolidated democracy over the past 15 years, with the 
constitutional design and vibrant civil society contributing to the process.  It is argued 
that there is no serious threat to the democratic governance, although its long-term 
prospects remain precarious (ibid, 3).  Among the problems, issues of corruption, poverty 
and unemployment, as well as due process in justice and right to health and other social 
and economic rights were seen as areas of concern.   
 
The general agreement among those who studied the democratization process is 




the face of multiple challenges.  There could be multiple explanations which boil down to 
the external forces (presence of pro-democratic players and absence of other patrons), 
unique historical coincidences (absence of a nationl father figure and lack of natural 
resources), existence of pseudo-democratic traditions, and constitutional design which 
provides balance of power.   
 
The consensus on the success of democratic transition is almost undivided.  
However, views diverge as to whether Mongolia’s democracy was able to consolidate 
itself.  Some argue that democracy was consolidated nd has become “the only game in 
town” while others argued that it is far from consolidation.  There are some warning sings 
of increased corruption and deteriorated governance.  In any event, the Mongolian 
democracy is likely to face more trials in the future.  
 
1.3. Economic Reforms and Privatization: Literature Review 
 
  
The first detailed account of the economic situation in Mongolia at the end the 
1980s and early 1990s was provided by the IMF, World Bank, and ADB.  Mongolia 
expressed its interest in membership in major IFIs at the end of 1990 and these 
institutions conducted comprehensive macroeconomic surveys of the country.  The 
reports produced (or endorsed) by these organizations – ADB 1992, Milne et al 1991, 
Yusuf and Burki 1992, World Bank 1992 – are useful by both providing extensive 
economic data and analysis of the economy, including the general macroeconomic 




economy, and macroeconomic policies such as fiscal and financial sector policies.  The 
early reports provide some information on the state of affairs at the very end of the 
communist era, and then initial liberalization and stabilization efforts of the government, 
and its ambitious privatization program.     
 
1.3.1 Macroeconomic Studies 
 
The ADB country study (1992) is the most comprehensive one.  It contains 
description and analysis of the economic and social development under the central plan.  
In particular, the study focuses on the national income aggregates, the structure of the 
economy, fiscal and financial sectors, saving and investment trends, and employment and 
wages, and the foreign economic relations.  The book pr vides more detailed analysis of 
various economic sectors, including agriculture, industry, transport, energy, social 
infrastructure, natural resource and environment.  Overall, this is a country study from a 
macroeconomic and sectoral perspective which is supported by comprehensive economic 
data.  It covers the late communist period and the initiation of reform in 1991.   
 
Milne et al (1991), Yusuf and Burki (1992), and World Bank (1992) reports are 
similar in structure and coverage of issues, althoug  more concise.  These first reviews of 
the Mongolian economy describe the economic pressur that surfaced in 1991 and the 
various measures undertaken by the government sincethen.  After an introductory 




and policy issues – price liberalization, stabilization efforts, and launch of privatization – 
and the country’s development prospects in the medium term.  
 
The emerging picture from the above country studies is that for most of its 70 
years of independence, Mongolia has been a centrally pl nned economy with extremely 
close ties with the Soviet Union.  During this period, the country has been gradually 
transformed from a rural nomadic economy to a semi-industrialized economy, a producer 
of semi-processed raw materials.  Industrialization was made possible by large 
investments and loans from the Soviet Union.  These loans amounted to a third of the 
state budget and quarter of GDP, permitting Mongolia to run large fiscal and external 
deficits and to enjoy relatively high rates of growth. 
 
However, things have changed dramatically in 1990 when the democratic changes 
occurred in the country, and the Soviet system collapsed leading to two major shocks for 
the economy: (i) termination of aid and (ii) disruption of foreign trade with 
dismantlement of CMEA.  The new coalition government formed in 1990 pledged to 
“construct a market-oriented economy.”  The governme t has embarked upon a 
comprehensive program of reforms covering the entir spectrum of economic policies, 
including privatization, price liberalization, and the establishment of new institutions for 
macroeconomic management.  Mongolia has moved swiftly to remove its old central 
planning system, and new institutions and policy instruments were being put in place.  
The reports approve of the government efforts in liberalization and stabilization, but often 





Later reports of the IFIs – e.g., Country Economic Memoranda, Country 
Assistance Strategies, and regular economic updates – are also informative as they follow 
the macroeconomic performance, assess the macroeconomic policies, and provide policy 
recommendations as the country continued on its reform path.  
 
1.3.2 Economic Reform Agenda 
 
Other sources on economic performance and economic reforms are scarce.  
Several scholars did some analysis of the reforms.  Denizer and Gelb (1992) analyze the 
very first reform attempts of the Mongolian government with a focus on privatization.  
They argue that the Mongolian circumstances make it difficult to determine whether the 
country would adopt fast or slow reforms.  It is often argued that an appropriate 
institutional and organizational capacity is needed for successful reforms; Mongolia 
lacked those severely.  Furthermore, a political transition to democracy makes market 
reforms irreversible.  Mongolia’s radical political reforms – as well as independence and 
nationalistic sentiments – did indeed help economic reforms.  However, it was argued 
that excessive politicization in the face of highly contested elections and social cost of 
reforms also contributed to the slow down of the reform process.   
 
Another factor that was considered important in making a successful transition is 
the existence of a clear model for the transformed society, such as Western Europe for the 




Mongolia, according to Denizer and Gelb, lacked such a model due to its geographical 
isolation and historical ties.  Lastly, severe macroe onomic imbalances or shocks force 
swift corrective measures but the choice between th liberalization and tightening of 
control was still unclear.  The authors argue that beyond a certain point, it would be 
difficult to sustain orderly reform process and governments may opt for wartime like 
control measures.  Mongolia faced rapidly shrinking resource envelope due to the fall of 
the Soviet Union and dismantlement of CMEA trade regime.  This induced fast reforms, 
but the success of reforms depended on the external aid that could help to preserve the 
capacity to implement market reforms.  All in all, Denizer and Gelb maintain that 
Mongolia’s situation was not very conducive to fast economic reforms and depended to a 
large extent on a fine balance of multiple factors.  A  the IFIs reports, the authors remain 
inconclusive as to the scope and success of reforms.  
 
Boone (1994) argues that the story of Mongolian economic reforms is one of “a 
clash between the urgent need to respond to the external shock and a lack of consensus 
concerning the speed and direction of reform” which made garnering support for major 
policy reforms more difficult, thus making transition more challenging (330-331).  For 
instance, price liberalization efforts of the central government were offset by price 
controls installed by local governments and line agncies.  A similar argument was raised 
by Murrell et al (1996) in the their analysis of price reforms in the early 1990s when 
rapid price liberalization was proclaimed but implemented only gradually.  They argued 
that the reforms fell short of their initial rhetoric because of the great influence “by the 




economic processes that were embedded in these policies”, rather than lack of 
commitment (176).  This goes contrary to the wide-spread argument that Mongolia 
adopted a shock therapy in its economic reforms.  
 
Despite the lack of consensus, substantial macroeconomic liberalization has taken 
place. Boone (1994) attributes it to legal and political reform that permitted traders to 
engage in economic activities thus leading to rapid growth of the private sector.  In 
particular, in the first nine months after the new government was formed in October 
1991, some 27 laws aimed at transition to a market economy were passed by the 
parliament.  “In effect, macroeconomic liberalization has been led by microeconomic 
change” (Boone 1994, 332).   
 
Another argument justly raised by Boone is that the conditionalities imposed by 
the IMF and others on Mongolia played a mixed role in promoting reforms, as these 
organizations initially opposed both rapid privatizon and rapid economic reforms.  
Boone claims that they were inexperienced with rapid reforms and preferred cautious, 
gradual program.  Their position contributed to undermining the political position of the 
reformers at the time. “During spring of 1991 an unusual situation arose where the 
[government was] advocating more rapid and comprehensiv  reforms than the IMF” 
(ibid, 354).  However, IMF’s position changed shortly afterwards.  Yet, when the IMF 
started advocating quick reforms, the more conservative wing within the government and 




government and the IMF, which was implemented only partially.  Thus, as Boone argues, 
the reforms which began with (a rhetoric of) a “big ang” turned out to be gradual.   
 
Nixson and Walters (2000) argue the opposite.  They maintain that “too much 
weight has been given to the orthodox policy prescriptions of the IMF [and others] that 
represent the “Washington Consensus” and that too lit le attention has been paid to those 
who have argued for a more balanced … approach to economic reform” (60).  The 
successive governments since 1990 have chosen to implement ‘shock therapy’ rather than 
pursue a more carefully sequenced and gradualist reform process, which has “deepened 
the crisis brought about by the external shocks and have further harmed the well being of 
the population” (ibid).  Nixson and Walters argue that this choice has been made by the 
governments themselves even though it was perhaps influenced by foreign advisers and 
with external technical assistance.  However, a more ca eful analysis of the actual reform 
steps provided in Boone (1994) and Murrell (various years) indicates that the reforms 
were far from shock therapy and these authors seem to fall for the rhetoric rather than 
actual reform measures.   
 
A critical outlook on the economic developments in Mongolia is advanced further 
in Rossabi (2005).  Rossabi provides an account of the political economy of Mongolia 
from the late communist period until the early 2000s and deal with the peaceful transition 
in the early 1990s, significance of foreign aid, and market reforms in 1990-1997, among 





The chapter on the peaceful transition in l990 provides significant detail about the 
events in the late 1989 and early 1990, until after th  first free election of July 1990, and 
could mostly be regarded as an accurate account of the events.  The chapter describes the 
mass protests in Ulaanbaatar in early 1990 and how t ey led to the resignation of the 
politburo and ultimately the first competitive elections of July 1990.  However, the main 
argument of the book is that, in spite of some political gains, the overall political and 
economic transition has gone wrong due to ill-fit policies.  The country ended up being 
desperately poor, with high level of corruption, lower level of literacy, poorer health 
services, depleted culture and environmental degradation.   
 
Rossabi briefly touches upon the “three pillars” of shock therapy implemented in 
Mongolia.  Rapid privatization was ripe for exploitat on and abuse due to the lack of 
market experience and the economically and politically well-connected gained from it 
enormously while the general public benefited little if at all.  Rapid price liberalization 
led to high inflation and bankruptcy of many enterprises.  Cutting the budget and the 
public sector in general weakened the state and undermined education, health, and social 
welfare.  The economy was in free fall, which was the result of the policies pursued by 
the successive governments at the advice and pressure of international financial 
institutions (Rossabi 2005, 51-54).   
 
One of the main themes of the book is the role played by the IFIs that contributed 
to such poor state of affairs in the country.  The IFIs saw Mongolia as a “laboratory in 




the historical and cultural heritage of the country when they were imposing the “cookie 
cutter” policies of democracy and free markets on a country which never had experienced 
these, and therefore it is not surprising that things have gone wrong.  The book therefore 
depicts a rather gloomy picture.   
 
In spite of some the valuable details, the book is flawed in several ways.  
Rossabi’s book does not tell a balanced story. Humphrey (2007) argues that “many of 
these problems do characterize Mongolia today, but the issue is how they should be 
explained and whether there are not also positive features of the present scene to balance 
the picture” (203).  Yet, for Rossabi’s critics, Mongolia is a success story because it “has 
become a stable and open democracy, and its different post-socialist governments, far 
from slavishly following foreign precepts, have purs ed varied policies of their own 
devising” (ibid, 204). 
 
Furthermore, it relies on too few sources – most notably opinions of only four 
individuals who played a marginal role in democratic politics and policy making in 
Mongolia – who “are not highly popular nor influential nor especially unique” (Campi 
2007, 841).  The author claims to have met and interviewed an impressive number of the 
leaders and players on both sides.  However, the book d es not make reference to their 
account of the events and ideas.  
 
Nonetheless, in spite of the above flaws, the book was praised for providing well 




(Humphrey 2007).  Moreover, he provides a valuable ov rview of the challenges 
confronting Mongolia and pointed out to the dangers inherent in the system of 
international aid and development agencies (Kaplonski 2005).     
 
1.3.3 Private Sector Development and Privatization 
 
The issue of privatization attracted justified interest from the IFIs and scholars.  
Hahm (1993) analyzes the structure and profile of the private sector.  There are two ways 
to develop the private sector: by encouraging new private entities and by privatizing 
state-owned ones.  The new legal framework in Mongolia allowed the former but the 
latter has been the main instrument to develop a market economy.  Hahm (1993) argues 
that unlike in China, “privatization serves as the main vehicle for Mongolia’s conversion 
to a market economy and the main instrument for private sector development” (13).   
 
Hahm argues that, although the scope and level of privatization were impressive, 
however, there remained numerous “kinks” in the system that serve as impediments to 
private sector development (ibid, 17).  For instance, after the initial phase of 
privatization, small enterprises and agricultural entities continued to work as before the 
privatization due to government intervention (e.g., state procurement quotas and other 
operational constraints) and the smallness of the domestic market.  As for large 
enterprises, many of the newly privatized enterprises remained under the state control 
until 1993 (ibid, 21).  Though formally abolished, the historic pervasiveness of state 




agricultural sector.  State regulation of foreign trade through export licenses gave 
preferential treatment to state exports.  State control of imports was even more pervasive 
given the lack of diversified foreign market and isolated position.  The paper concluded 
that “a positive early response from the private sector greatly depends on how well these 
issues are addressed and on how well the authorities nurture the environment for private 
sector development” (ibid, 44).  It seems the privatized enterprises in Mongolia continued 
to operate, at least initially, under the old institutional arrangements that governed the 
economy during the centralized planning.  
 
Korsun and Murrell (1995) described the progress of privatization – “one of the 
fastest privatization programs in the reforming socialist countries” (486) – by placing it in 
the context of sweeping program of political and economic reforms implemented since 
1990.  They point out to several peculiarities of Mongolia’s privatization program which 
make it a “fascinating example of post-socialist refo ms” (ibid, 473).  First, the speed of 
privatization is puzzling given that it occurred in the face of opposition from the ruling 
party.  Second, fast privatization occurred amid slower liberalization and stabilization, the 
other two major fronts of economic reforms.  Third, t occurred in the absence of any 
proper institutions to support property rights (ibid).    
 
Korsun and Murrell’s discussion of the genesis of the privatization program is 
accurate.  They describe in detail how a few economists developed a framework that was 
gleaned from the developments in Hungary and Russia; the legal framework which was 




large privatization.  They focus on the main political players, those who promoted the 
privatization and those who opposed it.  They argue that several factors help to 
understand why things changed so quickly.  The general d sire for change was strong 
throughout the society and the radical reformers took advantage of it by demonstrating 
“unexpected organizational capabilities” (ibid, 486).  Naturally, there were opponents.  
However, they were not cohesive enough to stop it, while the agricultural opposition – 
the strongest conservative group – was neutralized by allowing them to decide on the 
methods of privatization of the rural cooperatives.   
 
The aftermath of privatization and particularly post-privatization performance of 
enterprises, their efficiency and governance issues ar  analyzed in several articles by 
Anderson, Korsun, and Murrell (1999 and 2003) and Aerson, Lee, and Murrell (2000).  
Nixson and Walters (2000, 2006) focus on the impact of privatization on income 
distribution and poverty.   
 
Anderson et al (1999) note that mass privatization in Mongolia, unlike other 
reform efforts which were implemented haltingly or were slowed down considerably, was 
a program “where progress kept remarkably close to a very ambitious timetable” (218).  
On the supply side, privatization was highly centralized with the Privatization 
Commission deciding on most issues and enterprises having little discretion as to the 
valuation of assets, plan and method of privatization.  On the demand side, privatization 
was decentralized, with every citizen being entitled o shares to be purchased with 




managers and employees were given a weak preference over outsiders.  They could buy 
the shares of their enterprise at the initial nominal price of 100 per share.  However, this 
preferential treatment was not exploited by employees because the average market price 
per share turned out to be 76.  Therefore, employees waited for their enterprises to be 
auctioned and then proceeded to buy the shares.  Anderson et al (1999) argue that the 
outcome was that insiders became the new owners, however, not through the preferential 
treatment but through the market mechanism, which per aps was one distinguishing 
feature of the Mongolian case vis-à-vis some other transition countries where substantial 
explicit privileges were given to the insiders.  
 
The article examines ownership and governance issues of privatized enterprises in 
terms of exit (owners selling their shares) and voice (owners active in corporate 
activities).  The authors found mixed results which are not easily interpretable.  Core 
owners were in place in a significant number of enterprises.  Some ownership changes 
did occur as a result of opening the secondary cash market for shares (in August 1995, 
the data is collected 10 months later) which led to more concentrated ownership.  In 
terms of governance, “many enterprises do follow the company law and do not deviate 
from elementary criteria of good governance, even though mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the law are virtually non-existent” (Anderson et al 1999, 235).  However, 
it was found that governance mechanisms are of poorer quality in outsider-dominated 
enterprises, “suggesting that exit of small shareholders is necessary before voice can gain 





In an earlier article Korsun and Murrell (1995) made an interesting observation: 
Mongolia’s privatization has gone ahead of any meaningful institutional reform and 
could “provide a test of the theories that emphasize the effect of ownership patterns on 
the development of sound corporate and government policy” (473).  In a follow up 
article, Anderson et al (2000) use the survey data of half of privatized enterprises to 
determine whether privatization amidst weak institutions led to positive results and how 
ownership patterns affect performance of enterprises.   
 
Overall, about 34 percent of shares were owned by insiders, 45 percent by 
outsiders, and 20 percent by the state (Anderson et al 2000, 530).  Interestingly, they 
found majority state-owned enterprises depicted better performance on average than 
those owned by others.  The explanation could be that the insiders did not have efficiency 
as their primary goal while outsiders were dispersed and could not exert much control 
over the management.  Better performance of state enterprises is counterintuitive because 
state ownership is not expected to induce good performance.  However, Anderson et al 
(2000) suggest that the government pressured the state enterprises to perform due to its 
severe resource constraint and commitment given to the IFIs (545).  Most importantly, 
the authors found that – under the conditions of virtual absence of formal market 
institutions – competition played a critical role in inducing good performance.  The 
quantitative effect of competition in Mongolia’s ent rprise sector was larger than those 





Thus Anderson et al (2000) discovered that, in the shorter run, privatization per se 
did not produce higher efficiency in Mongolia.  On the contrary, residual state ownership 
generated better performance.  However, the paper concludes this does not mean that 
privatization process was irrelevant.  Opening of the secondary market (cash as opposed 
to vouchers) and further development of market institutions make it entirely plausible that 
the effects of private ownership would begin to show.  Thus, one could conclude that the 
efficiency objectives of privatization were not met while the government may have been 
more successful in achieving the political objectives of limiting the role of the state and 
building the rudiments of the private sector, which perhaps was indeed the case in 
Mongolia.  
 
Stubbs et al (2000) argue that while small enterprise sale went well, large-scale 
privatization was not wholly effective, with state retaining a measure of ownership in 45 
percent of privatized enterprises which left private investors fragmented and ineffectual 
minority holders.  Moreover, share market was sluggish to develop due to the lack of 
knowledge among the populace about the workings of a capital market and confusion 
with the voucher scheme.  Insufficient attention has been given to publicity and education 
of potential shareholders.  Secondary (cash) market was very slow to be developed.  The 
“sum effect of these was to leave the programme substantially discredited in the public 
view.  With hindsight, and with only modest foresight, it can be seen that the programme 





Nixson and Walters (2006) hold similar views.  Their paper focuses on the 
distributional impacts of privatization that have attr cted relatively little attention in 
international experience.  They argue that privatization in Mongolia “was undertaken 
without very much analysis or even consideration of the likely short- or long-term impact 
on poverty and income distribution” (1557) and the results are troubling, as in some 
transition countries.  It should be noted that the analytical link between privatization and 
income distribution is not clear.  Nixson and Walters argue that the shock therapy 
approach to economic reform was broadly encouraged by the IMF and was consistent 
with the interests of key sections of the Mongolian nomenklatura.  They argue that fast 
privatization, which was not in the interests of the great majority of Mongolians, was 
launched at least partially because “new vested interes s were generated, based on the 
new (or potential) distribution of productive asset” (ibid, 1558).However, as it will be 
shown later, no strong interest groups were present in Mongolia’s privatization, with the 
possible exception of agricultural collectives, which was traditionally a well-organized 
group.  No new vested interests emerged in the process of privatization, as privatization 
methods and low level of corruption indicate.  
 
In order to investigate to what extent and in what w ys privatization contributed 
to increases in poverty and inequality in Mongolia, the paper concentrates on the 
privatization of livestock, residential property, and SMEs and draws on the primary data 
collected in four surveys – two participatory and two sample surveys – carried out in 
2003.  The authors note that privatization took place in the context of severe 




part of the rise in poverty and inequality.  However, the evidence – mostly qualitative – 
points “unambiguously toward privatization having a significant effect with respect to 
rising inequality and, although perhaps to a lesser extent, to rising poverty” (1575).    
 
Privatization of livestock contributed to a widening of wealth inequality because 
assets were distributed only to members of the cooperatives and distribution between 
members was inequitable with several groups, for example, female-headed households, 
losing out.  The transfer at no cost of urban apartments to sitting tenants was extremely 
inequitable given that the large majority of Mongolians failed to benefit at all, leading to 
a massive inequality in wealth and subsequent income flows.  With respect to the 
privatization of SMEs, the initial distribution of shares was markedly unequal with 
insiders gaining at the expense of outsiders.  Thisargument is contrary to Anderson et al 
(1999) cited earlier who claim that insiders gained access to their own enterprises through 
market mechanisms rather than intentional privileges.  Nixson et al are probably correct 
in their view that privatization led to increased income inequality.  However, one should 
expect some increase in income inequality under the market economy, as the previous 
system was highly egalitarian (at least nominally), to large degree at the expense of 
efficiency.   
 
To sum up, there are diverging views about the economic reforms in Mongolia 
which could be divided into two camps.  Those who support radical and fast reforms 
consider Mongolia to be a relative success because it embarked on early reforms and 




program was the centerpiece of these reforms and in terms of speed, comprehensiveness, 
and clarity of design the program constitutes an example for the poorer, smaller transition 
countries” (Anderson et al 1999, 215). They attribute the relative economic performance 
of Mongolia – moderate, by transition country standrds, output decline and moderate 
inflation – to the liberalization and stabilization as well as early privatization efforts of 
the government.  Moreover, some argued that the reforms often fell short of the initial 
ambitious design and could have been even faster.   
 
There is also a group of scholars who support a more gradual approach to 
transition and consider the Mongolian experience flawed in many ways.  They argue that 
the government’s reform design was dictated by the IMF and others and government had 
to follow their orders due to severe resource constraint.  The reform policies were ill fit 
for Mongolia and left out many important aspects of development such as institution 
building, income distribution and poverty.  Although the positive outlook about 
Mongolia’s reforms is dominant in the literature, many of the arguments raised by the 
proponents of gradual reforms are valid and well documented.  
 
1.4. Research Methodology and Significance of Research 
 
Thus far I have reported the facts and summarized other people’s interpretations of 
the political and economic transition in Mongolia.  This section explains why the research 
topic was selected, why certain methods were employed, and what the contribution of 





- Why broad issues of political and economic transition? 
 
Literature on Mongolia’s political and economic transition is scarce.  At the same 
time the country’s experience is unique and to some ext nt unexpected.  Mongolia does 
not follow the general pattern of political and economic development in transition 
countries.  To be more accurate, it does not fit into the expected pattern of development 
which was common for countries with similar background, most notably in Central Asia.  
Rather, its development – both political and economic – is similar to that in poorer 
performing countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.   
 
Well known studies in comparative political and economic performance such as 
Åslund (2007), EBRD’s Transition Reports of various years until 2006 (when Mongolia 
became member of the EBRD), and the World Bank study of the privatization process 
and outcomes (World Bank 1997a) do not include Mongolia.  The few sources that do 
analyze Mongolia provide little detail about the processes and events and interplay of 
politics and economics.  Therefore, focusing on broader issues of political and economic 
transformation seems to be justified, as they are still not well documented and studied.  
 
- Why the period of 1987-1996? 
 
I cover briefly the late communist period because it not only provides some 




analysis of the late 1980s provides some background for applying some theoretical 
approaches to the democratization process in Mongolia.  Furthermore, they provide 
critical information about the groups and special interests that were formed in the late 
communist period and their relative power that ultimately influenced the choice of 
privatization methods and the process itself.  This information will be used when I 
attempt to apply political economy theories to privatization in Mongolia.   
 
The period of 1990-1996 seems to be fascinating because it laid foundation for 
the new political and economic regime.  The first two years of transition (1990-1992) are 
unique in the sense that unexpected and unprecedented political and economic 
developments occurred in the country.  Political institutional arrangements were also 
quite unique.  The years of 1992-1996 are also special because the old party regained full 
power but democratic and market changes were not revers d.  The first six years of 
transition are also a period which sets out Mongolia from the rest of Central Asia and 
many CIS countries.  Reforms and performance of transition countries in the following 
periods, especially in the economy, evened out to some extent when ultimately most of 
the transition countries advanced their reform agenda.   
 
Why stop at 1996?  This is dictated by the need to limit the scope of my research.  
Since the issues I deal with in this dissertation are broad and it aims to provide a detailed 
account of what happened in a given country during a given period of time, I opted to 
limit my research to end at the parliamentary elections of 1996.  Many have argued that 




economy in Mongolia.  It was the year when the political power was peacefully 
transferred to the democratic opposition, for the first time in the past 70 something years.  
The end of 1995 also saw the completion of the first large enterprise privatization 
scheme, the cornerstone of early reform efforts.  The subsequent period saw deepening of 
democracy and economic reforms, which marked a new stage in Mongolia’s 
development.   
 
- Why mostly descriptive methods and what are the data sources?  
 
The existing literature, with the possible exception of Rossabi (2005) and Korsun 
and Murrell (1995) lacks detail about the processes that took place in the early transition 
period, the agents and their beliefs, and interplay of political and economic developments 
in Mongolia.  In order to fill in this gap, one needs to focus on the particulars, the fine 
points of the events and processes, which grants the use of descriptive methods.   
 
Moreover, I take advantage of my personal experience of living through these 
dramatic changes and access to the primary data, especially those available in the local 
language.  I base my description and analysis mostly n the primary data: government 
documents (from the national and government archives), party documents (documents of 
three major political parties from the party archives), statistical data (National Statistics 
Office, Ministry of Finance, and international financial organizations), newspaper 
materials (two main daily newspapers “Ardyn Erkh” and “Unen”, from January 1990 to 




with a wide range of participants who represent various periods of time, different political 
parties, and differing perspectives, most of them were the key decision makers of their 
time, please see Appendix 7 for the full list of peo l  interviewed), memoirs of the 
participants of the events (the last communist leader J. Batmunkh, former Prime Minister 
D. Sodnom, first President P. Ochirbat, member of the parliament D. Lundeejantsan, and 
the leader of the Mongolian Democratic Union S. Amarsanaa), and public opinion polls.  
I believe the use of primary data would be a main strength of this research. 
 
There are two issues with using interview data.  First, nterviews were conducted 
about 20 years after the events that are described in the dissertation.  The recollections of 
events and processes may have been ‘filtered’ throug  the test of time so that the 
interviewee is trying to sell a certain point rather than recollect events in an impartial 
manner.  Second, many of the interviewees are people whom I know personally, which 
can be positive or negative.  On a positive side, th  interviewees may feel more 
comfortable sharing some facts and ideas due to greater trust in the interviewer.  On the 
negative side, depending on the type of prior encouter, personal relation may also 
prevent the interviewee from sharing some facts thulimiting the full potential of the 
interview.   
 
I tried to address the issues related to the validity of the interview data by several 
means.  First, I selected people who represent diverging views (due to their political 
affiliation or position) so that facts and events are crosschecked by both sides of the 




data against the contemporary newspaper accounts of the events and processes.  I present 
those data that do not contradict the evidence provided by other sources, including 
detailed memoirs of the participants.  My personal observation of the interviewees was 
that all of them had a genuine interest in providing as accurate information as possible.  I 
believe my personal relation with many of these intrviewees – positive yet distant 
enough – helped to get qualitative information otherwise not available. 
 
- What is the analytical part? 
 
In addition to the structural and historical explanations, Chapters 3 and 4 of the 
dissertation provide analytical parts which attempt to employ alternative analytical 
frameworks to explaining the processes and outcomes in Mongolia.  The attempts to 
analyze the democratic transition in Mongolia rarely apply any theoretical approach, 
partially because Mongolia’s case does not fit intothe common pattern of democratic 
transition and consolidation.  The explanations provided (e.g., Fish 1998 and 2002, and 
Fritz 2002 and 2008) focus on structural and historical factors that were present or absent 
in Mongolia that allowed such a transition.  I believe actor-centric political economy 
approaches provide a useful tool in explaining political as well as economic policy 
choices and outcomes.  These theories are able to cap ure the interplay of political and 
economic factors and actors that ultimately determined the policy choices.   
 
Likewise, the existing account of Mongolia’s economic reforms does not explain 




Mongolia in the early 1990s and why certain methods f privatization were preferred 
over others.  Voucher privatization is by no means u ique to Mongolia.  However, the 
particular methods employed differed from those used in other countries such as Russia 
or the Czech Republic.  I attempt to employ the same political economy arguments in 
explaining the privatization process which sets out Mongolia apart from other 
postcommunist countries and also explains the sectoral differences that were evident in 
Mongolia.   
 
Thus, the substantive chapters of the dissertation weave together new descriptive 
contribution with use of alternative analytic frameworks.  The dissertation wraps up with 
the summarizing and categorizing the external, structu al, historical, political, 
institutional, andcultural, factors that potentially contributed to the relative success of 
Mongolia’s transition to democracy and the market economy. In the last chapter I identify 
those factors – among the many presented earlier – that are critical, in the sense that they 
were among the sufficient conditions for successful transition, and explain why I believe 
them to have that role.  I also briefly then explain why the others are less important.  In 
doing so, I attempt to provide a comparative perspectiv  by referring to the examples of 
Central Asia and occasionally other countries in the region, which were provided earlier 
in the dissertation. 
 





The existing literature on Mongolia’s democratization contains a few academic 
articles and a couple of books by political scientists and anthropologists on democratic 
transition and consolidation, and a handful of brief surveys of selected political events 
that took place in the country.  They lack significant detail about the processes.  
Likewise, literature on economic reforms predominantly focuses on the macroeconomic 
performance and sectoral analysis.  They rarely touch upon the process of decision 
making and the interplay of politics and economics.  Analysis of privatization is more 
comprehensive and systematic, but also in most cases l cks detail and does not explain 
why certain privatization methods were chosen.   
 
The dissertation provides a detailed description of the political and economic 
events that took place in Mongolia in the early 1990s, thus filling in the gap that exists in 
the current literature.  I believe this will be the main strength of this empirical research.  
In doing so, I emphasize the main players – political parties, international organizations, 
and individuals – and their beliefs, constraints faced, and how these factors influenced 
adoption of certain policies.  I provide a political economy analysis of democratic and 
economic reforms.  My story of the political and economic events differs from Rossabi’s 
(the most detailed account thus far) because it relies on primary sources and more 
balanced in terms of arguments and sources.  It also supports the general argument of 
successful political and economic transition.  The dissertation unearths a lot of qualitative 
primary data that have not been used in the academic literature before.  This I believe 
allows for a more nuanced and subtle explanation of the events and takes into account the 





Lastly, the dissertation aims at providing some analytic l insight into explaining 
the processes and outcomes in Mongolia by using altern ive analytical frameworks.  I 
also attempt to identify the key factors that ultimately determined the path of democratic 
political and market economic change taken by Mongolia.  In doing so, I make some 
contrastswith the historical, cultural, political and institutional circumstances of the 






Chapter 2 Central Plan and Its Demise in Mongolia 
 
 
Mongolia differs from other former socialist countries in that it had a very long 
history of political, economic and fiscal dependence on the Soviet Union.   After three 
centuries of Chinese colonization, Mongolia entered the twentieth century as an 
impoverished country with animal husbandry being almost the sole source of livelihood 
for its nomadic population.  There were over 700 Buddhist monasteries in the country 
that housed 100,000 monks, almost one sixth of the entire population and a third of male 
population (Baabar 2006).  The Soviet influence wasestablished as early as in the 1920s, 
after Mongolia gained its independence from the Qing Empire.  Some initiatives to 
develop capitalism during the 1920s failed to blossom because the pro-Soviet faction 
within the Mongolian People’s Party (soon renamed the Mongolian People’s 
Revolutionary Party or MPRP) – the only political prty at the time which led the popular 
uprising against the Qing Empire – consolidated their power (with the support of the 
Soviets) and successfully eliminated all opposition.  
 
At the onset of the regime, the party denounced traditional values such as religion 
and the traditional way of life.  The regime declared that building a modern socialist 
economy based on industrial development, technological advancement, and continuously 
improving the wellbeing of its subjects was the main goal of the regime.  Up until the 
death of Bodgo Jibzundamba VIII, the last monarch and religious leader of the country, 
in 1924, Mongolia was a theocratic monarchy.  The 1924 congress of the MPRP was 




destiny was to realize the “the historical necessity of the non-capitalist road… for once 
backward countries … with the support of the world’s first Soviet socialist state.”  Thus, 
the cause of non-capitalist development became the party’s general line (Okladnikov et 
al. 1983, 344).   
 
Following this major political decision, a new regime with public ownership of all 
means of production and limited civil liberties was imposed on the people of Mongolia 
and became a full-functioning communist12 system by the late 1940s.  The Constitution 
of 1940 and particularly of 1960 not only made the goal of building a new society 
explicit, but also identified the means by which such advancement should occur: by 
developing a comprehensive central planning system and reliance on the ‘fraternal’ 
assistance of the Soviet Union.   
 
The regime was not accepted easily because the new path of development denied 
the old traditions and the religion.  This was especially true for the Buddhist monks – 
about a third of the male population of the country at the onset of the regime served in the 
Buddhist temples – whose interests were affected th most.  The famous mass uprising of 
the monks in 1937 led by the prominent religious leaders and the subsequent brutal 
suppression was a landmark victory for the new regim .  It also showed that the regime 
was backed up militarily and financially by the Soviet Union, which made the future 
uprisings improbable.  After successfully eliminatig all “domestic enemies” – political 
                                                
12 The terms ‘socialist’ and ‘communist’ will be used interchangeably in the dissertation, meaning the 




opposition, religious leaders, noblemen and the lik – by the end of the 1940s, the 
communist party13 launched its comprehensive economic development pla .  
 
The first five-year plan was introduced in 1948 marking the beginning of new era 
of central planning.  The last landmark event in imposing socialism was forceful creation 
of agricultural collectives – the so-called negdels – via cruel nationalization of livestock 
in 1959.  The year of 1960 when the new (third) Constitution was adopted marked the 
year the country stepped into socialism with full state ownership and central planning 
under way.  Two decades later, the ideologues of the regime would declare that the 
“general line of the party, centered on the country’s b passing capitalism in its advance 
to socialism has triumphed.  Mongolia accomplished the historic transition from 
feudalism to socialism by taking a non-capitalist pa h of development” (Balkhaajav, et al. 
1981, 67). 
 
During the first two five-year plans (1948-1957) and the subsequent three-year 
plan (1958-1960)14, Mongolia grew from a monoculture livestock-breeding country into 
an agrarian-industrial economy.  However, full-scale industrialization began during the 
1960s, with the emphasis on shifting from agro-based activities to manufacturing finished 
goods and the development of mining, infrastructure, transport and communications.  In 
the 1960s about one third of all investment was alloc ted to industry, a sevenfold increase 
over the previous decade (ADB 1992, 10-11).  During the third five-year plan (1961-
1965), a new industrial complex was built in Darkhan in the northern part of the country, 
                                                
13 The term ‘communist party’ refers to the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party.  The MPRP was the 
ruling communist party from 1921 to 1990 and beyond.  




which turned it into the second largest city in the country.  This period also saw 
significant expansion of crop farming by utilizing virgin land.  The most significant event 
during these five years was Mongolia’s joining the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) in 1962.  This led to establishment of joint ventures and credits 
coming from not only the Soviet Union but also other Eastern European countries.  
Mongolia’s national plans were now coordinated with those of the USSR and CMEA 
members. 
 
The fourth five-year plan (1966-1970) aimed at strengthening and expanding the 
production and technological base by further industrialization.  A new industrial complex 
was built in the city of Choibalsan in the eastern part of the country.  Major power 
generation projects were undertaken during this period.  The 1970s saw great expansion 
of the light industry, such as leather, carpet, food processing, etc.  During the second half 
of the 1970 the planners became focused on productivity and quality, when the economy 
started showing the signs of growing inefficiency.  The next decade, the 1980s, was 
marked by the expansion of agricultural farms and completion of a major mining project, 
the joint USSR-Mongolia copper and molybdenum plant Erdenet in 1981.  Erdenet 
became the third largest city.  During the last five-year plan (1986-1990) the focus shifted 
from physical production targets to policy reforms, which will be discussed in more detail 
later.  
 
Although one could argue that the alternative, market and private ownership-




Mongolia, one also should acknowledge that several decades of communist rule 
witnessed a major transformation from an extremely backward, semi-feudal, pastoral 
economy to a semi-industrialized economy, uninterrupted rates of growth and modest but 
rising living standards of the people.  The country was transformed not only 
economically but also socially, with free and universal education and health care system, 
and comprehensive social welfare programs.    
 
2.1. The Classical Central Plan and Its Institutional Characteristics 
 
 
Mongolia adopted the economic planning system in 1948, the second country in 
the world after the Soviet Union to follow this path.  After successfully nationalizing all 
means of production by the end of 1950s, the Constitution of 1960 officially declared that 
the country had entered a new stage in building socialism, namely “the final stage in 
building the material and technological base of socialism.”  It also declared that the 
economic development of Mongolia would be “determined and directed by a single state 
national economic plan in the interests of the constant growth and development of 
productive forces of the country” (article 15, Constitution of the Mongolian People’s 
Republic, 1960).  The plan covered all economic activities and included targets for 
production, investment, prices, employment, wages, and living standards of the people.  
Targets were not only specified in numeric terms, but also each year they provided for an 





The economy of Mongolia was an example of the “classical central plan”, unlike 
in Hungary or Poland where significant private sector and market activities took place.  
In addition to the state ownership of all means of pr duction, there are several key 
institutional characteristics of the central plan that were fully developed in Mongolia: 
centralized planning of all economic activities; the command-and control system; and 
implicit taxation and fixed prices.  
 
Centralized planning was developed on a short (annul), medium (five-year), and 
long-term (10-15 years) basis.  During its long communist history, Mongolia has gone 
through a few long-term plans, such as the “General Scheme of the Development and 
Location of the Mongolian People’s Republic Productive Forces up to 1990”produced in 
the late 1970s and eight five-year plans.  The state created a multitude of organizations 
that were involved in this process.   Planning originated within the party, which produced 
the guidelines for economic and social development for the five-year period 
corresponding to the party congress.  Based on these guidelines, the State Planning 
Commission (SPC) drafted the five-year and annual natio al economic plans, which were 
approved by the People’s Great Khural (the national elected assembly) and became law.  
The Council of Ministers (the cabinet) directed and implemented national planning 
through the SPC and through the Ministry of Finance (MoF).  Planning for different 
sectors of the economy was conducted by relevant miistries and state commissions; 





The plan was comprehensive.  National economic plans included general 
development goals as well as specific targets and quotas for agriculture, capital 
construction and investment, domestic and foreign trade, industry, labor resources and 
wages, retail sales and services, telecommunications and transportation.  They contained 
targets not only for all major economic and social indicators such as output, investment, 
prices, wage level, but also detailed targets for eve y individual enterprise.  Plans were 
prepared in physical terms, because they were meant to transform the physical reality 
rather than the financial value.  The comprehensive plan had to ensure that it reached 
every industry and enterprise and extended to the remotest corners of society.  The state 
wanted to make sure that it controlled all means of pr duction so that no productive force 
would be diverted from the legitimate objective set by the communist party. 
 
Once approved, the plan was mandatory, not indicative.  Unlike forecast or 
projection, the plan extended beyond the speculative sphere in which it was first 
conceived.  “A plan is based on a commitment by the subject to act in a predetermined, 
coordinated manner, in order to achieve a set goal.  A plan is thus an instrument that a 
conscious individual uses as a means of controlling reality through predetermined action” 
(Dembinski, 1991).  Approved plans had a force of law and the system of command and 
control was designed to ensure that planned targets were met by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and other agencies.  The state plan was published in the Mongolian press; plan 
fulfillment was also reported in the press, although some irregularity and inconsistency 
existed (Sanders 1987).  Thus, the plan manifested the conscious, targeted direction of 





2.1.1 Command-and-Control System 
 
In order to achieve the economic and social development outcomes outlined in the 
plans and widely publicized, the state had to create an elaborate enforcement mechanism.  
The planners could not simply rely on the goodwill and selfless devotion to the national 
interest on the part of their subordinate officials nd managers (Rutland 1985).  An 
extensive command-and-control system was established in order to address the principal-
agent issues.  
 
In the absence of market competition and market incentive structure, the 
command-and-control system needed to compensate for these and ensure that the plan 
was delivered.  The system had to be able to control the behavior of agents at the level of 
whole organizations as well as individuals.  The main problem consisted in the 
information intensity of monitoring and evaluating the performance of enterprise 
management (as making the plan in the first place) nd therefore required an extremely 
complex system to tackle the information asymmetry and vast potential for shirking and 
fraud.  
 
The command-and-control system put in place in Mongolia to deal with this issue 
was immense and consisted of numerous rules and players.  The banking system with a 
single state bank established in 1954 closely monitored all transactions of all government 




(1954) outlined the major functions of the bank to m nitor the implementation of the 
physical and financial plan, profitability of the SOEs, and tax collection through the 
accounts established with the bank.  Since 1956, cash tr nsactions among the enterprises 
outside the state banking system were prohibited, thus ensuring total control over the 
flow of money (Rinchin 1996, 338).   
 
Together with the launch of plan, in 1952 a new function of financial control was 
assigned to the State Control and Inspection Commission (SCIC).  The functions of the 
Commission included, among others, “monitoring the registration and maintenance of 
state property, implementation of planned targets prtaining to the quality of the goods 
and services, labor productivity, and cost reduction; … inspecting usage of budget funds” 
(Resolution 103 of the Council of the Ministers, April 4, 1952).   The Commission 
conducted frequent site visits to enterprises and conducted a detailed inspection of all 
accounts, material assets, manufactured products, their quantity and quality, petty cash, 
etc.  The resolution specifically mentioned the penalties for the breach of plan, such as 
monetary penalties, administrative measures including emotion or resignation from the 
government post, and even imprisonment. Selected reports of misbehavior and measures 
taken were publicized in an attempt to demonstrate he seriousness of the enforcement. 
 
Until the mid-1960s the SCIC was a hierarchical organization supported by the 
Prosecutor’s office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  It’s main goal was to “detect the 
enemies of the state”, i.e., those who sabotaged the plan, by employing harsh measures.  




dissolved) approved a law which imposed capital punishment for those individuals who 
used public – state or cooperative – property for personal gain or allowed such misuse.  
As C. Bavuu (a former senior controller) recalls, the law – “the cruel Jambaldorj law”, 
named after the person who initiated it – was enforced until the mid-1950s in the severe 
cases of misuse (interview with Bavuu).  Likewise, kipping work, producing low-quality 
goods, or giving misinformation about the number of livestock or public assets were 
considered as criminal acts and punished accordingly.   All these acts were considered as 
acts of sabotaging the regime.    
 
However, this approach started changing since the mid-1960s.  Bavuu noted that 
the system was not successful in detecting poor performance because it was highly 
centralized with no powerful branches in the localities, little outreach, and poor local 
staff.  It mostly relied on administrative tools and was costly for the government 
(interview with Bavuu).  In 1964 the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the 
MPRP decided to combine the state control system with the party control.  By the 
decision of the politburo the First Deputy Chair of the MPRP Control Commission15 was 
appointed simultaneously the Chair of the SCIC.  This was the period when the party 
started playing a leading role in all decision-making.  The youth organization and trade 
unions were also involved in the control function.  The strategy of the communist party 
was to bring NGOs and the general public into the control functions.  Public control units 
– so-called control groups and control posts – mushroomed as a result of a countrywide 
campaign.  These units were established (almost) in every enterprise and government 
agency.  The public control units were led by the party leaders of individual enterprises 
                                                




and organizations.  In 1972, there were 960 public control units with some 11,000 
members. 
 
The grassroots control system led by the party cells was further consolidated into 
the so-called “people’s control system” in 1972 by the decision of the 3rd Plenary 
Meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP and later legalized.  The main objective 
of creating the “people’s” system – which referred to the participatory nature of the 
control – was to engage as much as possible the workers of SOEs in the control process.  
The workers were the insiders within the SOEs who had intimate information about the 
production process and behavior of the directors of SOEs as well as fellow workers.  
With proper incentives, the workers could help the regime to solve the principal-agent 
issues.  
 
The Law on People’s Control and Inspection was approved in 1981.  The law and 
the entire experiment with devolution of control were designed after the similar 
experiment in the Soviet Union.  Bavuu, as the deputy chairman of the SCIC, worked on 
the draft law in 1979-1980.  As part of drafting the law, he studied similar laws passed in 
the Soviet Union and East Germany, which were built on he same principles.  In 1980 he 
accompanied Minister of Justice B. Chimid to Moscow t  familiarize himself with the 
Soviet system of state control.  Bavuu recalls thate delegation was quite impressed 
with the system when visited the central control organs in Moscow.  However, he was 
disappointed to see the incompetence and carelessness of local organs in Kabardino-




system did not work well in the regions, which cast some doubt in the success of the new 
system (interview with Bavuu).   
 
The newly legalized structure was based on the same principles of uniting the 
state, party, and public control elements.  This new d centralized nature of the control 
was meant to address the growing information asymmetry issues.  Those appointed to the 
people’s control groups exercised substantial power against the management of the SOE 
to criticize the production and decision-making processes and point to and report on the 
cases of misuse of resources, waste and inefficiency.  The units conducted inspections on 
a regular basis and inspections covered such important issues as fulfillment of the plan by 
SOEs, use of inputs and technology, incidences of waste and inefficiency, and behavior 
of the directors of SOEs.  The local control units could undertake their own measures or 
inform the upper instances about the problems.  Therenamed People’s Control and 
Inspection Commission (PCIC), in turn, now inspected not only selected SOEs and 
agencies but also monitored the performance of the control units.  
 
Members of the people’s control units were elected by the open vote of all 
workers and appointed for two years.  Usually those elected were the best performing 
workers and were considered by the party leaders as reli ble. By the mid-1980s, the 
number of those involved in the control system reach d 40,000 – over 80 percent of 
which worked in the control units – making it the largest state/public organization in the 





The ultimate goal of the state control was to improve efficiency, increase rate of 
return on public investment, promote economy in the us  of resources, detect any 
production gaps and ways to overcome it by identifyi g reserves that could be used for 
improving productivity.  Inspections aimed not only at detecting bad performers but also 
revealing best practice and expanding it to other enterprises and farms.  They also 
suggested changes to the existing norms and normatives on the unit consumption of raw 
materials, energy, and technology. Broad involvement of workers meant that a large 
group of people gained experience in economic matters which was the positive side of the 
reforms.  The normatives (or ceiling on the use of certain inputs per unit of product) 
constituted an important piece of information for drawing annual and multi-year plans.  
In 1982 alone, as a result of state control some 4,975 normatives were revised; 2,966 new 
normatives were introduced; and 4,388 normatives were enforced resulting in 52 million 
Togrogs of public savings (Sanjdorj and Bavuu 1982).  
 
The state control was one of the cornerstones of the regime and was as important 
as planning itself.  Naturally, the communist party gave utmost importance to the 
function of control.  Just like the planning commission, the control commission was a 
powerful well-staffed organization and had a higher status than other government 
commissions.  Since the commission was involved in inspecting enterprises and agencies 
in various sectors, the best performing and brightest employees of various ministries with 
professional knowledge of the industry were selected to work for the commission 





The communist party was a real source of power under the system and, as 
mentioned earlier, its powers escalated since the 1960s.  As in all other socialist 
countries, in Mongolia the performance of individual enterprises with regard to plan was 
monitored by the party organizations, which were set up at every entity including state 
enterprises, state and collective farms, schools, hpitals, and government organizations.  
The inspection and control in the name of the Central Committee of the MPRP were 
frequent.  However, the open votes to select control groups were party controlled.  As 
Bavuu said, in those days it was virtually impossible to organize anything without party 
involvement.  In fact, ultimately the reform was to improve the party control over 
production through broad engagement of the workers.  In all organizations, the head of 
the control group was simultaneously deputy party leader of the organization (interview 
with Bavuu). 
 
2.1.2 Implicit Taxation System 
 
How did the communist rulers in Mongolia accumulate resources necessary for 
fulfilling the plan?  One important feature of the c ntral plan is that it was based on a 
system of implicit taxation.  McKinnon argues that the one of the essential features of the 
classical socialist economy was that the system of taxation is “largely implicit and 
uncodified” (McKinnon 1992, 110).  Because the state owns all means of production, the 
surpluses are extracted directly from enterprises and indirectly from households without 





As in other centrally planned economies, the tax system in Mongolia was 
dominated by turnover and enterprise profit taxes, the two main types of implicit taxes.  
The amount of these taxes depended on the prices set by the planners, i.e., these taxes 
were embedded in the price system.  As shown inTable 2.1, throughout the 1960-1980s, 
70-95 percent of tax revenue came from turnover and state enterprise taxes.  
 
Table 2.1 Shares of major sources of state budget revenue, 1960- 90 (as percent 
of total revenue) 
 
  1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 
Tax revenue 95.2 91.1 79.2 84.0 78.2 81.2 71.5 77.6 
  Turnover tax 65.6 71.7 56.2 54.2 49.8 47.7 34.9 35.6 
  Enterprise taxes 18.4 15.2 18.3 26.0 24.8 30.1 33.8 31.5 
  Personal income tax 4.8 1.8 2.0 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Nontax revenue 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 
  Social security 4.8 3.5 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.7 3.7 
Foreign borrowing 0.0 4.1 15.7 10.7 16.8 14.3 23.9 17.9 
Total revenue and net borrowing 100.0 100.0 100.0 10.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia 
 
Turnover taxes were levied on imported consumer goods, exported goods and 
certain domestically produced goods and were the pric  differential between the price 
paid to the supplier and price paid by the consumer (Tanzi 1992).  In the case of imported 
goods, they were the difference between the (fixed) domestic price and the price paid to 
the foreign supplier of the good converted into the local currency at the official exchange 
rate.  These were also known as the import price diff rential.  Turnover taxes on exported 
goods were determined by the price differentials betwe n the domestic procurement price 




rate.  Domestic producers paid turnover taxes which were included in the wholesale 
price.  
 
There were laws regulating personal income tax, e.g. Tax Law of 1957 and 1964.  
However, there was no such legal regulation for turnover or enterprise taxes.  Resolution 
of the Council of the Ministers (1961) specified that the turnover tax rate could be 
anywhere between 15 and 60 percent (Rinchin 1996).  Turnover and profit taxes were 
individually negotiated with enterprises, depending o  their expected performance.  
There was no uniform tax rate or tax principle.      
 
Throughout the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, about three quarters of 
turnover tax revenue was contributed by the foreign trade state companies in the form of 
import and export price differentials.  Domestic producers paid significantly less, with 
vodka and beer producers contributing about 70 percent of domestic turnover taxes.  
However, in 1986 turnover taxes on a large number of p oducts were withdrawn and 
replaced by profit taxes.  This was not a deliberate t x policy change but rather a result of 
wholesale price reforms which led to substantial increase in wholesale prices on many 
goods.  Since retail prices on most goods and services remained at the same level, the 
price differential between the wholesale and retail price was much smaller as a result.  On 
the other hand, enterprises were able to increase their revenue due to higher wholesale 





Enterprise taxes, or profit taxes, were incorporated or “planned” into the 
wholesale prices and were individually negotiated with enterprises.  The profits were 
defined as the difference between the sales revenue a d production costs.  The enterprise 
profit tax therefore was a tax on production rather t an on net income and was in effect a 
mandatory transfer of funds to the budget (ADB 1992).  The share of profit taxes in the 
total revenue increased gradually through the 1970-1980s, as turnover taxes declined. 
 
Personal income tax played a negligible role.  During the earlier years of the 
communist regime, tax structure served to discriminate against the private sector, with 
progressive tax rates of 7-15 percent on wages and s laries and 35-75 percent on income 
from private entrepreneurship which hired labor (Tax L w 1957).  Since 1960 when all 
means of production were completely nationalized, excluding a small fraction of the 
herds left in private ownership after the mass expropriation in the agricultural sector in 
1959, the tax differentials ceased to play a meaningful role and were eliminated in 1960.  
Following the policies of the Soviet Union, a series of personal income tax cuts were 
undertaken in the 1960s, thus reducing the importance of direct taxation.  The tax rates 
were further reduced down to 0-4.2 percent (the lowest and highest) in 1971 (Order 140 
of the People’s Great Khural16, July 5, 1971).  The ultimate goal of the tax system was to 
eliminate any type of direct taxes levied on indiviuals, as “the levels of socialist 
accumulation increased reaching a level sufficient to finance government activities 
without personal taxation” (Tsedenbal, 1967, Vol. II, 439).   
                                                
16 People’s Great Khural is a national assembly which gat ered only twice a year and made decisions on 
major national policy issues.  Although de jure a supreme decision-making body, it was in fact a rubber 
stamp for the decisions made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of 





2.1.3 Fixed-Price System 
 
Another important feature of the central plan was that it was based on a fixed-
price system.  The fixed-price system ensured the stability and predictability of the 
planned economy both in terms of the production and consumption.  The history of 
planned economy in Mongolia witnessed extraordinary stability in terms of prices, which 
have not seen significant changes for decades (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 Retail prices on selected consumer goods, 1960-1990 (Togrogs/unit) 
 
Commodity Unit 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Milk  Liter  1.2 1.3 1.4 1.9 
Meat Kg 5.0 6.2 5.9 5.9 
Coats  Piece 137.0 112.0 119.0 170.0 
Shoes  Pair  44.0 41.0 57.0 46.0 
Coal  Metric ton 40.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Gasoline  Liter  0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 
Power (household use) kW/hour 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Source: National Statistical Office 
 
The fixed-price system created an illusion of relative stability of real income of 
the people, particularly at the earlier stages of socialist development.  However, when the 
economy started experiencing shortages, which becam particularly noticeable in the 
1970s and 1980s, the real incomes gradually eroded.  The black market of consumer 
goods, particularly clothes and shoes, flourished towards the end of the 1980s, while 




goods were maintained at a stable and incrementally increasing levels (see Table 2.3 
below for the real per capita production of some basic goods).  
 
Table 2.3 Per capita real production of selected goods, 1960-1990 
 
Commodity 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Electricity, kW per hour 117.5 439.3 973.2 1613.1 
Coal, kg 649.7 1602.0 2719.0 3443.7 
Copper concentrate, kg - - - 170.0 
Fluorspar, fluorspar concentrate, kg 42.3 61.8 375.0 355.0 
Cement, kg - 77.1 110.5 212.4 
Leather boots, pair  0.9 1.3 1.3 2.3 
Leather coat, piece (per 100 persons) 1 3 3 2 
Fur coat, piece (per 100 persons) 3 3 5 7 
Processed meat and meat products, kg 13.4 28 35.3 28.4 
Processed milk and dairy products, liter 1.05 9.0 15.5 28.4 
Flour, kg 27.6 66.7 51.8 90.1 
Bread and confectionary, kg 14.6 29.8 43.5 50.5 
Hand soap, pieces 2 3 3 5 
Source: National Statistics Office 1991 “The Economy of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 70 
years (1921-1991)”, Statistical Almanac 
 
Table 2.4 provides data for the nominal and real income of the people during the 
1960-1990.  We observe a moderate and decreasing growth in per capita real income 
throughout the last three decades of the communist regime.   
 




1960 1970 1980 1990 
Growth rate (percent) 






1174 1660 2146 2539 141.4 129.3 118.3 
Real income 1254 1836 2523 3060 150.4 133.8 121.3 
Source: National Statistics Office 1991 “The Economy of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 70 
years (1921-1991)”, Statistical Almanac 
 
The problems with the fixed-price system and the ned to reform it were 
repeatedly discussed by the top leaders of the country. As the former Prime Minister D. 
Sodnom admitted in an interview, the prices no longer served any economic purpose 
because they did not reflect the costs or the interplay of supply and demand.  They 
became a tool of political management rather than eco omic policy.  The issue of price 
reforms was postponed for several decades and some partial reforms were finally 
introduced in 1986.  However, these were not radical because they reformed the 
wholesale price system while the retail prices were maintained at the same level, i.e., at 
the level of the 1960s.  Sodnom and the former Finance Minister A. Bazarkhuu                                                 
note that a hot debate about price liberalization among the leaders which took place in the 
mid-1980s did not lead to major changes because it was almost politically impossible to 
pursue such reforms.  The communist leadership thoug t that liberalizing prices might 
shake the foundations of the system and ultimately the legitimacy of the regime.   
 
Because the economy was dependent on foreign inputs and markets, the policy of 
fixed pricing inevitably meant that the state had to provide subsidies in the cases where 
the cost of production was higher than the fixed price.  The government spent a 
significant share of its budget in the so called materi l production17.  In addition to public 
                                                
17Material production under socialism covered production of material products: goods and material 
services, such as transportation and distribution of go ds, repairs and the like. Provision of non-materi l 




investment in these sectors, these expenditures included various types of subsidies (Table 
2.5).   
 
Table 2.5 Budget expenditures by sectors, 1960-1990 (as share of total 
expenditure) 
 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 
Material production 53.1 50.5 46.3 37.6 38.5 43.6 47.1 44.5 
   Agriculture 13.1 9.5 11.8 11.1 10.0 9.5 13.4 12.4 
   Industry 6.5 11.1 7.4 3.1 2.1 3.1 6.2 7.4 
   Construction 9.1 11.0 4.3 7.0 8.0 5.1 7.1 6.8 
   Transport and communication 6.3 3.0 1.6 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.2 
   Communal services 6.1 3.4 1.4 4.8 3.5 4.7 8.5 6.5 
   Trade 12.0 12.3 19.7 10.8 14.3 20.0 10.2 10.2 
Social and cultural activities 31.4 37.4 38.8 41.9 40.4 37.9 38.6 42.8 
   Education 14.4 17.0 17.1 18.6 18.6 16.7 15.8 17.7 
   Health 8.9 9.2 9.0 9.0 8.1 7.6 7.8 8.5 
   Social security 4.3 4.8 4.0 4.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.5 
   Social welfare 1.0 2.7 5.3 6.6 7.3 7.1 7.2 8.3 
   Other (science, culture, sports) 2.7 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.5 4.7 4.8 
Defense and administration 13.2 11.4 13.7 18.6 19.7 17.3 13.3 11.6 
Other 2.3 0.7 1.2 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
Subsidies included export, producer, and consumer subsidies.  Producer subsidies 
include subsidization of “unplanned” losses incurred by state enterprises, due to 
inefficient technology as well as government intervention in pricing decisions.  
Enterprises, including state trading companies and state agricultural farms, were also 
granted with consumer subsidies, when the fixed price of consumer goods was less than 
the cost at the retail point.  The government subsidized many essential goods and services 
                                                                                                                                      
activities in the non-material sphere where only redistribution and final consumption of product and icome 




such as housing, food, transportation, heating, children’s clothes, etc.  The subsidies were 
also given in the form of free medicine and food.  These constitute the bulk of budget 
resources spent on material production, which amounted to about 45 percent of state 
budget on average in the three decades of 1960-1990.  
 
The communist state pursued strong paternalistic pol ies with regard to personal 
consumption.  Besides cash wages, workers and employees “receive payments and 
allowances from social consumption funds in the form f social insurance payments, 
pensions, various benefits, grants to students, free education and free medical services, 
expenditure on the maintenance of kindergartens, nur eries, etc.” (Statisticheskiy 
Yezhegodnik SEV 1984, p. 379). 
 
2.2. Role of Foreign Aid and Trade 
 
Although the basic system of the central plan in Mongolia described above 
closely resembles that in the Soviet Union, there is one feature that distinguishes 
Mongolia from most other countries in the Eastern Bloc, perhaps with the exception of 
Cuba – its heavy reliance on foreign aid as a means of securing funds for investment and 
development purposes.  Mongolia started receiving substantial amount of aid after joining 





2.2.1 CMEA Trade Regime 
 
Foreign assistance and investment in Mongolia came in the form of credits on 
preferential terms, grants, turnkey projects18, and joint ventures.  Joint ventures in such 
sectors as transportation (Mongolian Railroads Company) and minerals (Erdenet Copper 
Mining Concern) were of strategic economic value to the Soviet Union.  With the 
establishment of several joint ventures, industrial development accelerated significantly.  
Foreign trade expanded rapidly.  The country started specializing in certain industries and 
adopted international standards of measurement. 
 
As a new member of CMEA, Mongolia now officially became part the 
specialization and “division of labor” among the CMEA countries.  Mongolia’s further 
industrial development was determined by its role as a supplier of agricultural products.  
Developing light industry including leather and furprocessing, meat and meat products, 
wool and cashmere became the core of the industrialization policies in the 1960-1970s.  
A new boost to foreign aid was conditioned by the adoption of the “Comprehensive 
Program of Developing Socialist Economic Integration” in 1972 at a CMEA summit 
(interview with Bazarkhuu).  The main purpose of the comprehensive program was to 
support relatively backward CMEA member countries – namely Cuba, Vietnam, and 
Mongolia – to develop economically and integrate them into the system of division of 
                                                
18 Examples of turnkey projects constructed since 1960 include a woodworking combine built by Poland; a 
flour mill by Hungary; cement works by Czechoslovakia; a meat combine by East Germany; a house-
building combine by the Soviet Union; a furniture and cardboard combine by Romania; a sheepskin coat 
factory by Bulgaria, and many others.  There were a few hundred projects of varying size financed by the 
Soviet Union alone.  Turnkey projects financed by loans from the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries 




labor.  Following the adoption of the program by the CMEA, the Mongolian government 
took series of measures in its planning, foreign trade, loan, and foreign exchange systems 
in order to incorporate the new foreign economic policies.  Transferrable ruble became 
the main foreign currency to be used in all international transactions.  The five-year and 
annual plans and investment plans were now tightly in egrated with those of the Soviet 
Union and other CMEA countries.  The flow of resources from these countries increased 
substantially as a result.   
 
As part of the newly implemented policies of integration, Mongolia became a 
supplier of agricultural products – meat, wool, cashmere – and later with the launch of 
Mongolia-Soviet joint venture of the Erdenet Copper Mining Concern in 1981, supplier 
of cheap copper and molybdenum.  As the sole purchaser of export products of Mongolia, 
the Soviet Union imposed prices lower than the world p ices, which created a new 
incentive for the Soviet Union to maintain economic relations with Mongolia. 
 
Mongolia’s tight economic and political ties with te Soviet Union defined in major 
way the socio-economic development of the country since the 1960s.  Because of the 
undiversified nature of its economy, Mongolia’s dependence on the CMEA arrangement 
was perhaps the highest among the group (interview with Bazarkhuu and ADB 1992).  
Exports accounted for 28.1 percent and imports accounted for 46.9 percent of GDP on 
average throughout the 1980s (adjusted ratios calculated by the IMF in Milne et al 1991, 
25).  The share of imports is even higher if the financing of large turnkey projects is 
included in the calculation, imports/GDP ratio reaching 56 percent in the second half of 




dominant role throughout the second half of the 1980s, but its share sharply decreased in 
the first half of the 1990s (see 
 
Figure 2.1 Share of the USSR/former USSR in total exports and imports 
Mongolia (percent, 1985-
 
Source: National Statistics Office
Note:  Data from 1985 to 1991 show trade with the USSR.  Data from 1992 on includes countries 
which formerly were part of the USSR, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine in 
total imports and Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine in total exports.
 
 
According to T. Namjim, one of Mongolia’s former top planners, over the period 
of 1965-85, Soviet aid to Mongolia increased tenfold; the basic assets of he Mongolian 
national economy grew almost tenfold; and gross social production and national income 
grew almost fourfold.  During the last two decades leading to the drastic changes in 1990, 
Mongolia’s Net Material Product grew at an average rate of 5.5 percent annually.  In the 
mid-1980s, when most CMEA countries were experiencing systemic difficulties and 
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newspaper Komsomol’skaya Pravda, November 26, 1986).  During this period of time 
Soviet aid to Mongolia was more “generous” than ever before (Sanders 1987) and there 
were certain geopolitical reasons which will be discussed later. As a result, the economy 
grew at an average rate of 6.1 percent annually during 1966-1989 (National Statistics 
Office). 
 
This increased reliance on foreign aid is reflected in the budget numbers.  Budget 
revenue figures presented in Table 2.1 reveal a rising deficit during 1960-1990.   Revenue 
lag recorded its highest level in the 1980s, with a structural deficit ranging from 13-14 
percent in the first half of the 1980s to 15-20 percent in the second half of the 1980s.  
Foreign borrowing was almost the sole source to support this extremely high fiscal 
deficit.  Borrowing was well above 30 percent of GDP for most of the 1980s.  As the 
budget increasingly relied on foreign financing, the need to mobilize domestic resources 
to meet development objectives diminished.  As such, neither expenditure cuts nor 
additional revenue mobilization was observed.  As a consequence, during the three 
decades before transition the economy grew without a rigorous resource constraint as 
well as structural adjustment (ADB 1992).  During the late communist period, Mongolia 
borrowed not only for investment purposes, but even for consumption purposes, in 
particular to pay for imported consumer goods.19 
 
The external shocks of the late 1980s were absorbed by an increased foreign 
assistance but had considerable negative effect on the balance of payment and fiscal 
                                                
19 This argument surfaced repeatedly in interviews with the former Prime Minister D. Sodnom, former 




affairs, leading to further weakening of the budgetary position in the second half of the 
1980s.  By the end of 1990, outstanding foreign debt amounted to about 10 billion 
transferable rubles, which was ten times the country’s GDP, in accordance with Standard 
and Poor’s estimation20.  It should be noted that about 80 percent of total debt was 
created in the fifteen years between 1975 and 1990 (Namjim 2002), and well over 60 
percent in the 1980s only (See Table 2.6 below). 
 




Trade loans  
(Balance of payment deficit) 
Technical assistance loans 












Percentage of all 
loans 
1980 81.3 28.5% 204.2 71.5% 285.5 
1981 189.0 31.1% 418.5 68.9% 607.5 
1982 190.0 28.9% 467.4 71.1% 657.4 
1983 205.0 35.3% 375.6 64.7% 580.6 
1984 230.2 36.8% 394.5 63.2% 624.7 
1985 251.5 38.1% 408.7 61.9% 660.2 
1986 270.1 35.4% 492.5 64.6% 762.6 
1987 285.2 38.9% 448.9 61.1% 734.1 
1988 270.0 37.1% 457.9 62.9% 727.9 
1989 205.4 31.5% 446.3 68.5% 651.7 
1990 161.8 28.6% 404.0 71.4% 565.8 
Total  2,339.5 34.1% 4,518.5 65.9% 6,858.0 
Source: National Statistics Office, various years 
                                                
20 The two countries held negotiations for debt repayment in the late-1980s –early 1990.  The Mongolian 
Government insisted on renegotiating the amount, arguing that for decades Mongolia has been selling 
agricultural and mineral products to the USSR at prices well below the market rates.  The Mongolian 
Government requested 90 percent debt relief (Namjim 2002).  However, the negotiations were interrupted 
in 1990.  This outstanding debt was paid off in 2004, as a result of a deal between the two countries.  
Mongolia paid $250 million.  Many said that the deal m rks the largest debt forgiveness by Russia of loans 
provided by the former Soviet Union.  






Loans received from the Soviet Union and some other CMEA countries were 
generally divided into two categories: trade loans to compensate the balance of payment 
deficit and technical assistance loans that financed turnkey projects and machinery and 
equipment.  Investment loans were used in the industrial, agricultural, construction, 
energy and infrastructure, and social development sctors and were given at a preferential 
interest rate of 1.5-2 percent per annum.  As Table 2.6 above demonstrates the share of 
trade loans vs. technical assistance loans has generally been increasing throughout the 
mid-to-late-1980s, mainly due to deteriorating terms of trade.  For the period from 1975 
to 1990, the prices of machinery, equipment, spare ts and other critical import items 
increased on average by 220 percent, with prices of some items increasing fivefold.  
During the same period, the prices of export items such as copper and agricultural 
products increased only by 36 percent (Namjim and Itgel 2003).  
 
Following the economic difficulties the Soviet Unio started experiencing and the 
establishment of the new convertible currency trade regime, Soviet foreign assistance to 
all developing countries within CMEA and outside of it in the form of trade credits, 
technical assistance and project assistance slowed down considerably in 1990, and 
stopped in early 1991.  Figure 2.2 provides data on the relative significance of foreign 
aid.  The share of foreign aid picked in the mid-to-late-1980s when the Soviet Union 
increased substantially its financial and technical aid.  Aid reached over 30 percent of 
GDP in the 1980s.  These were used to finance several large turnkey projects as well as 




unprecedentedly high levels of budget deficit, which peaked at 23.9 percent of GDP in 
1988.  
 
Figure 2.2 Share of foreign aid (ODA) in GDP (1980-2005, in percent) 
 
 
Source: National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance 
Note:  ODA (official development aid) in 1980-1990 includes all external resources received in the 
form of budget assistance, trade loans, and turnkey projects financed by the Soviet Union and 
other CMEA countries.  ODA since 1990 includes concessional loans and grants provided by 
multilateral and bilateral donors for the balance of payment purposes and project financing.  
 
Extensive use of imported inputs in most production activities and extensive 
reliance on imports of consumer goods amplified supply shortages in all sectors and 
contributed to a sharp decline in output in the early 1990s.  The rapid political and 
economic changes taking place in many trading partners and the collapse of the CMEA 
resulted in enormous trade disruptions.  Growing reluctance to supply goods for 
transferable rubles and the breakdown of the old Soviet distribution system resulted in 
import constraints from trading partner countries.  Trade with convertible currency area 





















































































































partners.  Exports fell by 43.5 percent and imports by 49 percent in 1990.  The following 
year saw another round of sharp contraction in imports, a further halving of the 1990 
import level (World Bank 1993).  Imports became essentially concentrated on petroleum 
and food, and export earnings afforded very limited amounts of other products.  
 
2.2.2 Geopolitics of Foreign Aid 
 
What kind of considerations did the Soviet Union rely on when it decided to 
provide such a ‘generous’ support to Mongolia?First, Mongolia was the second country 
in the world to follow in the path of socialist development and the Soviets had a clear 
political interest in spreading the ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism 
outside its own territory.   Soviet dominance was established in the 1920s, after the Red 
Army supported Mongolia’s liberation effort against the Chinese colonization.  The 
Soviet Union was guided by its own interests when it offered to protect the independence 
of Mongolia during the 1930s and 1940s when Mongolia was struggling to be recognized 
by the world community as an independent state.  Scholars agree that the Soviets had 
important geopolitical reasons for dominating Mongolia, such as using Mongolia as a 
buffer state between China and Japan and the Soviet Un on (Dashpurev and Prasad 1993, 
43).  It could be argued that a country of less than two million people was a great buy for 
the Soviets; they got the same geopolitical benefits but at very little cost relative to other 





After a power struggle in the early 1960s among the political leaders of the 
MPRP, the pro-Soviet wing took over (not without the help of the Soviet rulers) and the 
policies of Sovietization of Mongolia were openly pursued.  Soviet troops were stationed 
in Mongolia since the mid-1960s when the relationship between the Soviet Union and 
China deteriorated and the two countries parted, following their own ways.  The number 
of Soviet advisers, consultants, and specialists in every branch of the social, economic, 
and political life of the people increased substantially (Dashpurev and Prasad 1993, 55).  
There were over 100,000 Soviet specialists stationed i  Mongolia with their families by 
the early 1980s.  By the 1980s, the main aspects of economic and social development 
were decided with heavy involvement of the Soviet Union.   
 
Soviet specialists stationed in Mongolia were involved mostly in technical issues 
but less so in policymaking.  A few ministries had Soviet advisors, usually one per 
ministry, who provided guidance on policy issues.  Bazarkhuu recalls that the advisor 
who worked at the Ministry of Finance was not heavily involved in ministerial issues and 
was removed from political decisions.  Apparently, this was the case with other ministries 
as well.  The consultation with the Soviets was at the higher level on general 
development and sectoral issues, but not at the enterprise level, perhaps with the 
exception of Erdenet copper plant where numerous Soviet engineers were employed.  
The number of policy advisors in Mongolia was minimal, while the bulk of specialists 





Technical specialists worked in their own units anddid not directly interact with 
Mongolians, e.g., there were several construction units that worked on major construction 
projects; they employed a few Mongolians like drives and support staff but not technical 
specialists.  There were entire residential districts in Ulaanbaatar (and a couple of other 
cities such as Darkhan and Erdenet) where the Soviet specialists lived, with schools, 
specialized shops and services with limited (Soviets only) access.  
 
It was no accident that Mongolia’s joining the CMEA coincided with the 
worsening of political relations between the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and 
China.  The ideological differences of the leadership of the two parties became more 
profound in the early 1960s – 1962, to be precise – which eventually led to the breakup 
and even military conflict between the two countries.  Mongolia was forced to follow the 
Soviet Union. Mongolia became a member of CMEA in Ju e 1962 at the 16th 
extraordinary meeting of the CMEA.  In 1964, Soviet military troops were moved to 
Mongolia to “help the construction sector in Mongolia”; two residential districts were 
initiated and big construction projects began shortly after.  Accompanying the 
construction troops, a big contingent of Soviet military engineering, communications, air, 
tank and machine-gun units were stationed in Mongolia.  As a result, Mongolia had to 
cancel its Law on Protection of Peace and the associated anti-military measures adopted 
in an effort to support the world peace movement.  The Defense Ministry was re-
established, after about ten years since its abolishment in the early 1950s, and military 




(Rinchin 1996).  In return for the military involvement, the Soviet Union expanded its 
financial and technical support.   
 
Soviet aid decreased sharply since 1989 and approached zero within less than two 
years.This is conditioned both by economic and geopolitical reasons.  The Soviet 
economy experienced severe decline in the late 1980s so that it has become increasingly 
difficult to spare resources to support a regime els where.  Secondly, the geopolitical 
situation in East Asia and the world as a whole changed so much that the USSR did not 
need any support of Mongolia in the region.  Both the USSR and Mongolia improved 
their political and economic ties with China in themid-1980s.  Mongolia resumed border 
trade with China in 1985, but the relationship between the two countries improved 
noticeably after Mikhail Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech in July 1986, in which he said 
that Mongolia and the Soviet Union were discussing a partial withdrawal of Soviet 
troops.  A Soviet motorized rifle division withdrew between April and June 1987, a 25 
percent cutback of the roughly 60,000 Soviet troops still left in Mongolia (Jarret 1988, 
81).   
 
In his speech to the United Nations in December 1988 Gorbachev promised that a 
‘large portion’ of the troops would be withdrawn, sub equently quantified at three-
quarters.  The decision reflected the change in the global environment and subsequent 
change in foreign policy of the Soviet Union, rather than the pressure of the Mongolian 
leaders.  In March 1990 the Mongolian and Soviet governments reached an agreement 




7).  In 1987 Mongolia officially renewed its scientific and technical cooperation with 
China, which was disrupted for over two decades. 
 
2.3. Demise of the Central Plan and Attempts to Reinvent It (1987-
1989) 
 
2.3.1 Economic Reforms 
 
 
The first signs of a demise of the central plan were r flected in the 
macroeconomic performance of socialist countries.  By the early 1960s, many countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself already exhibited the first signs 
of stagnation and slowdown.  The most developed countries among the group – 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Hungary – recorded the lowest 
growth rates.  In 1963, Czechoslovakia was the first communist country to register an 
official decline in national income in peacetime, a shattering event.  Numerous studies of 
former socialist countries provide ample evidence of the demise of the system which 
started in the 1960s.  Since the 1960s, many countries tried reforms which came under 
various labels such as “market socialism”, “workers’ self-management”, or “third way” 
between capitalism and Soviet-style socialism.  In spite of partial reforms effort, by the 






Macroeconomic and social indicators of Mongolia during 1960-1990 show a more 
cheerful picture.  Economic growth of Mongolia was one of the highest in the group 
through the end of the 1980s (see Table 2.7 and Table 2.8). 
 
Table 2.7 Net Material Product (NMP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
average annual growth rates, 1966-1989, percent22 
 









Source: National Statistics Office  
 
Table 2.8 Change in NMP (in constant prices) 1980-1990 (in percent of 1980) in 
selected CMEA countries 
 
Indicator BUL CUBA CZECH GER HUN MON POL ROM VIET USSR 
NMP in 1990 
(1980=100) 
141 143 117 139 112 156 108 144 153 127 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of COMECON Countries 1989, Table 21, p. 59 
Note: BUL – Bulgaria, CZECH – Czechoslovakia, GER – East Germany, HUN – Hungary, MON – 
Mongolia, POL – Poland, ROM – Romania, VIET – Veitnam 
 
In spite of seemingly successful functioning of thecentral plan in Mongolia, as 
growth rates demonstrate, efficiency issues were a major problem and emerged 
                                                
22 Data for 1966-1979 show annual growth rates of the Net Material Product.  Data for 1980-1989 show 
GDP growth rates. Net Material Product was the main macroeconomic indicator used for monitoring 
growth in national accounts of socialist countries.  NMP is the conceptual equivalent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), but numerically is calculated differently. NMP is calculated for the material production 
sectors only, and excludes most of the “non-productive” service sectors, which are part of GDP, and 




continuously.  In a small and undiversified economy like Mongolia the task of drawing 
comprehensive plans has been easier, particularly at the initial stages of socialist 
development.  Lack of well-trained planning cadres ha been mentioned as a hurdle, but 
Mongolian planners relied heavily on the Soviet education system and expertise.  
However, as the economy matured and became more diversif ed, it is not difficult to 
imagine that the planning task became exceedingly difficult.  Mongolia’s State Planning 
Commission prepared plans for production and sales of over 2,000 products in the mid-
1980s (Namjim 2004, 313), which was significantly less than in a giant economy like the 
Soviet Union, where over 60,000 product plans were drawn up in total, representing some 
10 to 15 million different types of product in circulation in the USSR (Yakovets in 
Rutland 1985, 116).  Yet the planning exercise became increasingly cumbersome for 
Mongolia’s limited capacity. 
 
The initial high growth rate of socialist production was fuelled by extensive 
methods. Generally the inefficiency built into the investment processes meant that high 
growth rates could be generated only by disproportionately high investment rates, at the 
cost of consumption. Mickiewicz (2010) argues that centrally planned economies were 
already in recession or near-stagnation, in spite of maintaining huge investment spending 
programs.  Mongolia, with a record-breaking 46 percent of its GDP spent on investment, 
generated only 4.2 percent GDP growth in 1989 (Mickiewicz 2010, 29-30).  
 
Inefficiencies and economic malfunctioning of the system started to be recognized 




problems emerged earlier.  Massive investments in the industrial production led to a 
substantial change in the structure of the national utput.   However, it was noted that the 
production efficiency and rate of return on investment was consistently falling.  In 1987 
Prime Minister Sodnom stressed that there was an increasing gap between the “potential 
growth rate” conditioned by growth of assets and actual economic growth.  It was noted 
that much of the greatly improved industrial growth potential has not been realized.  In 
spite of the unprecedented increase in investment, the real production rose only at a 
moderate rate.   
 
The most important reason for satisfactory economic and social performance was 
foreign aid pumped into the economy in massive amounts.  Large infusions of Soviet and 
CMEA aid and the agreement of Moscow to underwrite the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1971-
1975) had salutary effect on the economy.  Gross industrial production rose by 45 percent 
during this period.  All subsequent five-year plans were coordinated with the Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries.  More aid was forthcoming in the following years to 
support agriculture, mining, fuel, power, food, and light industries (Worden and Savada 
1991).  It was noted by the top leadership that in the fifteen years between 1975 and 
1990, total investment amounted to 58 billion Togrogs which was 3 times more than all 
investment in the preceding 55 years of socialist development (T. Namjim, First Deputy 
Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Speech at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 





As the central planners estimated, in the 5th five-year plan (1971-1975), one 
Togrog23 of investment in the material sector produced 0.21 Togrogs of marginal net 
output.  The number was reduced down to 0.12 Tog in the 6th five years (1976-1980), 
0.13 Tog in the 7th five years (1981-1985), and 0.098 Tog in the firstthree years of the 
last five-year plan, i.e., 1986-1990.  Investment in agriculture was least productive 
compared to other sectors.  The marginal net product of one Togrog of investment in 
agriculture was 0.07 Tog in the 5th five-years, while the same indicator fell down to 0.03 
Tog in the first three years of the 8th (last) five years.  One of the reasons of low return on 
investment was increasing prices on investment goods an  deteriorating terms of trade.  
However, it was emphasized that one should not blame the worsening terms of trade 
alone for this problem (from Speech of P. Damdin, Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the MPRP at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP (June 22, 
1989) on improving the efficiency and rate of return on investment). 
 
The existing planning practices were criticized at the party plenary meeting for 
being overly centralized and inflexible.  It was emphasized that heavily centralized 
planning leaves individual enterprises limited scope for input decisions, low incentives 
for innovations and so-called “socialist entrepreneurship”, i.e., various initiatives to 
improve efficiency and production levels, turning idividual enterprises into passive 
players waiting for the instructions from the higher authorities.  It was underlined that 
under the existing planning practices, the foremost g al of enterprises became to fulfill 
the planned production targets at any cost, which had negative impact on the quality of 
                                                
23 The national currency of Mongolia, a commercial rate of 4.44 Togrogs per transferrable ruble was set in 




the goods and services, as well as productivity and efficiency (Third Plenary meeting of 
the Central Committee of the MPRP, June 1987). 
 
By the mid-1980s the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries have already 
initiated reforms, gradually drifting away from the c ntralized plan towards the system of 
indicative planning and economic incentives.  Mongolia lagged behind these countries in 
terms of the scope and nature of the reforms.  The changes that were taking place in the 
Soviet Union and particularly Central and Eastern Europe were felt in the trade regime 
between Mongolia and these countries.  Mongolia’s external terms of trade started 
deteriorating in the second half of the 1980s, when CMEA trade arrangements changed to 
reflect the world prices.  The new contract prices for traded goods for 1986-1990 were 
fixed at the average world prices for 1985 which turned out to be disadvantageous for 
Mongolia.  This resulted in deterioration of the terms of trade by 12 percent in 1986 (see 
Table 2.9 below).  Mongolia suffered from the fixed 1985 level prices when in the 
subsequent years the world prices of copper increased nd world prices of petroleum 
products, the main import item, declined.  However, the amount of aid, particularly the 
balance of payment loans, which culminated in 1986-1988, effectively covered these 
imbalances and concealed the imminent signs of institutional demise in Mongolia.  
 
Table 2.9 Terms of Trade (1975-1990) 
 
 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Index, 
1980=100 
149 100 99 94 87 83 86 76 76 78 83 85 
Annual 
change (%) 
8.3 -8.3 -1.0 -6.5 -6.7 -6.3 3.8 -11.9 11.0 22.0 5.4 3.4 





These unfavorable changes which involved transferring to hard currency regime 
and worsening terms of trade, combined with the customary path to follow in the steps of 
its “big brother” finally forced the Mongolian government to undertake more decisive 
reforms.  
 
The eighth five-year plan (1986-1990) was the last comprehensive central plan 
elaborated by the government.  During this period, the focus shifted from the 
achievement of physical targets under the central plan to policy reforms.  
Notwithstanding the generally on-track achievement of targets during the plan period, 
there was a growing realization among policymakers that the CMEA structure was 
gradually disintegrating and that the changing international environment required 
restructuring of the economy based on free-market systems and dismantling of central 
planning (ADB 1992, 11). 
 
In the late 1980s, dissatisfaction with the economic slowdown of the last years of 
almost 40-year reign of Tsedenbal and the influence of the Soviet perestroika led 
Mongolia to launch its own program of economic refoms.  Loss of efficiency and poor 
quality of goods were considered the main issues by the country’s communist leadership.  
The very first reform ideas were openly discussed in 1985 by the Central Committee of 
the MPRP, following similar discussions held by theCommunist Party of the Soviet 
Union.  During the following party meeting (May 1986) it was noted that “The main goal 
for the forthcoming five years is to increase efficiency by economizing on material costs; 




technical innovations; improve economic mechanisms of planning and management in all 
sectors of the economy.” (Speech of P. Jasrai, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairm n of 
the State Planning Commission at the 12th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of 
the MPRP on May 21, 1986).   
 
The leaders took a gradual approach in reforming the system of centralized 
planning.  Following these discussions, experiments with a new economic management 
system were gradually introduced in line ministries, starting with the SOEs and entities 
under the Ministry of Light and Food Industry and Ministry of Communications in 1985.  
Ministries and their subordinate SOEs moved to a new system of management and 
planning after two years of experimenting.  The politburo was encouraged by generally 
positive results – moderate increase in industrial output and total sales, some reduction in 
costs, and examples of economy on raw materials – and planned introducing the new 
mechanism gradually in all enterprises.  Experiments continued in 1986 in energy and 
water sectors, with new ministries engaging in the experiments gradually over the next 
two years.  It was planned to finish the experimental period by the end of 1989 and move 
to the new system by the end of 1990. 
 
Batmunkh (2001) thus explained the delay in reform: “We were carefully 
studying the reforms taking place in the Soviet Union, watching how they proceeded and 
whether they would succeed.  It was also necessary to think how similar reforms would 
work in Mongolia.  Radical reforms experimented in a giant economy like the Soviet 




be due Batmunkh’s leadership style.  Many of his contemporaries considered Batmunkh 
to be a slow and careful decision maker. 
 
Batmunkh recalled attending the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February 1986 
which was held in an entirely different atmosphere.  P restroika and glasnost were in full 
bloom in Moscow (Batmunkh 2001, 104).  Many new ideas floated and new changes 
were coming.  The Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP which 
took place on June 30, 1987, announced a decision to introduce management reforms 
throughout the entire economy.  This program aimed at, among others, reforming 
management and planning systems; providing greater ind pendence to enterprises; and 
ensuring a balance of individual, collective, and societal interests.  Thus, the reform 
process began in Mongolia on full scale.  The reform goals were broadly defined as 
“employing the system of economic incentives within the socialist mode of production”, 
strengthening the economic management and cost accounting principles, reforming the 
finance and credit system to enhance production effici ncy and quality of goods and 
services (Report of D. Sodnom, Chairman of the Council of the Ministers of Mongolia, to 
the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP 1987).   
 
The so-called unified planning system was officially introduced in 1987 for the 
first time in Mongolia, which, as the leaders believed, marked the beginning of a new era 
in planning.  The role of the central planning should consist in ensuring macroeconomic 
stability and balance, the overall structure of the economy and desirable changes in the 




continuously improving the standard of living for the people and social development.  
Instead of promulgating the planned numbers down to en erprises, individual entities – 
with the exception of export producers – were to develop their own plans within the 
economic norms and cost ceilings provided by the central planning authority.  Plans were 
based on the contracts established between the suppliers and purchasing agencies, such as 
other state enterprises and state trading companies.  As a result, the number of planned 
targets should be reduced and contain only the essential indicators.  The performance of 
enterprises and their management was to be measured bas  on the fulfillment of 
contracted goods and services (Report of T. Namjim, First Deputy Chairman of the State 
Planning Commission to the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CC of the MPRP, June 30, 1987 
on Improving Production Efficiency and Quality of Goods and Services). 
 
Individual enterprises developed their own production and profit plans based on 
the normatives provided by the State Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance, 
which included average usage of inputs, average output per unit of input, formation of 
accumulation and wage funds, profit-sharing principles, investment, centralized 
allocation of supplies and materials, state orders on certain products, ceilings on the 
foreign currency that they can use to order spare pts and other imported inputs.  These 
indicators were designed to promote more efficient use of resources and prevent 
enterprises from stocking up on imported goods and materials in excess of the amount 
required by production.  Indicators were delivered to SOEs before the planning process 
starts; they were stable; and no new indicators were given after the plan has been 




Economic viability of enterprises and realization of their increased independence 
were ultimately attached to the price system.  Therefore, the most important ingredient of 
the reforms was the price reform.  Major wholesale price revisions in 1986 attempted to 
reflect the increasing prices of imports and economic changes that took place in the past 
decades.  Retail prices remained untouched.  In the fu ure, however, it was proposed to 
gradually move towards more flexible prices which reflect supply and demand, within the 
price ceilings provided by the central planning agency, although no time frame was 
proposed for such changes (ibid).  
 
In spite of the old terminology used in the party documents, the content of the 
reforms was far reaching.  Implementation of these r forms began with reorganization of 
government agencies dealing with the economy.  Several k y agencies responsible for 
planning, prices, labor, wages and salaries, and statistical services – the State Planning 
Commission, Central Statistics Office, the State Price and Standardization Commission, 
and the State Labor and Social Welfare Commission – were restructured into a new State 
Planning and Economic Commission in January 1988, a massive organization which 
brought together all the above functions. 
 
The planning agency was to oversee only capital investment policy.  The number 
of planning indicators was also to be decreased.  Enterprises were put on a new regime of 
“financial autonomy”, becoming accountable for their losses and fulfilling sales and 
export contracts.  They also were permitted to sell for profit output in excess of the state 




expenditure norms for all budget entities were revis d and budgets based on these newly 
established norms were strictly enforced.  By 1989, 1157 budget entities or 38.5 percent 
of all entities were put on the system of cost accounting and strict budget constraint.   
 
Economic reforms were further strengthened by several r solutions issued by the 
government in early 1988, including the measures to promote individual and cooperative 
economic activity of the citizens, introduction of so-called “patent payments” or fixed flat 
taxes to be paid by the citizens involved in indiviual economic activity, and introduction 
of taxes on income of labor cooperatives (Resolutions 75, 76, and 77 of the Council of 
Ministers of Mongolia, March 22, 1988).  By 1988, there were 480 individual and family-
based cooperatives.  Restrictions on private ownership of domestic animals were 
removed in March 1990 by the decision of the State People’s Khural, the national 
assembly.  These series of regulations marked the revival of private property and 
individual business activity in Mongolia and created new obligations for the Ministry of 
Finance and relevant government agencies to deal with private sector entities and tax 
collection issues.   
 
2.3.2 Political Changes and International Developments 
 
Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union touched not only the economic base – the 
perestroika component of the reforms – but also political and social spheres, which was 
the essence of glasnost.  Mongolia’s reforms were ca fully designed after the Soviet 




be noted that perestroika and glasnost were launched tog ther by Gorbachev in 1985.  
However, in Mongolia increased political transparency and reduced party censorship 
followed economic reforms.   
 
There was a major political change in Mongolia prior to initiating the reforms in the 
second half of the 1980s: removal of Tsedenbal from his party and state positions in 
August 1984.  Tsedenbal served as the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the 
MPRP since 1940 and as head of the state since 1971 with death of J. Sambuu, Chairman 
the Presidium of the People’s Great Khural.  Tsedenbal was the first person to 
simultaneously assume the highest party and state positions.  Tsedenbal’s leadership 
became increasingly dictatorial since the late 1970s, when he started to arbitrarily remove 
and appoint high-ranking personnel.  
 
The issue was exacerbated by involvement of Tsedenbal’s wife.  Tsedenbal was 
married to a Russian woman, Anastasia Ivanovna Filatova whom he met while studying 
in the Soviet Union.  Filatova, initially far from the politics, was soon appointed the head 
of the Children’s Fund and started increasingly getting involved in budget allocation (in 
favor of her pet projects) and other decision making.  Eventually, with decaying health of 
her husband, Filatova actively interfered with party politics and appointments.  She was 
known for offensive behavior towards the Mongolian leaders as well as the personnel 
serving the first family. Many Mongolian leaders were weary of her outrageous behavior.  




distance itself so profoundly from Tsedenbal and his wife and initiated an investigation 
into their wrongdoing. 
 
The removal of Tsedenbal happened in summer 1984, when the Mongolian 
leaders were on vacation.  Batmunkh (then the Prime Minister) remembered vacationing 
in Crimea resort in the Soviet Union, when he (and Molomjamts, a Politburo member and 
party secretary, also vacationing in Crimea) received a call from a high-level 
representative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).  Batmunkh and 
Molomjamts were summoned in Kremlin the next day and met by Party Secretary 
Gorbachev (not General Secretary yet), Defense Minister Ustinov, KGB chief Chebrikov, 
and several other high-ranking officials.  The Soviet leaders informed that Tsedenbal’s 
health – who was on medical treatment in Moscow at the time – was in a critical situation 
(severe case of dementia) and he was no longer able to carry out the duties of the leader 
of a country.  The Kremlin doctor Yevgeniy Chazov was there to provide medical 
testimony.  It was recommended that Tsedenbal be prom tly removed from his high posts 
and remain in Moscow for further treatment.  Batmunkh and Molomjamts recalled being 
in a deep shock (Batmunkh 2001, 139). They asked about the possibility of gradually 
reducing the workload and eventually freeing him from all his positions, instead of such 
an abrupt retirement.  However, the doctors and the Soviet leaders insisted on full 
retirement, for the sake of Tsedenbal’s future healt  nd national interests.  The 
Mongolian leaders asked Prof. Chazov, who treated Tsedenbal for the past 18 years, to 




the Central Committee of the MPRP, to promote speedy d cision making, to which he 
agreed.   
 
In a memoir – “Health and Power: Memoirs of the ‘Кremlin Doctor’” – where he 
describes many circumstances concerning the health of the Soviet leaders and of some 
leaders of the Soviet satellites, Chazov recalled that he knew two different Tsedenbals: in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s Tsedenbal was a bright, well educated and sharp-minded 
leader.  However, this was gone in the 1980s, when his brain cells were damaged due to 
atherosclerosis and alcohol use and he turned into a forgetful old man without any 
personality.  Chazov described Filatova as a belligerent, rude, not so bright woman who 
dominated her husband and terrorized people around her, including medical personnel.  
She turned into a real “thunderstorm” for the Mongolian leaders.  Chazov remembered 
being ashamed of her, as many saw her as a Soviet citiz n and representative (Chazov 
1992, 68-69).   
 
After the Kremlin meeting, Batmunkh and Molomjamts went to see Tsedenbal 
and his family and convey the news.  Tsedenbal accepted the news relatively calmly, 
although diverted from the main subject several times and repeatedly asked the same 
questions, and agreed the politburo to meet and make the decision.  Filatova, on the other 
hand, was furious and accused Batmunkh and others of attempting a coup (Batmunkh 
2001, 141).  She also claimed that she did not trushe Russian doctors’ diagnosis and 





Resignation of a communist leader who ruled the country for some 40 years was a 
major event in Mongolia in 1984.  The party plenum of August 23 relieved Tsedenbal of 
all his duties, “taking into consideration his state of physical health and with his consent” 
(note the wording which did not say “upon his request” as was usually the case with other 
resignations) and unanimously elected Batmunkh – the Prime Minister and second in 
command – to be the new leader.  With Batmunkh reassuring the continuity of policy and 
praising Tsedenbal for his “distinguished service to the party and the people”, Sanders 
(1985) for instance concluded that, “in matters of importance, nothing had changed” 
(130).  Although for an external observer – and the general public – things looked like as 
if an old ailing leader was being replaced by his immediate successor, later disclosure of 
historical facts by the participants – both in Monglia and the Soviet Union – revealed 
multiple underlying events and processes.  
 
Sh. Nadirov, a Soviet high-ranking diplomat and party official who worked on 
Mongolia issues for over 20 years and was intimately involved in all interactions of the 
Mongolian leaders with the Soviet leaders, wrote a book of memoirs in 1995 titled 
“Tsedenbal, 1984” where he used previously confident al party documents.  The book 
contains wealth of detailed information about the lat  period of Tsedenbal’s rule, his 
removal in 1984, and the role played by his wife in Mongolian politics and his eventual 
resignation.  Nadirov observed that by 1983, some troubling news started reaching the 
Soviet leadership about the frequent turnover of high-ranking party and government 
officials in Mongolia, which subsequently led to splitting up and growing mistrust within 




leaders within the MPRP were reported becoming more critical of Tsedenbal and his 
policies.  As a response, Tsedenbal made frequent replacements within the cabinet and 
party leadership as well as local governors and party officials, trying to eliminate his 
critics.  This nationwide campaign was reported to have reached its peak when Tsedenbal 
was planning to remove almost half of the current Politburo and many members of the 
Central Committee of the MPRP during the August 1984 plenary meeting (Nadirov 1995, 
21).  
 
It was also reported that Tsedenbal was becoming less engaged in leadership due 
to his ailing health and as a result Anastasia Filatova was increasingly involved in 
decision making, especially removals and appointmens.  For the Soviet leaders, there 
were several problems with the political situation in Mongolia.  First, with involvement 
of Filatova, the top leadership was divided.  On the one hand, there was Filatova who was 
promoting Maidar, first Deputy Prime Minister and me ber of the politburo, to replace 
Prime Minister Batmunkh.  She was aided by a few loer-ranking officials, but this 
group was in minority.  On the other hand, there was a larger group of people, mostly 
economists, including party secretary Molomjamts, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman 
of the State Planning Commission Sodnom, his first deputy Jasrai, Minister of Foreign 
Economic Relations Ochirbat, who were disfavored by Filatova, among others.  The 
group was in majority and supported by Prime Minister Batmunkh (Nadirov 1995, 11-





Second, this group of economists and top-level party and government officials 
raised an issue of economic inefficiency of some trade and production arrangements 
between Mongolia and Soviet Union.  Most notably, there was an issue of state subsidies 
provided to the Erdenet copper mine, a joint venture with the USSR, due to low fixed 
export prices on copper and molybdenum.  The price diff rential – 114 rubles per ton – 
was subsidized from the state budget, which totaled to an annual amount of 30-40 million 
togrogs (Batmunkh 2001, 204).  Although the copper giant was profitable, the bulk of it 
in fact was subsidized from the budget.  When distribu ing the profit, these subsidies 
were not deducted from the revenues which meant favorable treatment of the Soviet 
Union as a shareholder.  The Mongolian side wanted change the price system so that 
subsidies were eliminated and Erdenet became more pr fitable for Mongolia.  They 
prepared some detailed calculations on pricing and argued that the price was set too low, 
even by the price setting practices under the central plan.  There were some talks of 
finding an alternative purchaser (probably Japan) of Erdenet products who could offer 
world prices.  Second, they insisted that the state budget be reimbursed from gross 
revenue before profits were distributed to shareholders.  And lastly, the Mongolian 
government wanted Erdenet to pay user charge for exploitation of natural resources 
(Sodnom 2003, 81).  The calculations and price issue  were raised with the Soviet 
leadership and needed to be settled.  
 
The above incident was used by Filatova to claim that some top (pro-Chinese) 
Mongolian leaders were endangering the Mongolian-Soviet friendship – the most serious 




more loyal people, i.e., her favorite Maidar.  Moreov r, Filatova acted as though she was 
backed by the Soviet leaders, which was not the cas, as Nadirov claimed.  In fact, the 
Soviet leaders were aware of the outrageous behavior of Anastasia Filatova and the 
negative reputation she had in Mongolia and did not want to be her ally.  Since most 
Mongolian leaders were on the other side and Filatova was often seen as a Soviet citizen 
and perhaps representing the Soviet opinion, the Soviet leaders thought that removal of 
several prominent party leaders (generally with good reputation) might fuel anti-Soviet 
and even nationalistic sentiments among the Mongolian leaders and the public in general 
(Nadirov 1995, 21).  This would be damaging for the image of the Soviet Union and 
economically harmful for both countries.  
 
Thus, the overall situation in Mongolia was seen unstable and adverse for the 
Soviet Union.  Nadirov reported that the Mongolian leadership problem was discussed at 
the Central Committee of the CPSU meeting in Novembr 1983.  First, the Erdenet issue 
had to be investigated and resolved.  Initially, Soviet Union denied any price adjustments 
claiming that the price difference was paid in goods (i.e., there was a type of barter 
arrangement) and the Mongolian government makes significant profit on the price 
differential (i.e., the price difference between the import price and domestic retail price).  
The Mongolian government responded that domestic pricing was an internal issue and 
had nothing to do with the Mongolian-Soviet copper trade arrangements (Batmunkh 
2001, 204).  Soviet mining and financial specialists led by a high-ranking official of the 
Central Planning Commission of the USSR V. Pavlov (who later served as Russian Prime 




June 1984 – it was decided in favor of the Mongolian government.  Prices were increased 
(but not to the full extent of domestic price) and profits were distributed after deducting 
the share of price differential subsidy provided by the Mongolian state budget.  The user 
charge for natural resources, however, was not resolv d until 1991 (Sodnon 2003, 81-82).  
 
It was agreed by the Soviet leaders that the best way to resolve the pending 
political situation would be for Tsedenbal to voluntarily resign from all his positions.  He 
should be praised for his great contribution to developing the country and advancing the 
Soviet-Mongolian friendship and retire with dignity, and perhaps focus on writing his 
memoirs (Nadirov 1995, 107-108).  The CPSU wanted to give some “friendly advice” to 
the MPRP leaders and resolve the issue peacefully.  As Nadirov put it, the exact wording 
was to arrange resignation “with our participation but unnoticeably” (ibid).  However, 
things did not work out in accordance with the initial plan.  In the course of the following 
months it became clear that Filatova would not allow Tsedenbal’s resignation and the 
latter, barely being able to act upon his own will, would not voluntarily agree.  
Ultimately, as Nadirov claims, the resignation had to be executed forcefully and, with use 
of doctors’ testimony, it was decided to firmly pressure the Mongolian leaders to make 
Tsedenbal resign.  However, the official reasons stated were purely medical.  No one 
mentioned Filatova’s behavior or other considerations, probably for political and 
diplomatic reasons.   
 
Batmunkh (2001) admitted that he was not aware of Tsedenbal’s intentions to 




However, he agreed that there were frequent replacements among the high-ranking party 
and government officials in the early 1980s.  For instance, about 30 percent or 12 
members of the 39-member cabinet were replaced in a matter of two years from June 
1981 to mid-1983.  There were numerous other replacments including several Politburo 
members, president of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences Shirendev (for publishing a 
book abroad without permission), deputy Prime Minister and chairman of the People’s 
Control and Inspection Commission Molom (for imposing penalties on some older party 
leaders), chairman of the Price Commission Byambasuren (for wholesale price increase 
on some goods which was disadvantageous for the Sovi t Union), party secretary Jalan-
Aajav (allegedly for being a leader of anti-party group in the 1960s).  Mid-level 
bureaucrats also were reshuffled, particularly in the military, courts, prosecutor’s office, 
and state control and inspection.  Even women’s and youth organizations did not escape 
some restructuring (Batmunkh 2001, 224-227).   
 
The incident with removal of Tsedenbal highlights several important 
developments in Mongolia in the early 1980s.  First, there was an increasing 
dissatisfaction with the economic development and particularly the low efficiency of 
Soviet aid and unfairness of some trade and other economic arrangements with the Soviet 
Union.  Such ideas were started to be openly discussed among the leaders and conveyed 
to the Soviet Union as well.  Thoughts and talks about alternative economic partners 
surfaced perhaps for the first time.  Second, the Soviet political influence was still high, 
but the Soviet leaders started to acknowledge the opinions of Mongolians and became 




country got rid of a dominating leader and his manipulative wife.  Ironically, the role of 
Soviet Union was most crucial in making such a quick decision.  The timing might have 
been beneficial for Mongolia, as soon perestroika and glasnost got under way and more 
serious changes followed.  The succeeding leader – Batmunkh – proved to be much 
milder and more liberal, as his cautious actions with regard to removal of Tsedenbal and 
the subsequent events of 1990 have proven.  
 
After introducing major economic reforms in 1987, the party initiated several 
important changes in the political and social life in the country.  The era of Tsedenbal 
was described as one of “bureaucratic centralism” and “economic stagnation”.  The 
official decision to make changes in the political sphere was made at the 5th plenary 
meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP which took place in December 1988.  
The MPRP started its political reforms with initiating an important process of reassessing 
the past policies of political repression and subsequent rehabilitation of those who were 
executed or imprisoned on charges of treason and counterrevolution. 
 
The reasons for delaying the political reforms were r lated to two factors.  First, 
as with economic reforms, the MPRP leadership had to “study” the experiences with 
glasnost and pluralism in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.  This meant 
careful watching of the processes and examining their party documents.  Second, since 
the focus of the upcoming plenary meeting was going to be on re-evaluating the past 
mistakes, the party leaders had to learn the facts and processes that went on during the 




original documents were kept in the Soviet archives b cause many Mongolians were 
executed in the Soviet Union.  The party leadership requested these documents from the 
Soviet authorities.   Draft documents to be discussed during the plenary meeting were 
published in the daily newspaper.  This was the first incident when high level party 
documents became subject for public discussion (Batmunkh 2001, 21).   
 
Another unprecedented event that took place just before the 5th plenary meeting 
was series of critical articles published in the party newspaper Unen.  The articles were 
critical of leadership style and management of some high-ranking officials – members of 
the politburo Molomjamts, Luvsangombo, and Altangerel, among others.  The articles 
supposedly were written by ordinary citizens who were critical of the leadership 
(although this could not be confirmed).  Readers were astonished.  Although reputed as a 
conservative, a prominent writer and editor-in-chief of the MPRP daily newspaper Unen 
L. Tudev was credited with initiating and supporting these open deliberations (memoirs 
of Lundeejantsan, member of the parliament since 1990). 
 
Journalist T. Galdan recalled that the general expectation (among the 
representatives of the press and general public) was that the Central Committee would 
undertake a major organizational reshuffling and the named people would be removed 
from their high positions during the plenary meeting ( ewspaper Il Tovchoo February 1-
20, 1991, issue 4).  However, no organizational issue  were discussed and no one was 
removed.  Batmunkh (2001) argued that the main goal of the plenary was not to dismiss 




thought it inappropriate to fire officials based on newspaper criticism (ibid, 25).  More 
critical articles followed and soon became a new norm in the mass media.  The above 
individuals – many of retirement age – were eventually removed, but in the following 
year.   
 
The party plenary meeting criticized its own leadership methods as being overly 
centralized, condemned the leadership style of the previous decades as being based 
around certain personalities rather than ideology.  The plenary also proposed democratic 
centralism, openness, and pluralism as its new princi les of leading the country.  In order 
to reinforce the party’s new leadership principles, two commissions – on drafting the new 
party program and on rehabilitating the politically repressed – were established and 
started functioning in 1989.   
 
Following the 5th plenary meeting, political and social initiative of ordinary 
citizens increased significantly.  People started expr ssing their opinions openly and they 
were usually critical of the existing system and its leadership.  In 1989 the Central 
Committee dissolved its own Department of Mass Media and Literature Control, which 
was the main censorship body which controlled the content of media and literary work.  
Several prior decisions about the ideological restrictions were also annulled.  The 
newspapers were now flooded with critical articles about leaders and officials, pointed to 
numerous problems in economic and political life, published previously restricted 
materials related to political repression, etc. (Batmunkh 2001, 39).  Most notably, in light 




experiment with a system of nominating several candidates in the election of the national 
and local assemblies (Sanders 1989, 48).  
 
Sanders concluded that the policy of “openness”, although acting through the 
party-controlled media, brought in “public debate … over a broader range of issues – 
multicandidate elections, the reevaluation of the post-revolutionary history, the 
development of cooperative and private employment”, which “could eventually lead 
Mongolia toward democracy” (Sanders 1989, 53).    
 
Two new phenomena were reported in Mongolia in 1989: the Ministry of Public 
Security investigated “individuals who had been duplicating and distributing ‘slogans’”.  
However, as Minister Major-General Jamsranjav concluded, they were not “anti-state 
groups trying to undermine the socialist system, but “promoters of the acceleration of 
restructuring” (Sanders 1990, 61).  Another unpreced nted event was a strike organized 
by workers at an Ulaanbaatar factory over wages and housing conditions.  The outcome 
of the strike was not reported.  However, a local newspaper noted that Mongolia had no 
law banning or permitting strikes (ibid, 66). 
 
As the reasons for removal of Tsedenbal suggest, broad dissatisfaction among the 
MPRP leaders with the efficiency of Soviet aid was building up in the early-to-mid-
1980s.  P. Ochirbat was appointed in January 1985 as the new Chairman of the State 
Foreign Economic Relations Commission (after serving for 9 years as the Minister of 




Foreign Economic Relations and Acquisition to include the former Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and State Acquisitions Commission as a result of government restructuring.   Upon 
his appointment as the new chairman, his main task was to make estimations and draft a 
document to be sent to the Soviet government about the financial aid required in the 
upcoming five years (i.e., 1986-1990 five year plan).  Ochirbat (1996) recalled that the 
general attitude among the Mongolian leaders in the mid-1980s was that the country was 
receiving huge amount of aid which was not very useful for the country.  The common 
understanding was that there was a lot of unfinished construction, the cost of construction 
was very high, the Soviet technology was obsolete, and the capacity was not fully used, 
i.e., the Soviet-built factories were simply too big for Mongolia (Ochirbat 1996, 98).     
 
There were several issues that the Mongolian governm nt was particularly 
concerned with.  First, the number of Soviet workers, specially in construction, was too 
high.  As a Soviet official claimed, in 1985, Mongolia was hosting a third of all Soviet 
specialists who worked abroad and the Soviet officials regularly pushed for wage 
increase which further fueled the costs (ibid).  It was commonly claimed by the Soviet 
officials that Mongolians lacked the required qualifications which allegedly forced the 
Soviets to bring in their own employees.  Second, the dominant form of financial 
assistance was in the form of turnkey projects where the Soviet side completed the entire 
project including construction and equipment without involvement from the Mongolian 
side.  No information on the actual costs of turnkey projects was given to the Mongolian 
government, although it was receiving big loans to finance these projects.  Third, the 




economy of Mongolia.  Ochirbat in an interview with acclaimed Soviet journalist from 
the magazine Ekho Planety Vladimir Ionov candidly admitted the low efficiency and 
obsoleteness of some of the Soviet factories built in Mongolia.  For instance, financial 
estimates showed that a poultry farm and poultry processing plant built near Ulaanbaatar 
was to recover its initial investment only after 200 years of operation.  A fur factory 
completed in 1988 in Ulaanbaatar used the technology of the 1960s.  A large-scale timber 
processing plant in Tosontsengel (western province of Zavkhan) required that the entire 
forest of western Mongolia be cut within a year in order to operate on a full scale (from 
interview with Ochirbat, translated and printed in full in the newspaper Unen, January 28, 
1989, issue 24).  
 
The document sent in 1985 to the Soviet leaders raised several original points.  
First, it was crucially important to reduce the costs of construction.  It was proposed to 
increase the number of Mongolian workers employed in the Soviet construction 
companies from 3,000 (employed at the time) to 17,000 which would bring the cost down 
and improve the qualifications of the Mongolian workers.  Second, reduce the number of 
turnkey projects and increasingly involve Mongolian construction and other companies in 
completing the projects financed with loans.  This will ensure transparency in cost 
estimates and reduce the costs.  Third, it was proposed to improve domestic capacity and 
involvement in preparation of future projects to be developed and financed with loans.   
 
The Soviet Union was not supportive of the above ideas, although some partial 




was provided to the Mongolian government on 7-10 board items instead of one bulk 
number.  Costs of few construction projects were bargained down by about 10 percent 
(Ochirbat 1996, 102).  
 
Mongolia made a big splash in Western media in 1987 when Gorbachev 
announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Mongolia and Mongolia 
established diplomatic relations with the United States.  Both events had major 
implications on the country’s geopolitical future, signaling that Mongolia’s relations with 
China would improve and it was diversifying its foreign relations outside the Soviet 
camp.  Both Mongolia and the United States made some efforts to establish diplomatic 
relations in the mid-1980s.  However these efforts were not encouraged by the Soviet 
Union until 1986 when the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Mongolia and 
noted that he would support Mongolia’s official relations with the USA, thus leading to 
establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1987 (Batmunkh 2001, 34).  First ever 
official visits of Foreign Minister Dugersuren to Japan and Australia the same year were 
also important signs of such diversification (Jarrett 1988, 84). 
 
The trend strengthened in the following years, when s ries of agreements were 
signed with China and trade picked up; the Soviets continued withdrawing its troops with 
15, 000 (or 25 percent) withdrawn in 1987 and further 8,000 in 1988.  The search for new 
economic partnership started with the two advanced countries that had diplomatic 
relations with Mongolia at the time: Japan and UK.  Ochirbat recalled several occasions 




business people in 1987 and 1989 about possibilities of trading with and investing in 
Mongolia, most notably in cashmere production and oil explorations.  Trade with Japan 
doubled in 1988 compared to 1987, following the establishment of Mongolia-Japan 
intergovernmental economic commission (Sanders 1990).  However, no major 
investments were agreed upon (Ochirbat 1996, 110).  Efforts of diversification intensified 
in the subsequent the year, when Japanese Foreign Minister visited Mongolia in 1989 and 
Prime Minister Sodnom went on a first trip to Japan in February 1990. 
 
2.4. Conclusion: Slow and Ultimately Failed Reforms 
 
The late communist period in Mongolia is hardly studied.  The processes in the 
second half of the 1980s very much reflect what wasgoing on in the rest of the Eastern 
bloc.  Yet, I believe this period in Mongolia differed significantly from other countries.  
Mongolia fared relatively well compared to the Soviet Union and other centrally planned 
economies in terms of economic and social performance i  the late socialist period.  One 
could argue that the seemingly decent economic performance did not make the reforms as 
urgent as elsewhere.  Was it the realization of the economic problems or the influence of 
the events in the Soviet Union that pushed the rulers to move forward with the reforms?  
And, most importantly, could these reforms solve the mounting principal-agent problems 
in a more effective way so that the central plan would be sustained as a system in the 






In 1984, there was a change in the ruling elite of the country.  Tsedenbal, who 
was an extreme pro-Soviet communist leader and rule th  country for some 40 years, 
stepped down for health reasons, with the help of the Soviet Union.  Batmunkh, who 
succeeded him, was believed to be more liberal and tolerant, although a close ally of his 
predecessor.  Former top planner Namjim argues that Batmunkh’s coming to power – and 
his strong economics background – had positive effect on the advancement of the reforms 
(Namjim 2004, 789).  In his report to the 19th Party Congress (1986) and subsequent 
plenary meetings (1988 and 1989) Batmunkh noted that pressing forward with 
comprehensive reforms encompassing the political, eonomic, ideological, and social 
spheres of the society has become an important goal of the party.   
 
In an interview Namjim asserts that the reforms were not urgent under the 
economic conditions in Mongolia.  He disagrees with those who insist that the socialist 
economy was in a crisis situation or even stagnatio ( he Soviet leader Gorbachev called 
the 1970-1980s a period of stagnation in the Soviet Union).  Mongolia continued 
enjoying relatively good economic times launching major investment projects.  If we 
look at the macroeconomic data for this period, growth was maintained at about 6 percent 
and was the highest among the CMEA countries (Table 2.7 and Table 2.8).  However, the 
fiscal and foreign trade data reveal that the economic situation in Mongolia was not all 
that positive.  The budget data presented earlier (Table 2.1) illustrate the effect of 





This was conditioned by two inter-related developments in the foreign economic 
relations of Mongolia.  First, the terms of trade worsened significantly during the late 
communist period.  This meant that Mongolia needed either to adjust its foreign trade 
policies or face severe balance of payment difficulties.  However, the economy was not 
able to make the necessary structural changes to adjust to the relative prices on the 
international market.  This imbalance was deepening throughout the 1970s and more 
profoundly in the 1980s.  Second, since no structural changes were made, the Mongolian 
rulers needed increased inflow of foreign exchange i  order to maintain the same and 
even increasing levels of imports.  The balance of payment deficit was financed by the 
inflow of investment and trade loans from the Soviet Union. As we have seen from Table 
2.6, all types of foreign loans increased substantially in the 1980s, particularly trade loans 
which covered the balance of payment deficit.  They amounted to almost 40 percent of 
total loans by the end of the 1980s.   
 
Overall, the leaders positively assessed (at least officially) the economic and 
social development of the country.  Batmunkh, the Secretary General of the Central 
Committee of the MPRP, emphasized in his report to the party plenary meeting in 
December 1985 that the main planned targets for the 7th five-year plan (1981-1985) were 
successfully fulfilled and several major investment projects were completed.  Due to the 
increased inflow of foreign aid, the economy continued to perform at the acceptable 
levels into the late 1980s.  D. Sodnom, who served as the Prime Minister during this time, 
summarized that the Mongolian economy was not performing better compared to other 




as elsewhere.  However, it was not in crisis either, owing to the Soviet assistance 
(interview with Sodnom).   
 
However, the party leadership was increasingly dissati fied with some aspects of 
economic performance.  First, they started to question the usefulness and efficiency of 
large amounts of loans provided by the Soviet Union and fast-growing foreign debt.  By 
and large, the general atmosphere was that large amounts of loans are being imposed on 
Mongolia without proper financial calculations in the form of often large-scale obsolete 
factories that did not accommodate the capacity and nee s of the country.  Although not 
openly anti-Soviet, some leaders raised the issue of inequitable trade and economic 
arrangements agreed with the Soviet Union and achieved some success in amending 
previous agreements.  The Soviet Union, perhaps due to the newly prevailing spirit of 
openness and plurality, accepted some of the offers proposed by the Mongolian leaders.  
 
It was acknowledged that in spite of substantially increased industrial potential, 
efficiency rates remained unsatisfactory.  Labor prductivity lagged behind the capital 
intensity: about one fifth of SOEs in the industrial, construction, and transportation 
sectors did not fulfill the planned targets for increasing labor productivity and over one 
third fell short of fulfilling the planned targets for reducing average production costs 
(Report of J. Batmunkh at the 11th Plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the 
MPRP on December 4, 1985).  As a result, by the 1980s, growth has slowed down; 
domestic resources for investment were still scarce; efficiency and labor productivity 




fixed prices created no incentives for individual enterprises, plan being imposed from 
above left little discretion and incentive for SOEs to produce more.  The reforms were 
initiated to speed up development, improve efficieny and give incentives to the SOEs to 
perform better (interview with D. Sodnom).   
 
Namjim notes that the external ideological influenc – namely the perestroika 
launched by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union – played th  key role in the reform process.  
The influence of the Soviet reforms – as any other political and ideological influence 
exercised in the course of several decades – should n t be underestimated.  As Prime 
Minister Sodnom – also a prominent economist who was appointed to this post in 1984 
replacing Batmunkh – emphasized in his mid-1987 speech that the government’s reforms 
proposals were in line with the “revolutionary ideas of perestroika”initiated by Mikhail 
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.  Mongolian leaders always carefully observed and 
followed the developments in the USSR.  Some of other party leaders critically evaluated 
the situation in Mongolia as lagging behind the initiatives not only in the Soviet Union 
but also in Central and Eastern Europe.  Nonetheless the top leadership took a gradual 
approach.  
 
Former Finance Minister G. Davaasambuu states that the central plan attempted to 
reinvent itself in all socialist countries in order to survive.  The CMEA countries 
discussed the issues of efficiency and perestroika at the highest level such as the 
secretaries of the communist parties.  A summit of socialist leaders was held in Sofia, 




reforms in order to improve efficiency and reinvent the central plan.  Mongolia followed 
the lead, for the following two reasons.  First, Mong lia had to coordinate its 
international and domestic policies with other socialist countries.  Since the reform was 
on the agenda, we also put efforts in order to imple ent similar reforms.  Second, 
Mongolia had tried to improve the efficiency by introducing certain incentive 
mechanisms since the 1960s, as did other socialist countries.  But these measures 
exhausted themselves and a new wave of reforms was desperately needed (personal 
interview with Davaasambuu).  
 
Interviews with individuals who led the reform process in the 1980s reveal some 
divergence in the opinion but they all agree, firstly, that the reforms were necessitated 
both by the domestic circumstances of sluggish growth rates as well as external factors, 
such as worsening terms of trade and reforms launched in the Soviet Union.  It should be 
noted that the reforms in Mongolia were launched relatively late compared to Central and 
Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union.  Secondly, i  terms of the scope, the reforms 
were quite similar to the Soviet perestroika.  They did yield partial positive changes in 
selected enterprises in terms of increasing output levels.  However, overall the reforms 
were not considered successful or far-reaching.  Thirdly, the reforms could not achieve its 
main objective of “reinventing” the central plan because it did not touch the very sources 
of deadweight loss and inefficiency, namely the state ownership and fixed price system 
and the related phenomenon of soft budget constraint.  Although the very first steps – 




politically too costly and damaging for the communist rulers to undertake further 
reforms, e.g., retail price liberalization, at least in the late 1980s.   
 
I believe two important observations were overlooked in the previous studies, yet 
had very important repercussions on the events and policies that followed.  Evidence 
points to the fact that the Mongolian leaders were the followers and sometimes observers 
of the radical events taking place throughout the region in the second half of the 1980s.  
These events were imposed on the country’s leaders and they were not quick to respond.  
The late launch and slow implementation of the perestroika type of reforms contributed 
to the growing frustration among the masses and the new elite and disrepute of the old 
leadership which probably contributed to the quick and successful overthrow of the 
regime. 
 
The slow economic reforms also meant that little devolution of power occurred in 
the late communist period to the lower levels of burea cracy, SOEs, and local 
governments.  Gorbachev is often accused of dismantling the control system while the 
state still was the residual claimant, which, many believe, led to strengthening of the 
bureaucrats and regional governors, massive looting f the system and its ultimate 
bankruptcy.  This also defined the privatization and partial economic reform process.  In 
Mongolia we still observe highly centralized economy and still strong control of the 
resources by the center.  This contributed to the more or less egalitarian nature of the 
privatization and relatively fast economic reforms.  These issues will be discussed in 




Important political developments – reassessing the past policies and practices, 
openness and self-criticism, rehabilitation of those who were unjustly repressed on 
political grounds, increased diversification in foreign relations – fueled mass deliberation 
and lessened the fear among the people who now openly criticized the system.  Thus, we 
observe changes both in the economic management – albeit relatively slow – as well as 
political governance in the late 1980s.  However, in spite of these precipitating events, 
and the fact that it was becoming more and more clear that the system was disintegrating, 
the subsequent events – including political developments – came as a shock for the rulers.  
In the face of sudden shock, the gradual reforms launched in the late 1980s could not 
catch up with the new political and economic developments.  The demise of the central 







Chapter 3 Democratic Political Changes (1989-1996) 
 
 
Inspired by the developments in Eastern Europe and policies of openness declared 
by the party leadership in 1988, the first fledglin dependent civil society movements 
were formed in Mongolia at the very end of the 1980s, i.e., relatively late compared to 
countries in Eastern Europe. The political group called “Shine Ue” (translated as the 
“New Generation”) was formed in October 1988 and headed by E. Bat-Uul.  As active 
member of the group S. Amarsanaa later recalled, on the ight of January 2-3, 1989, they 
printed over 100 political leaflets and posted them around the city, on the streets, in 
student dormitories, university campuses, and some stat enterprises, which marked the 
beginning of a more active political engagement.  Naturally, the leaflets created certain 
panic within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  They were taken off shortly and the 
ministry started watching the new groups more closely (Dashzeveg 1998, 18-19).   The 
“Shine Ue” group expanded to form the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) in 
December 1989 and a shortly thereafter the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP).   
 
The “Young Economists’ Club” was another semi-underground group organized 
in April 1989 by young economists who graduated from universities in the Soviet Union 
and other Eastern European countries.  D. Ganbold led the group.  The group initially was 
closely watching the economic perestroika efforts in the Soviet Union and later got 
interested in deeper market reforms.  They were the cor  group which eventually 




(MNPP).  The first economic reforms initiated in 1990-1992 by the coalition government, 
including the mass privatization program, were the brainchild of this group.   
 
A group of mathematicians and scientists at the Nation l University of Mongolia 
also formed a new movement called the Democratic Socialist Movement in 1990 which 
later transformed into the Mongolian Social Democrati  Party (MSDP).  B. Batbayar, 
biochemist by training and one of the leaders of this group, studied in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s in Krakow, Poland.  When the Solidarity movement was officially registered 
and ‘national warning strike’ against the communist regime erupted in Poland in the 
spring of 1981, he and others who studied in Poland were forced to leave the country and 
transferred to domestic universities in Mongolia.  Apparently the MPRP considered the 
influence of the dissident events in Poland to be too dangerous for Mongolian students.  
However, as Batbayar admitted, witnessing the events in Poland undoubtedly had an 
important influence on his outlook and later involvement in the democratic events in 
Mongolia (interview with Batbayar).  He wrote several articles in 1988 and 1989 – under 
the pseudonym Baabar by which he became famous – about Mongolia’s independence 
and called for dramatic political changes.  These rebellious articles were distributed 
secretly among the newly emerging political groups and students.  Baabar’s articles 
became widely popular by the end of 1989 and early 1990 when the mass events broke 
out.  
 
There were few other underground groups mostly based in the universities.  The 




fledgling movements joined together by the late 1989.  S. Zorig, who was a young 
Moscow-trained lecturer of political science at theNational University of Mongolia, 
became the main coordinator of the new movements.   
 
The movements were led mostly by the intellectual elite who were trained in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  Zorig was a son of a prominent scholar Sanjaasuren, 
Dean of the Social Science Faculty at the National University. The “Shine Ue” movement 
was led by Bat-Uul who was a son of a famous Mongolian writer Erdene.  The 
Democratic Socialist Movement included people from the academia (mostly 
mathematicians and scientists) and most of them were s lf-made intellectuals, some of 
them from the rural areas. Baabar, a biochemist trained in Poland, spent a year in 1989 in 
the UK conducting research.  Gonchigdorj received his P D in mathematics from a well-
known university in the Soviet Union.   
 
The Young Economist Club members were mostly children of the elite.  
Ganbold’s father was a well known economist and academic who also represented 
Mongolia in CMEA and the family lived in Moscow for some time.  Sukh-Erdene was a 
son of a prominent Mongolian diplomat and also lived abroad, including the USA.  He 
was a great grandson of Sukhbaatar, the Mongolian le der from the 1920s who led the 
anti-Chinese and later communist revolution.  Zoljargal and Bold, both bankers, were 
Hungarian-trained economists and children of the elit .  Enkhsaikhan, who led the club, 
was a Soviet-trained economist and worked for the Ministry of Foreign Economic 





Thus, the ‘revolutionaries’ who led the democratic movement were a well-
educated and relatively privileged selective group, mostly children of the elite or self-
made intellectuals, who were exposed relatively early to dissident ideas through their 
education or knowledge of foreign language.  There were other members – especially in 
the Shine Ue group which later turned into the Mongolian Democratic Union – who were 
less educated and held more extreme views.  However, they were not as influential or 
were removed from decision making.  Amarsanaa, a founding member of the Shine Une 
and a Soviet-trained journalist who worked for the labor union newspaper “Hudulmur” 
(translated as labor) recalled in a recent memoir that some members were punished for 
remarks and behavior that was considered damaging for the new political forces.  Thus, 
D. Sukhbaatar was expelled from the Democratic Union’s General Consultative Council 
(its governing body) for announcing at a public meeting that he was number one hooligan 
of Tosontsengel town in the western aimag of Zavkhan (Amarsanaa 2012).  The 
announcement was probably the truth but the new political groups wanted to avoid an 
image of a street gang.  
 
3.1. Popular Uprising and Political Roundtable Negotiations 
(December 1989 – May 1990) 
 
The first popular spirit of radical change surfaced at the so-called Second National 
Conference of Young Artists which was held in Ulaanb atar on December 8-10, 1989.  
The podium of the conference became a political podium for sharp criticism of the 




in the country and elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc.  The spirit carried over to the broader 
masses and the Mongolian Democratic Union – the first political organization besides the 
MPRP – was announced on December 10, 1989.  The MDUheld series of mass 
gatherings in the following weeks which were attended by a continuously increasing 
number of people.  
 
At the first meeting held on December 10, 1989 the MDU delivered a political 
petition to the Central Committee of the MPRP and the People’s Great Khural (please see 
the original document in Appendix 1).  The petition noted that the reform efforts of the 
leadership (designed on the Soviet perestroika and glasnost) were not giving positive 
outcomes and more radical changes were needed.  In particular, the petition put forward 
13 political demands aimed at political democratization and market economic reforms.  
This initial document laid the foundation for the political and economic changes in the 
country and was sharply distinct from the reform efforts of the late 1980s (Ochirbat 1996, 
137).   
 
The document focused on the following issues, among others: (i) restrict the 
powers of the MPRP in the state affairs, separate the hegemonic party from the state, 
allow multiple political parties: (ii) create a permanent parliament; (iii) change the 
election system, hold the next elections in the first half of 1990; (iv) protect freedom of 
speech and freedom of press; (v) admit party mistake , rehabilitate the politically 
repressed persons and pay compensation to their families; and (v) introduce socially 
oriented market economy.  These ideas were reiterated in the subsequent petitions and 





3.1.1 First Mass Meetings and the Hunger Strike 
 
 
In few days (December 13, 1989) the Central Committee of the MPRP held its 7th 
plenary meeting and announced that the party was committed to its course of perestroika 
and glasnost and its ultimate goal of building socialism.  Since the political plea of the 
MDU was not addressed in any way in the MPRP’s initial decision, the union had to 
continue its political fight by staging more mass protests.  These attracted an increasing 
number of people, became more critical of the regim and gained interest from the 
international community and international mass media.  News about democratic uprising 
in Mongolia was widely broadcast on major international stations.  This news was not 
available in Mongolia for the broader public, with the exception of a Soviet channel 
which ran the news of the first mass meeting in December 1989 in Ulaanbaatar.  Most 
notably, the Mongolian media was mute on the subject (Amarsanaa 2012).  Some 
protesters might have had access through various channels including foreign journalists, 
who entered the country on tourist visa and started reporting on the events in Mongolia 
(ibid).  The banners at the meetings read “Democracy is our goal”, “Multiparty system”, 
“Freedom of speech and press”, “Time to wake up”, “End the hegemony of the MPRP”.  
The crowd at the meetings consisted of many types of pe ple.  In addition to those who 
genuinely believed in and demanded democracy and human rights, there were 
nationalists, extremists, descendants of those who were justly or unjustly punished or 
repressed by the MPRP, the radicals within the MPRP, cautious observers, and mere 





D. Sodnom, then the Prime Minister and member of the politburo, recalls in his 
memoirs that the 7th plenary meeting on December 13 of the Central Committee of the 
MPRP did not discuss openly the political situation in the country.  The petition was 
handed over to one of the politburo members (there w r  seven members at the time), but 
neither that member nor the party leader Batmunkh touched upon this issue.  Sodnom 
argues that the top party leadership was not ready to iscuss the radical political changes 
as demanded by the MDU because the issue was never rais d before and they did not 
know how to respond to it.  The issue of political hange, including amending the 
Constitution, was discussed before but never meant to make any systemic changes.  The 
main focus of discussion therefore was the deepening of economic reforms.  Sodnom 
himself, responsible for the economy, explained the negative economic repercussions of 
quick market reforms – sudden price liberalization etc. – and pushed for gradual 
economic reforms (Sodnom 2003, 107-114).  The lack of discussion about the emerging 
situation may have indicated not only the fact thatit caught the party off guard.  
Apparently, there was significant (but silent) disagreement among the party leadership 
about these events and how to proceed.  Some members of the politburo may have started 
thinking who will succeed, if the party leader resigns under the popular pressure.  In any 
case, there was little unity around the party leader nd, at least initially, no debate about 
the political situation.  This ultimately led to the initial lack of action and some delay in 
resolving the situation.  Sodnom admits that the party leader Batmunkh showed little 






After several public protests, the MPRP finally deci d to hold negotiations with 
the MDU and several other political movements such as the Democratic Socialist 
Movement, the National Progress Movement, and the Sudent Movement.  The first 
negotiations were held on January 19, 1990 but did not lead to any positive change.  
Opinions could not be reconciled.  The first congress of the MDU was organized on 
February 18, 1990.  The government decided to send its representatives to the congress.  
The first deputy Prime Minister D. Byambasuren, party official Dr. K. Zardykhan, and 
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Acquisitions P. Ochirbat were selected by 
the MPRP to attend and observe the congress.  These t ree were among the most radical 
elements within the MPRP. The congress approved its charter and prepared another 
political plea to the Central Committee of the MPRP and the parliament, but this time 
demanding them to resign, form the so-called People’s T mporary Khural (Assembly) to 
replace the existing assembly and make political decisions until the new parliament is 
formed as a result of free elections, and call for elections.  Series of repeated pleas were 
sent to the Central Committee and largely ignored or rejected throughout February 1990.   
 
Lack of action on the MPRP side forced the newly formed democratic movements 
to opt for a more dramatic measure.  On March 7, 1990, at 2:00 pm ten protesters 
representing the various movements announced a political hunger strike on the main 
square of the capital city demanding the resignatio of the politburo and the government.  
Dozens of other members were protecting the strikers from the police.  The number of 




people who later rose to prominence and served as members of parliament and cabinet 
members.  The political situation became extremely charged and volatile.  Fast action 
was needed.  In the afternoon of March 8, Prime Minister Sodnom and Deputy Prime 
Minister Byambasuren met with the leaders of the protesters, including Bat-Uul, Zorig, 
and Baabar.  It was agreed to meet in the studio of the national television.  The meeting 
was broadcast live nationwide.  The government representatives condemned the 
protesters for risking people’s health and life by taking such an extreme measure.  They 
further explained that the resignation of the politburo and the government should be 
decided by their respective governing bodies and not just by its top leadership.  They 
argued that the decision had to be collegial.  They also informed that the plenary meeting 
of the Central Committee would convene in 4 days and the session of the People’s Great 
Khural shortly thereafter, where the final decision would officially be made.  Naturally, 
the protesters were not satisfied with such explanatio s, although they may have seen that 
change was coming (interview with Byambasuren and Sodnom 2003, 121-123).   
 
3.1.2 Resignation of the Politburo 
 
 
In the afternoon of March 9, 1990, members of the politburo, members of the 
cabinet and some deputies of the People’s Great Khural gathered in the Government 
House to discuss the situation and possible ways to res lve it.  Many issues were 
discussed and various opinions expressed.  But the discussion ultimately centered around 
two issues. First, it was suggested that the Prosecutor General announces the activities of 




the hunger strikers.  In fact, there was no legal regulation of any mass demonstrations.  
Therefore, second, it was also suggested that the People’s Great Khural issues a decree 
forbidding any public gathering or public protest in Ulaanbaatar and introduce a special 
regime in major government buildings and objects (Ochirbat 1996, 139).   
 
As agreed two days earlier, the Ministry of Public Safety, Ministry of Justice and 
Arbitration, Prosecutor’s Office, and the Supreme Court were to draft such a resolution.  
Accordingly, the draft resolution officially titled “On the Extraordinary Measures of 
Restoring Public Order in Ulaanbaatar City” was prepar d.  The draft resolution was a 
short document which centered around two issues.  The first clause stipulated that starting 
from March 10 until July 1, 1990, any public gatherings and protests were prohibited on 
the streets within the Small Ring Road of Ulaanbaatar (which captures the city center and 
adjacent area), at railway station and airport or near any other object under government 
surveillance (e.g., power stations).  Second, the government, police, and city authorities 
were to implement some extreme measures to restore public order, including restricting 
public movement in the city center, controlling traffic, introducing curfew if necessary, 
reinforcing security of special objects as telecommunications, power stations, water 
reservoirs, etc.  Citizens were prohibited from advocating public disorder, distributing 
leaflets, and carrying firearms and cold steel.  In case of non-obedience from the citizens, 
the government was authorized to use armed force in order to restore public order.   
 
At the politburo meeting which took place earlier on the same day, Batmunkh 




measure to introduce a special temporary regime in Ulaanbaatar and did not address the 
need for a legal document that would regulate mass g therings and demonstrations in 
general.  It was agreed earlier that the demonstrations need to be regulated legally and 
such a document was non-existent and needed to be developed and approved.  Second, 
Batmunkh was convinced that taking extreme measures suggested in the resolution would 
not resolve the situation but rather likely to exacerbate it by adding oil to fire.  Naturally, 
it did not mean that the country leader was against y government regulation or 
measure.  Rather, he advocated more peaceful means so that the situation does not grow 
out control and expand into violent interactions (Batmunkh 2003, 60).    
 
The minutes of the extended meeting – which included some cabinet members 
and leadership of the People’s Great Khural and which took place in the afternoon of 
March 9 – demonstrate that opinions diverged (see th  minutes of this meeting in 
Appendix 2).  The very fact that such a resolution was drafted in the first place indicates 
that there was a group of hardliners who preferred forceful action.  At the meeting, they 
pushed for the resolution to be passed promptly and military action taken.  Others were 
more cautious.  The discussion focused on potential consequences of using force (and not 
using force), which were not clear at all.  It was al o noted that the police and internal 
troops would not be able to secure such a big perimeter as Small Ring Road.   
 
Most notably, Minister of Public Security A. Jamsranjav insisted that such 
decision should not be taken and, even if made, could not be enforced.  He threated to 




resolution changed his position stating that the day before he supported using force, 
however now he thought that this would not be effectiv .  The concern about how the 
resolution would be perceived by international community was raised by several 
attendees.  Ultimately, the party leader Batmunkh decided that the decree should not be 
issued and the issue would be further discussed among the politburo members (Ochirbat 
1996, 139; Batmunkh 2001, 58-64).  He noted that resignation of the politburo was 
possible.   
 
The politburo met on the same day, half an hour after the end of the above 
meeting.  Seven full members of the politburo and few candidate members as well as 
party secretaries all attended the meeting.  The meeting lasted about an hour.  Batmunkh 
recalled that in a critical situation like this, noone expressed their opinion openly and 
everyone waited for the leader to speak out.  Without much explanation, Batmunkh stated 
that the dire political situation in the country and the need to resolve it quickly and non-
violently requires undertaking some extreme measures.  He proposed that the politburo 
should resign and convey its decision to the upcoming plenary meeting (to be held in 
three days) and make it formal.  Batmunkh recalled that the politburo members looked 
shocked and kept silent for a while, after which Batmunkh’s deputy Ts. Namsrai told that 
it was probably the right decision.  Since the decision was an important one, Batmunkh 
did not take a vote but rather asked every member to personally communicate his 
decision.  Everyone agreed.  Batmunkh noted that it still remains a mystery who 
genuinely agreed to resignation and who was forced to agree under peer pressure 





 The decision not to take forceful actions against the protesters and attempts to 
find peaceful solutions to the emerging political situation was conveyed to the democratic 
movements.  The person to expose himself to the infuriated protesters and their leaders 
was Deputy Prime Minister Byambasuren.  It was agreed that the Secretary General 
Batmunkh makes public announcement about the decision of the politburo, which he did 
in the evening of March 9 on the national TV and called for protesters to immediately 
stop the hunger strike.  After the speech of Batmunkh, the hunger strike was dissolved at 
10:00 pm.    
 
The 8th plenary meeting of the Central Committee took place on March 13, 1990.  
The politburo officially resigned.  It was decided to hold an extraordinary congress of the 
MPRP in April.  Unlike the previous plenary, some animated discussions went on during 
this meeting.  About 70 members of the Central Committee expressed their opinion on 
the current issues, democratic changes, market economic reforms, changes in the 
Constitution, separation of the party from the state, new state structure, and the future of 
the party (Sodnom 2003, 115 and 124).  With the resignation of its top leadership, G. 
Ochirbat was appointed the new leader of the MPRP. 
 
P. Ochirbat noted in his memoirs that this plenary meeting marked the end of the 
perestroika-type of reforms and the beginning of the Mongolian democratic political 
reforms (Ochirbat 1996, 140).  A group of fifteen radical reform-oriented scholars led by 




which was adopted by the Central Committee and served as the basis for its change.  The 
reform program was developed on an open letter they sent earlier to the Central 
Committee which was published in the MPRP official newspaper “Unen” on February 
23, 1990.  On March 20, 1990 the next 9th plenary meeting took place and discussed the 
issues of organizing an extraordinary party congress and resignation of the current 
government and leaders of the parliament as well as appointment of the new Prime 
Minister, cabinet members, and the Chairman of the People’s Great Khural (nominally 
head of the state).  
 
The next day, March 21, the session of the People’s Great Khural took place.  
Batmunkh officially resigned from his post of the Chairman of the Presidium of the 
People’s Great Khural and Sodnom from his post of the Prime Minister.  The new interim 
government – to be in power until the next elections – was now led by the then 
Agriculture Minister Sh. Gungaadorj.  Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Acquisitions P. Ochirbat24 became the new head of the state.  The radical reform rs 
Byambasuren was promoted to the post of the First Deputy Prime Minister, and 
Zardykhan to the post of Deputy Prime Minister.  The March 1990 session of the 
People’s Great Khural not only appointed new head of the state and the government, but 
also made several important political changes.  It amended the Constitution of 1960 to 
abolish the special status of the MPRP as the vanguard and leading force in the society.  
Article 82 of the amended Constitution legalized the multi-party system in Mongolia.  
The amendment to the Constitution was approved on March 23, 1990.  On the same day 
                                                
24 Please note that there were two different people with the name Ochirbat: G. Ochirbat, the new party 




the session of the People’s Great Khural issued a decree on the new (interim) structure of 
the state.  It was suggested to create the State Small Khural (a permanent parliament), the 
lower chamber of the parliament, and the new post of the President of Mongolia.  The 
proposed amendments to the Constitution were to be discussed at the next session of the 
People’s Great Khural.  A working group comprised of 25 prominent lawyers, many of 
whom were important politicians, to prepare the official amendment to the Constitution 
about the new structure of the state was appointed on March 23.  The working group was 
assigned to prepare the draft amendments before the end of April.  Another working 
group headed by the Justice Minister O. Jambaldorj was appointed to prepare the draft 
law on political parties and publicly discuss it.  
 
In the meantime the new democratic forces had theirown ideas of reforming the 
state and changing its structure and institutions.  After successfully achieving their 
primary goal of forcing the old leadership into resignation, now they focused on the 
issues of building a new state structure.  Continuous discussions and roundtable 
negotiations were held from March to May 1990.  On April 24 meeting, for instance, the 
Mongolian Democratic Union put forward several issues, including, again, formation of a 
Temporary People’s Khural (assembly) to replace the existing parliament; formation of 
the people’s extraordinary council with equal participation of political parties to evaluate 
the past actions of the MPRP and punish its leaders; r locate the MPRP apparatus from 




space25.  The new MPRP and government leaders did not agree to these demands, with 
the exception of the last point (office space was provided shortly thereafter).   
 
In particular they considered unlawful and unconstitutional the first requirement 
to abruptly dismantle the existing state structure.  They insisted that any changes, even 
the radical ones, should be made as much as possible within the existing legal framework 
or by lawfully amending the existing legal framework.  So far, the resignation of the 
politburo was decided on by a due process of the party regulations.  The MPRP 
leadership believed that the due process was even more i portant in making changes to 
the state structure.  They did not rule out radical ch nges, however these would have to 
be made only by the legitimate means of changing the laws.  The only establishment that 
had the nominal power to make changes to the existing laws and the constitution was the 
general session of the People’s Great Khural. 
 
The MPRP could not acquiesce to the pressure to establish a joint commission to 
evaluate and prosecute the old party leaders.  Theyargued that the only legal authority to 
judge people and prosecute them if necessary lied wthin the courts, and not some vague 
partisan institution as “the people’s council”.  The leadership was firm on this issue.  It 
was not only illegitimate, but there also might have been a degree of fear of vendetta by 
the outraged masses (although perhaps not as severe as in Romania).   
 
 
                                                
25 At the time all buildings were state owned and the newly formed political parties could not rent office 





Box 3.1 Chronology of political events, Dec 1989 – Sep 1990 
 
Dec 10 – First political protest took place where th Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) was 
announced.  The protesters demanded separation of the Communist Party from the state, multiparty 
system, permanent parliament, free and fair elections t  be held in the first half of 1990, free press, and 
rehabilitation of the politically repressed by the MPRP 
 
Dec 12 – The 7th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP took place but no response to 
the political demands of the MDU was made. 
 
Dec 17 – The second meeting (protest) of the MDU took place, about 2,000 people attended, the 
banners of the protesters read “Free press”, “Democracy is our goal”, “Don’t be afraid, do it”.  The 
MDU presented its political program. 
 
Dec 28 – Democratic Socialist Movement (DSM, the second political movement with social-democratic 
aspirations, mainly consisted of mathematicians and other academics) was announced. 
 
Jan 4, 1990 – The DSM announced its platform to be the welfare of the people.  
 
Jan 14 – The third protest of the MDU was attended by over 10,000 people.  The protesters demanded 
repeatedly the MPRP to respond to their political pleas.   
 
Jan 19 – The New Progress Movement (NPM, the third movement, consisted mainly of young 
economists) was announced. 
 
Jan 19 – The first meeting with some of the leaders of the MPRP took place, but the MPRP did not give 
any positive or even definite answer.   The meeting was broadcast nationwide via radio and television.  
 
Jan 21 – The fourth meeting of the MDU took place on the main square.  The MDU leader Ts. 
Elbegdorj announced that the MDU has about 60 branches nationwide and has over 30,000 supporters. 
More than 20,000 people attended the meeting.  
 
Feb 8 – The DSM sent an open letter to the MPRP leader nd head of the state J. Batmunkh.  They 
demanded him to resign, hold free elections and form a temporary people’s khural (assembly), which 
will develop new Constitution, election laws and other major laws to establish a new democratic 
political system. 
 
Feb 11 - Baabar, a leading author and founding member of the DSM, published as a book and 
distributed publicly several dissenting articles he wrote in 1988-1989.  
 
Feb 11 – Over 30,000 people attended the fifth meeting of the MDU.  
 
Feb 18 –The first congress of the MDU took place.  S. Zorig was appointed the leader of the MDU. 
Simultaneously the Mongolian Democratic Party was announced.  
 
Feb 18 – The first issue of the non-government newspaper “Shine Toli” (“New Mirror”) was printed.  
 
Feb 22 – The statue of Josef Stalin was dismantled by the government, under the popular pressure. 
 
Feb 24 – A joint meeting of the MDU, DSM, NPM, and Students Union took place.  It was agreed to 






Box 3.2 Chronology of political events, Dec 1989 – Sep 1990 (cont’d) 
 
Feb 28 - Democratic forces plead the army and special un ts not to use military action against the 
people and protesters.  
 
Mar 2 – Mongolian Social-Democratic Party was established (based on the DSM). 
 
Mar 3 – Fifteen scholars (mostly members and supporters but few nonpartisan) sent an open letter to the 
Central Committee of the MPRP insisting that radical changes are needed, both in the society and 
within the party. This letter later served as the basis of the new platform for the MPRP 
 
Mar 4 – The first joint meeting of all democratic parties and movements took place and was attended by 
about 90,000 people.  A joint official demand wad handed to the representative of the People’ Great 
Khural (national assembly). The letter demanded the politburo to resign, separate the party from the 
state, form a temporary people’s khural (national assembly) with equal representation of new political 
parties, maintain public order and national sovereignty.  The protesters demanded answers by March 7, 
via national TV and radio.  
 
Mar 6 – Ts. Namsrai, Deputy Chairman of the People’s Great Khural, met with representatives of the 
new political parties and movements and declared that the government could not accept their demands.  
 
Mar 7 – In return, ten members of the MDU announced a hunger strike on the main square.  More 
people joined.  
 
Mar 8 – Massive protest took place.  Deputy Prime Minister D. Byambasuren met with the protesters 
and agreed to hold roundtable negotiations.  The negotiations took place shortly and were broadcast on 
the national television and radio.  However, no definite agreement was reached.  Protests continue.  
 
Mar 9 – Negotiations renewed at 7:00 pm.  D. Byambasuren led the negotiations.  He announced that 
the politburo would resign.  At 9:00 pm Party leader and the head of the state J. Batmunkh publicly 
announced that the plenary meeting would formally deci e on the issue of resignation.  Hunger strike 
stopped at 10:00 pm.  
 
Mar 11 – Mongolian National Progress Party (MNPP) was established.  
 
Mar 12-14 – The 8th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP took place.  The politburo 
officially resigned.  It was decided to hold an extraordinary party congress on April 10. 
 
Mar 21-23 – The 8th session of the People’s Great Khural took place.  Article 82 about the leading role 
of the MPRP was abolished from the Constitution.  Resolution on the new structure of the state is 
issued but not legalized. Working group is appointed to prepare draft amendment to the Constitution to 
include the new state structure.  P. Ochirbat appointed the new head of the state, Sh. Gungaadorj 
appointed the new Prime Minister.  
 
Mar 29 – Political parties and movements held another public meeting and demanded to approve a new 
Law on Political Parties and mass media be released from the control of the MPRP. 
 
 Mar 31 – Mongolian Social-Democratic Party held its f rst congress.  
 
Apr 1 – The People’s Great Khural convened to discus  the draft Law on Political Parties and draft 
amendments to the Constitution.  
 





Box 3.3 Chronology of political events, Dec 1989 – Sep 1990 (cont’d) 
 
 Apr 15 – Three major democratic movements and three major political parties (MDP, MSDP, MNPP) 
signed the “Agreement on Coalition of Democratic Forces”.  
 
Apr 24 – A renewed political demand to (i) form a temporary people’s khural (assembly or legislative 
organ), (ii) form people’s extraordinary council with equal participation of political parties, and (iii) 
relocate the MPRP apparatus (staff) from the Governm nt House was issued by the Democratic Union 
and Democratic Party.  
 
May 4 - The Presidium of the People’s Great Khural le dership () announced that it could not accept 
the above demands of the MDU and MDP. 
 
May 4 – The Social-Democratic Party suggested that the re-emerging critical political situation should 
be resolved through peaceful negotiations.  Roundtable of political parties and movements as well as 
the leadership of the People’s Great Khural took place.  It was explained that te government is taking 
actions to reform the state structure.  The Consultative Council to include all political parties was 
established within the national assembly. The negotiati ns were broadcast on the national TV.  
 
May 7 – All parties signed an agreement that they will not hold any mass protests while the new 
mechanisms of restructuring the state organs are being d veloped.   
 
May 10 – The People’s Great Khural approved the Lawon Political Parties and Law on the 
Amendments to the Constitution on the new structure of the highest state organs introducing the 
presidency and the permanent parliament.   
 
May 15 – The Presidium of the People’s Great Khural announced that the first multi-party elections 
will take place in 75 days.  Political parties launched their election campaigns.  
 
May 16-26 – All political parties were officially registered in accordance with the new Law on Politica  
Parties.  The MPRP was the first to register.  
 
Jun 10 - Political parties held open discussions on the main square about their platforms in the 
upcoming elections.  
 
Jun 16 – Amendments were made to the Election Law about the two-stage majority rule. The first 
round of elections was to be on July 8 (later officially postponed until July 22) and the second – 
between the two candidates who received the largest share of votes – on July 29.  
 
Jul 22 – The first round of elections took place.  
 
Jul 29 – The second round of elections took place.  Voter turnout was 97.8 percent. The MPRP won 
363 seats out of 422 in the People’s Great Khural.  In terms of party preferences, MPRP won 61.8 
percent, MDP – 24.3 percent, MNPP – 5.9 percent, MSDP – 5.5 percent of all votes. Based on the 
proportional representation, they received respectiv ly 31, 13, 3, and 3 seats in the permanent 
parliament, the State Small Khural (total of 50).   
 
Sep 3-10 – A general session of the People’s Great Khural began.  P. Ochirbat appointed the President 
of Mongolia. R. Gonchigdorj appointed Vice President a d Chairman of the State Small Khural. D. 
Byambasuren appointed the Prime Minister. Fifty memb rs of the State Small Khural are appointed.  
 
Sources: Archives of the National Democratic Party, newspaper “Unen”, Ochirbat (1996), Dashzeveg 




However, the MDU continued to push for extreme measures, eventually staging a 
mass picket on April 27 on the main square, which almost broke out into violence.  By 
the time the demonstrators reached the square, it was already secured by the police.  It 
became clear that no government representatives would c me out to talk to them.  They 
already gave their negative answer the previous day. Tens of thousands of people 
gathered and confrontation with the police seemed in vitable.  Zorig, the main 
coordinator, attempted to calm down the outraged masses and make them sit down.  
Ultimately, the democratic leaders succeeded, the demonstration dissolved, and police 
left. 
 
Amarsanaa (2012) recalls that this was a sobering experience for the democrats.  
The split within the MDU was becoming apparent.  More extreme elements led by Dr. 
Nergui (an economist by training and older MDU membr) pushed for further aggressive 
action.  He was the author of the idea to establishing a people council to prosecute the old 
leadership.  However, the leaders agreed that the April 27 picket was a mistake which 
almost cost them their political reputation (as a socially responsible and non-violent 
political force) and political gains they were able to achieve so far, including resignation 
of the politburo and legalization of a multi-party s stem.  This failure had an effect of “a 
bucket of cold water poured over [their] heads” andtaught them to realistically assess the 
delicate political situation and appreciate and build on the previous successes (Amarsanaa 





While some elements of the MDU were pushing for exteme measures, the social 
democrats pleaded that peaceful talks are the only way to resolve the issue and called for 
concessions on both sides.  After the retreat of the MDU, the roundtable discussions held 
on May 5, 1990 at the initiative of the Social Democratic Party reached several very 
important decisions. The April 27 picket did have its positive effect.  Both sides had to 
compromise on their positions.  The MPRP agreed to include other political parties in the 
development of major draft documents and laws and partially reform the state structure 
within the amended legal framework.  The democratic for es backed off with their 
demand to tear down completely the existing state structure and start building the state 
from scratch.  
 
3.1.3 Political Consensus and Constitutional Amendments 
 
 
First, it was agreed to form the Consultative Council within the Presidium of the 
People’s Great Khural.  The role of the Consultative Council was to draft, discuss, and 
agree on the new laws and regulations (e.g., amendmts to the Constitution, Law on 
Political Parties, Election Law, etc).  The Consultative Council should consist of the 
representatives from the MPRP, the Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, and 
the National Progress Party, and professional stafffrom the parliament, government, and 
ministries.  Other political parties were also welcome to join the Council if they wished.  
The main person to coordinate the activities of the Council was B. Chimid, one of the 
most prominent lawyers who later was named “the father of the new constitution”.  




Chimid’s idea to form such a council, which became the main coordination body among 
the various political parties.  The Council made important decisions about the democratic 
political developments that followed. 
 
Second, the parties agreed to propose to the People’s Gr at Khural amendments to 
the relevant laws on the formation of the permanent parliament, the State Small Khural, 
the main legislative body.  It was agreed that the parties would receive seats in the new 
permanent parliament based on the proportional repres ntation, which, in turn, would be 
determined by the popular vote in the run-off elections.  In other words, people will vote 
on their preference about the political parties and based on the share of the voters, 
political parties would receive seats in the Small Khural.  The members of the Small 
Khural would be appointed by the People’s Great Khural.  
 
Third, all political parties participating in the elections will be represented in the 
central and local election committees, as will be described in the Election Law.  
 
Fourth, the issue of forming the People’s Temporary Khural would be further 
discussed by the parties, if necessary.  However, this issue never came up as the 
democratic forces considered the compromise made by the MPRP acceptable.   
 
Lastly, all political parties, which participated in the negotiations, should ensure 
political stability during and after the free elections, during the process of forming the 




protests should take place once the parties agreed on the rules of the game.  This was the 
compromise the democratic forces had to make in order for political developments to 
evolve smoothly (from the minutes of the roundtable negotiations in Ochirbat 1996, 150-
152).  
 
Five days later, on May 10, following this major agreement on reforming the state 
structure, a general session of the People’s Great Khural was held.  All the main 
proposals to amend the Constitution were adopted without much deliberation.  The 
People’s Great Khural traditionally played a role of a rubber stamp, which it did this time 
too, as all main issues were already agreed by the top leadership in consultation with the 
new democratic opposition.  
 
The new Law on the Amendments to the Constitution of the Mongolian People’s 
Republic determined the new (interim) structure.  This law repealed Parts 3 and 4 of the 
Constitution of 1960.  It was a relatively short law with four main parts.  The first part 
concerned the People’s Great Khural and its authorities, which were limited to the 
discussion and approval of the Constitution; and appointment of the President, Vice 
President, the State Small Khural, the Prime Minister, Prosecutor General, and the 
Supreme Judge.  The People’s Great Khural should hold four sessions during its entire 
term (the term was set at five years or until the new Constitution specifies otherwise).  
All law-making authority – with the exception of the Constitution – now rested with the 
new legislative body, the State Small Khural.  The Small Khural was also solely 




reforms, holding public discussion and referenda, ratifying international agreements, and 
so on.  The new permanent – permanent in the sense that it held sessions continuously – 
parliament was proposed to consist of 50 members, three quarters of which should be 
members of the People’s Great Khural.  
 
The new law also introduced the new position of the Pr sident (part 3), who will 
be appointed by the Great Khural and was the symbol of the national unity and 
sovereignty, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.  Authorities of the 
President included ratifying laws, and vetoing the laws and other decisions of both the 
Great and Small Khural.  However, if the Khurals deci d by its majority not to accept 
the veto, the President had to ratify laws and other decisions.   The government (i.e., the 
cabinet) held all executive powers and was accountable o the State Small Khural.  It had 
to develop an action plan and get it approved by the Small Khural.  
 
The new law (one could call it the interim constitution) became effective on the 
first day of forming the new People’s Great Khural following the elections, and was in 
force until the People’s Great Khural approved the new constitution.  Thus, the 
amendment to the constitution determined the principally new interim state structure 
before the free elections took place and the new constitution itself is developed and 
approved by the freely elected parliament.  Under th  new arrangement, the Great Khural 
was to approve the new constitution and the State Small Khural was to determine the 
legal basis for the radical political and economic changes that were proposed and carried 








Following the amendments to the Constitution, the elections were announced to 
be held on July 29, 1990 – 75 days after the approval f the amendments on May 10, 
1990. 
 
The political Consultative Council was formed under the People’s Great Khural 
with participation of the MPRP and five new democrati  parties.  The status and 
authorities of foreign observers were clearly specifi d; including entering the polling 
cabins, filming, being present during the vote counting, interviewing the candidates and 
their campaign managers, review complaints and the follow up decisions of the Election 
Commission, use translators in all their activities (Resolution of July 20, 1990 of the 
Presidium of the People’s Great Khural).  
 
The amended Election Law was based on the major agreements reached by the 
political parties: political parties are free to nominate their candidates; candidates could 
be nominated not only by parties but also movements, NGOs, state enterprises, and even 
citizens.  The elections would consist of two major v tes: a majority vote on the 
individual candidate to represent constituents in the People’s Great Khural and a 
proportional vote on the political parties which would determine the composition of the 
State Small Khural.  The number of seats in the People’s Great Khural was expanded to 
include one candidate from each soum (the smallest administrative unit) and one 




districts which was slightly more than the previous 402 mandates in the old Khural.  The 
Election Law specified that a successful candidate should have gained support of a 
simple majority of constituents in a given district.  Because there were districts with 
several dozen candidates where no candidate could secure the support of half of voters, 
the law was amended to include two stages: preliminary elections to identifying two 
candidates with highest percentage of votes from all candidates who competed, and the 
run-off elections to choose between the two frontrunners.  The preliminary elections were 
held on July 22, 1990.  The run-off elections were held a week later, on July 29, 1990.   
 
3.2.1 First Democratic Elections 
 
 
In some electoral districts (all with a single mandte) there were several dozen 
candidates, at most 72 (district 23 of Ulaanbaatar City).  However, there were 43 national 
districts (out of 430) where initially only single contender declared candidacy.  The 
Election Commission had to make sure that every district had at least two candidates and 
called for more candidates to join the race.  Ultimately, all districts had at least two 
candidates competing.  As the number of districts in the countryside was decided on the 
administrative principle – there were over 300 soums represented – and the average 
population of a soum was around 3,000 people, ruralesidents were greatly 
overrepresented in the People’s Great Khural.  Thiswa  to the advantage of the MPRP 
which traditionally had stronger legs in the localities and to the disadvantage of the new 





In total, there were 2,413 candidates running in 430 districts, of which 1,689 
candidates were from the MPRP, 57 from the National Progress Party, 189 from the 
Democratic Party, and 98 from the Social-Democratic Party (Ardyn Erkh Jul 5, 1990, 
issue 2).  Thus, there were more than one MPRP member candidate in most districts and 
not even one candidate per district from the new parties combined, which reflects the 
peculiarity of the nomination process as well as the lack of influence of the new parties in 
rural areas.   
 
The nomination process was rather unusual, as noted earlier.  Not only political 
parties but also enterprises, schools, and other entities and also citizens could nominate 
candidates in the elections.  The peculiar outcome was that multiple candidates were 
nominated from the MRPP (although officially nominated not by the party itself but other 
entities as well) in single districts.  For instance, the former Prime Minister S. Bayar 
recalled in a recent interview in 2010 that his colleagues at the MONTSAME News 
Agency where he worked as a legal expert, nominated him to run in the 1990 elections 
while he was recovering in the hospital from a leg injury.  On many occasions, the 
constituents of certain districts would invite people to ballot in their districts and express 
their support.  Thus, many prominent public figures, politicians, artists, scientists and 
scholars, etc. were nominated based on the “invitations” they received from certain 
districts.  There were occasions where multiple district  wished that someone represented 
their district and the candidate had to choose among them. The former Prime Minister 
Gungaadorj recalled in a TV interview in January 201  (on the occasion of the 20th 




electoral districts and chose the one that came earliest, from a very remote soum in 
Umnugobi (South Gobi) aimag.  The districts – usually in the rural areas – would 
sometimes be hometowns of the proposed candidates bu  on many occasions they were 
totally unrelated districts.  This indicates that information about the potential candidates 
was scarce and the local authorities – local governors, directors of local state enterprises, 
state and collective farms etc. – usually had a cler advantage in being nominated, and 
eventually elected, in their own districts.  
 
The number of candidates reveals two phenomena.  First, the party discipline was 
lacking, as multiple candidates from the same party r n in the same district.  In fact, 
parties did not play the key role in nominating candidates in the elections.  The 
nomination process was taken over by non-partisan entities such as the government 
agencies and state enterprises, and even groups of ordinary citizens.  This might have 
been due to weak influence of party ideologies in the election process; personal 
qualifications of individual candidates seemed to have been important in the elections of 
the People’s Great Khural, while the various ideologies played more important role in the 
proportional vote to be also cast during the run-off elections.  
 
Secondly, the degree of political competition in the districts varied greatly.  The 
fiercest competition went on in the capital city while there was virtually no competition 
in some rural districts.  This reflects the unequal degree of political development and 
influence of the new democratic movements in various l calities.  And thirdly, the new 




all, the MPRP had an obvious advantage in the elections of the People’s Great Khural.  
Irrespective of the personal or party composition of the People’s Great Khural, the 
proportional vote on parties in the run-off elections would determine the makeup of the 
State Small Khural – the permanent legislature withfull lawmaking authorities – and the 
government.  This last point in the elections was crucially important for the new 
democratic forces, as they had better chances of winning more seats in the State Small 
Khural through the proportional vote. 
 
The first democratic elections in Mongolia were closely watched by the 
international community.  For instance, 27 people from the U.S, Great Britain, Poland, 
and other countries worked as observers of the elections, including U.S. Secretary of 
State James Baker.  Also, some 110 journalists repres nting the press of 20 some 
countries were also present (Dashzeveg 1998, 86).  The news about the free elections in 
Mongolia was broadcast worldwide.  
 
Foreign observers and journalists had the power to actually monitor the vote count 
at the elections posts, along with the Mongolian citizens.  No major incidences of 
breaching the Election Law were reported.  The voter turnover was very high – about 98 
percent – and voter education level was also appropriate because of the high literacy level 
in the country.  By and large, all election stakeholders considered the first elections to be 





As a result of voting for political parties, the MPR  received 61.7 percent of 
votes, the MDP – 24.3 percent, the MNPP – 5.9 percent, the MSDP – 5.5 percent, the 
Green Party – 1.2 percent, and the Free Labor Party – 1.2 percent of votes, respectively.  
Based on the number of votes, the parties received the seats in the State Small Khural 
were split among the parties as follows: MPRP – 31 seats, Democratic Party – 13 seats, 
National Progress Party – 3 seats, and Social Democratic Party – 3 seats (Prohl and 
Sumati, 2009). 
 
Gonchigdorj – prominent member of the MSDP who also served as the Vice 
President of Mongolia during 1990-1992 – argued that t e MPRP won the elections by 
taking over most of the rural seats.  Those who ran on behalf of the MPRP in the rural 
constituencies were predominantly local governors and directors of state farms who 
usually were better known in their localities.  Administrative powers were also allegedly 
used by the local governors in their election campaigns.  More conservative rural 
electorate favored the local heads of the negdels, state farms, and local party leaders.  The 
democratic forces did not have much influence in the rural areas (interview with 
Gonchigdorj). 
 
As a result, the composition of the People’s Great Khural was rather conservative.  
A survey was conducted among the deputies by independent research agency “Shinjeech” 
shortly after the first session. Total of 300 deputies – about three quarters of the newly 




questions on the personal attitude, beliefs and values of the deputies.26  Based on 
responses to multiple questions, the researchers divide  the deputies into five groups 
(Table 3.1): 
 
Table 3.1 Groups within the newly elected People’s Great Khural (based on 
results of the survey) 
 
Groups Beliefs 
“Extreme reformists”  
(6 percent of the 
sample) 
They see highest value in democracy, openness, individual rights and 
liberties (as opposed to collective interests), most c nsistent supporters 
of radical reforms 
“Smart reformers” 
(18.3 percent) 
They value democratic principles and individual liberties but also see the 
need for justice, equality, and order; a strict lega  system which puts 
certain constraints on personal liberties, prevalence of national and group 
interests over individuals; the group has potentially the highest influence 




They are not certain of their convictions, they do not openly support 
either radical democratic or conservative views, they seem to support 
democratic values but at the same time favor restrictions on individual 
liberties; there is a lot of controversy in their current ideas. 
“Cautious group”  
(28.3 percent) 
They are not certain in the advantages of the new political system, 
doubtful whether it will be better than the previous one; they accept 
certain new democratic principles but at the same ti hey try to 
implement or constrain them severely, they hold a “w it and see” 
attitude; they have been good implementers of the old ideology, usually 
highly responsible, if necessary (if the new ideology wins) they will 
become good technocrats under the new system as well. 
“Conservative group”  
(35 percent) 
They hold largely onto the old principles, cautious about giving liberties 
to people, favor restrictions and harsh rules, do not see much value in 
individual liberties; they see the new system as a “reformed old system” 
rather than a totally different system; about 30 percent of the group (and 
                                                
26Unfortunately, I could not get access to the primary data and the information provided here is based on 




10 percent of the entire sample) consists of hard-line conservatives who 
do not accept any major change, the remaining members of the group 
may change their ideas as democracy progresses (Note: it is interesting 
that only half of the MPRP deputies are classified in this group.) 
Source: Survey conducted by Shinjeech among the deputies, in Ardyn Erkh, Sep 20, 1990, issue 33 
 
 
It was not surprising that the conservative group was the largest among the five 
groups within the parliament.  They reflected the sentiments of the general public – 
particularly in the rural areas – and the high level of uncertainty and lack of knowledge 
and experience about the democratic society and market economy.  This was expected 
given that about 40 percent of deputies were directo s of state farms and agricultural 
collectives (Ardyn Erkh, September 20, 1990, issue 33), who constituted the most 
conservative group in the society.  However, the study further argued that the size of the 
group was expected to reduce in the future, as the reforms proceed and more radical 
changes eventually take place.   
 
A substantial portion of deputies (from 42 to 53 percent) admitted that they lack 
(or are not satisfied with their own level of) analytical, decision-making, information 
processing, and leadership skills.  The majority (from 75 to 90.5 percent of all 
respondents) considered their experience in politics, legal knowledge and public speaking 
skills mediocre or lacking.  It is interesting to nte that 84.5 percent of deputies preferred 
the presidential political system to the parliamentary system.  Sixty percent were 




faith in foreign aid from developed countries, while 49 percent were doubtful about its 
usefulness. 
 
After the elections, the government Center for Public Policy and Social Issues 
conducted a public opinion survey among 600 citizens of Ulaanbaatar city on August 30-
September 1, 1990 about the trust in the newly elect d parliament27.  The results are 
shown in Figure 3.1 below (the full questionnaire and number of responses is shown in 
Appendix 3).   
 
Figure 3.1 Public opinion on the newly elected parliament (survey of 600 
residents of Ulaanbaatar, the capital city, August 30-September 1, 1990, following the 
first free elections) 
 
 
Source: S. Narangerel, PhD, researcher, in Ardyn Erkh, September 6, 1990, issue 27 
                                                
27Again, I could not get access to the primary data and the information provided here is based on the report 
published in the newspaper.  Information about sampling is not given.  The questions were asked at various 

































The polls reveal that, although there was little negativity, the majority of the city 
dwellers were uncertain and doubtful about the activities of the new parliament and its 
members.  Naturally, the attitude differed among the supporters of different political 
parties.  58.6 percent of MPRP member respondents expressed their trust in the 
parliament, while the share was significantly lower among the supporters of other 
political parties: 19.3 percent of MDP, 27.7 percent of MNPP, and 9.7 percent of MSDP.  
The remaining 40.1 percent of MPRP member respondents were doubtful (uncertain) of 
the new parliament.  The share was 73.4 percent among the MDP members, 66.8 percent 
among the MNPP, 80.6 percent among the MSDP, and 57.7 percent among the non-
partisan respondents (article by S. Narangerel, PhD, researcher, in Ardyn Erkh, 
September 6, 1990, issue 27). 
 
The People’s Great Khural appointed the President, Vice President, and the Prime 
Minister.  P. Ochirbat, who served as the Chairman of the Presidium of the People’s 
Great Khural became the first President of the Mongolian People’s Republic.  He proved 
to be a pro-democratic radical leader within the MPRP.  Even though the elections 
outcomes did allow the MPRP to form its own governme t – as noted earlier they won 
over 60 percent of votes – the party leaders decided to invite some representatives of the 
democratic forces into the government as well as the leadership of the People’s Great 
Khural and the State Small Khural.  Thus, one of the opposition leaders R. Gonchigdorj 
from the Social Democratic Party became the Speaker of the State Small Khural and Vice 





3.2.2 Formation of the Coalition Government and Its Policies 
 
Byambasuren, another radical representative of the MPRP, became the Prime 
Minister.  The newly appointed Prime Minister Byambasuren suggested forming a 
coalition government on a collegial (cabinet) principle.  This was to reflect the new 
political situation in the country and the need to incorporate the voices of the new 
democratic forces in the government policies (Ardyn Erkh, September 25, 1990 issue 35).  
Initially Byambasuren suggested that a representative from the three major parties which 
received seats in the State Small Khural be represent d in his cabinet.  He suggested that 
a representative from the National Progress Party becomes responsible for the economic 
portfolio, while the Democratic Party could take over the legal reforms and the Social 
Democratic Party social issues.  However, the MSDP refused to be part of the newly 
established cabinet.  
 
On September 28, 1990 Small Khural appointed the new cabinet.  The new 
government consisted of 12 ministers, the Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister 
and two Deputy Prime Ministers.  D. Ganbold from the MNPP was appointed First 
Deputy Prime Minister and D. Dorligjav – representing the MDP – was appointed Deputy 
Prime Minister.  All other members of the cabinet – including another Deputy Prime 
Minister C. Purevdorj – were representatives of the MPRP (Ardyn Erkh Sep 29, 1990, 
issue 36).  This was the first multi-party coalition government in history of Mongolia.  
There were no formal negotiations among the parties about forming the coalition 




shared.  The coalition government was to a significant extent result of individual 
initiative by Prime Minister Byambasuren and decision  by individual leaders of the new 
parties (interview with Ganbold).   
 
Gonchigdorj noted in an interview that there were several reasons for appointing 
Byambasuren, a radical reformist within the MPRP, the Prime Minister.  First, 
Byambasuren led the round-table discussions of the MPRP with the democratic forces in 
March 1990 and was able to reach major agreements.  Therefore, he was seen by the 
MPRP as someone who could find a common language with the new political parties and 
was considered to be acceptable by the democratic forces.  Second, since the resignation 
of the politburo and the old government, a relatively conservative Prime Minister 
Gungaadorj led the interim government with little success.  Therefore, to some extent the 
conservative wing lost its credibility to lead the country under the new circumstances.  
Third, the radical wing within the MPRP got stronger when the politburo resigned, new 
leadership was appointed, and elections were held.  For instance, a group of several 
scholars who were prominent members of the MPRP wrote a famous “letter of the fifteen 
scholars” to the leaders of the MPRP.  The letter outlined the necessity to pursue 
democratic political reforms and market economic reforms.  To pacify this radical group 
and maintain political stability, some representatives of this group were included in the 
Byambasuren government.  Thus, the government in 1990 mostly consisted of radicals 






The new government consisted mostly from the more radical members of the 
MPRP.  It is noteworthy that of the 16 members of the new cabinet several people later 
left the MPRP to join other parties or form new parties.  In 1992 Labor Minister Ts. 
Tsolmon, Justice Minister J. Amarsanaa, Education Minister N. Urtnasan, and Foreign 
Affairs Minister Ts. Gombosuren formed the National Renaissance Party (archives of the 
MNDP, Jan 1992, Vol. 1-94).  Several prominent forme  MPRP members also joined this 
party.  Because of the large number of academics and practitioners with doctoral degrees 
(gained mostly from non-Mongolian universities) theparty was referred to as the “party 
of the intellectuals.”  Later this party joined the united Mongolian National Democratic 
Party (MNDP).  Prime Minister Byambasuren himself broke off with the MPRP to 
establish his own National Democratic Renaissance Party in 1992 (different from the 
Renaissance Party) but gained little support thereafter.  In 1997 National Development 
Minister J. Batsuuri simply renounced his membership in the MPRP due to the 
divergence of views (Dashzeveg 1998, 96-97).  Thus, alf of the first coalition 
government later turned away from the MPRP.  
 
Mongolia saw deep economic and social crisis in 1990-1 92 when the coalition 
government was in power.According to First Deputy Prime Minister Ganbold, the new 
governmentwas implementing its policies under the circumstances where: (i) there was 
no legal environment for economic reforms; (ii) thepublic mentality was not ready for 
radical economic reforms; (iii) political forces without sustainable and clear views about 




and (iv) the government had to rely on the old burea cratic machinery in implementing 
some radical economic policies (interview with Ganbold). 
 
The government faced the twin challenge of stabilizing the economy and making 
some major structural adjustments.  The core of the gov rnment’s structural adjustment 
policy was rapid privatization of state assets.  Although the concept of privatization 
developed with key involvement of the MNPP has been adopted by the new government 
and approved by the State Small Khural, the privatization process faced multiple 
difficulties.  More conservative political forces openly opposed the privatization program 
and used mass media to influence the public, which in turn was not ready to accept the 
ideas of privatization.  Lack of knowledge and understanding about privatization – and 
the private sector in general – led to inadvertent opposition on the side of the central 
bureaucracy and even ordinary citizens.  Lack of capa ity of local privatization 
committees, lack of coordination by the central privatization committee badly affected 
the speed of the privatization process.  In some cas s conservative local officials openly 
opposed or even disregarded the decisions by the gov rnment and the Privatization 
Commission In other cases some individuals were using illegal methods to benefit from 
privatization.  Many of those “supporters” of this kind of spontaneous privatization were 
mid-level bureaucrats with economic decision-making powers who formed the critical 
mass of the MPRP.  The issue of privatization will be discussed in more detail in the next 





The conflict around the issue of mass privatization and radical economic reforms 
in general put the government in a politically fragile situation.  On the one hand, the 
government was criticized from the more conservative wing within the MPRP for being 
too radical, taking too much risks, and jeopardizing economic stability and the livelihood 
of the people.  On the other hand, it was attacked by the new democratic forces for being 
too slow, dragging on with the reforms, thus prolonging the crisis and postponing 
economic recovery.  Under these circumstances, there was no political force which fully 
backed the government and its economic reform agenda in 1990-1992.  Later, 
Byambasuren admitted that decisions of the government often contradicted the opinions 
of political parties on both sides.  The main challenge of the government was, on the one 
hand, to find a fine balance between the speedy reforms and readiness of the public to 
accept such radical measures.  On the other hand, the government was caught between 
the two political camps: radical reformers demanding more speed and more cautious 
conservatives who criticized the government for overburdening the masses with high 
social costs of swift adjustment (Ardyn Erkh August 1, 1992, issue 111).  
 
Baabar, the Chairman of the MSDP, criticized the MPRP for postponing the 
decisive reforms and thereby deepening the crisis (Ardyn Erkh, press conference of the 
MSDP, July 3, 1991, issue 106).  They suggested that the two democratic parties – MDP 
and MNPP – withdraw their representatives from the cabinet and let the MPRP take full 
responsibility for the economic hardships.  In a roundtable of political parties he posed a 
question: “Are there representatives of different political parties in the government, or is 




the “government party” was reflecting the ideology of neither the ruling MPRP nor other 
parties in the coalition.  It seemed that political p rties had become irrelevant in 
government decision making, at least at the cabinet, but perhaps also the parliament level, 
since the Small Khural had a full authority to make th  government to resign but had not 
done so.  Even the MPRP was in opposition to the gov rnment; at least there were some 
factions which were not supportive of the government policies.  Some more conservative 
members of the MPRP observed that the coalition government was formed in a rush, 
without any unified agreed upon political and economic program, therefore, all parties, 
even those who formed the government, seemed to be critical of its actions (interview 
with Namjim).   
 
In a roundtable discussion of the leaders of political parties on how to overcome 
the economic crisis held on July 15, 1991 (published in Ardyn Erkh, July 16, issue 113) 
leader of the MDP Bat-Uul accused the government for making “politically correct” 
decisions instead of pushing forward important radic l measures.  For instance, the 
government was criticized for letting the agricultural collectives to decide how privatize 
their assets – under the pressure of the conservative Union of Agricultural Cooperatives – 
instead of coordinating this important issue with the macroeconomic policies.  He 
claimed that there were many other instances of political concessions which ultimately 
slowed down the reforms and deepened the crisis.  Likewise, the leaders of the MPRP (B. 
Batkhishig in a roundtable on July 15, 1991) felt that the party was finally learning to 




to deal with makes it very difficult to influence the decision-making at the executive 
level. 
 
There was no clear delineation between the ruling and opposition parties (Ardyn 
Erkh, July 16, 1991, issue 113).  The political situation which developed in the late-1991 
– a ruling party becoming the opposition force to its own government – was rather 
unusual in a parliamentary democracy.  Martin Shapiro, Professor of Law at the 
University of California Berkeley, observed during his visit to Mongolia in March 1991 
that the MPRP was no longer a monolithic ruling party o  power.  There seemed to be 
several groups with diverging views about democrati nd economic reforms.  There are 
at least two phenomena that support this argument.  First, there was consistently a 
significant group of lawmakers in the State Small Khural who vote against the 
mainstream ideas proposed by the ruling MPRP; often th y side with the democratic 
forces.  Second, the ruling party, although it received 60 percent of votes, formed a 
coalition government, which is highly unusual under the democratic system (interview 
with M. Shapiro in Ardyn Erkh, March 1, 1991, issue 43).   
 
With deepening crisis there were more critical voices about the government 
policies.  Since spring of 1991 – few months after its formation – active debates about 
motion of no confidence in the governmenthave been heard within the State Small Khural 
as well as the general public.  In December 1991 the parliament heard the official report 
by the government.  The government was criticized by both sides.  The campaign to 




Parliament debates over the draft Constitution approaching the final stage, public opinion 
became more focused on the government due to expected Parliament motion of no 
confidence in the government.   
 
Before the parliamentary hearing of the official report by the Cabinet, the 
Academy of Public and Social Research28 conducted a survey among 258 deputies of the 
People’s Great Khural29.  At the time of the hearing, 76.5 percent of deputies supported 
the dismissal of the Cabinet but about a third admitted that they might change their 
opinion based on further deliberations.  Changing positions was rather frequent in the 
People’s Great Khural as a result of deliberations a d the general atmosphere during the 
sessions.  Moreover, there were no firm beliefs about most of issues under discussion and 
partisan politics was rather weak.  The two most important reasons for calling for the 
government resignation were, first, loss of a large sum (80 million U.S. dollars) in a 
foreign exchange deal by the central bank30 and use of gold reserves as collateral for a 
credit from abroad and, second, missteps in the privatization process.  It should be noted 
that the money was lost by some young members of the MNPP reform group led by 
Sukh-Erdene, who perhaps thought that they could outsmart the world financial market.  
The survey concluded that although the majority of the deputies were critical of the 
government, the likelihood was that the government would stay in power because, first, 
only few months were left before the next the elections and, most importantly, it would 
                                                
28 A public research institution  
29I did not have access to raw data and the reports are from the newspaper article. 





be too costly to reach a new consensus on which to form a new government (Ardyn Erkh 
December 31, 1991, issue 232). 
 
In light of the motion of no confidence, Prime Minister D. Byambasuren 
submitted a letter of resignation to the Parliament.  He explained in his interview to 
newspaper “Unen” that he made this decision “…based on the survey results and 
insinuations by MPRP-affiliated newspapers” (Dashzeveg 1998, 167).  By and large the 
parliament tried to put blame on the government for he general economic slowdown and 
deteriorating living standards of the people, although the economic situation was out of 
the control of the government due to the exogenous f rces that were hurting the economy 
immensely.  During the hearing Prime Minister Byambsuren admitted that no 
government could function without political support f parties and pointed out to the lack 
of such support from the State Small Khural and politica  parties (from the minutes the 
People’s Great Khural session, January 16, 1992, Archives of the Parliament).  However, 
in the end 59 percent of deputies voted against themotion of no confidence.  It was noted 
that, in spite of some serious mistakes, the coaliti n government’s core policies were 
adequate, particularly its reform efforts in transitioning to a market economic system and 
placing Mongolia as a new member of the internationl community were largely 






3.3. Adoption of the New Constitution 
 
 
The first natural step of the newly formed parliament was start working on the 
new Constitution.  A commission to draft the first democratic constitution was appointed 
by the decree of the State Small Khural on October 4, 1990.  The commission was headed 
by President P. Ochirbat, and included Deputy Chairm n of the Small Khural Dr. K. 
Zardykhan, member of the Small Khural B. Chimid, Prime Minister D. Byambasuren, 
Justice Minister J. Amarsanaa, Chairs of the Standing Committees of the Small Khural S. 
Bayar, T. Ochirkhuu, R. Khatanbaatar, L. Tsog, M. Enkhsaikhan, leaders of political 
parties B. Batbayar (MSDP), E. Bat-Uul (MDP), Z. Basandorj (Green Party), D. Ganbold 
(MNPP), Ch. Dul (Free Labor Party), and G. Ochirbat (MPRP).   
 
Thus, the commission included political leaders of major parties who also were 
prominent lawyers and economists.  Most notably, it included the most radical elements 
within the MPRP.  The commission was to present the first draft of the Constitution to 
the Small Khural before March 1, 1991.  However, due to the sheer amount of work 
required – including looking into own history, international experiences, pubic opinion, 
legal and political science etc – and the necessity to hold multiple discussions with many 
stakeholders, the initial draft was finalized on April 19, 1991.  The process of drafting 
was detail-oriented and painstakingly long.  Initially there were three drafts suggested by 
different lawyers and members of the parliament.  The initial debate was around the issue 
of adopting a basic draft from among the three.  However, the drafting commission 




another (memoirs of Lundeejantsan 2011).   The major conceptual issues of the new 
Constitution were: guaranteeing basic human rights including political rights, protecting 
private property rights, establishing the new state structure which reflects the power 
sharing principle (legislative, executive, and independent judiciary), establishing the rule 
of law as opposed to the dominance of party.   
 
3.3.1 Public Discussion of the Constitution 
 
 
The State Small Khural briefly discussed in the course of five working days the 
first draft and made few suggestions.  It was decided that the amended draft be put for 
public discussion from June 10 until September 1, 1991.  Following the public 
deliberations, the State Small Khural should make further amendments to the draft and 
submit it to the People’s Great Khural by October 1, 1991 (from the Decree 35 of the 
State Small Khural of May 25, 1991).  
 
Thus an extensive process of public discussion began.  The government 
newspaper Ardyn Erkh became the main podium for public discussion, although 
arrangements were made for ordinary citizens to convey their opinion directly to the 
drafting commission.  Every issue of the daily newspaper Ardyn Erkh from June to 
September 1991 contained several pages devoted to the discussion of the draft 
Constitution.  They contained letters from citizens, i terviews with lawyers, members of 
the drafting commission, deputies of the People’s Great Khural, roundtable discussions of 




published internationally, and experiences of other countries, especially other transition 
countries.  
 
As part of the public discussion, the Commission organized a widespread public 
awareness campaign, held numerous local, regional, a d national discussions and 
conferences, two international conferences where international scholars and practitioners 
shared their experiences.  Individual organizations a d even enterprises held their own 
discussion of the draft constitution. The statistics show that total of 7,000 entities and 
900,000 people participated in the discussions of the draft constitution and contributed 
their ideas (Ochirbat 1996, 164).  This probably covers all public and business entities 
and the entire adult population of the country.  As the commission officially reported 
later, out of over 220,000 suggestions made during the nationwide discussion, about 44.3 
percent were reflected in some way in the draft (from the statement by President Ochirbat 
about the nationwide discussion of the draft constitution at the session of the State Small 
Khural on the outcomes of public deliberations on the draft constitution, Ardyn Erkh, 
November 15, 1991, issue 201).  The first constitution has become a matter of national 
interest for every Mongolian.  
 
In order to ensure participation of the deputies of the People’s Great Khural in the 
early discussion process – before the formal deliberations take place and the Constitution 
is adopted – regional meetings of the deputies were organized in March-April 1991.  
Members of the drafting commission took active part in these meetings explaining the 




senior local government officials, the Chairman of the People’s Great Khural J. 
Gombojav noted that 348 deputies or 81.6 percent of all deputies, 436 senior central and 
local government officials, and some 600 representatives of various NGOs, political 
parties, SOEs, and the general public participated in the regional discussions of the draft 
constitution (Ardyn Erkh July 9, 1991, issue 110).  The President, Vice President, Prime 
Minister and other members of the cabinet also participated in the discussions.  Several 
issues were in the center of discussion: the type of the society new Mongolia is aiming to 
build, presidential vs. parliamentary political system, the composition of the parliament 
(unicameral vs. bicameral, number of the members, etc), l galizing political and other 
basic human rights, regional development and administrat ve and territorial reforms in the 
country.  The last issue was of great importance in the rural areas as the draft proposed to 
combine several current local government units – soums – into larger jurisdictions, 
khoshuus (banners).  Rural dwellers were cautious about administrative reforms as this 
might lead to dislocations of people, and larger jurisdictions may lead to distancing of the 
local authorities – together with their services – from the people due to the sheer size of 
the country.    
 
After the regional meetings, the State Small Khural decided that public 
discussions of the draft constitution should be conducted by the deputies during their 
meetings with their constituents.  It was also decid to further expand the Commission 
on drafting the Constitution with scholars and professionals as well as representatives of 
ordinary citizens (Decree 53 of July 5, 1991).  The Commission was extended to include 




were produced by numerous scholars.  Members of the commission and the working 
group visited several other countries to look at the various political and electoral systems.  
Advice also came from international sources, including scholars and international 
organizations.   
 
In September 1991, an international conference on “Constitution in the Process of 
Democratic Transition in Mongolia” took place in Ulaanbaatar.  Representatives of 11 
countries – including Russia, Germany, the U.S, India, Romania, Poland, France, 
Vietnam, and Pakistan – took part in the conference.  There were lawmakers, political 
figures, scholars, and legal experts.  Zardykhan presented a major report about the reform 
process in Mongolia.  He – the main scholar who at the time served as the Deputy 
Chairman of the State Small Khural – touched upon the conceptual issues of the political 
system, the reform process (gradual vs. big bang), democracy vs. totalitarianism, 
economic reform agenda, the constitution, parliamentary vs. presidential system, etc. 
(Ardyn Erkh, September 11, 1991, issue 154).  The second key speaker – S. Bayar, 
member of the drafting commission – mentioned that after year and a half of the trial-
and-error experiences of adopting series of laws governing the economy and polity, and 
with extensive participation of the citizenry, a new constitution was being developed.  
This experience – the ABC of democracy and the market – was equally important for 
both political players and the general public (ibid).   
 
The revised draft of the new Constitution – the fruit of 14 months of intensive 




Deliberations in the national assembly went on for over two months, much longer than 
initially envisaged.  Factions and groups were formed within the Great Khural, for 
instance the faction of Independent Deputies, “Democratic Coalition” alliance, 
Agricultural Group, Youth for Democracy group, etc.  Every faction or group had its own 
beliefs and promoted certain ideas.  Occasionally fierce debate erupted, but ultimately 
compromise was reached.  Groups and factions gave regular press conferences in order to 
explain their views and gain popular support.  For instance, Dashbalbar (a prominent poet 
and publicist) who was heading the group of independents asserted that the dominance of 
a single party was replaced by the dominance of many p rties and the interests of the 
minority deputies were largely neglected (Ardyn Erkh, November 26, 1992, issue 208).   
 
Naturally, many important and occasionally controvesial issues were raised, 
including changing the name of the country from the Mongolian People’s Republic to 
simply Mongolia and approving the new national flag and the anthem.  However, the 
main debate focused on the key issues of the state structure and governance.   
 
The deputies – members of the Mongolian Democratic Party – for instance, 
expressed their collective opinion on the following ssues.  First, collective decision-
making would be more preferable for Mongolia.  This would require limiting the 
proposed authorities of the President.  The reasons for the democratic opposition to prefer 
collective decision making were at least partially conditioned by the fact as it allowed 
better chance for the new opposition to influence political decision making.  As will be 




Furthermore, they argued that the proposed 6-9 years t nure of such high-ranking 
officials like the Prime Minister, members of the Parliament, cabinet ministers, and 
members of the Constitutional Court are too long for a democratic state and should be 
limited to 4-5 years.  Also, aimags and soums should not have permanent khurals 
(assemblies) directly elected by voters; instead, governors should be responsible for the 
implementation of the government policies and work under the direct supervision of the 
Prime Minister (Archives of the MNDP, October 1991, vol. 17-19).  Most of these 
provisions were ultimately reflected in the Constitution, with the exception of the idea of 
abandoning the local khurals.  
 
3.3.2 Parliamentary vs. Presidential Regime Debate 
 
The main debate around the Constitution was undoubtedly he debate about the 
presidential vs. parliamentary political system andthe institutions of state governance in 
general.  The debate broke out at the very beginning of democratic transition.  However, 
it got more serious as the constitution was drafted an  the public discussions began.  
Baabar, a prominent publicist and founding member of the MSDP, argued that Mongolia 
should adopt the parliamentary political system for several reasons: (i) Mongolia’s 
experience with democracy is virtually nonexistent, therefore the threat of re-establishing 
an authoritarian rule by a single person – one similar to Choibalsan and later Tsedenbal – 
was real; (ii) parliamentary form was more conducive to creating the much needed 
national consensus and participation of the new political parties; in this sense the 
presidential system was politically fragile and theparliamentary one more solid; and (iii) 




with big powers than to deal with a collegial decision-making body such as parliament 
(excerpt from his new book on the recent history of M ngolia, in Ardyn Erkh, July 9, 
1991, issue 110).   
 
In Baabar’s opinion, one of the reasons why some segments of the political elite 
and the masses in general favor the presidential system was related to the social chaos 
and economic hardships the country was experiencing at the time.  The people might 
miss the “iron hand” of a ruler who can establish social and economic order and bring 
about some security and stability.  However, such a system was not stable in the long run, 
as it would not be based on wide social consensus.  Baabar argued that the existing 
system – president with limited authorities who is appointed by the parliament and the 
executive representing the majority in the parliament – seemed to be an appropriate 
model to follow.  However, Baabar argued, in order to satisfy the wishes of those who 
desire a strong president, the latter could be publicly elected and hold more powers than 
the head of the state in customary parliamentary systems.  This could be the compromise 
between the proponents of the two systems (ibid).  This, in fact, was exactly what 
happened in Mongolia.  
 
The new constitution declared Mongolia a democratic state with a parliamentary 
system – although it was categorized as semi-presidential system by Shugart (2005) and 
semi-parliamentary by Munkh-Erdene (2010) – which distinguishes Mongolia from many 
transition countries, and especially CIS members, which adopted presidential or semi-




comparison of political systems in transition countries and more detailed discussion of 
the evolution of the regime type in Mongolia).   
 
Gonchigdorj refers to several reasons why a (predominantly) parliamentary 
system was ultimately adopted.  First, the idea of single person holding significant 
power was not very appealing to the majority of the Mongolian people and particularly 
the new democratic forces.  The increasingly authoritarian style during the later years of 
Tsedenbal’s reign and intensified interference form his Russian wife in government 
decision making were still very fresh in the memory f the people.  Tsedenbal, although 
removed from office, was still alive and lived in Russia with his family; many of his 
loyalists continued to hold high positions in the party until the politburo’s resignation in 
March of 1990.  In fact, one of the main criticisms the democrats brought up against the 
old regime was specifically this “cult of personality” and the privileges enjoyed by the 
ruling class.   
 
Second, the MPRP itself did not oppose the more coll gial political system, i.e., 
the parliamentary system, although some elements did push for a strong president.  The 
negative appraisal of several decades of Tsedenbal’s semi-authoritarian rule and initiation 
of corrective measures in 1990 indicated that the MPRP no longer favored the rule of a 
single person.  Furthermore, in 1990 there was no strong national figure among the 
MPRP leadership to grab power, similar in power andinfluence to Nazarbayev in 




strongman with vast ambitions made it easier for the MPRP leadership to support the 
parliamentary system.   
 
Third, the state structure outlined in 1990 by the amendments to the old 
Constitution – with the office of presidency having limited powers – was largely carried 
on to the new democratic Constitution of 1992.  This continuity also played a role in 
adopting a parliamentary rule.  The issue of parliamentary vs. the presidential republic 
was – and still is – occasionally brought up by individual politicians.  Although political 
parties never discussed the issue of changing the political system, there were undoubtedly 
those who would have preferred strong presidency (interview with Gonchigdorj).   
 
Disparity of views among the deputies, and particularly among the members of 
the MPRP, became more profound during the discussion and approval of the draft 
Constitution.  Some deputies of the People’s Great Khural formed the so-called 
“Democratic Coalition” alliance within the Great Khural.  The Democratic Coalition 
consisted the 44 deputies officially representing the new democratic movements, 32 
radical members of the MPRP, 10 representatives of the youth organization, and 7 non-
partisan deputies.  The coalition consisted of progressive members of the parliament and 
was led by a prominent scientist Dr. R. Barsbold, member of the MPRP (Archives of the 
MNDP, October 1991, vol. 17-19).   In spite of the minority in the numbers (93 members 
out of over 400 deputies), their influence in promoting solid democratic principles was 
more pronounced, at least partly because of the reputation of individual deputies.  Many 





“The session of a democratically elected parliament differed markedly from the 
previous monotonous sessions.  It became a great school of democracy for all deputies as 
well as the general public who carefully watched them” (op ed by journalist Ts. 
Dashdondov in Ardyn Erkh 1990, Sep 20, issue 33).   
 




After approving the new Constitution with great effort of all parties concerned, 
the second elections took place in June 1992.  The Election Law also changed to reflect 
the new Constitution.  The new constitution established a unicameral parliament with 76 
members which would be elected every four years.  The electoral rule was driven by 
political reasons rather than the constitutional mandate because the Constitution did not 
specify how the elections should be held and organized.  The new Election Law 
established a majority rule with multiple mandate electoral districts.  In contrast, the 1990 
elections were based both on the majority (forming of the People’s Great Khural) and 
proportional principle (forming of the State Small Khural).  The outcomes of the first 
elections have shown that the majority rule was beneficial for the MPRP – at that time – 
while the proportional rule allowed the new democrati  opposition to be represented to a 
greater extent in the permanent parliament.  Therefore, it was expected that the MPRP 
would support the majority rule and the new democratic forces would root for the 





The discussions of the new draft Election Law began in mid-March 1992, three 
months before the next elections.  The debate was on the majority vs. the mixed (partly 
majority and partly proportional) rule.  The debate was whether the proportional (and 
therefore the mixed) rule would contradict the direct voting principle  - ‘people have a 
right elect the State Great Khural by direct vote’ – outlined in the constitution  (Ardyn 
Erkh, March 12, 1992, issue 31).  Ultimately, the majority rule adopted in the 1992 
Election Law and became effective on April 8.   
 
3.4.1 Second Democratic Elections 
 
 
There were 76 seats in the new parliament, the Stat Great Khural, and 26 
electoral districts with multiple mandates.  This was in stark contrast to the founding 
elections where there was the popularly elected People’s Great Khural with 430 single-
member districts and the State Small Khural, which was appointed by the People’s Great 
Khural ¾ from among the Great Khural members and the remaining quarter from outside 
of it, based on the proportional representation. Candidates (n candidates in -member 
districts) who secured the largest shares of votes and passed the 25 percent threshold 
were elected the members of the parliament.  This time only political parties were 
allowed to nominate candidates.   
 
Total of 292 candidates ran in the parliamentary elections, including:  
- 76 candidates from the MPRP; 




- 27 from the Mongolian Renaissance Party;  
- 28 from the MSDP.  
The remaining 113 people or a little over a third of the candidates were nominated 
by other smaller parties or were independent candidates.  
 
The parliamentary elections took place on June 28, 1992.  Overall turnout was 
very high ranging from 92.9 percent in Bayan-Ulgii aimag to 99.2 percent in Sukhbaatar 
(Ardyn Erkh, July 4, 1992, issue 97).  The MPRP won the elections by a large margin 
securing 70 seats.  The remaining 5 members represented new democratic forces and 
there was one independent (Table 3.2).  
 




(% of total) 
Mandates  
(number and % of total) 
MPRP 57.1 70 (92.1%) 
Coalition of MDP, MNPP, and Green Party 17.5 4 (5.3%) 
MSDP 10.1 1 (1.3%) 
Other parties and independent candidates 15.3 1 (1.3%) 
Total  100 76 (100%) 
Source: Prohl and Sumati 2009, 42 
 
The landslide victory of ex-communities who ruled the country for over 70 years 
was totally unexpected and came as shocking news for supporters of the democratization 
process, both in the country and abroad (Dashzeveg 1998, 153).  For instance, Prime 
Minister Byambasuren noted in an interview to a Belgian journalist that it was anticipated 




would win a substantial portion of seats in the new parliament.  However, such a big 
defeat of the democratic forces was unforeseen (Ardyn Erkh, July 3, 1992, issue 96).   
Likewise, Dash-Yondon, leader of the MPRP, admitted hat the party did not expect or 
even wished to have such an overwhelming majority in the parliament (interview with 
Dash-Yondon in Ardyn Erkh, November 11, 1992, issue 169).  He was cautious that the 
outcome would damage the fragile political balance of power and might lead to political 
instability.  Baabar, leader of the defeated MSDP, emphasized that the new parliament 
lost an important mechanism of check and balance, which may prove to be ‘tragic’ for the 
Mongolian politics (interview in Ardyn Erkh December 9, 1992, issue 185).  Zardykhan, 
a former radical member of the MPRP who left the party, called for a very radical 
measure: the MPRP should consider changing the majority election rule, dismissing the 
current parliament and calling for early elections so that other fledgling political parties 
have a better chance of becoming parliamentary parties and the national political balance 
be restored.  He argued that such a measure would be beneficial for the country as well as 
the party (MPRP) itself (interview in Ardyn Erkh, November 20, 1992, issue 174).   
 
Prohl and Sumati (2009) argue that the decisive factor for the election outcome 
was “the change in the election law.  While seats in the permanent parliament were 
previously allocated on the proportional basis, a majority system was applied in 1992.  
Under the new law, the MPRP was able to win 92 percent of the mandates with 57 
percent of votes, leaving the democratic opposition with a parliamentary minority that 
was not even big enough to form a formal opposition group31” (41). 
 
                                                




Immediately following the election, the Center for Public Policy and Social 
Issues, a government research institution, conducte a public opinion poll of 659 
residents of Ulaanbaatar City on the reasons for a major defeat by the democratic parties 
in the elections.  No information about sampling was given.  As 48.2 percent of 
respondents noted, the major reason for their defeat was the apparent too critical and 
confrontational stance of the democratic leaders.  There was lack of understanding of the 
dominant popular sentiments and the election campaign was conducted wrongfully (37 
percent of respondents).  About 26.5 percent of respondents thought that the new 
democratic parties were not seen as a reliable political force.   
 
The democratic forces had to accept political defeat.  Immediately following the 
elections, they held a press conference about the election rules and how these worked in 
favor of the MPRP.  Probably, the political situation was misread and misunderstood by a 
group of elite leaders, although not openly admitted at the time.  However, they did not 
question the legitimacy of the elections or electoral rule.  This was a time for the new 
democratic forces to reflect on their strategies and policies.   
 
What kind of lessons did the new democratic forces learn from this major defeat?  
First, it was acknowledged that the various new parties with narrow political interests 
could not unite during the elections to stand up against the MPRP, a party with long 
history and political experience, both positive and negative.  Although three parties 
formed a coalition, this coalition was only on paper.  The bigger political players – the 




parties and independent candidates did not constitute a solid counter-balancing power 
against the MPRP.  This was probably the main reason – and lesson – for their defeat.   
 
Second, the parties did not nominate their candidates for all districts and did not 
position their candidates wisely to get the benefit of the majority system.  In several 
districts – particularly the rural ones – there were no candidates from the democratic 
parties, while in the urban districts multiple candidates were competing against each 
other thus dividing the votes between several smaller parties.  Democratic forces had 
little election experience, and this was obvious (Dashzeveg 1998, 154-155).  However, 
this was also true of the MPRP.  
 
Third, the election campaign was critical of the policies of the current government 
and the MPRP in general.  The MPRP was portrayed as the ‘public enemy’ which 
impeded the reforms and attempted to rule the country the old way.  The campaign also 
focused on the mistakes made by the Byambasuren government.  The MPRP also focused 
on the mistakes of the government for taking too radical measures and neglecting the 
social costs of radical reforms.  However, instead of attacking the new political parties 
they concentrated on their new image as a changing party and trustworthy and 
experienced political force.  Ganbold, the First Deputy Prime Minister of the coalition 
government, admitted in an interview that, although both parties criticized the ‘estranged’ 
coalition government, its mistakes were mostly associated with the reform agenda of the 
National Progress Party and therefore the democratic forces in general.  The reform 




the electorate.  The electorate was not ready to accept the short-term costs of economic 
adjustment and the government did little to explain the policies to the general public.  The 
people looked for the scapegoats for the economic hards ip and the democratic forces 
became one.  Naturally, policy preferences played a significant role in the election 
outcomes.   The radical policies of 1990-1992 ultima ely cost the democratic forces the 
second elections (interview with Ganbold).    
 
A “mild conservative” P. Jasrai was appointed the Prime Minister as a result of 
the elections.  At the onset of his premiership Jasrai pledged that he would continue the 
previous government’s economic reform policies including speeding up the privatization 
and further liberalizing prices.  The most successful policy of the previous government 
was to establish good political and economic relationship with the international 
community and Jasrai admitted that his government would have to rely on external 
assistance for some time.  The economy started to grow in 1994 after four years of 
decline.  He formed his government from within his own party but invited six members 
from the previous government into his new 16-member cabinet to ‘ensure continuity of 
reform policies.’  
 
It is commonly argued that Jasrai’s government action plan was relatively 
conservative compared to Byambasuren’s.  Jasrai himself noted several times before that 
there was “no market without state regulation” and this was at the core of his policies.  
On the one hand, the government repeatedly reassured its commitment to advance market 




conservative.  For instance, the action plan contained numerous controversial clauses 
such as establishing centralized provision of raw materials to the state owned enterprises 
which directly contradicted the principle of market competition, and heavily relying on 
administrative measures to improve food supply (thecountry was still on food rationing 
at the time) which suggested lack of trust in the market (the Government Action Plan 
approved on October 12, 1992).  President Ochirbat criticized the government action plan 
for being too vague and frequently using the words “state regulation”.  He warned that 
such controversial statements might give wrong impression to foreign partners and create 
confusion about Mongolia’s course of transition policies (Ardyn Erkh October 3, 1992, 
issue 147).  However, despite the image and as it will be shown later, the government 
was rather market oriented.  It continued with the privatization program; the currency was 
made convertible; the central bank still kept a strong anti-inflationary policy; trade was 
kept open; and there were no major violations of prpe ty.   
 
The four years that followed – from 1992 to 1996 – were relatively quiet 
compared to the preceding turbulent and action-filled two years.  Although this period 
was very important in terms of deepening the market reforms and advancing the fledgling 
democracy – and many important laws were adopted during this period – hardly any 
serious debate took place in the parliament.  The five members of the opposition had 
negligible impact on the parliamentary debate.  Former Prime Minister Byambasuren – at 
the time an elected member of the State Great Khural – left the parliament shortly after 
the elections for political reasons, as he considere  it “meaningless to be part of such a 




Byambasuren).  A couple of other members left too, citing health and other reasons.  
Elbegdorj, a leader of the Democratic Party, left the parliament amid the allegations of 
the exposing the ‘state secret materials’.  Another rep esentative of the MDP, 
Enkhsaikhan, assumed a new job of the President’s Chief of Staff in 1993 and also left 
the legislature.  As one member admitted, being a member of the parliament in 1992-
1996 was not a popular job.   
 
Ganbold argued that one positive thing about the overwhelming majority in the 
parliament by one party was the undivided support secured by the parliament.  Unlike the 
previous government which worked under an extreme political pressure from both camps 
and the general public, the Jasrai government enjoyd the full political support of the 
monolithic parliament.  However, such political privileges – as well as the relatively good 
economic times with the global prices of copper andgol  (major export items) hitting 
high in the mid-1990s – were definitely underutilized by the Prime Minister as the 
reforms were slowed down and opportunities lost (interview with Ganbold).  The 
economic policies of the Jasrai government will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter.    
 
3.4.2 Political Struggle of Democratic Opposition 
 
Virtually ousted from the parliament, the opposition parties had limited means of 
political influence.  The presidential elections of 1993 presented a good opportunity for 
the democratic forces to counter-balance the overwhlming powers of the MPRP.  In 




National Democratic Party (the newly united party) and the MSDP – had the right to 
nominate their candidates to run for the President.  The candidate had to be a Mongolian 
citizen who reached the age of 45.  This time the MNDP and the MSDP had to form a 
coalition given that these two parties had minority seats in the parliament, most of the key 
members of these two parties had not reached the age limit, and the MPRP had the full 
political power in the parliament and the government.  L. Tudev, chief of the newspaper 
“Unen” – the main MPRP newspaper – was nominated as a candidate for the presidential 
elections by the decision of the MPRP’s plenary meeting.  Incumbent President P. 
Ochirbat – although a former member and nominee of the MPRP – was nominated as a 
candidate by the democratic forces as being able to compete against the MPRP candidate.  
Ochirbat surrendered his membership in the MPRP and r  on behalf of the democratic 
coalition.  Tudev – a well-known writer and journalist – was widely known as the most 
conservative but influential member of the MPRP.   
 
Two observations could be made about the nominations.  First, the delineation 
between the conservative and radical wings within te MPRP was becoming more 
profound, with departure of some radical members like Byambasuren and Ochirbat from 
the party.  As a result, the conservative wing within e MPRP clearly was gathering 
strength compared to the previous two years, as nomination of an extreme conservative 
Tudev had shown.  Secondly, the democratic forces started realizing the importance of 
political unification.  Also, nomination of the incumbent President (nominated previously 
by the rival party) showed that the democratic coaliti n lacked human resources and there 





A Hong Kong-based magazine “Far Eastern Economic Review” noted in its April 
29, 1993 issue that the political support for the structural economic reforms in Mongolia 
was rather lacking with the conservative parliament.  Tudev’s victory in the upcoming 
presidential elections would create a new political challenge for the reforms.  If Ochirbat 
who supported the private sector, won the elections, the structural reforms promoted by 
the IMF would get a new stimulus. This was seen as the main difference between the two 
political candidates by international observers.   
 
Incumbent President Ochirbat won the elections and became the first publicly 
elected President of Mongolia, giving the much-needed boost to the democratic 
developments.  The institution of the President wasfrequently used to veto laws and 
resolutions of the State Great Khural, bringing some political balance.  However, the 
powers of the President were limited.   
 
Deprived of major legal means of fighting against the government – the five 
members within the parliament were too few to even form an official parliamentary 
opposition group – the democratic forces opted for ext eme measures and to took it to the 
streets.  Allegations of corruption scandals involving high-ranking public officials 
including Speaker of the State Great Khural N. Bagab ndi, Prime Minister P. Jasrai, and 
Deputy Speaker J. Gombojav, hit the news in early 1994.  The opposition intensified its 
anti-government campaign after the public announcement ade by the officials of the 





Amid these corruption allegations, the Democratic Union and the Student Union 
(the mass organizations) convened in the central square – for the third protest – at 1:00 
pm, on April 13, 1994 demanding resignation of the Jasrai government.  After the 
meeting, 17 members and supporters of the MDU and the MSU went on a hunger strike.  
Some observers noted that the government could not be simply dismissed as a result of 
street protests or demand by a small group, and only political parties would benefit from 
this hunger strike.Participants of the hunger strike declared on several occasions that 
some political parties – MNDP and MSDP – failed to achieve their common political 
goal, and in case of non-resignation of the governmnt they would demand the 
dissolution of the parliament (Dashzeveg 1998, 192-3). 
 
As a result of lengthy negotiations, on 21 April 1994 the parties reached an 
agreement.  The leaders of the three main parties – the MPRP, MNDP, and MSDP – 
appealed to the members of the parties with the seats in the parliament with an official 
document named “political consensus.”  It was agreed that the parliament would discuss 
during its spring and fall sessions of 1994 such important laws as the law on public 
meetings and demonstrations, and law on freedom of press initiated by the President, 
laws on ethical conduct of high ranking political officials, anti-corruption law, and law on 
general referendum.  It was further agreed that the political parties would support the 
President’s views embedded in the draft law on freedom of press, namely the 





The political hunger strike was dissolved on its twelfth day.  In spite of the 
political consensus reached, the democratic forces did not consider the outcome to be 
very successful.  The government did no resign. The hunger strike and its aftermath 
demonstrated that the times of extreme politics – such as hunger strike and street 
demonstrations – were probably over.  The government largely neglected them and they 
did not receive as much popular support as in 1990.  The reason – probably the main 
reason – for dissolving the strike was because it bcame obvious that Prime Minister 
Jasrai would not give in and change his firm positin and the health of the protesters was 
jeopardized due to the prolonged hunger strike (Dashzeveg 1998, 192-193).   
 
The period of 1992-1996 was generally full of frustation for the democratic 
forces.  To better prepare for the next elections, the small minority in the State Great 
Khural proposed to change the Election Law to incorporate the proportional principle in 
electing the lawmakers.  However this attempt failed (Ardyn Erkh, April 18, 1996).   
 
In spring 1996, the leader of the MNDP Ganbold and the Leader of the MSDP 
Gonchigdorj signed an historical agreement forming a coalition officially named as the 
Democratic Coalition of the MNDP and the MSDP.  Befor  forming this coalition the 
leaders of the two parties held several negotiations and reached a decision to form the 
coalition based on a thorough assessment of the political situation in Mongolia.  It was 
acknowledged by the leaders that with foundation of political parties in 1990 such as the 




been formed in principle.  However, the maturation process of the newly founded parties 
proved to be difficult.  Many mistakes were made.    
 
After several years of political struggle and a major defeat in the previous 
elections, it was time for the parties to unite.  A number of surveys showed the improved 
ranking of new parties, however, the MNDP, the MSDP or any other democratic party 
solely could not get higher ranking than the MPRP, and only jointly they could get more 
popular support.  Thus, there was a vital need for the MNDP and the MSDP for form a 
coalition in order to participate in the parliament lections.  Furthermore, the political 
platforms of the two major parties were close.  Thus, it was argued that it would be 
inefficient for two parties to compete for the seat in the parliament on the same platform.  
Moreover, voters in general had the view that both the MNDP and the MSDP had scarce 
human resources in case they win the elections, which could be overcome only by 
combining the efforts and human resources (Dashzeveg 1998, 117).  
 
The main election platform was embodied in the so-called “Contract with the 
Voters”, designed after the Contract with America, with the support of the International 
Republican Institute.  The document had in total 183 items which covered all aspects of 
the societal changes the Democratic Coalition aimed to achieve: political, economic, 
social policies, and the national security and foreign policy.  
 
Voters viewed the MPRP and the Democratic Coalition as the main competitors 




across the country.  The voter turnover was again very high: 92.2 percent of all registered 
voters came to ballots, an indication of the strength of democracy and high importance 
attached by the public to elections.  This time the Democratic Coalition won 50 seats, the 
MPRP 25 seats, while the Mongolian United Traditional Party secured one seat.  Three 
days after the elections, the leader of the MNDP Ts. Elbegdorj stressed at the press 
conference that, with voters’ confidence in the Democratic Coalition, “democracy has 
now more favorable grounds to advance in the country” (Dashzeveg 1998, 121).  
 
U.S. Ambassador Donald Johnson observed “The election was an excellent 
example of how power can be challenged. … I congratulate the former government led 
by Prime Minister Jasrai for the dignity with which they handled their defeat.  It is not 
easy to be defeated in public.  No one from either party that I talked to thought that the 
people of Mongolia would make this dramatic change, but that’s democracy” (from 
newspaper The UB Post, No. 16, August 21, 1996). 
 
3.5. Strategies of the Political Players and Political Compromise 
 
 
The initial years of transition saw the formation of two cohesive political parties 
that were ongoing organizations that were stable enough to produce a continuing policy 
debate.  What kinds of strategies were held by the major political parties and how was the 





3.5.1 The MPRP 
 
 
The MPRP as the lead player had to adopt markedly different strategies under the 
emerging circumstances of democratic change.  The former Minister of Finance 
Davaasambuu noted that starting from the 1960s the party got heavily involved in 
economic and social development issues, virtually replacing the state or, rather, arising 
above the state in the decision-making process, thu going beyond mere politics and 
ideology.  The party leader Tsedenbal became simultaneously the head of the state in 
1971 after the death of J. Sambuu, his predecessor, while before the two positions were 
held separately.  The same was true for other top positions in the country.  Only members 
of the politburo or the Central Committee held top g vernment positions.  All decisions – 
economic or otherwise – were now made by the party first and confirmed by the relevant 
state agency (interview with Davaasambuu).  This had to change and that was where the 
party reforms started.   
 
After the forced resignation of the politburo and the old government in March 
1990, the MPRP took several steps to adjust to the new political situation.  The new 
strategies of the MPRP leadership were focused on (i) surrendering its political 
hegemony and becoming one of the many political parties in the country; (ii) distancing 
itself from the old leaders and old policies of party hegemony; (iii) admitting (at least 
partially) some of the mistakes made in the past and making amends with regard to the 
politically oppressed, and (iv) identifying a new ideology to replace Marxism and thus 





The party promptly denounced Tsedenbal’s  “escalated uthoritarian style of 
leadership which was detrimental to the collective decision making, public interests, and 
justice … [and which led to] increased concentration of both party and state power in a 
single hand during 1940-1984.”  As such, the Central Committee of MPRP unanimously 
approved the decision to expel Tsedenbal from the party at its 8th plenary meeting held on 
March 14, 1990  (newspaper Unen, March 16, 1990, issue 64).  
 
Naturally, this step was an extreme measure, becaus many of the decision 
makers themselves were the former supporters of Tsedenbal.  Sodnom, the former Prime 
Minister, admitted in his memoirs that, although openly voted for expelling the old leader 
from the party, many felt hesitant about their decision.  It was not surprising when later 
the MPRP restored Tsedenbal’s party membership during its 22nd Congress held on 
February 21, 1997, and N. Bagabandi, President of Mongolia from the MPRP, signed in 
November 1997 a presidential decree to restore – posthumously – Tsedenbal’s previous 
state honors and titles.  Nonetheless, reprimanding the old leadership and distancing itself 
from its past was one of the main strategies of survival for the MPRP.   
 
The main political message of the MPRP in the firstelections was that the party 
was getting rid of its past beliefs and mistakes and reforming itself under the new 
conditions.  “Vote for the renewing MPRP!” was their main election slogan.  In a major 
interview the newly elected chairman of the party G. Ochirbat explained that it would be 




political platform.  The main mission of the party is to build “a humane democratic 
society” based on the private ownership and the market principles.  The breakup with its 
old Marxist-Leninist ideology was becoming clear (journal “Tsag Ue”, 1990, issue 8). 
 
Shortly after expelling Tsedenbal from the party ranks, the Central Committee of 
the MPRP and the government established a commission to evaluate the policies of 
Tsedenbal.  The new MPRP leadership pursued detailed inv stigation into the actions of 
the old Politburo. There were two issues in the focus of the commission.  First, it was 
established that there were around 150 occasions (acts) of political repression of various 
degrees in the 1960-1980s.  Most of these people wer repressed for expressing critical 
ideas against the party leadership: removed from high positions, demoted, or, in the 
severe case, sent to exile in the remote areas of the country.  These people needed to be 
identified and formally rehabilitated.   
 
After the mass repression of Buddhist monks in the late 1930s, views diverging 
from the dominant hard line view pursued by the top leaders were expressed sparingly 
throughout the 1950-1970s.  To give a few notable examples, member of the politburo D. 
Tumur-Ochir was accused of nationalistic sentiments for proposing to celebrate the 800th 
anniversary of the Chingis Khan in 1962.  Ts. Lookhuuz, B. Nyambuu, and B. Surmaajav 
– members of the Party Central Committee – attacked th  cult of personality developed 
by Tsedenbal as well as proposed to maintain friendly and neutral relations with both 
China and the USSR instead of taking orders from the Soviet Union, when the 




them were removed from their posts, stripped of their privileges, and some were sent to 
exile to work as herdsmen.At the March 14, 1990 party plenary meeting a resolution was 
passed to rehabilitate Tumur-Ochir, Lookhuuz, Nyambuu and Surmaajav (Unen, March 
16, 1990, issue 64).  Two of the three who were alive in 1990 – already old men – ran 
successfully in the first democratic elections and contributed to the discussion and 
approval of the new Constitution.  Later, the State Commission on the Rehabilitation of 
the Politically Oppressed was formally established in 1991 and substantial monetary 
compensation was paid to the descendants of the many who suffered for expressing their 
beliefs during the communist period.   
 
The second issue in focus was that high ranking party officials received special, 
particularly non-pecuniary privileges in the form of free food, rent, furniture, paid 
vacations in the country and abroad, provision of household aid, free medical services 
abroad, very high (in excess of the established rule) pensions upon retirement, sale of 
household items at below the fixed price, privileged access to scarce goods and services, 
etc.  These special privileges were condemned and investigation of the privileges and 
legal action against those who broke the rules was taken.  For instance, it was discovered 
that one member of the politburo received in 1977-1989 the following benefits: 227,837 
Togrogs in free food, discount of 23,514 Togrogs on fur iture and household items, paid 
vacations abroad of 36,311 Togrogs, medical services abroad on total of seven occasions 
in the amount of 28,579 Togrogs, paid vacation in the country in the amount of 6,750 
(from interview with J. Erdenebaatar, a senior official in the State Prosecutor’s Office, 




the amount of 2,000-2500 Togrogs.  This meant that,on average, members of the 
politburo received twice as much non-pecuniary benefits as their nominal salary, not 
counting such benefits as access to the scarce goods.  Average monthly salary during this 
period was around 450 Togrogs.  
 
Another important step towards the political reform within the ruling MPRP was a 
complete change in the composition of its leadership, both party and the government.  No 
leader, including the top and upper-level leadership, remained in his position.  As the 
head of the interim government, Sh. Gungaadorj replaced the composition of high-
ranking government officials with new younger people who were supposed to handle the 
transition problems better.  Gungaadorj himself acknowledged that the main qualities of 
the new prime minister (after the elections) would be the ability to make compromises 
and collaborate with colleagues from different political parties, in addition to take risks 
and make quick decisions.  He admitted (before the elections) that the new government 
would most likely be formed from multiple parties (interview with Gungaadorj in Ardyn 
Erkh, July 7, 1990, issue 3).  The new coalition formed after the first elections was also 
comprised of the most radical representatives within t e party, although the process was 
reversed in 1992 with the appointment of Jasrai as Prime Minister.   
 
There was another round of change in the party leadership during its 20th congress 
in March 1991.  B. Dash-Yondon – a philosopher who promoted the ‘oriental’ values of 
ancient Indian philosopher Nagarjuna such as moderation nd “the middle way” as 




new party leader.  Factions within the party – namely the traditional and workers’ 
factions – were officially acknowledged.  The party approved its new program and 
charter.  New members of the Central Committee were appointed (Ardyn Erkh, March 1, 
1991, issue 42).  Although officially adopted as the new party doctrine at the 21st party 
Congress in 1992, the Buddhist philosophical ideals of Nagarjuna did not go far within 
the party.  They were largely alien to the former communists trained under strict atheist 
morale.  The party members did not perceive that an eastern philosophy could serve as a 
guiding principle for a political party in the 21st century.  Bold-Erdene et al (2011) 
distinguish several stages in the development of political ideologies in Mongolia: 
 
- Early-mid-1990s – period of ideology searching – the only dominant 
“ideology” was to abandon the old totalitarian political and economic regime, 
no party had a clear vision of their political and philosophical values  
- Mid-late-1990s – determination of ideologies 
- Early-mid-2000s – setting in of ideologies, parties pursuing policies consistent 
with their ideologies 
- From mid-2000s – the pragmatic period, changes in the chosen ideologies, 
pluralism of values (111). 
 
In the course of political developments in the early 1990s, the ideological 
delineation between the two wings within the MPRP became more and more profound.  
The more radical members eventually left the party establishing break-off parties or 




conservative wing within the party could not become a new communist party as it 
occurred in Russia, for instance.  The new strategy was to adopt more mild leftist 
ideology and replenish itself with new younger membrs, as it happened in the second 
half of the 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
Several groups took shape within the MPRP over the 1990s.  Democratic observer 
Baabar noted that before the 1996 elections there wseveral factions within the ruling 
party.  Table below (Table 3.3) summarizes the findings of Baabar.  
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32It should be noted that when this group came to power in 1992, it was willing to continue with the 



















































Source: Summarized based on article “Who Will Divide the Pie?” by Baabar, Business Times, No. 15(37), 
June 11-20, 1996 
 
The center-conservative group ruled the country in 1992-1996.  However, defeat 
in the 1996 parliamentary elections forced the MPRP to carefully revise their political 
platform and get rid of old conservatism as well as the indeterminate “middle way” 
philosophy.  The MPRP struggled for quite some time with identifying a new ideology to 
replace Marxism before arriving at the social democrati  ideals – center of the leftist 
ideologies – in February 1997 at its 22nd congress.  It was stated that the party – now that 
it lost the elections – confronted multiple problems and needed a new platform.  In 
particular, it was emphasized the need for rejuvenating the party with younger members 
and strengthening the bond between the younger and older generations within the parties. 
 
The mild social democratic ideology of the MPRP became stronger in 2000 when 
the Mongolian Social Democratic Party – at the time the official member of the Socialist 
International – was united with the National Democrati  Party to form the Democratic 
Party.  With dissolution of the MSDP, the MPRP officially could become a left-wing 
political party with social democratic ideals, to which it holds on until today.  It also 





3.5.2 Democratic Forces 
 
Democratic movements and parties emerged spontaneously at the very end of 
1989 and early 1990.  At the beginning of the democratization process, although united 
by their desire to democratize the society, there was little agreement on the peculiarities 
of their political platform.  Therefore, young and ambitious democrats formed their own 
movements based on certain (usually narrow) beliefs.  In spite of the diversity of their 
convictions, the democratic forces were divided into two wings: the extreme radicals who 
did not approve any compromise with the old party and pushed for a wholesale change in 
the society and economy and the moderate reformers who were more practical in terms of 
their strategies.  The political extremist group included some elements within the MDU 
and MDP but not in other movements and parties.  Economic radicals included most 
notably the MNPP and were generally supported by the MDP.  The social democrats held 
moderate positions on both political and economic changes and reforms.   
 
As shown earlier, the moderate political group dominated in the early 
democratization process and was able to negotiate the resignation of the politburo and the 
subsequent political changes.  The failure of the April 27 picket and the subsequent 
political developments marked further devaluation of the extreme political views.  The 
democratic opposition also agreed to be part of the coalition government and thereby 
push at least some of the items on their reform agenda.  Many concessions had to be 




privatization – but the general direction of change and the overall outcome was seen as 
positive and largely successful (interview with Ganbold).   
 
Figure 3.2 Evolution of democratic political parties and movements (1990-1996) 
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The division among the nascent political groups wasmore profound in the early 
transition period.  As journalist U. Enkhtuvshin claimed, there were almost 300 different 
(political or otherwise) movements, unions, and other non-government organizations by 
September 1991 (Ardyn Erkh September 18, 1991, issue 159), which is a very large 
number given the size of the country and the short period of time that has lapsed since the 
fall of the previous regime.  The movements were not o ly numerous but also started 
experiencing conflicts among themselves.  The conflict was particularly evident among 
the most prominent political parties and the related movements.  For instance, as Baabar, 
the leader of the MSDP noted, the leaders of the Democratic Union movement were 
critical of the decision of the Democratic Party to join the coalition government.  Nergui 
and Boshigt, the main proponents of the extreme political approach, left the MDU shortly 
after the failed April 27 picket.  Zorig, leader of the Democratic Union – the “father” of 
the democratic uprising in December 1989 – left the movement to form a new political 
party, the United Party.  Such diversity of the new movements and increasing conflict 
among them was probably part of the natural “growth process” of the new political 
forces.  However, it may have created confusion among the public and contributed to 
their major failure in the 1992 elections.  The first political group to initiate the 
unification process was the MSDP which merged with the Democratic Socialist 
Movement (DSM) in the late 1991.  Party leader Baabar emphasized that the DSM had 
completed its historical role of initiating the democratization process in the country and 
from now on social democrats intended to participate in the national politics only through 
its party structure.  Other parties followed the suit b t only after their major defeat in the 





The outcomes of the 1992 elections dictated the parties to unite.  Several parties 
with similar political platforms - MDP-MNPP-Green Party Coalition and the Mongolian 
Renaissance Party – formed a working group to initiate the unification process.  The 
process of political growth and the failure in the parliamentary elections led the parties to 
conclude that they fell short to be cohesive in achieving the ultimate goal of political 
power, and this created ample room for the MPRP to survive in a new political 
environment.  The first unification congress took place on October 25, 1992.  The newly 
formed unified party was named the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) 
(MNDP archives, October 1992, Vol. 1-197).   
 
A year after the (organizational) unification, although the MNDP leaders had 
more or less common views and shared common concepts, its local branches were still 
weak.  Given some persisting differences in ex-party ffiliations, limited scope of 
activities by party organizations, and weak impact on he public opinion, the MNDP had 
to redefine its vision and future goals.  Thus, it was important for the MNDP to 
strengthen its central and local apparatus, management and organization in order to 
become a national party with strong foundation in aimags.  Secondly, the party had to 
express their opinion on the government policies and find ways to impact the more 
conservative Jasrai government (MNDP archives, November 1993, Vol. 13-19).   
 
Thus an extensive campaign to publicize the party platform and recruit new 




members of the party General Council (the central decision-making apparatus) travelled 
in approximately 210 soums of all 18 aimags meeting with local people, recruiting new 
party members, and forming new party cells to boost the party activities and reputation in 
the rural areas and strengthen the local base.  The party chairman Ganbold noted that the 
party was “changing itself from being a loose political movement to becoming a 
professional political organization active at all levels of governance and facing the 
challenge to strive to become a nationally recognized party.  In addition to the political 
will, the party should have comprehensive ideology, and transparent and fair policies” 
(from the letter of chairman Ganbold to the local prty leaders, MNDP archives 
November 1995, Vol. 11-88).  Later, the party leaders acknowledged that they largely 
succeeded in becoming a strong national party (from speech of Secretary General Bat-
Uul at the extraordinary congress of the MNDP in Jauary 1996, cited in Dashzeveg 
1998, 208).   
 
As for the government policies, the party leadership turned away from extreme 
street measures such as hunger strike which erupted in April 1994 to more constructive 
criticism.  Ganbold noted that the aim of the MNDP should be not only to criticize the 
government and the ruling party for not being able to overcome the deep economic crisis, 
but it should “… as a party with a comprehensive economic program and strategies … 
effectively cooperate with the ruling party … in an ttempt to help the government to 





The MNDP proposed the government to sign an agreement on further cooperation 
in order to take urgent measures to create favorable environment for the private sector, 
support foreign and domestic investment, create flexibl  taxation system, fight 
corruption, intensify the privatization process, and ensure law and order.  Later the 
official proposal with thirteen clauses was submitted o Prime Minister Jasrai but did not 
lead to any formal cooperation or major policy changes. 
 
Further strategy of the MNDP and MSDP was to combine their efforts in the 
upcoming parliamentary elections.  Later the parties concluded that the formation of 
coalition was the major reason for success in the 1996 elections.  Both parties nominated 
candidates to run in the elections not only from their own members but also supporters, 
which helped them to recruit additional cadre with good chances of being elected, 
particularly in the rural areas where they lacked good candidates.   
 
Zardykhan who belonged to the radical wing of the MPRP in the early transition 
years and from the beginning was a big supporter of the new democratic forces, said in an 
interview that “seven years ago the democrats were not ready to run the country.  Some 
of them did not even know what they were fighting for!  But times have changed.  … 
many of them have developed political skills over the years and are ready to make big 
changes in this country” (UB Post Mongolia Weekly News, issue 14, August 7, 1996). 
 
Elbegdorj, the leader of the Democratic Party stated that the “historical events in 




were a democratic revolution to oust communism, but they were also a national 
movement against the Soviet socio-political dominance and the struggle for the country’s 
freedom and independence. … For 300 years Mongolians depended on Beijing or 
Moscow – now we have gained freedom in its real sense.  Since 1990 as an independent 
nation we are provided with an opportunity to choose ur leaders, pursue an independent 
foreign policy.  … We were guaranteed freedom speech and religion, the right to travel 
abroad and be united on the basis of conviction, engage in commercial activities and live 
a prosperous life.  Mongolian democracy has provided ts people with basic human rights 
and freedoms” (excerpt from the speech in celebration of 7 years of democratic 
revolution, the Mongol Messenger, No. 49 (283), December 11, 1996). 
 
3.6. Radical Political Transformation: Structural Explanations 
 
 
The earlier sections described the political events in great detail.  However, 
several issues remain puzzling.  In this section I present historical and structural 
explanations of the events and outcomes.  The questions posed and analyzed below are 
interrelated and reinforce each other.   
 
- Why did not the MPRP use force against the demonstrators?   
 
And why both the MPRP and democratic forces were committed to non-violence? 
After the hunger strike erupted on the main square in early March 1990, the old leaders 




fundamental turning point in the history of Mongolia.  A few people who could have 
taken military action decided not to do so.  As the minutes of the meeting and memoirs of 
two participants reveal, the reasons for making such a decision boiled down to few 
factors.  First, it was perceived that the police and the military did not have enough forces 
to secure the city and dissolve the demonstrators, as it happened in China less than a year 
earlier.  Traditionally, the military in Mongolia was weak and the regime relied on the 
Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia on domestic andinternational security issues.  
Defense ministry was re-established in 1962 when th relations with China went sour, but 
the domestic army was small and inconsequential.   The military leaders were never 
influential in political decision-making.  The military’s claim that they could not crack 
down the demonstrators was an important ingredient in the political decision that 
followed, although perhaps not the key ingredient. 
 
Second, more importantly, it was perceived by the MPRP leadership that using 
force against the demonstrators and hunger strikers would further exacerbate the situation 
and might lead to more violent acts and get out of control.  This judgment was probably a 
realistic one.  The last thing the regime wanted was to fail in using force but being 
blamed for it.  This would have permanently damaged th  political reputation of the 
MPRP.  The bloody events in China as well as Romania, where thousands were killed 
and the old leader Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife were executed on Christmas day in 
1989, provided their lessons.  The military in China had enough power to suppress the 
demonstrations on Tiananmen Square, while the Ceauș scu regime seriously misjudged 




leaders did not want to repeat their mistakes.  Moreover, opinion of the international 
community did matter.  Violent events in China and Romania were condemned in the 
international press and commented on negatively by the Soviet leader Gorbachev.  It was 
apparent that no Soviet support was forthcoming should the leaders in Mongolia fail in 
militarily containing the protests. 
 
Democratic forces, on the other hand, were also committed to non-violence.  All 
demonstrations staged since December 1989 had a tight security organized from among 
the MDU members.  There was a special group of people within the MDU who were 
responsible for the security issue.  They wore ribbons on their left arm (pictures taken 
during these meetings disclose a substantial number of these people among the crowd).  
They were controlling the crowd, protecting the stage nd the speakers, and maintaining 
overall calm.  The security group was continuously reinforced when the crowds grew 
bigger (Amarsanaa 2012).   
 
There were two reasons for maintaining peace.  First, the democratic opposition 
believed that violence induced by the demonstrations would be extremely damaging for 
the political reputation and political future of the nascent democratic movements.  This 
was particularly true at the initial stages of political fight, when they struggled to garner 
popular support.  They perceived that the general public would not attend their meetings 
if there was a risk of violence.  Although not satified with the existing regime, the public 
did not necessarily support the democracy.  They were atching cautiously the new 




the reasons the mass protests gained increasing popular support was precisely in the 
absence of violence (Amarsanaa 2012, 227-229).   
 
Secondly, they believed that uproar and violence would trigger the authorities to 
interfere with use of force and the military.  Most likely, they perceived it would have 
resulted in total crush of the new political movements.  They did not have the support of 
the police or the army.  They even did not have the support of the majority of the 
populace yet.   This became most apparent when the MDU unsuccessfully staged a picket 
on April 27, when the crowd almost went out of contr l nearly leading to violence.  The 
leaders and organizers of the picket took great effort to calm the crowd and peacefully 
dissolve it.  Most notably, the other two major political parties – MNPP and MSDP – did 
not endorse this gathering and considered their demand to dismantle the current state 
organs and establish an extraordinary council to prosecute the old leaders going over the 
board.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the MDU itself was divided on the latter issue.  When the 
more extreme elements suggested establishment of the ex raordinary people’s council 
with prosecution rights, Zorig argued against Nergui (the main architect of the idea) that 
this reminded him of “the Bolshevik type of revolution” and Nergui was accused of 
taking a stance similar to that of Marxist (communist) doctrine of rival classes, which 
definitely was not a doctrine of the new democratic for es (Amarsanaa 2012, 228).  
Amarsanaa himself (an influential MDU member) noted that Nergui’s proposal was akin 




without trial and therefore could not be supported.  He further reasoned that the likely 
defeat of the democratic forces might be used as an excuse by the rulers to postpone the 
upcoming elections indefinitely “until proper circumstances are in place”.  Even if the 
elections were held, the people would not trust them and the entire idea of a democratic 
revolution would be buried (ibid).  Thus, we observe strong commitment to non-violence 
which was conditioned by the fear of the democratic opposition to be discredited in the 
eyes of the general public and the fear of being violently suppressed.   
 
- Why did the politburo decide to resign?   
 
The decision of the politburo to resign was a distinctive one.  The decision came 
quickly and peacefully, compared to many other countries in the region, where incumbent 
communist leaders still continue to rule in these countries to this day (or until very 
recently), e.g., Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Karimov in Uzbekistan, and Niyazov in 
Turkmenistan, or the clash between the political forces was so severe that it lead to a 
prolonged civil war in Tajikistan.What kind of thinki g was going on among the MPRP 
top leadership and what led them to make such a drastic decision?  Naturally, the decision 
for the politburo to resign in March 1990 was not an e sy one, but it was probably the 
best strategy for the MPRP.  Batmunkh, the main decision maker, recalled that he had 
several considerations in mind.  The politburo, although critically important in the 
government decision making process, nominally was the governing body of the MPRP 
and not of the state.  As such, its resignation should not affect the legitimacy of the state 




Moreover, the party could appoint a new Politburo if it wished, although this tactical 
point did not materialize (Batmunkh 2003, 64). 
 
Batmunkh further recalled that the MPRP leadership thought that it could not 
accept dissolution of the People’s Great Khural under any circumstances.  They believed 
it represented the people and could be dissolved only at the will of the people, i.e., by 
referendum or other legal means.  Thus, it was politically less costly for the MPRP to 
accept resignation of the politburo in order to save its control over the national assembly 
and state affairs in general (ibid).  In other words, even with resignation of the politburo, 
the MPRP as a ruling party would still hold real poitical power within the state structure.  
Its resignation affected the party less than the indiv dual members of the politburo, most 
of whom, in turn, were in power for many decades and of retirement age, including 
Batmunkh himself.  Moreover, the decision of resignation took place within two hours 
after the issue of using military force against the demonstrators was discussed and ruled 
out.  Since the regime chose peaceful means, it had o go for a compromise.  Hence, there 
was little scope for alternative decisions.   
 
Resignation of the politburo was a strategic move that could be traded for the 
stability of the state structures, at least temporarily.  Indeed the MPRP used the 
politburo’s resignation as a reason for refusing to form a new People’s Temporary Khural 
to replace the existing assembly.  The reaction of the MPRP during the April 27 picket – 
when the MDU continued to raise the issue of dissolving the People’s Great Khural and 




leaders – was very dissimilar to their reaction to the March 7 hunger strike.  The rulers 
did not negotiate and were firm on their position.  Moreover, they condemned the new 
political demands of the MDU as illegal and extremist, and infringing on the rights of the 
people.  They did not hesitate to bring in the police in case public order was needed to be 
restored.  
 
- Why was the legality of changes so important for the ruling party?   
 
Did they believe in it or were they simply buying time?  Rule of law never was an 
important institutional constraint in socialist countries, where very few laws existed and 
important decisions were regulated by party resolutions.  Therefore, it seems puzzling 
why the MPRP insisted on acting within the legal boundaries.   
 
At the very first meeting on December 22, 1989 with the representatives of the 
newly announced Mongolian Democratic Union (which lasted only a few minutes), 
Secretary of the Presidium of the People’s Great Khural Ts. Gotov declared that any 
political changes, including establishment of a new political movement and political party 
should be done in accordance with the constitution.  Naturally, they could not claim that 
the MPRP did not approve them.  The MDU representatives were left puzzled as it was 
not clear whether or not the authorities considered th  formation of the MDU legal 
(Amarsanaa 2012, 84).  The issue of legality of the MDU and other political parties and 
movements was raised consistently during the subseqent meetings with the authorities.  




women’s, sports, science, cooperative, professional, a d other civic associations.  It also 
stated that the MPRP was a guiding force of the society and all civic organizations 
(Article 82).  It also stipulated that the people had a right to express themselves in the 
press and though speech and organize demonstrations nd rituals and these would be 
regulated by special laws and regulations (Article 87).   
 
Article 82 was interpreted by the MDU as a right to join the existing organizations 
endorsed by the MPRP rather than establishing new ones, especially with political goals.  
No special laws and regulations existed to manage public demonstrations.  At the same 
time, the constitution neither specifically prohibited establishing new organizations nor 
banned demonstrations.  With the constitutional vagueness on the situation, the 
authorities did not suppress the demonstrations and did not forbid the new political 
movements.  The MDU leaders opted to exploit the lack of constitutional clarity to their 
advantage (Amarsanaa 2012, 85-86).  Perhaps the same lack of clarity prevented the 
MPRP from suppressing the new movements, once they themselves declared that changes 
should be made within legal boundaries.  
 
The constitution was much more specific on the state structure, especially how to 
form and dissolve the national assembly and what were its authorities vis-à-vis the 
government (cabinet).  The MPRP leaders were firm in their desire to adhere to these 
constitutional clauses and make changes only throug the legal means.  This perhaps was 




national assembly, whereas establishing a Temporary Khural without elections was much 
riskier for them.   
 
Views of the two opposing parties initially diverged fundamentally.  The MPRP 
preferred the status quo (although realizing that a to al status quo was impossible) while 
the democratic opposition favored total makeover of the state structure.  As mentioned 
earlier, it was important for both political camps to maintain peace and national unity as 
their political reputations depended on it.  Reputation was important because neither 
party believed that they could maintain their regime with force.  A peaceful solution was 
perhaps somewhere in the middle.  Amarsanaa’s memoirs reveal that at least some 
elements within the new democratic opposition attached much significance to the legality 
issue.  This was especially true for the more moderate leaders within the MDU/MDP, 
who eventually prevailed (Amarsanaa 2012).  As the later actions of the MNPP and 
MSDP leaders show, they also preferred legal means.  MSDP’s call for peaceful legal 
changes in early May 1990 proved to be critical for drafting and approving the legal 
changes that allowed free elections and formation of a new assembly.  The most reliable 
legitimate means of bringing in change was seen through constitutional changes rather 
than extraordinary measures.   
 
- Why did the strategy of the MPRP change so quickly? A related 
question is why did the constitutional changes happen so quickly and 





The MPRP was able to reinvent itself in a very short pe iod of time.  It turned 
from a communist party into a party which admitted its past mistakes, valued national 
unity and was open to changes.  It did not disappear as  political force as it happened in 
some transition countries where communist parties wre banned.  In fact, it effectively 
led the dramatic changes. 
 
One argument is that the MPRP was guided by its drive to survive under the 
emerging new domestic and international political situation.  The international 
environment was changing dramatically.  The MPRP’s main patron, the Soviet Union, 
was in chaos.  The MPRP did not have good relations with the Chinese Communist Party 
for historical and geopolitical reasons.  The masses pr viously disappointed by the 
regime but without clear vision of what they wanted, were now mobilized by the 
democratic opposition and turning against them.   
 
Rossabi (2009) argues that this “transmogrification” of the MPRP’s message has, 
in fact, contributed to its survival.  The scenario of MPRP survival and indeed dominance 
was not predetermined.  Instead, it was, in part, the product of clever “political 
maneuvering and compromises by its leaders and, simultaneously, its inexperienced and 
fragmented opposition” (Rossabi 2009, 231-232).   
 
The newly emerged political situation contributed to the change in the relative 
power of different fractions within the MPRP.  With resignation of the politburo, the 




and political changes.  Batmunkh and his colleagues representing the old guard were wise 
enough to assess the emergent political situation corre tly and resign.  Batmunkh is justly 
credited for this decision, albeit the decision came in with some delay and under extreme 
political pressure.   
 
However, he or most of his colleagues in the top leadership were by no means 
radical reformers.  The protracted nature of the previous reform efforts and delay in 
critical decision making is evidence of the slow approach taken by the old leadership.  
The power of the old guard was significantly diminished with the resignation of the 
politburo.  Together with Batmunkh, went down other influential decision makers such as 
Dejid, Molomjamts, Sodnom, and Namsrai, a relatively young and ambitious party 
apparatchik, second-in-command to Batmunkh who diedin 1990 of a sudden heart attack.  
They have become “ordinary citizens” who now lived on their retirement pensions.  
 
The second tier of the leaders (just below the politburo) was divided.  Some 
favored gradual changes and did not want to give in to the democratic forces 
(Gungaadorj, Jasrai, Byambajav, to name a few), while t e more radically minded 
elements led by Byambasuren, Ochirbat, and Gombosuren among others were in favor of 
radical political changes.  This group, supported by the radically inclined academics such 
as Zardykhan and Davaadorj, quickly filled in the power vacuum that emerged after the 
resignation of the politburo.  The reason for their political success was reflective of the 
popular atmosphere which was critical of the ruling party.  Also, the MPRP now needed 




representing the MPRP needed to be either politicaly very strong to impose their will or 
play along with the political opposition.  They also had to have a workable and 
convincing plan of actions acceptable to all.   
 
The more conservative wing within the MPRP did not have either.  After stepping 
down of the politburo, they were in disarray and not cohesive enough to form a strong 
coalition within the party.  Former Prime Minister Sodnom (2003) recalls that the party 
leadership was at loss and did not propose any workable solution.  Batmunkh’s departure 
left the party confused and disorganized.  And this power vacuum was taken by up by the 
radicals, who in fact did not represent the party’s predominant sentiments (as the 
subsequent events have proven).  However, historical cir umstances presented them with 
such an opportunity.  
 
The dominance of the radical wing within the MPRP and disorganization among 
the other groups could at least partially explain why the ruling party, first, appointed 
Byambasuren as the new Prime Minister, and second, was so lax in giving the decision 
power to him to form his own government.  It should be noted that the composition of his 
government was not entirely radical, although radicl elements dominated, indicating 
their relative influence within the MPRP.  Most notably, though, Byambasuren invited 
Ganbold to hold the economic portfolio, which was a critical decision.  This decision 
might have been motivated by other considerations, such as the need for blame sharing 
for the looming economic hardships, lack of knowledg  and therefore absence of a clear 




reformers in order to retain power in the longer run.  Nonetheless, the coalition 
government probably would have been impossible without dominance of the radical 
wing.  
 
Another possible motivation for building a coalition could be that, since the 
economy has collapsed along with the regime’s legitimacy, it would give the opposition a 
chance, which “of course” they would fail and then the party could come back and take 
over again.   However, I do not find evidence to support such claim.  First, the opposition 
was given only two positions in the government and the ultimate responsibility for failing 
or succeeding rested with Prime Minister Byambasuren and the MPRP which appointed 
him.   Failure of the government would be a joint failure at best, and definitely not a sole 
failure of the democratic opposition.  Second, the extent and severity of the economic 
crisis probably was not fully recognized by either pa ty, until it hit hard in reality.  The 
economic shock came abruptly.  The MPRP could not have predicted the nature of the 
crisis and the imminent failure of the government that could then be blamed on the 
opposition.  The strongest motivation of Byambasuren to form a coalition was probably 
the need to garner support for his reform agenda, as he was in minority within his own 
party. 
 
Constitutional changes similar to the ones that took place in Mongolia by May 
1990 took several years to happen in the former Soviet Union and have not happened yet 
in China.  The quick and dramatic changes could probably be attributed to the takeover of 




provided by the resignation of the MPRP, the more radical wing quickly made the 
important constitutional changes in the spring of 1990.  The political fortune of this 
group, however, changed in 1992 when the more conservative group gathered strength 
and took over.  These members were marginalized within the MPRP and were forced to 
form independent spin-off parties. 
 
The political changes were initially proposed and supported in earnest by the new 
opposition.  This was a crucial factor in making early changes.  We observe an amazing 
amount of collaboration and collective action between the old and new parties in the early 
transition period, which ultimately made a peaceful and far-reaching political transition 
possible. This stands in stark contrast with some oth r transition countries where 
confrontation between the old and new proved to be fatal and led to political suppression 
and retaliation, loss of lives, and even civil war.  This leads us to the next question.  
 
- Why did the political forces cooperate relatively easily and were able 
to reach a consensus?  
 
There are several critical instances of such collabr tion.  First, the Consultative 
Council to make critical amendments to the old Constitution was relatively easy to form 
and included all political players.  Second, after the first elections the victorious MPRP 
invited the opposition into the government and offered some key positions.  Third, the 
drafting of and the subsequent public deliberation on the new constitution turned into a 




privatization program and radical economic reforms in the late 1990 was preceded by a 
nationwide economics conference which invited a thousand professionals from around 
the country.  It should be noted that the above extraordinary efforts took place in 1990-
1992.  Indeed, this period was unusual in many respect .  From 1992 on, politics as usual 
(i.e., partisan politics) prevailed, albeit these wre now democratic politics.   
 
The earlier discussion attempted to explain why both parties had a firm 
commitment to non-violence, which helped to preserve their political reputations and 
ultimately garner popular support.  Both parties, each having at least two groups with 
diverging interests, were eventually prevailed by the more moderate elements.  On the 
MPRP side, the most reformist interests took over.  Within the MDU and other new 
political parties, more moderate elements prevailed after some critical tensions.  The 
relative closeness in ideas of these two segments within the two camps made 
collaboration easier.  The political interests of the parties – to retain power and share the 
blame for the MPRP and further promote their reform ideas for the new parties – also 
served as a basis for political collaboration.   
 
However, the analysis of self-interest and motivations of the major political 
players does not explain the broad, occasionally natio wide, deliberation and 
collaboration which was evident in 1990 and beyond.  One needs to look at deeper-seated 
cultural and anthropological aspects of the Mongolian society that may have contributed 
to the peaceful overthrow of the old regime.Indeed, a few scholars who analyzed the 




that set Mongolia’s transition apart from that in Central Asia and elsewhere.  However, 
no systematic study linking the anthropological andcultural heritage of Mongolians with 
its democratic transition exist, apart from those of Sabloff and Kaplonski mentioned in 
Chapter 1. 
 
Two cultural determinants seem to be noteworthy here: a strong sense of national 
identity and lack of particularistic political claims based on historical and cultural 
aspects, e.g., religious, ethnic, or regional.   
 
A strong sense of national identity and pride resurfaced quickly during the 
political changes in the late 1989 and 1990.  Nation list and religious sentiments were 
brutally suppressed during the communist period, uner the pressure and with the help of 
the Soviet Union.  Thousands of monks were executed in the 1930s.  Party leader Tumur-
Ochir was sent to exile in the 1960s for proposing to celebrate anniversary of Chinggis 
Khan (Inner Mongolians in China were celebrating it at he time).  However, many agree 
that sovereignty of the state was established and preserved with the support of the USSR.   
 
The fact that external and domestic policies were dt rmined by the Soviet Union 
further inhibited the nationalistic attitudes. As MDU leader Eldegdorj claimed, the 300-
year rule of the Manchus was replaced by the Soviet rul  and 1990 was the year when the 
Mongolians finally got to determine their own fate.  Mass protests staged by the new 
opposition were held under the call for national independence and self-determination.  A 




Ue movement in 1989 and actively participated in all its political events.  Most notably, 
some of the critical mass meetings on the main square and the hunger strike were 
attended by a group of lamas, led by Baasan, who perf rmed religious rituals, indicating 
revival of the religion.   
 
A growing sense of true independence and self-governance was also existent 
among the MPRP leaders.  By the end of the communist period, encouraged by 
Gorbachev’s ideas of glasnost, the Mongolian leaders attempted to speak against some of 
the disadvantageous economic arrangements made betwen he two countries.  
Usefulness of Soviet aid and efficiency of selected turnkey projects were challenged by 
some leaders in the mid-to-late 1980s.  However, thy did not openly support the newly 
emerging religious sentiments.  Sabloff’s (2002) claim that the image of Chinggis Khan 
and his rule was still strong among modern Mongolians nd had its impact on the 
formation of democratic values seems to be not convincing and lacks analytical depth.  
However, the revival of nationalist and traditional sentiments which were suppressed 
during the several decades of communism, including the image of the emperor and 
Buddhist values, helped to forge the new sense of natio al identity and pride.    
 
This is in stark contrast with Central Asia, where no strong independence 
sentiments and movements were registered.  This has partially to do with the fact that 
none of the Central Asian republics had experience of nationhood before being 
incorporated into the Russian empire during the 18th and 19th centuries (Pomfret and 




developed.  As part of their approach to incorporating the non-Russian parts of the Tsarist 
Empire into a Soviet state, the Soviets divided the lands historically comprising Central 
Asia into ethnonational territorial units.  After Central Asia became part of the USSR in 
1922, it was subdivided into the republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 1924, and 
further subdivided into Kazakhstan, Kirghizia (present-day Kyrgyzstan), and Tajikistan 
in 1929 (Jones Luong 2002).  Unlike in some parts of he Soviet Union, many argue that 
independence was forced on the Central Asian republics with the break-up of the Soviet 
Union rather than won by them (e.g., Åslund 2007).  This meant that the political elites 
lacked the benefit of political legitimacy that they might have gained from a struggle for 
independence, such as in Georgia and the Baltic staes.  On the other hand, it also meant 
that the elite had to face the completely unexpected hallenges of nation building. 
 
While the revival of national identity and religion were also the phenomena that 
were present in other transition countries (especially members of the former Soviet 
Union), in Mongolia these sentiments did not lead to the emergence of strong groups with 
specific political claims, as it happened in Central Asia.   
 
Ethnically, Mongolia is comprised of Khalkha Mongols (about 80 percent of the 
population) and other minorities including Kazakhs, Buryats, Durvud, Zakhchin, etc.  All 
so-called ethnic minorities, with the exception of Kazakhs, are of Mongol origin and do 
not differ substantially from each other in terms of language and customs.  Sneath (2004) 
claims that ethnicity in Mongolia was not built on ki ship relations as elsewhere.  Rather, 




exception of Kazakhs who came to Mongolia relatively late).  As such, ethnicity never 
played a critical role, especially in political mobilization.  There were no political parties 
based on ethnicity or religious beliefs.  Electoral success of politicians from ‘ethnic 
minorities’ suggests that they have a solid Khalkha voter base.  The sense of ‘locality’ 
(i.e., aimag and soum) was much more important, but it at aches much less ‘moral’ 
weight compared to ethnicity or religion.  Therefor, ethnic and religious claims were not 
political but rather cultural (Sneath 2012, 149).  
 
Mongolian history provides strong evidence of unique forms of political, 
economic, and social organization that have been eff ctively suited to Mongolia for 
centuries.  Sneath (2004) argues that, although Mongolia has its examples of strongmen, 
Chinggis Khan being the most prominent one, much of M ngolia’s history is dominated 
by decentralized type of rule and effective collabor ti n among the ruling aristocrats and 
monasteries.  In fact, Sneath argues that centralized power was never popular among 
Mongolians.  Historical records show that even during the Chinggis Khan’s reign major 
decisions were made collaboratively through an aristocratic council.  In the pre-
Chinggisid and post-Chinggisid era, territory of Mong lia was divided into 
administrative divisions, each ruled by a nobleman and adhered to agreed upon rules and 
laws (Sneath 2004, 68).  During the Qing dynasty, the Mongolian aristocracy coordinated 
policies through the regional assemblies chaired by a rotating head.  Decentralization was 
such a critical characteristic of political governance in Mongolia that Sneath calls this 





Sneath analyzes a peculiar example of a headless state which emerged in the 17th 
century, when, in the face of growing power by the Manchu, the traditionally rival 
Chinggisid princes from the central Khalkha Mongol territory and Oirat princes of 
Western Mongolia stopped their clashes and decided that it was time to put aside old 
grievances and form a new political union, which endured for forty-eight years.  The 
union formed in 1640 had “laws – the Mongol-Oirat Code – rulers, and subjects, but it 
was to have no capital, no center, and no sovereign.  It was a distributed, headless state 
formed by independent nobles and their subjects and sharing a common law code and 
aristocratic social order” (ibid, 181).  Sneath argues that this political confederation 
“represents another innovation in that it had no sigle overlord at all.  It was, of course, a 
unique historical outcome, just as was the Chinggisid empire, but it was not entirely 
without precedent” (ibid, 186).  
 
In contrast with Mongolia, none of the Central Asian republics are mono-ethnic, 
with several distinct minority groups including Slavic settlers and diaspora of minorities 
indigenous to the region.  Minorities’ loyalty to the newly established states was often 
doubted.  The Fergana Valley is densely populated and inhabited by Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and 
Tajiks, and split between the three countries, posing a danger of inter-ethnic friction and 
possibly violence.  A substantial Russian population in the northern party of Kazakhstan 
provoked a fear of irredentism.  The Kyrgyz in the north look down on the Uzbeks in the 
southern part of Kyrgyzstan as “market people” and treat them with suspicion.  As a 
result, all countries in Central Asia drifted towards state-centric nationalism which was 




element of the new societies (Matveeva 1999).  For instance, the Kyrgyz, as the 
governing ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, hold the public positions formerly held by 
Russians, while the Uzbek are denied such opportunity (Slaughter 2002).   
 
Furthermore, some scholars argued that fragmentatio long regional, tribal or 
clan lines persisted within the titular nationalities themselves, and sub-ethnic identities – 
the main social fabric of these societies – remain very strong and they served as a basis 
for political mobilization, social support, and espcially for elite relations.  In 
Turkmenistan, for instance, it may be the case that the country’s tribal disunity has been 
one of the most influential determinants of the centralized, repressive political system  
(Ochs 1997, 318). 
 
Jones Luong (2002) challenges the conventional wisdom that pre-Soviet identities 
(i.e., tribe, clan, or religion) emerged as the most salient sociopolitical identity in the 
aftermath of Soviet rule.  The three of the five Central Asian republics – namely 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan – managed to contain inter-ethnic conflict and 
this happened because, during the transition, elites embraced the political identity they 
adopted under Soviet rule – regionalism, rather than cl n and other historical identities.   
This is not to say that tribal, religious, and national identities were not present.  In Jones 
Luong’s view, regional identity was much stronger than any other type of identity.  The 
pattern of inter-ethnic cooperation and intra-ethnic conflict since independence indicates 




divisions established under the Soviet regime – has emerged as the most salient political 
cleavage in Central Asia. 
 
To sum up, political mobilization fueled by heightened sense of national identity 
and self-rule was high among Mongolians.  Unlike in most of Central Asia, the concept 
of a national people was deeply and powerfully installed in public culture (Sneath 2012, 
159).  On the other hand, ethnic, religious or other forms of collective identity were 
traditionally weak and did not lead to political mobilization.  Regional divisions were not 
strong as in many Central Asian states due to the centralized nature of the economy and 
politics.  Industrial regions were very weak in Mong lia.  What is considered regions 
elsewhere, in Mongolia it is rural population, dispersed and engaged on traditional 
pastoral nomadic lifestyle.  These factors, perhaps reinforced by historical precedents, 
contributed to successful broad-based collaboration not only among the old and new 
political forces but also lead to nationwide deliberation, which was a critical element of 
advancing democracy in Mongolia.  Historical importance of decentralized governance 
might have contributed to the preference given to the parliamentary form of government.   
 




Conventional accounts of democratic transition in Mongolia focused on structural 
and historical factors.  However, alternative theoretical approaches could be applied to 
explain why things happened the way they did in Mongolia.  Scholars theorized about 




develop and others do not.  The reasons are usually exp ained by government failure, and 
therefore political failure.  Transition literature on political and economic performance of 
postcomunist countries employs the political economy factors in explaining the diverging 
policies and outcomes in these countries.  Two groups of theories within the political 
economy paradigm seem to be of particular interest: fir , various hypotheses about the 
constitutional design and the importance of political nstitutions and, second, theories that 
look at the interest groups and collective action problems.  
 
The transition to democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has 
provided political scientists and economists an opportunity to reexamine several old 
institutional and other theoretical debates.  Political scientists explored the impact of 
institutional design on the process of postcommunist democratization.  Over the last 
decade much has been written about electoral and party systems and the regime type in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The issue of political institutions and 
regime type is important because in the opinion of m st scholars it has an impact on the 
transition to and consolidation and the maintenance of democracy.The choice of regime 
type has generally been regarded as lying between parliamentarism and presidentialism, 
and until recently most political scientists argued that a parliamentary regime was more 
conducive to democratization (e.g., Linz 1994).  In spite of some diverging empirical 
evidence, the argument still remains dominant.  More recent studies have focused on the 





Electoral rules are also seen to be an important determinant of democratic 
transition and consolidation.  They influence political parties and their behavior thus 
leading to strengthening or loosening of political p rties.  A broad consensus exists that 
strong disciplined political parties are a good foundation for advancing democracy, while 
loose parties lead to more personified politics which, n turn, tends to hinder democratic 
institution building (e.g., McFaul 1997, 1999).  Electoral rules diverge widely among the 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries f om list-based proportional regime 
to the first-past-the-post pluralist regime.  There a  a handful of countries with mixed 
regimes like Mongolia in 1990-1992.  Åslund (2007) argues that democratic change is 
meaningful and democratic pressure is effective if the constitution and electoral rules 
allow for political representation of the new democratic forces and this is best promoted 
through a proportional representation. 
 
Åslund (2007) stresses the importance of political competition in promoting far-
reaching economic reforms.  Just like market forces check monopoly and rent seeking, 
political competition and democracy restricts the political power of the elite.  Similarly, 
EBRD (1999) argues that political competition helps to weaken the power of vested 
interests and therefore the possibility of state capture.  It finds that “transition countries 
with the most competitive political systems have tended to achieve greater progress in 
economic reform” (EBRD 1999, 112).  
 
Collective action and special interest theories were widely used to explain the 




vested interests to influence the state and modify policy to their advantage has been a 
primary threat to economic reform” in a significant number of transition countries (102).  
Initial partial reforms which created favorable conditions for arbitrage and rent-seeking 
for certain groups did not advance further in many countries because full removal of price 
and other distortions and installment of meaningful property rights and other core market 
institutions threatened the interests of these powerful groups (Hellman 1998).  The cases 
of privatization provide ample evidence that the int rests of entrenched groups had to be 
incorporated in the privatization scheme in order for the program to proceed (Boycko et 
al 1995).   
 
Interest groups were important not only in adoption and rejection of some reforms 
and economic policies.  Some argued that they were also critical in the institutional 
change that occurred in postcommunist countries.  Authors point to the significance of 
the relative power of important political and economic groups in the success of 
institutional change (Frye 1997, McFaul 1999, Olson 2000).  Institutional change in 
postcommmunist countries reflected the relative power and interaction among these 
groups.  Countries where pro-democratic political opposition was stronger democratic 
overhaul of political institutions occurred quickly and smoothly.   
 
The two groups of theories are based on rational choice assumptions.  The unit of 
analysis is the individual (or group of individuals).  Unlike pure structural, historical, or 
cultural arguments which focus on the circumstances, these theories focus on individual 




direct causal relationship with successful and unsuccessful institutional change or policy 
initiative. Regarding the behavior and preferences of individuals, the method of rational 
choice analysis assumes that individuals act rationlly, pursuing their own interests and 
maximizing their own expected utility.  
Constitutional design and institutional theories further assume that polities and 
economies are structured organized, and facilitated by economic and political institutions.  
Institutions establish norms, rules, and procedures for actors and organizations, thereby 
decreasing uncertainty, reducing transactions costs, and facilitating certain political and 
economic activity (North 1990). These institutions al o stimulate the development of 
certain kinds of collective actors, organizations, and social groups.   
Special interest and collective action theories assume that the success of interest 
groups will be determined by their ability to act collectively.  Olson argued that large 
groups often fail to act collectively because of the dispersed nature of the costs or 
benefits of certain policies.  Smaller groups, on the other hand, with concentrated costs or 
benefits, are usually perceived to be stronger, more organized due to the greater takes and 
lower organizational costs involved.  As such, they are better able to exert pressure on 
policymakers. 
The actor-centric political economy theories challeng  pure cultural, historical, 
and structural arguments in explaining why certain countries were successful in their 
transition to market democracy and others not, or why certain policies were adopted.  
However, these theories do not necessarily disregard cultural, historical, and structural 




analysis as determinants of the preferences of actors, c nstraints placed on their behavior, 
menu of choices of individuals, and relative strength of various individuals or groups of 
individuals. 
 
3.7.1 Electoral Rules and Their Impact on Democratic Changes 
 
 
McFaul (1997, 1999) argues that, although national peculiarities do matter, 
elections that allowed party nominations, the propotional representation rule, hurdles for 
representation (thresholds), and timing of a “founding election” have had the predicted 
great impact on democratization in postcommunist countries.  Real political parties had to 
be built to represent a broader public interest and their formation and maturation 
depended greatly on whether parties were permitted in a founding election (McFall 
1997).  Swift democratic transition in Mongolia was aided by favorable electoral and 
political institutions which were established early on.  
 
The core element of the electoral rule was the choice between the plurality and 
proportional representation in the parliament.  Many scholars argued that the proportional 
representation gives greater chance to the new democratic political parties.  Furthermore, 
it strengthens the party system, enhances party discipline, and provides more of broad 
public goods.  Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic States followed the 
proportional rule and turned into strong democracies, with stronger political parties and 
less corruption.  The literature on postcommunist countries tends to emphasize the 




system.  The less successful countries adopted plurality or mixed systems which, in the 
absence of strong parties, often led to personified el ctions.  However, it should be noted 
that the proportional representation also leads to fragmentation of political parties and 
therefore does not encourage the two-party system that proved to be productive 
elsewhere.  Installation of a threshold partially mitigates this problem, but not entirely.  
McFaul (1997) argues that the mixed system with a proportional representation of half of 
deputies in the parliamentary elections in Russia in 1993 and 1995 encouraged the 
proliferation of parties, stimulated fragmentation and protoparty development, and 
provided few incentives for party consolidation (10).       
 
It was also suggested that more complex and divided societies similar to the ones 
in Central Asia need to devise more complicated electoral arrangements rather than 
following a simple open-candidate system, in order to incorporate diverse groups into the 
governance structure.  Electoral systems in India, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland could 
present examples of such arrangements.  However, the predominantly majoritarian rules 
of governance in Central Asia show that no institutional attempts have been made in 
these societies to find a meaningful role for the opposition within the political system.  It 
could be argued that such practices led to civil war in Tajikistan, where opposition has 
been stronger than elsewhere or opened the road to auth ritarian trends in Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, where the initial opposition was weaker and subsequently made 





Jones Luong (2002) argues that, within Central Asia, some diversity exists in the 
majority electoral rules adopted by different countries.  Among the three Central Asian 
republics where some political changes did occur, the electoral rules are most inclusive in 
the Kyrgyz Republics, least inclusive in Uzbekistan, d somewhere in between in 
Kazakhstan.  She argues that this diversity depended on the degree to which the old 
regime and old leaders were challenged by the new political opposition.  In Kyrgyzstan, 
where the center felt that is was losing power to a greater degree than elsewhere, the new 
electoral rules were designed to better represent th  in erests of the new opposition.  In 
Uzbekistan, where the old elite was challenged to a much lesser degree, greater 
continuity of the old system persisted.  In other words, the degree of institutional 
continuity vs. change depended on the bargaining power f the old elite – represented by 
the center – vs. the new elite represented by the regions.  Therefore, power shifts – or 
rather, elite’s perceptions of power shifts – determined by the strength of the political 
opposition is critically important in the design of the electoral rules, which, in turn, define 
the process of democratization (ibid, 13). 
 
Mongolia’s first elections incorporated both electoral rules: the plurality rule in 
the upper house and proportional rule in the lower house.  Thus the situation looks similar 
to some CIS countries which had mixed systems.  Consistent with the above arguments 
and experiences of transition countries, the plurality rule favored established parties with 
strong local representation.  An overwhelming majority in the People’s Great Khural – 




old party, the MPRP.  The new parties received only15 percent of seats in the upper 
chamber.   
 
The lower chamber, the State Small Khural, formed on a proportional rule, 
consisted 60 percent of the MPRP legislators and 40 percent of the democratic 
opposition, which was a much more favorable composition for the new political parties.  
The five percent threshold in the proportional representation was imposed but was not 
important in cutting the number of parties to be represented in the State Small Khural.  
From among about a dozen parties, only four parties made the threshold.  However, the 
four parties represented 97 percent of all votes, therefore the rule did not have such a 
significant impact on the composition of legislature as elsewhere.  The proportional rule 
served as a basis for the coalition government in 1990.  Thus, the new democratic forces 
were more powerful in policy making in 1990-1992 than one would expect based on the 
pure election results.  The situation however changed during 1992-1996, when a re-
established simple majority rule gave significant advantage to the MPRP.   
 
The reason for the relative influence of the new political parties in 1990-1992 was 
related to the constitutional rule which gave full legislative powers to the Small Khural, 
while the more conservative Great Khural had a limited power of approving the new 
constitution only.  All other critical laws that governed economic policies and promoted 
the radical democratic and economic changes in 1990- 2 were approved by the Small 
Khural.  Moreover, the Small Khural had the sole power to appoint the cabinet members 




argue that on critical reform issues, the proportional representation rule dominated in 
Mongolia, thus empowering the new democratic forces early in the transition process.  
The importance of the proportional electoral rule was signified by the events in 1992, 
when the new parliamentary elections were held on the pure majority rule.  As a result, 
the MPRP declared a sweeping victory over the new political parties, claimed 71 seats in 
a 76-seat single chamber parliament, while securing only 57 percent of all votes. 
 
One critical institutional arrangement was that political parties were allowed in 
the founding elections.  They emerged on the basis of popular movements.  As described 
at the beginning of this chapter, there was no single unified front or movement in 
Mongolia like in some other transition countries (e.g., Solidarity in Poland).  There were 
several such movements which, although united on the issues of overthrowing the old 
regime and establishing a democratic market society, had diverging agenda.  The 
Democratic Union stressed the importance of civil lberties and political democracy, the 
National Progress Union focused on market economic reforms, while the Democratic 
Socialist Movement emphasized the importance of the “humane” nature of the new 
society and hence social protection.  As the new move ents focused on different themes 
of democratic and economic transition, one could argue that it was easier for them to 
cooperate.  The agendas were not competing or confli ti g.  The subsequent successful 
cooperation in staging mass protests and negotiating w th the government proved this 
point.  However, after successfully negotiating the resignation of the Poliburo in March 




movements could not consolidate into a single party.  This happened later, in 1994.  As 
will be shown later, electoral rules contributed to such consolidation.  
 
 Official registering of new parties in March 1990 (the MPRP was the first to be 
re-registered as a political party under the new Laon Political Parties) was a defining 
moment in the 1990 elections. About a dozen new parties were registered on the same 
day.  However, parties were not the only subjects who could nominate candidates.  Public 
entities, NGOs, state enterprises, movements, and even individuals could nominate 
candidates in the 1990 elections.  The reasons for allowing non-party nominations were 
perhaps related to the fact that parties were officially formed only a couple of months 
before the founding elections took place.  They still were loose associations without firm 
organizational structure – with the exception of the MPRP – and without firm ideology, 
including the MPRP.  Even the MPRP itself was in the process of significant internal 
reshuffling, with toppling of the old leadership, diverging ideas being expressed, and new 
factions forming.   One indication of this is that the MPRP had multiple candidates in a 
single district in the 1990 elections.  With brand new parties virtually with zero 
experience on the one hand, and a crumbling old party, the Election Law specified that 
the nominations could be made by non-party organizations. This is reflective of a general 
observation that the founding elections were the most p litically accommodating, as it 
happened in many postcommunist countries.   
 
The dispersed nomination power and multiple candidates from the same party 




transition.  However, in the next elections which took place two years later following the 
approval of the new constitution, the only subjects which could nominate candidates were 
political parties.  The role of political parties increased significantly in the first two years 
and the shift to party-only nominations occurred in a fairly short period of time.  In the 
1992 elections only political parties nominated their candidates and no party nominated 
multiple candidates. In comparison, in Kyrgyzstan (the most democratic country in the 
Central Asia region), only the 1996 elections saw political parties compete in the 
parliamentary elections, while the previous parliament was dominated by independents, 
which suggests the relative importance of personalities rather than ideologies.  Perhaps 
the critical reason why Mongolia opted to party-only ominations was that it was in the 
interests of all parties represented in State Small Khural – which passed the amendment – 
to restrict nominations to political parties.  The MPRP wanted to gain full control over its 
members.  Multiple candidates from the MPRP nominated by various non-party groups 
divided the MPRP votes.  The new opposition parties hoped to gain new candidates who 
were supportive of the democratic ideas but still hesitant to join the parties and ran on 
non-party nominations.  The State Small Khural itself was composed entirely of deputies 
on party nominations and was the main arena where party olitics took place, whereas 
parties were less influential in the People’s Great Khural which did not have full 
legislative powers.  
 
Thus, the first elections in Mongolia were not the ordinary party elections as in 
Central and Eastern European countries, but it differed from the Soviet Union in that (the 




weak.  The change in the electoral rule which permitted only party nominations was 
important in consolidation and strengthening of parties.  The change in the rule from 
mixed (majority and proportional) to pure majority resulted in the defeat of new political 
parties in the 1992 parliamentary elections.  After th ir massive loss, several new 
political parties united and strengthened their loca  base, particularly in the rural areas, 
thus becoming true national parties.  In 1990, all p rties with the exception of the MPRP 
were largely urban-based parties.   
 
Fish (1998) observed that, following the first two elections, political parties in 
Mongolia were remarkably strong and the country developed a mature political party 
system relatively early.  Successful early elections – after only three months following 
the resignation of the politburo – contributed to the early formation of political parties, 
consistent with McFaul’s argument about the importance of timing of the first founding 
elections.   
 
Mixed electoral rule of 1990 elections was a real boon to the emergence and 
establishment of new political parties.  They were better represented in the legislature 
through the proportional rule.  However, the switch to the pure majority rule in 1992 
contributed to consolidation and unification of thestill fragmented parties.  Since then, 
majority rule helped further consolidation, as the tendency has been towards greater 
consolidation with the (united) Democratic Party emerging as a single contestant of the 





Had pure majority rule been the case all the time, th  new political parties probably 
would have never gained a foothold.  It was the power they had from the 1990 elections 
that gave them an ability to survive through 1992-196.  On the other hand, had the 
proportional rule been the case all the time, the fledgling parties would have remained 
fragmented and would not be able to claim victory in 1996.  Changes in the electoral rule, 
although perhaps not intentional, contributed to fostering competitive politics in 
Mongolia.  
 
3.7.2 Regime Type and Its Evolution 
 
Another important political institution that influences policies and outcomes is the 
type of constitutional regime.  Scholars argued that different political systems provide 
different institutional arrangement that assign veto and agenda-setting power and the 
interaction between the legislature and the executive.  The general agreement has been 
that a constitutional rule that gives more power to the subjects that represent broader 
interests produces better policies.  It also discourages the rise of counterproductive 
strongmen like Yeltsin or Nazarbayev.  Hence, parliamentary systems served better in the 
context of poscommunist transition, proving “the perils of presidentialism” argument of 





Many postcommunist countries, though, depict mixed or semi-presidential33 
systems.  Semi-presidential regimes were first ident fi d by Duverger as having three 
basic characteristics: “(1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; 
(2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime 
minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in 
office only if the parliament does not show its oppsition to them” (Duverger 1980, 166).  
 
The concept of semi-presidential regimes was further refined based on the 
distribution of power between the two executives, the president and the prime minister.  
Countries in which the prime minister exerts greater executive power are labeled premier-
presidential regimes, while countries in which the pr sident wields greater authority are 
known as president-parliamentary regimes.  In accordance with this classification, all 
semi-presidential regimes in Eastern Europe except for Croatia fall into the category of 
premier-presidential while ‘presidential parliamentary’ regime exists in Russia and 
Ukraine (Shugart and Carey 2000).  For instance, the Russian president has dismissed 
cabinet ministers, including several prime minister, without consulting the Duma, and 
the Ukrainian president has also exercised the power unilaterally to dismiss cabinet 
ministers (Roper 2002). 
 
Elgie (2005, 2010) provides a rigorous empirical study which evaluates the 
impact of the two types of semi-presidentialism on the survival and development of 
democracy.  His sample includes (almost) all current and historical semi-presidential 
                                                
33The term "semipresidentialism" was first coined by Duverger (1980) to describe the system of 
government established during the French Fifth Republic and has since been used to describe a host of 




regimes and proves Linz’s original claim of the superiority of the premier-presidentialism 
over a system with stronger president, with regard to advancing democratic practices.  
Elgie’s main argument is that incentives of the presid nt and the legislature are different 
under the two types of regime.  Under the president-parliamentary system, the president 
has little incentive to cooperate because of the greate  power invested in him.  He often 
tries to impose his own prime minister on the reluctant legislature.  There is likely to be 
an ongoing conflict between the two institutions, which leads to political instability and 
often democratic collapse.  Under the premier-president al system, the president is likely 
to be more accommodating because he knows that the only way to govern is with the 
legislature’s consent.  Governments are likely to be more broadly based and democracy 
has a greater chance of survival (Elgie 2011, 96). 
 
Mongolia’s political system in 1990-1992 resembled that of Hungary, which 
opted for the parliamentary system from the very beginning.  The president elected by the 
National Assembly every five years, has a largely cremonial role, with nominal powers 
of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and nomi ation of the Prime Minister 
who was to be appointed by a parliamentary majority.  However, the new constitution of 
1992 brought in some ambiguity to the presidential constitutional rule, as in some 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States.   
 
The 1992 constitution provided that the president would be elected by popular 
vote rather than by the legislature as before. The president was the head of state, 




constitution empowered the president to nominate a prime minister in consultation with 
the winning party in the parliament (actual appointment rests with the parliament), call 
for the government’s dissolution (the actual dissoluti n also rests with the parliament), 
initiate legislation, veto all or parts of legislation, and issue decrees.  This qualifies 
Mongolia as a semi-presidential republic, but its premier-presidential type (Shugart 
2005).   
 
Elgie’s main argument about the superiority of the pr mier-presidential type over 
the presidential-parliamentary type was based on the premise that the president, being 
able to govern only through the parliament, has fewer incentives to oppose the parliament 
under the premier-presidential type.  This would, in turn, lead to less confrontation and 
political stalemate and therefore potential collapse or reversal of democracy.  Thus, the 
premier-presidential type of regime in Mongolia should accord less confrontation 
between the president and the parliament.   
 
However, we observe two very different types of behavior of President Ochirbat 
(1993-1997) and President Bagabandi (1997-2001) under the same regime.  Both 
presidents cohabitated with a parliamentary majority f om the opposing party.  There 
were no major conflicts during Ochirbat’s presidency.  The president often spoke 
critically of the more conservative government of Jasrai and occasionally issued vetoes 
on government decisions and laws, but they were customary.  No significant 





However, the year 1998 proved to be a challenging year for the Mongolian 
politics.  Incumbent President Ochirbat was defeated by N. Bagabandi, an MPRP 
nominee who secured a solid victory in 1997.  The parliament, on the other hand, was 
dominated by the Democratic Union Coalition (DUC).  When the motion of no 
confidence resulted in resignation of the Enkhsaikhn government in 1998, the formation 
of a new cabinet under President Bagabandi proved to be a big struggle, which resulted in 
a political stalemate and gridlock.  
 
The constitution contained a source of such gridlock, which was not disclosed 
before.  Article 33 of the constitution said that the president was to nominate the 
candidate for the prime minister upon agreement with the majority party in the 
parliament.  The constitution was not clear who hadthe prevalent voice in nomination of 
the prime ministerial candidate and how the agreement should be reached if difference in 
the opinions arose.  Thus, the Constitution equipped th  president with the power to reject 
the majority’s nominee for prime minister, paralyzing the State Great Khural’s 
prerogative to form the cabinet.  In 1998, the DUC nominated D. Ganbold seven times, 
G. Gankhuyag three times, and E. Bat-Uul once for prime minister, only to be turned 
down by President Bagabandi (Munkh-Erdene 2010).  The president provided a short list 
of six candidates who he thought would be fit to serve as prime minister and whom he 
supported.  The DUC rebuked the president’s “short list” and accused him of 
transgressing the majority’s privileges, but to no avail.  Eventually, Ulaanbaatar City 
Mayor J. Narantsatsralt (from the short list) was proposed by the DUC and approved as 





The five months’ long struggle, from which the presid nt came out victorious, 
fully revealing the capacity of his “negotiating” power to form the cabinet, triggered the 
DUC to propose constitutional amendment.  The proposal aimed at limiting the 
president’s authority in forming the cabinet and introducing open ballots for 
parliamentary voting, among few other things.  The party leaders were determined to take 
charge of the cabinet by reducing the president’s ivolvement in it (ibid, 322-323).  As a 
result, the presidential powers were significantly cut by the constitutional amendment 
which became effective in 2000.  The State Great Khural can override the president’s 
veto with a two-thirds majority, the winning party can nominate a prime minister without 
presidential consent, and presidential decrees becom  effective with the prime minister’s 
signature.   
 
Thus, we observe two very different types of presidntial behavior under similar 
institutional and political circumstances.  Two observations could be drawn from this 
case.  It seems that the institutional arrangement of the premier-presidential system in 
Mongolia did not provide strong incentives for the behavior of the presidents.  One chose 
cooperation, while the other opted to confront and ultimately successfully imposed on the 
parliament majority his own candidate for the prime inister.  However, in spite of the 
different behavior, Mongolia is not a confounding case of Elgie’s argument because 
democracy did not collapse in Mongolia.  On the contrary, it probably became stronger 
with limiting some of the powers of the president.  Bagabandi’s exercise of his full 




the advantage of the premier-presidential system see  be not in the incentives for 
cooperation but actual power limitations imposed on the president.   
 
Munkh-Erdene (2010) argues that the above constitutional changes effectively 
made Mongolia a parliamentary republic.  He argues that the defining feature of a semi-
presidential regime is that the president controls the ultimate authority to form the 
cabinet.  That is, if the president does not ultimaely control formation of the cabinet, then 
it is the legislature that controls the survival of the cabinet.  This makes the regime 
parliamentary (ibid, 332).   
 
Classification of the regime types has not been consistent depending on the 
definitions of the semi-presidentialism.  However, Mongolia is classified a semi-
presidential republic (see two tables below), although some describe it as a parliamentary 
republic34.  
 
 Table 3.4 Types of political system in postcommunist countries 
 
Presidential systems  
(with a prime minister) 



















                                                
34 Wikipedia, for instance, has two conflicting descriptions of the government system in Mongolia.  It is 
















Source: Wikipedia “political systems in the world”, categorization based on UNDP (1994)  
 
Elgie defines semi-presidentialism “as a situation where a constitution makes 
provision for both directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet 
who are collectively responsible to legislature” (Elgie 1999) and claims that this 
definition is now widely accepted (Elgie 2011).  This definition is much broader and 
includes many countries which are traditionally classified as parliamentary, such as 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
 














Armenia (since 2006) 
Bulgaria 













Ukraine (since 2007) 
Source: Elgie (2011) 
Notes: “President-parliamentarism” is a form of semi-presidentialism where the prime minister and 
cabinet are collectively responsible both to the legislature and the president. 
“Premier-presidentialism” is a form of semi-presidentialism where the prime minister and 
cabinet are collectively responsible solely to the legislature.  
 
Thus, although Mongolia and Russia both qualify under a “semi-presidential” 
form of government, there is significant difference in the powers of the president vis-à-
vis other branches.  In Russia, in addition to substantial executive powers, the president 
exercises even partial legislative powers by issuing decrees and directives that have full 
force of law without legislative review.  The president appoints the Prime Minister and 
has a right to dissolve Duma.  None of the above rights are enjoyed by the Mongolian 
president.  In Mongolia, the parliament is among the most powerful in the world (see 
Table 3.6 below).  When ranked based on the Parliamentary Power Index scores (higher 
score meaning more parliamentary power), Mongolia has one of the highest indices 
among the over 150 countries around the world.    
 
Table 3.6 Parliamentary Powers Index Scores, selected countries 
 
Country PPI  Country PPI  
Parliament of Azerbaijan 0.44 Parliament of Poland 0.75 
Chinese National People’s Congress 0.34 Parliament of Romania 0.72 
Parliament of the Czech Republic 0.81 Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
0.44 
Parliament of Estonia 0.75 National Council of the Slovak 
Republic 
0.72 
Parliament of Georgia 0.59 Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan 0.31 
National Assembly of Hungary 0.75 People’s Council of Turkmenistan 0.06 




Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan 0.47 Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan 0.28 
Parliament of Latvia 0.78 Parliament of the United Kingdom 0.78 




Source: Fish, S. and M. Kroenig (2009) The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey, 
New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
 
Notwithstanding the difference in classification, the evolution of the political 
system in Mongolia has been towards limiting powers of the president, a development 
similar to many countries in Eastern Europe.  These countries, initially also with 
ambiguous constitutions, restricted the powers of the president to largely ceremonial.  
Selected CIS countries like Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, and more recently the Kyrgyz 
Republic also limited the powers of the president.  This is in stark contrast with some 
other CIS countries where presidents had significant powers from the beginning – even 
under a nominally semi-presidential system – and harnessed their powers even further in 
the course of transition. 
 
Some argued that the parliament-dominated political system in Mongolia has been 
important in fostering and advancing democracy in the country (e.g., Fish 2001 and Fritz 
2002 in Chapter 1), although it is seen as one of sveral important structural factors.  
Prevalence of the parliament in the policy process conditioned by the initial institutional 
configuration generally promoted collective deliberation and decision making.  More 
importantly, predominance of the parliament was crucial in further expanding its powers 









Most of the postcommunist countries installed regimes which are markedly 
different from communism.  Regime change (political and economic) in postcommunist 
countries is often seen as a wholesale change in the governing institutions.  However, for 
this to happen McFaul (1995) argues all major political actors must agree to reject old 
political institutions and accept the new rules of the game.  Great diversity exists in the 
new rules adopted by various countries.  And this diversity if often explained by 
interaction among political and economic groups which represent diverging interests.  In 
other words, actors (or groups of actors) are viewed as the main factor not only in 
determining certain policies but also adopting new institutions. 
 
3.8.1 Narrow Political Agenda and Successful Pact 
 
It commonly assumed by political economy theories that he there are two groups 
– incumbents (the old elite) and challengers (democratic opposition) – who have 
diverging interests and their relative strength differs across countries.   
 
Mongolia’s configuration of political interests and groups is largely consistent 
with this assumption, although some subtleties do exist.  The most general configuration 
of political interests at the onset of democratic transition consisted of two broad groups.  
The first group – let us call them the “conservative group” – either preferred the status 




old regime but make some improvements upon it, suchas more active involvement of the 
masses, limited criticism of the regime or party, permission of plurality of views, and 
decentralization of decision making.  In other words, this group would prefer perestroika 
type of gradual reforms under the guidance of the communist party which would help to 
rejuvenate the old regime or, if the systemic transition is inevitable, the process should go 
slowly, without much social disruption.  These prefe nces were incorporated in the 
MPRP documents and have been the main party course in th late 1980s.  
 
The second group – the “radical group” – preferred wholesale transformation of 
the system, installation of a liberal democratic regime with free elections and secure 
human rights.  No partial or gradual reforms could lead to such a regime, therefore 
radical and quick measures – overthrow of the old ruling elite by revolutionary means – 
were necessary to achieve the democratic goal.  These id as were first put forward by the 
Democratic Union and echoed by other new political movements and parties.  
 
The conservative group in Mongolia was represented by some people within the 
top leadership of the MPRP, mid-level bureaucrats and party nomenklatura, local 
governors, and directors of the industrial enterprises, negdels and state farms.  The radical 
group consisted of the leaders of the new democratic movements, intellectuals, and 
students.  Some members of the MPRP top leadership – Byambasuren, Zardykhan, 
Ochirbat etc. – also belonged to this group.  Industrial workers and herders were not 
organized.  At the beginning of the democratic change the stance of these large societal 




democratic while the rural population was more conservative, which later was confirmed 
by the election results. 
 
Thus, the two groups have a diverse composition.  First, we have divided top 
leadership, some rooting for the preservation of the old regime, others wanting radical 
change.  The top leadership also controlled the police and the army.  But as argued 
earlier, these forces were relatively weak in Mongolia due to reliance on the Soviet troops 
in international and domestic security issues.  With withdrawal of the Soviet troops, 
Mongolia was left without strong armed forces.  Second, the group of mid-level 
bureaucrats and local chiefs was coherent and likely to resist the democratic change.  As 
the results of the elections have shown, rural residents were mostly conservative and 
largely backed their local leaders.  The strength of t is group depended on the degree of 
power they held at the end of the communist regime.  As noted earlier, in many transition 
countries, especially the former Soviet Union, these interests were particularly strong and 
greatly influenced the reform processes.  Full democratization never occurred in many of 
these countries, at least due to resistance of these interests.  Third, the leaders of the 
radical group belonged mostly to the intellectual elite and were supported by the general 
public in urban areas, as the mass demonstrations have shown. 
 
Thus, there were two clearly defined groups of elite – old and new – who 
represented the two different ideologies (weak army siding with the old elite), and the 




Generally, the assumption of interest group theories about two broad groups largely holds 
for Mongolia.  
 
The mode of transition that most frequently produced d mocracy was an 
imbalance of power in favor of the democratic challengers (McFaul 2010, 12).  However, 
in Mongolia we do not observe any clear dominance of one group at the onset of changes.  
The situation seems to be similar to that of Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Tajikistan, and 
Moldova.  McFaul argues that under the circumstances of relatively equal balance of 
power between the two sides, the path of transition w uld be either a painful protracted 
fighting until one group wins or achievement of a pact.  The success of reaching a pact 
and thus installing democratic institutions depends on two factors: narrow agenda for 
change and shared perceptions about power distribution between the two groups.   
 
Agenda for democratic change in Mongolia as initially proposed by the 
democratic opposition was quite wide.  It included toppling of the old politburo and the 
current government, legalizing the multiparty system, dismantling of the existing national 
assembly and forming a temporary khural with representatives of all political parties, 
establishing the so-called people’s council to judge and prosecute old leaders, and calling 
for free elections (see the political requirements of the MDU in Appendix 1).  However, 
as described earlier, the agenda was narrowed down to eliminate some of the more 
extreme demands, such as temporary assembly and people’s council.  Most importantly, 
the economic reform ideas which complicated political transitions elsewhere – for 




consensus was reached which further postponed political compromise – were not put on 
the agenda when the pact was reached.  Very general id a of a market-based economy 
was among the demonstrators’ political demands, but they have not yet materialized into 
prominent agenda items.   
 
Moreover, fortunately for Mongolia, a high degree of s cietal homogeneity – 
ethnic, religious, and cultural – and its initial sovereignty contributed to a relatively 
narrow range of contested issues.  No specific religious, ethnic, territorial or other issues 
were raised.  The agenda squarely focused on the regime change issues therefore it was 
not as complicated as in some other postcommunist countries.  Further narrowing down 
of the reform did contribute to successfully reaching a political consensus.   
 
What led the two sides to narrow down the agenda an go for a compromise?  As 
McFaul (1999 and 2001) argues, the second defining factor is the balance of power and, 
most importantly, the shared knowledge about the balance of power.  The balance of 
power in favor of the regime challengers depends on everal factors: (i) overcoming of 
collective action problems within the radical group and mobilizing the masses; (ii) 
tipping the balance of power within the top leadership in favor of radical reformers; and 
(iii) eliminating or coopting mid-level bureaucracy and local governors.  
 
3.8.2 Successful Collective Action 
 
Collective action problems were overcome within the radical group when they 




‘revolutionaries’ to undertake such an extreme measure?  First, the costs of fighting for 
the new regime have been lowered when it became obvious that the old regime could not 
contain the popular uprising.  By the time the first public demonstration was held in 
Mongolia, almost all authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe were already overthrown 
and it was clear that the Soviet Union would not interfere with these developments.  On 
the opposite, Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union appear to have played a key role 
in the changes that occurred in Eastern Europe, as well as Mongolia, as they awakened 
hopes of greater independence and meaningful social change, reducing the perceived risk 
of dissent (Kuran 1991).  This lowered the level of fear – and the associated expected 
costs of rebellion – among the radically minded groups in Mongolia.   
 
How were collective action problems resolved?  Generally speaking almost all 
postcommuist countries saw a surge of political and civic activity in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Therefore, mass protests and increased civic engagement is hardly unique to 
Mongolia.  In fact, the mass protests from December 1989 through to March 1990 were 
influenced to a great extent by similar developments i  Eastern Europe.  Nonetheless, a 
few factors distinguish Mongolia from other countries in Central Asia.   
 
First, there wasan advantage of small population concentrated in a few places. In 
1990, Mongolia had a population of less than two million, about 60 percent of which was 
concentrated in few major cities.  Ulaanbaatar, the capital city, housed about 40 percent 
of the entire population and was the cradle of mass protests.  It was easier for the radical 




Demonstrations took place in the capital city and Darkhan and Erdenet, the second and 
third largest cities in the country.  It was the major industrial and political center – 
probably the only center – where the major political events took place and determined the 
course of regime change.  Such concentration of small population in the capital city made 
it possible for the masses to organize effectively at low cost.  Moreover, the elite – old 
and new – was small and perhaps more closely tied than elsewhere.  The leaders on both 
sides knew each other personally, which may have facilitated faster agreement between 
the regime and the opposition.  Although no clear evidence exists about behind-the-
scenes agreement, these factors may have contributed to r aching a successful pact. 
 
Second, the remainder of the population was comprised of more conservative 
rural residents.  Rural nomadic dwellers were widely dispersed throughout the country 
and were far from the center of action, making it prohibitively costly to cooperate with 
each other, irrespective of their views on the regime.  The only place where popular 
uprising took place in the rural area was the town f Murun, center of the Khuvsgul 
aimag, the most highly populated aimag in Mongolia.  Therefore, this group – about 40 
percent of the entire population – was largely isolated from vigorous political action.  
 
Another distinctive feature of Mongolia is the fact that the groups that emerged 
had broader, more encompassing agenda compared to some countries, especially the CIS 
countries.  Sneath (2012) argues that there has been very little by way of adversarial 
ethno-national mobilization in Mongolia.  There areKazakhs – the most distinct ethnic 




MPRP and opposition parties.  There are a number of Kazakh cultural organizations, 
often with links to Kazakhstan and other Islamic nations.  But ethnic mobilization is a 
cultural project, rather than a party political one (ibid, 159).  There are other forms of 
collective identity and interestingly the most important ones are those of locality, i.e., the 
aimag and soum administrative districts, rather than ethnicity or religion.  The importance 
of “roots” in local homelands is a central theme in Mongolian public life (ibid, 150).  The 
1990s saw a rapid growth of “local homeland councils” formed of those who lived in 
cities to support their home aimag or soum.   However, Sneath argues, these are 
discursive claims rather than a series of “social building blocks” that fit neatly inside each 
other or next to each other.  Collective identities – national, regional, ethnic, religious etc. 
– are context specific groupings, dependent on particular discourse or point of reference 
(ibid, 151).  
 
Some scholars note that civil society in Central Asia i  organized along traditional 
groups such as extended families, kinship associatins and religious communities, which 
are not voluntary and are not designed to play politica  roles (Anderson 1999, Fish 1994).  
Green (2002) argues that institutional hurdles in registering and operating non-
government organizations in Central Asia are much hig er than elsewhere in transition 
countries, both CIS and non-CIS.  Uzbekistan was bltant about its desire to control civil 
society, as it requires that groups hold afounding meeting to adopt a charter and elect 
officers, yet such meetings first requiregovernment approval. In most Central Asian states 
administrative discretion oftenmanifested itself in rejection of registration applications if 





An indication of successful broader collective action among the groups with 
broader interests was the emergence of numerous civil ociety groups in Mongolia, which 
were located almost entirely in large urban areas.  As noted earlier, in 1991, there were 
over 300 various political and non-political movements, NGOs, associations, and groups.  
For a country of two million people and very early in the transition, this number was 
quite impressive. Fish (1998) notes the significance of a vibrant civil society in successful 
democratic transition.  He particularly emphasizes two types of organizations: women’s 
and free press associations.   
 
Traditionally, unlike in many Asian cultures, women in Mongolia were strong and 
influential in decision making (e.g., Weatherford 2010, Humphrey 1992).  Humphrey 
(1992), for instance, argues that the dominance of military social values and sole reliance 
on nomadic pastoralism meant that domestic production was not ideologically separated 
from the military life, but was regarded as a means towards it.  “Women had to be 
capable of carrying out all the productive tasks because the men were often away for long 
periods.  There is a real sense in which the major pr duction of wealth rested on the work 
of women” (ibid, 180).Socialism aimed at gender equality and empowering women.  In 
Mongolia, not only various women’s associations emerged early on demanding civil and 
other rights for women and in general, but women also dominate in civil organizations of 






McFaul (2001) warns that sustained mass mobilization usually tends to cloud the 
calculations about the balance of power and therefore plays an ambiguous role in 
reaching a pact.   Mass mobilization means more players and less certainty about the 
preferences. “If transitions involve only elites, it is easier to know everyone’s preferences 
and assess everyone’s power.  The power of mass movements is harder to assess, because 
a movement’s ability to act collectively is often upredictable (e.g., Olson 1965).  
Likewise, when mass movements are involved, there is greater uncertainty about whether 
the leaders of representatives of these groups can control their followers” (McFaul 2001, 
20).   
 
However, mass mobilization did play a much more prominent role in brining 
about regime change in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Georgia.  This was also the case in 
Mongolia. I argue that mass mobilization played an important role in tipping the balance 
of power in favor of the regime challengers.  As noted earlier, the democratic opposition 
was in significant minority when the first demonstrations erupted in December 1989.  
These were almost a handful of intellectuals supported by students who initiated the 
change.  It was crucial for the newly emerging oppositi n to secure mass support, as they 
possessed no other resources, such as military or police, or direct foreign support.  The 
mass support which was gradually built over the following few months became a critical 
bargaining trump card in favor of the opposition.  The old elite had the army but the new 
elite had the urban mass support.  The rural masses pot ntially supportive of the old elite 





When time came to make a decision, the power calculations of both sides were 
such that they decided to refrain from confrontation.  McFaul argued that often both sides 
(falsely) believe in their superiority in terms of power which leads the parties to fight 
until one eventually wins, thus making a pact impossible and democracy fragile or 
partial.  This was not the case in Mongolia.  The power calculations on both sides did not 
necessarily coincide, however there was no overestimation of own power or 
underestimation that of the opponent.  As the minutes of a critical meeting to the use of 
power reveal (see the minutes in Appendix 2) the old leadership concluded, with 
insistence by the top military ranks, that they could not forcefully contain the mass 
protests.  Mongolia had limited military and economic resources to take forceful counter 
measures without resorting to the Soviet military and economic assistance, and the latter 
was not forthcoming.  This was probably especially true in the long run if they wanted to 
sustain the old regime.   
 
Evidence provided earlier in the chapter suggests that great uncertainty existed 
among the democratic opposition leaders about theirrelative power vis-à-vis the regime.  
They definitely saw mass mobilization as a means of bolstering their power.  However, 
the fear of forceful action, arrest and imprisonment was always there.  Once the mass 
mobilization became more pronounced, the issue of crowd control emerged as a new 
important issue.  As the experience with the April 27 picket show, masses were ready to 
get out of control.  Had the situation, which was on the brink of hostility that day, erupted 
in actual violence, the probability of a pact would have become very slim.  This was the 




Therefore, mass mobilization was critical in tipping the balance of power in favor of the 
regime challengers.  But, there was a point beyond which a successful pact would have 
become impossible.  This is consistent with McFaul’s argument about the ambiguous role 
of mass mobilization.  
 
Another factor that contributed to the realistic calculation of relative power 
betweenthe two groups was the international environment.  Now that the Soviet Union 
and the entire socialist system were disintegrating, he country had to rely on alternative 
sources of support and partnership, both economically and politically.  The likely new 
partners – non-socialist countries and international fi ncial institutions – clearly favored 
democratic and market regimes.  Perhaps the only potential support for the old regime 
could have come from China, with which Mongolia had strained relations for the past 
several decades.  IFIs and advanced market economies would not have helped the 
Mongolian unless it undertook some radical changes towards democratizing the political 
system and marketizing the economy.  Importance of external factors in the collapse of 
the communist regime and democratic transition is stres ed in Fish (1998) and Fritz 
(2002).  Fritz (2002) argued that the Mongolian democracy was externally induced and 
externally supported; hence she used the term “dependent democracy”.   
 
However, I believe that this statement is much too str ng.  There is no evidence of 
direct foreign involvement in Mongolia’s democratic transition.  No country or 
international agency forced or explicitly supported democratization on Mongolia.  The 




than interests or actions of specific international agents.  McFaul (2010) stresses the 
importance of the international factor in all postcmmunist transitions.  He argues that 
compared to the “third wave of democratization” of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
postcommunist democratic transformation occurred under the new conditions of 
unipolarity of the international system.  With the end of the Cold War, the international 
system was transformed from bipolar to unipolar with much greater consensus on how 
economies and polities should be organized. 
 
Thus power calculations took into account the domestic situation and dominant 
international setting.  Realizing the newly emerged situation, the communist rulers did 
not take any serious counter measures.  Instead, they opted for a different strategy: 
quickly negotiating on the popular political demands, making the appropriate legal 
changes, and calling for and holding free elections.  Thus, a pact was reached between the 
old and new elite.   
 
Experiences of Central Asia demonstrate that, in the absence of mass mobilization 
and in the presence of patronage-style polities and the legacies of state socialism, the 
transition to democracy tends to be highly problematic.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
Central Asian states do not meet democratic standards – although Kyrgyzstan, in the 
early years of transition, came much closer than its eighbors (Bunce 2003).  Jones 
Luong (2002) argues that the Central Asian cases were pacted transitions.  It is usually 
argued that elite pacting enhances the prospects for successful democratic transition (e.g., 




mass mobilization, merely meant that elites agreed to limit, not tolerate or support, 
political change. 
 
3.8.3 Weak Special Interests 
 
As the experiences of postcommunist countries have demonstrated, collapse of 
the old ruling elite does not necessarily mean that t e democratic transition will ensure.  
On many occasions, the rule of the communist party was replaced by the rule of an 
authoritarian leader.  In cases where there was no authoritarian ruler, the new political 
structure favored particularistic interests of entrched groups.  Therefore, collapse of 
communism is not sufficient for a democratic regime to merge.  In Mongolia, contrary 
to some countries, there was no single political figure to grab power when the old 
politburo resigned in March 1990.  After removing Tsedenbal in 1984, no strong leader 
emerged.  The successor, Batmunkh was known for his mild manners and his preference 
for (limited) changes.  He successfully initiated perestroika and glasnost type of reforms 
in the late 1980s.  This factor prevented Mongolia from becoming an authoritarian state 
from the very beginning.  There was no strong person or strong group of people with 
authoritarian preferences, although these preferencs were articulated during the party 
meetings.   
 
Another factor that contributed to successful democratization was the relatively 
weak power of vested interests of the old regime, namely mid-level bureaucracy and 




was still centralized within the politburo.  In contrast to many transition countries and 
especially the Soviet Union, little devolution (both spontaneous and intentional) has 
occurred in the late communist period.  
 
The rigid planning exercise was still very much in place in the real sectors by the 
end of the 1980s, in spite of some experimentation with devolution of powers to 
enterprises and local governments in the second half of the 1980s.  This includes output 
planning, investment and credit allocation, as well as taxation powers and public 
expenditure allocations.  The main control of the planning agency was through the 
control of resources and inputs in the real sector and imposing hard budget constraints on 
local governments.  Thus, we do not observe the typ of collusion among the middle 
level bureaucracy and local governments against the in erests of the communist party that 
took place in the Soviet Union (see Murrell and Olson 1991 and Olson 2000).  The 
decentralization efforts that were undertaken in the late 1980s had only limited effect on 
the economy and the real powers of the center.  The central planning agency in Mongolia 
still held much control over the industries and local governments.  This argument will be 
developed in more detail in the next chapter where I discuss the privatization policies.    
 
One reason for the centralization of power is related to the size of the economy and 
its concentrated nature.  Naturally, in a large economy such as the Soviet Union, it was 
virtually impossible for the center to control the bureaucrats and local government, 
whereas the task might have been a little easier in a small economy like Mongolia.  In 




the center.  The bulk of industrial production was concentrated in few cities and the 
center controlled inflow of foreign resources.  Another reason is related to the fact that 
Mongolia introduced decentralization reforms relatively late – in 1988 – which means 
that the enterprises, ministerial level bureaucrats, and local governors had limited time – 
about one year – to exercise their increased powers.   
 
Thus, resistance to the democratic changes had been limited from the mid-level 
officials.  Under these circumstances, whatever the center decides becomes the key to 
new policies.  Once the politburo voluntarily resigned, the power of the old elite was 
reduced; the privileges of a leading party were abandoned by the amendment to the 
constitution, although it did have significant de facto influence.  Democratization was 
under way.  Centralization of power also meant that t e new democratic forces were 
weaker too, therefore they do needed the old elite to cooperate in order to pursue their 




This chapter described in detail the process of democratic political transformation 
in Mongolia in the early-to-mid-1990s and presented structural and alternative theoretical 
explanations of the factors that contributed to fast democratic transition.  
 
Scholars acknowledge that political events in Mongolia t ok a very fast and 




due to the lack of evidence.  This chapter brings i new evidence which helps to shed 
some light on the processes that took place during that period of time.  Several new 
insights are noteworthy.   
 
The new evidence helps to explain why did the politburo decide to resign, which 
was a distinctive event. The minutes of the meeting which were presented in the late 
leader Batmunkh’s memoirs reveal the tension and the type of thinking which was going 
on among the old leaders.  The decision to resign was ultimately made by the leader and 
was based, first, on the commitment to preserve peace and national unity, and second, the 
desire to conserve the MPRP’s control within the state structure.  A key aiding factor 
seems to be the military’s disbelief that they could contain the mass protests if they 
decided to use force.  This is reflective of the fact that Mongolia never had a strong army 
and always relied on external sources with its international and domestic security.  With 
the Soviet Union pulling out its troops, the regime in Mongolia lacked military backing.  
 
On the side of the democratic opposition, however, there was always a fear that 
the rulers would crash them down, if there ever wasviolence.  This belief in each other’s 
strength served as the basis for negotiating a pact vi  peaceful means, which was not the 
case in many other countries, where violent acts or even civil wars emerged. The 
government felt its weakness, the opposition realizd its limits, and this allowed the 
parties to strike a peaceful transition.  The analysis of the relative strength of the political 
parties, and most importantly beliefs of both parties about each other’s strengths, as well 




the existing literature.  Yet, these are critical to understanding the processes and 
outcomes that emerged in Mongolia.  This, I believe, is one of the contributions of this 
dissertation.  
 
Resignation of the Politburo and the government seriously undermined the old 
guard.  This gave a unique window of opportunity for the radical elements within the 
MPRP to collaborate with the more moderate elements of the democratic opposition.  
This fact was not observed by those who studied Mongolia’s transition.  As a result, we 
observe formation of a coalition government which was implementing “no one’s political 
platform” but its own, and which was criticized by oth parties.  This “triangulation” was 
a very unusual state of affairs, where the ruling party was not supportive of its own 
government, which was observed by other scholars but not explained.   
 
In addition to the above structural and historical conditions, I provide alternative 
actor-centric political economy explanations of thepolitical processes and outcomes.  
Some theoretical approaches have been applied to pos communist political transitions 
elsewhere, but not in the case of Mongolia.   These theoretical arguments provide a useful 
analytical tool to bring into analysis such important factors of democratic transition and 
consolidation as political institutions, how they shape the behavior of political players 
and are shaped by the interests and relative power f those players.   
 
Electoral and political institutions in Mongolia were mixed.  Most successful 




parties in the founding elections, had proportional electoral rules, and predominantly 
parliamentary systems with weak president.  The institutional arrangement in most of the 
CIS countries was usually the opposite.  Mongolia, n the other hand, had some mixture 
of different political institutions.  
 
In spite of such a perplexing combination of political institutions when no 
straightforward conclusion could be made about the success or otherwise of democratic 
transition, a closer look at these institutional arrangements reveals that they were 
conducive to democracy rather than not.  Electoral rule to empower political parties and 
promote party discipline was installed fairly quickly, in the second parliamentary 
elections, two years after the founding elections.  The Small Khural with its proportional 
representation gave the new political parties a grete  chance to participate in 
policymaking.  Institutionally, it had more influence on agenda setting and decision 
making than the majority elected Great Khural, which had very limited legislative 
powers.  The powers of the president – initially relatively strong – were gradually 
curtailed following a political stalemate in 1998, effectively making Mongolia a 
parliamentary republic.   
 
I believe electoral rules provide a key explanation – which is overlooked in the 
existing literature – to the formation and consolidation of political parties, which proved 
to be extremely important in democratic transition and, later, consolidation.  The 
proportional rule of the first elections gave greater chance for the fledgling new parties to 




overcome political fragmentation and forge two large consolidated parties.  Emergence of 
a single large democratic party on the eve of the 1996 parliamentary elections was 
perhaps more important in fostering political competition rather than maintaining several 
smaller parties (or protoparties) which could not effectively compete with the MPRP.   
 
More or less favorable political institutions were aided by successful collective 
action among the broad based interest groups, which flourished in the early 1990s.  It was 
easier for the more radically minded urban dwellers who were concentrated in few cities 
but most notably in the capital city to overcome collective action problems than more 
conservative but dispersed nomads who lived in the rural areas.  Collective action and 
interest group arguments help to incorporate cultural and anthropological dimensions into 
the political process.  These were previously noted by few scholars but not tied to the 
democratization process.  Ethnic and religious homogeneity, absence of regional division, 
as well as greater social cohesion was at the rootsof successful collective action and 
cooperation that contributed to the political changes.  It is also one dimension where 





Chapter 4 The Politics and Economics of Privatization 
 
 
By the end of the communist period, the Mongolian economy was performing 
better than many other centrally planned economies but facing similar problems of 
building inefficiency and distortions as elsewhere.  There was growing sense of 
dissatisfaction within the MPRP leadership with the eff ctiveness of foreign aid and 
foreign economic relations in general.  It was realized that the economy was highly 
dependent on foreign resources and markets.   
 
Some reform steps taken by the government in 1986-190 were slow to unfold 
and partially successful at best.  The reforms prior to October 1990 did not aim at a quick 
structural adjustment of the economy to introduce a market-oriented system (ADB 1992, 
82).  Only the political events described in Chapter 3 forced the government to move 
rapidly in a wide of range of areas with the view of c nverting the economy to a market-
oriented system.  The centerpiece of the government’s conomic reform program was 
privatization of state-owned assets.  Other areas of ref rms included pricing, exchange 
rate management, financial sector reforms, fiscal reform, and improvement in trade and 
payments system.   
 
4.1. Fiscal and Economic Crisis of the Early 1990s and Policy Reforms 
 
Revenue shocks were generated both externally and internally.  Externally huge 




significantly starting from 1991.  The share of theUSSR/former USSR in total exports 
fell from almost 80 percent in 1990 down to 30 percent in 1995 and a mere 8 percent in 
1997.  Russians stopped buying Mongolian goods and r w materials.  Mongolia had to 
find new trade partners and China became the first one to trade with Mongolia.  Other 
new partners such as Japan, the U.S. and Western Europe also slowly emerged.  The 
situation with imports had more negative repercussions on the Mongolian economy.  The 
share of the Soviet/former Soviet imports fell from about 80 percent of total imports in 
1990 down to 51 percent in 1992 and further down to 38 in 1997 (see Figure 2.1 in 
Chapter 2).   
 
4.1.1 Trade Disruptions and External Shock 
 
 
Import disruptions – particularly of gasoline products and intermediate inputs – 
were one of the major sources of decline of domestic output in the early 1990s.  In 
addition to external shocks, other domestic factors such as uncertainties over 
privatization, inconsistent liberalization efforts, and overall poor macroeconomic 
management due to the lack of market institutions mu t have contributed to the economic 
downfall. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the following section.    
 
Since Russia was a major oil-exporting country in the region, it could not be 
replaced easily by other sources.  Therefore, the Mongolian government held hard 
negotiations with the Russian government on continuous supply of oil products, which 
turned out be to largely unsuccessful when the Russian government pulled back from its 




with former Prime Minister Byambasuren).   Former First Deputy Prime Minister 
Ganbold admitted that the Soviet Union closing down the borders on December 31, 1990 
was the biggest challenge the coalition government faced at the time (magazine Toim, 
December 12, 2012, issue 49).  Eventually, the Soviets agreed to supply some amount of 
petroleum in exchange for hard currency but this wasignificantly lower than in the late 
communist period.  Imports of diesel oil were reduced by 27 percent, gasoline by 36 
percent, and lubricants by 82 percent in 1991 compared to the previous year.  The amount 
was slashed even further in the following year, where imports of diesel oil stood at mere 
40 percent and gasoline at 61 percent compared to 1990 (Statistical Yearbook 1992).  
Some scholars and politicians argue that the Soviet Union turned extremely unfavorable 
to Mongolia because its government was led by an extreme anti-Soviet leader, 
Byambasuren, who looked West and tried to pursue ind pendent policies (interview with 
former top planner Namjim).   
 
Byambasuren recalled in a TV interview that in April 1990 he visited Moscow on 
his way to the UN gathering in New York.  He met wih the chairman of the Soviet-
Mongolia Joint Economic Commission and was warned not to disregard the Soviet Union 
as they could “momentarily shut the faucet” implying great economic trouble for 
Mongolia.  Apparently the Soviets were insulted by the anti-Soviet sentiments expressed 
during the mass protests and the generally positive a titude shown by the ruling party 
towards such sentiments.  The Soviet leaders hinted that they have not found a common 
language with Byambasuren.  Byambasuren himself agrees that there were two important 




and starting to withdraw its troops from Mongolia, the Soviet Union wanted to retain two 
major objects of intelligence in Mongolia.  Second, they also wanted to keep some of the 
technical personnel in Mongolia.  Byambasuren firmly opposed.  All the troops and 
personnel had to leave, as agreed.  He was suspicious that these tensions might have led 
the Soviets to think of him as an anti-Soviet figure.  Which is fact, was the truth.   
 
Byambasuren recalled that the issue of oil supply was eventually resolved with 
the U.S. support.  Byambasuren shared the news of effective economic boycott by the 
Soviet Union against Mongolia during his meeting with State Secretary Baker in June 
1991 in Washington DC.  Shortly thereafter, Baker visited Moscow and during his 
meeting with Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister B ssmertnykh pressured the Soviet 
Union to continue to supply oil to Mongolia.  The embargo was lifted in summer 1991 
(television interview with Byambasuren shown on Channel 25 on the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of the democratic revolution, March 2010, available on youtube.com). 
 
The chaos in the Soviet Union itself (the attempted putsch, the ensuing collapse of 
the USSR and subsequent political quarrel in Russian politics) probably was at the roots 
of trade disruption.  Under the new political and economic conditions oil and 
intermediate goods supply could not be sustained at the previous levels.  However, the 
evidence provided above also suggests that trade disruptions were exacerbated by the 
strategic decision of the Soviet Union to influence th  behavior of the Mongolian leaders, 
especially remind Mongolians of its recent political and economic past.  Abrupt closure 




increased inflow of oil and other goods suggest some presence of a strategic component 
in the decision making. 
 
Imports of intermediate inputs were slashed significantly in the 1990-1991 and 
almost stopped at the end of 1991.  Domestic enterpris s built on the Soviet or Eastern 
European technology – often obsolete – were highly dependent on intermediate inputs 
from these specific countries.  With the collapse of trade regime and severe economic 
crisis in the partner countries, local enterprises could not find other suppliers.  The loss of 
trade destroyed the industrial base, which was heavily reliant on Soviet technology and 
markets (Boone et al 1997, 124).  Mongolia quickly reoriented its foreign trade to non-
CMEA countries.  Imports from other countries increas d significantly in the early 1990s.  
However, these were easily replaceable foodstuff and essential consumer goods, initially 
mostly from China and Japan.  The Japanese government was the single most important 
provider of food donations in the early 1990s while individual traders and small 
companies started importing daily consumer goods from China in a decentralized 
manner.  No investment goods were imported yet from advanced countries.  Only one 
excavator and two cranes were imported in 1992 into the entire country (Statistical 
Yearbook 1992).  
 
Another external source of economic shock was complete withdrawal of the 
Soviet and CMEA aid in 1991.  Foreign aid from the Soviet Union and other CMEA 
countries which stood well above 30 percent of GDP throughout the 1980s (36 percent in 




1991.  Boone et al (1997) estimated that the shock due to the loss of Soviet financing 
equaled to approximately 37 percent of GNP prior to the reforms (124).  It was partially 
replaced by aid from Japan and international financial institutions (IFIs) when Mongolia 
announced its transition to a market economy, but the amount was far less than the 
enormous resources pumped by the Soviet Union in the late communist period.  In 1991 
and 1992 the share of foreign aid stood at below 10 percent of GDP (see Figure 2.2 in 
Chapter 2).  However, it picked up in 1993 reaching 25 percent of GDP and gradually 
declined since then.  
 
Domestically, an economic downturn not experienced in the past several decades 
seriously jeopardized the economic tax base.  Moreover, tax collection capacity was very 
low if not absent.  Decades of sustained economic growth have been replaced by a deep 
economic recession in 1990, which culminated in 1991 depicting economic decline of 9.5 
percent (Figure 4.1).  This decline in GDP dramatically affected the tax base.   
 
Since 1990, notwithstanding a pickup in activity from the emerging private sector, 
industrial and agricultural production was constrained by shortages of intermediate goods 
and spare parts and, in the case of agriculture, by adverse weather.  Domestic investment 
fell sharply, reflecting in part curtailment of projects financed by the former Soviet 
Union.  Savings also declined due to a fall in realincome.  Inflation accelerated to almost 
300 percent by end-1992, reflecting liberalization of official prices as well as a relaxed 
monetary and credit policies during the first part of he year (World Bank 1996).  In the 




production of which exhibited real growth – molybdenum concentrate produced by the 
Erdenet Mining Concern, and vodka.  All other commodities on which the National 
Statistics Office provided annual data showed some degree of decline, and at times the 
decline was severe (Namjim and Itgel, 2003, 152). Figure 4.1 below depicts the dynamics 
of economic growth in 1969-1999.   
 




Source: National Statistics Office, various years, Asian Development Bank Key Indicators, 2001 
 
Several features of the above figure are noteworthy.  First, there are only two 
years of very negative growth of over 9 percent in 1991 and 1992.  These decline rates 
are actually smaller than in many transition countries.  Decline slowed down in 1993 and 
the economy started to grow again in 1994, partially due to increased copper prices.  This 
again stands in stark contrast to many other transitio  economies where economic 
                                                
35 Data for 1969-1980 show annual growth of Net Materi l Product; data for 1981-1999 show annual 








































































































































recovery was much slower (see Figure 1.1in Chapter 1 fo comparative economic 
performance of 26 transition economies).  Some attribu ed relative economic 
performance of Mongolia to the speed and depth of ref rms, because initial conditions – 
with a possible exception of relatively underindustrialized base – were not favorable, as 
discussed in Chapter 1.  The coalition government of 1990-1992 introduced some critical 
reforms in liberalization and privatization.  These policies were further advanced by the 
subsequent (more conservative) MPRP government led by Jasrai. 
 
Inflation was very low throughout the entire communist period, depicting annual 
average of 0.2 percent in 1981-1990.  The prices spiked in the early 1990s with price 
liberalization, shortage and economic crisis.  In 1991, inflation rate was at a moderate 20 
percent.  However, the government could not control further price increase spiral.  The 
annual average Consumer Price Index (CPI) peaked at 268 percent in 1993, then declined 
sharply thereafter reaching single digits in 1998 (Figure 4.2).  Although the rates indicate 
hyperinflation, it was lower than in many other transition countries where inflation rate 
was as high as four or even five digits (seeTable 1.2in Chapter 1 for comparative inflation 
















Source: IMF World Economic Outlook data (2011)  
 
High inflation was fueled by several factors.  Until 1991 the government received 
about 25 percent of its budget revenue ad direct financing from the Soviet Union.  In 
addition, it earned approximately 12 percent of GNP, or one third of budget revenue, 
through trade and trade-related taxed (the so-called import price differentials discussed in 
Chapter 2).  Once these major sources of budget revnue were gone, the government 
responded by printing money to finance its expenditure (Boone et al 1997).  As noted 
earlier, the state bank was under legal government control until mid-1991, but still was 
heavily dominated by the government when it nominally shifted under the supervision of 
the parliament with the new Banking Law.  Another important reason of price inflation 
was decentralization of the banking system. Two-tier banking system was established in 
May 1991 and newly established commercial banks (initially state banks followed by 
creation of private banks), in the absence of adequat  supervision from the central bank, 













4.1.2 First Economic Policy Measures and Price Reforms 
 
 
The very first measure taken by the coalition government was the Government 
Resolution 20 of January 15, 1991 on “Some Measures of Transitioning the Economy to 
a Market Regulation”, simply known as the “Resolution 20”.  The resolution made some 
major changes in the wholesale prices and money scale.  First, the wholesale prices of 
gasoline and diesel, coal, and electricity were increased by 75-100 percent, wholesale 
prices of agricultural products purchased as part of the state requisition system – food and 
raw materials for the industry – were increased by 1.2-3.8 times. The government 
established the ceilings of increase in wholesale prices of major manufactured goods and 
services, in the range of 40-80 percent depending on the product.  These wholesale price 
changes were to reflect the world prices and were the first step of the government to 
amend the price distortions inherited form the previous system, as Prime Minister 
Byambasuren claimed in a press conference (Ardyn Erkh, January 16, 1991, issue 11).  
Although the measure claimed to be radical by the government and was perceived as such 
by the public who have not experienced price increase to this point, in fact it was not a 
far-reaching measure because substantial amount of price control remained.   
 
Second, all salaries and wages, pensions and benefits w re increased by two 
times, simultaneously all retail prices of goods and services were increased by two times.  
Thus, the “money scale” was changed.  Some small social funds were established to 




compensation or benefits.  Individual savings of up to 10,000 Togrogs were increased 
twice but any extra savings remained at the same amount.  This latter clause caused 
multiple criticisms and the government was later forced to compensate for all savings in 
excess of the established ceiling, albeit even the initial measure was generous compared 
to many other transition countries.  Third, the government approved the list of primary 
goods and services where the government fixed pricewould prevail, at least in the initial 
stage of transition.   
 
Naturally, the reform that caused most commotion among the public was the 
change in the scale of money.   This measure was most damaging for those who held 
large amounts of cash on hand.  Former Prime Minister Byambasuren recalled in a TV 
interview that there were several reasons for undertaking such measures.  First, with aid 
withdrawal the interim government was forced to make large emissions of currency to 
pay for its bills and there were about 742 million Togrogs of cash in the hands of people 
which created inflationary pressure and, with stillfixed prices on most goods, 
opportunities for arbitrage for those with cash (TV interview on Channel 25, March 2010, 
available on youtube.com).   
 
There was another geopolitical reason that Byambasuren was in no doubt.  
Mongolian banknotes at the time were printed in the Soviet Union.  In Byambasuren’s 
opinion the Soviet military and technical specialists were given large amounts of the 
Mongolian Togrog – far greater than their salaries d nominated in Togrogs – which they 




control over the currency being issued into the domestic economy.  Byambasuren further 
argued that the inventory of goods in the amount of 3.3 billion Togrogs which was in 
place in October 1990 was sharply reduced to 1.6 billion within a matter of two months, 
which was far greater than the estimated cash and svings of the Mongolian citizens.  
This led him to suspect that the Soviets might be involved in bringing in large amounts of 
Mongolian cash into the country.  Although many are doubtful about the Soviet covert 
activities – and critical of his allegations, e.g., Namjim (2003) – Byambasuren was firm 




Whatever the reasons, the policy to change the money scale was to reduce the 
inflationary pressure of large amount of cash in circulation and protect the living 
standards of the poorer strata in the society.  Ganbold admitted in a recent interview that 
he suggested to change the money scale not by two but f ur times, but Prime Minister 
Byambasuren did not agree.  He even suggested introucing entirely new money without 
Box 4.1 Food shortage in Ulaanbaatar 
 
The Candy and Confectionary Factory of Ulaanbaatar did not produce any output in May and June 
1990 due to electricity blackouts.  There were major disruptions of production in 1990: total of 337 
hours of idleness.  The situation will not improve in 1991, because no contracts have been signed with 
the suppliers of raw materials and technology.  Thefactory will not produce any cookies in the first 
quarter due to disruptions in electricity supply and lack of ingredients.  This will force the people to go 
without candy during the New Year and Lunar New Year.    
 
The long line for milk which was formed at 7:00 am in city grocery stores got even longer in the 
afternoon.  The milk was not delivered to the stores by 5:00 pm.  People went without milk for the last 
two days, in spite of spending the whole day queuing.  The majority of those lining up were 60-70 years 
old pensioners who had spare time to stay in the line for the whole day.  The state dairy farms do no 
supply milk as agreed.  Dairy factories also face the issue of electricity blackouts.     
 




one or two zeroes, as did Russia, but that idea again was not supported by the State Small 
Khural.  Hyperinflation was in full force in all other transition economies and it was 
anticipated that prices would increase further in Mongolia and with much higher speed.  
The government decision was made in anticipation of higher inflation.  All in all, as 
Byambasuren put it, the Resolution 20 was “the small fire set by the government against 
the big fire of upcoming hyperinflation” in an attempt to curtail the latter (magazine 
Toim, December 12, 2012, issue 49).   
 
There was another measure that the government took a few days earlier in order to 
deal with severe food shortages.  Effective January 15, 1991, the Government introduced 
a special regime in several SOEs and public entities which were involved in food 
production, transportation, and distribution.  The “special regime” entailed restrictions on 
the minimum number of hours of operation, work schedul , amount of pay, control over 
supplies, strict norms on the use of these supplies, minimum production levels, 
appointment and removal of the management, prohibition of exports, etc.  In other words, 
all issues pertaining to the operation and production of the enterprise were now under the 
state control.  Political parties and trade unions were prohibited from operating in these 
enterprises.  These 20 enterprises and entities included most food processing plants such 
as bread and confectionery plants, flour plants, meat plants, soap plant, food distribution 
organizations such as state food wholesale organizations, Ulaanbaatar City food 
distribution agency, state auto parks which were responsible for transportation of food, 





Starting from January 20, 1991 (Government Resolution 21 of January 15, 1991) 
food rationing system was introduced in major cities and aimag (province) centers in 
order to ensure secure and equal distribution of essential food items and necessities to all 
citizens and combat incidences of food speculation and rising prices on food.  The 
Government Commission on Implementing the Special Regime was led by the First 
Deputy Prime Minister D. Ganbold and comprised of several ministers and high-ranking 
government officials.  Minutes of the Government Commission on special regime reveal 
problems with severe shortages of food and essential household supplies such as soap and 
toothpaste.  For instance, it was reported that the bev rage company stopped its 
production for 25 days due to the shortage of lemon acid.  The only produce people could 
buy in 1991 without standing in long queues was 1 kg packages of domestically produced 
salt.   
 
The special regime was removed from some entities in September 1991, but 
remained in eight enterprises such as meat, flour, bread producing companies and food 
transportation company.  Food rationing lasted for about a year and a half before being 
abandoned in summer of 1992.  Rations on flour, bread, meat, and rice were established 
on a per person basis while on tea, vegetable oil, lo se tobacco, and vodka were 
established on a household basis.  Tobacco and vodka and occasionally some other 
‘luxury’ items such as milk powder from Japan and apples from China were given once 
in a quarter or before national holidays.  Dairy products and vegetables were not rationed.  
Disruptions in rationed food were initially quite frequent but soon stabilized.  Generally, 




public perceived it positively.  As gas became extremely scarce because of trade 
disruptions with Russia, it was also rationed in May 1991.  Priority was given to public 
transportation, delivery vehicles, and government cars.  Private vehicles received very 
marginal amount.  The above measures resembled war-time measures.  They were 
temporary and largely effective and helped the governm nt to handle the situation of 
extreme shortages.   
 
One important stimulus to solve food and consumer goods shortage was issuance 
of international passports to all citizens.  The resolution to issue international passports36 
was adopted in November 1991 (Ardyn Erkh, November 12, 1991, issue 198).  People 
were now free to travel to other countries.  Opening up the country was not only an 
important measure of political freedom – people were prohibited from travel under the 
old system – but it was also “one way to resolve the economic issues of shortage, high 
inflation, and even the initial accumulation of capit l” (interview with Ganbold).  The 
first destination of Mongolian traders was China where goods were abundant (but very 
low quality) and people could make some money by importing the much-demanded food 
and consumer goods to Mongolia.  Many made a fortune by re-exporting Chinese goods 
to Russia (and even Eastern Europe) where the shortages were equally severe but the 
markets were much bigger.  Both borders – with China a d Russia – were open and 
Russia’s travel and trade regime was much stricter at the time which gave the Mongolian 
traders a significant advantage (interview with Ganbold).  Many of the first Mongolian 
‘capitalists’ were born in the trade sector and some – e.g., Battulga of the Genco Group 
                                                
36 National passports were used for identification purposes within the country.  To distinguish from the




and Batkhuu of the Shunkhlai Group – later became prominent business people.  Such 
innovative market practices perhaps were one reason why economic recovery was 
quicker in Mongolia than elsewhere.   
 
4.1.3 Fiscal and Financial Sector Reforms 
 
Planning and budget preparation processes went throug  substantial changes.  The 
plan became a much shorter document.  Naturally, the difficulties caused by the external 
developments – disruption in trade and aid – constituted the main economic challenge.  
However, as the plan developers admitted, the main hurdle in developing this document 
in 1990 was “the clash between the need to manage the conomy in accordance with the 
market principles and lack of knowledge and the old planning mentality that still 
prevailed among the top leaders” (interview with the former Prime Minister 
Byambasuren).   
 
The plan had to be abandoned altogether in 1991.  For the first time the main 
fiscal document was not an annual plan but general guidelines only.  During the 
discussion of the General Guidelines and budget for 1991 by the State Small Khural, it 
was noted that this was the first guidelines in the history of the country that predicted 
decline in the output and was developed under the circumstances of high level of 
uncertainty about the future economic prospects.  The budget for 1991 differed 
significantly from the previous years.  The state changed its planned targets into the so-
called “state acquisition orders” put on enterprises and state farms which produced 




products, few industrial products, and 29 export products which generated the much-
needed hard currency.   These constituted only a portion of enterprises’ total output, 
although still a substantial portion.  This dual production and sales system was a 
characteristic of early Chinese reform and was important for stopping economic decline.  
It seems to have produced some positive incentives in Mongolia as well, although the 
origins of this policy were not clear. The economic situation worsened in 1992.  The 
prospects became gloomier but at least clearer, reducing uncertainty.  It was clearly stated 
that no aid would be forthcoming and the crisis would continue and may deepen, at least 
in the next three years.   
 
Faced with severe fiscal shocks in the form of aid withdrawal and overall 
economic downturn, the newly established coalition g vernment started devising new 
fiscal institutions on an ad hoc basis.  Mongolian policymakers now accorded high 
priority to fiscal reform and to addressing issues of domestic resource mobilization.  
Several important changes were forcefully introduce in the legal framework of the tax 
system.  A whole range of taxes that existed under the central plan lost economic 
rationale as the economy started to shift to a market system.  Turnover taxes based on 
fixed prices and exchange rates had to vanish with pr ce liberalization.  The government 
abolished all turnover taxes in January 1991.  A customs tariffs at 15 percent on all 
imported goods and selected export goods at the govrnment discretion was officially 
introduced in June 1991 to replace the import price d ff rentials, which were the main 
source of turnover taxes for decades.  As for domestic turnover taxes, with poor 




government could not raise sufficient tax revenue from this source.  The arbitrary 
domestic turnover taxes were replaced with simple universal 10 percent sales taxes on 
goods and services in October 1991 (Government Resolution 290), to compensate for the 
loss of the government’s price differential income due to move to free market prices on 
most imported goods. 
 
Enterprise profit taxes that once accounted for ove30 percent of total revenue 
declined severely by 1990.  At the same time, private companies started to emerge.  
Therefore, the individually negotiated SOE profit taxes had to be replaced by a universal 
income tax that applied to all types of ownership and business activities.  In December 
1990 the government adopted a new General Tax Law th t introduced universal income 
taxes.  Company income taxes had six tax brackets with the highest marginal tax rate of 
46 percent.  Personal income taxes were divided into 12 brackets and the marginal tax 
rate went as high as 50 percent (General Tax Law 1990).  One significant feature of the 
new tax law was that, unlike tax laws under the previous system, it defined universally 
tax responsibilities of all entities, both of state nd private ownership, and all citizens. 
 
Institutional hurdles included not only the major changes in the tax laws and 
regulations, but also lack of the institutional capacity to collect tax revenue prescribed by 
new legal arrangements.  Such a capacity was virtually absent in 1991 when the first 
changes were made.  In 1991, there were 909 limited liability companies, 2,357 




7,702 business entities registered with the Ministry of Finance37.  As opposed to about 
1,100 large state-owned enterprises registered in the la e 1980s, this was an 
unprecedented increase in the number of entities the tax office had to deal with.  
Therefore, at this stage, the major challenge in the implementation of the new set of fiscal 
statutes has become the institutional strengthening of the government’s revenue-raising 
machinery.  A tax division was set up within the Ministry of Finance and aimag 
(province) centers and city governments in December 1990. Customs administration was 
established in January 1991.   
 
On the expenditure side, dismantlement of the plan as a major means of 
controlling the economy and budgeting, with no effective alternative system, created 
chaos in allocating the resources.  The State Planning and Economic Committee was 
abolished in September 1990.  A new process of budget preparation without firm planned 
targets was experimented with for the first time in co nection with the preparation of 
1991 budget.  The state had to withdraw from direct economic activities and downsize its 
massive bureaucratic apparatus (See Figure 4.3 for the dramatic decline in the scope of 
the state budget). The Government Action Plan (approved in 1991) noted that sudden 
interruption in external financial aid pumped into the economy for several decades 
demonstrated the true physical and financial limitations of the domestic economy, its 
resources and management.  As Mongolians say, time has come “to stretch the legs to the 
length of the blanket.” 
 
                                                





Figure 4.3 Share of government revenue and expenditure in GDP, 1981
(percent) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
 
 
The financial sector underwent major and rapid changes. As in the public finance, 
some major changes occurred within the first two years of the reforms.  The core of the 
financial sector reforms was establishment of the two
described earlier, the banking sector was dominated by a state
simultaneously issued banknotes, held foreign reserv , collected deposit, gave 
commercial loans, as well as collected taxes and cotrolled state enterprises.  There were 
no money or capital markets.  Monetary policy, like the fiscal policy, was not an 
important policy instrument and was subject to the plan. 
 
The two-tiered banking system 
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of the government.  The central bank – the Bank of M ngolia – started its operations in 
May 1991.  The first two commercial banks – the State Bank of Mongolia and the Bank 
for Investment and Technological Renovation – started working in February 1991.  
Several other commercial banks – all state owned – were established between September 
1990 and May 1991 as spin-offs from the old state bnk.  The new banking system with 
separate central and commercial banking was legalized by the Banking Law of May 1, 
1991.  Commercial banks started taking deposits and advancing loans to enterprises.  
Following the establishment of commercial banks, in 1991 the central bank introduced 
the some sound management and regulatory system for commercial banks, such as 
monthly reporting requirements, licensing of commercial banks, etc.  However, 
supervisory functions were weak in the early 1990s, which fueled hyperinflation in 1991-
1992 and ultimately led to several banking crises in 1996-1997.  The central bank 
initially was under the direct supervision of the government but with the new Banking 
Law it legally became accountable to the State Small Khural, the parliament, which 
somewhat restricted the money printing powers of the government, although the central 
bank continued to finance the budget deficit in 1991 and 1992 (ADB 1992, 35).  The 
Bank of Mongolia pursued serious monetary tightening by the end of 1992, in response to 
hyperinflation.  It also introduced reserve requirements in 1992 to limit commercial credit 
issue and used open-market operations since 1993 to supplement its efforts to control the 





The Mongolian Stock Exchange was established on paper in 1990 but became 
operational in February 1992.  The main function of the stock exchange was to privatize 
the state assets through vouchers.  This issue will be discussed in more detail later.  
 
4.1.4 (Cautious) Continuation of Economic Reforms (1992-196) 
 
The first two years of transition witnessed some bold changes both in the political 
and economic spheres.  The country was totally transformed during this short period of 
time.  With the victory of a more conservative MPRP government, new Prime Minister 
Jasrai took economic reforms more cautiously, althoug  no significant slow down was 
registered, as many believed to be the case.  Jasrai, leader of the conservative group 
within the MPRP, included in his cabinet several representatives of other factions within 
the party, but not radicals (see Table 3.3 for description of various factions within the 
MPRP).  The radicals were ousted together with the democrats.  
 
Ch. Ulaan, a mild conservative, was the National Development Minister.  
Purevdorj, Deputy Prime Minister, was an experienced technocrat reappointed from the 
previous government.  He was largely responsible for rebuilding energy and 
infrastructure sectors.  Davaasambuu, Finance Minister, was among the economists who 
developed a blueprint of transitioning to the market economy in June 1990 and was the 
only person who spoke English and could directly communicate with the IFIs and 
bilateral donors.  “He was the most outspoken one but on many occasions was in the 
minority” (interview with D. Baasankhuu, senior Ministry of Finance and World Bank 




(in 1995) due to health reasons.  A strong conservative Byambajav, who previously 
served as Finance Minister and who strongly believed in gradual reforms (as admitted by 
himself in interview) took over the Finance Ministry.   
 
Thus, the economic package was led by a rather conservative team, especially if 
you compare it to Ganbold’s.  Moreover, “Prime Minister Jasrai ultimately was the 
person who made key economic decisions.  Compared to the previous government (and 
the ones which came later), the Jasrai government adhered to the principles of strong 
hierarchy.  The norms of party chain of command seemed to be still strong in the early 
1990s among the prominent party members who largely composed the government” 
(interview with Baasankhuu).   
 
The Jasrai government “formally stated its fidelity to the reform policy” (Ganbold 
in UNDP 1992) but its actual steps were more cautious.  The Government Action Plan, 
approved by the State Great Khural on October 8, 1992 (Resolution 27), noted that the 
country underwent major political and economic changes and the previous government 
undertook some ‘courageous measures’ to reform the economy.  Democracy and markets 
were declared to be irreversible now.  At the same ti , it was emphasized that many 
issues such as deep economic decline and poverty emerg d and insufficient attention has 
been paid to the negative consequences of speedy reforms (newspaper Zasgiin Gazryn 
Medee38, third week of October 1992, issue 38).   
 
                                                




The government aimed at “correcting the mistakes made by the previous 
government with privatization” and simultaneously at completing the large privatization 
by the end of 1993.  Different privatization methods – other than vouchers – were 
proposed in order to raise budget revenue and improve efficiency of privatized 
enterprises.  The government also proposed to privatize land for those who wish to 
engage in farming.  Housing privatization was another important issue on the agenda.  It 
was also stated that subsidies to state enterprises would be reduced substantially in 1993 
and terminated thereafter (ibid).  These were ambitious goals and it was not surprising 
that most of them were not achieved.  Housing privatization was completed in 1997 by 
the next government while land privatization issue was not resolved until the early 2000s.  
However, meaningful progress has been made towards these goals.   
 
Jasrai’s policies were focused on two issues.  First, as noted earlier, it aimed at 
correcting the mistakes of the previous government which often meant more cautious 
step-by-step reforms, particularly in privatization. Unfortunately, no notable positive 
change occurred with regard to the newly emerged poverty and other social issues as a 
result of more cautious policies.  Second, the governm nt wanted to contain the economic 
decline.  The economy has been declining in the past two years and it was the 
government’s mission to stop the decline and bring about economic recovery.  In order to 
achieve this goal, the government opted for direct state intervention measures, a 





The government pursued policies of supporting state en rprises by providing 
them with loans and direct subsidies.  For instance, funds provided in 1993 by the Asian 
Development Bank in the amount of US$100 million were distributed to the state 
enterprises as loans.  The German development agency GTZ also provided funds to the 
government to support small and medium enterprises.  The loans and subsidy policy of 
the government largely failed and the government ultimately had to withdraw from direct 
state intervention (interview with Davaasambuu).  Unsurprisingly, there were occasional 
allegations of corruption in distributing the loans.  While subsidies were reduced, 
budgetary capital grants increased substantially during these years (Table 4.1 below).   
 
Table 4.1 Subsidies and Grants to Public Enterprises (1993-1995), in million 
Togrogs 
 
 1993 1994 1995 
Current subsidies 3,482 5,418 3,607 
Capital grants 1,000 (est.) 2,759 9,676 
Total subsidies and grants 4,482 8,177 13,283 
Total subsidies and grants as % of GDP 2.7 2.9 3.5 
Source: World Bank 1996 
 
 
Economic decline was contained in 1994, when the economy started growing 
after four continuous years of decline.  Prime Minister Jasrai’s famous phrase “we have 
seen a light at the end of the tunnel” reflected the popular weariness about the economic 
situation and public anticipation.  Even though the government attempted to take credit 
for the positive macroeconomic change, it was at least partially attributable to the 
favorable global environment in the mid-1990s.  By this time, Mongolia was trading with 




prices on copper – the major export commodity – were high during 1994-1995, before 
going down in 1996-1997 and hitting the bottom in the first half of 1999 (see Figure 4.4 
below).   Gold prices performed very well throughout 1993-1996 before steadily 
dropping from the first quarter of 1997 until the last quarter of 1999.  
 
Figure 4.4 Copper and gold prices (1991-1999, quarterly), gold (right axis) 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2011): International Financial Statistics (Edition: September 2011) 
 
Increase in global commodity prices also served the basis for a moderate 
economic growth in 1994 and very high growth – 6.3 percent – in the following year (see 
Figure 4.1).  Naturally, the growth rate was not sustainable as it was conditioned by the 
high commodity prices and exposed the vulnerability of the economy to the global 
environment. 
 
On the other hand, world prices of petroleum – the major import item – were 









































































































































































































































1996 (see Figure 4.5 below).  Thus, terms of trade were mostly positive in the second half 
of Jasrai’s premiership when real growth occurred. 
 
Table 4.2 Terms of trade, percentage change 
 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 -0.2 -6.2 .. .. 17.9 13.4 -23.6 12.2 -23.3 -6.8 
Source: World Bank 1991, IMF 1997 at ht p://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1997/pn9725.htm 
and IMF 1999 at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=2872.0 








Source: International Monetary Fund (2011): International Financial Statistics (Edition: September 
2011) 
 
Many criticized the period of 1992-1996 as the “lost f ur years” in terms of 
deepening the radical market reforms initiated in the previous two years.  Ganbold 





































































































































































































































did take place were implemented rather slowly.  Thefavorable global market conditions 
created significant fiscal room for implementing more radical reforms, which in fact were 
not taken advantage of (interview with Ganbold).   
 
Summarizing the government policies in 1992-1996, the World Bank emphasized 
that “… after a quick start, Mongolia's reforms have lagged behind the rapid reforms of 
Eastern European and Baltic countries.  Mongolia annou ced a strong reformprogram in 
1990, privatized most small enterprises by voucher, and initiated price liberalization 
measures.  But price liberalization was less rapidly implemented than in Eastern 
European countries.  Moreover, delayed price adjustmen  necessitated continued 
subsidies to energy and food, which increased fiscal pressures on prices, and weakened 
the banking sector.” (World Bank 1997, 10) 
 
The report further criticized the government’s lack of enterprise restructuring 
policies.  “Large state enterprises continued to benefit from subsidies, capital grants and 
subsidized loans, which amounted to an annual 6.5 percent of GDP over 1993-95, much 
larger than the 1 percent of GDP or less in rapid Eastern European and Baltic reformers.  
Financing these loss-making enterprises prevented resou ce allocation from low- to high-
productivity sectors: during most of the transition period, services, which led growth in 
rapid reformers, actually declined or stagnated in Mongolia, indicating limited resource 
reallocation.  Moreover, the continued subsidies undermined the credibility of the 
Government's stabilization efforts, because fiscal demands threatened to derail monetary 





However, the EBRD transition index data do not support such claims (see Figure 
4.6 below).  First, we do not observe any reversal of the reforms.  We observe substantial 
advances in price and trade liberalization, sustained privatization efforts, and some gains 
in financial sector and infrastructure reforms in the later period.  Although marginal 
achievements seem to be slightly smaller than in the previous and the subsequent periods, 
the Jasrai government’s performance does not seem to be noticeably poorer compared to 
other governments.   
 
Figure 4.6 EBRD Transition Index averages, 1989-2000 
 
 
Source: EBRD transition index dataset 
Notes:  The indices are cumulative and are averages of several indices: privatization index – 3, 
liberalization – 3, financial sector – 2 indices, and infrastructure index is a single 
composite index. 
 
Secondly, there was no substantial change in the reform approach.  Many 
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shock therapy, or big bang (see Chapter 1 for literature review).  The Jasrai government 
policies, on other hand, are commonly considered to have taken a more gradual approach, 
which is probably justified.  However, a more careful analysis of the initial reforms 
reveals that these were also gradual, rather than big bang.   
 
Price liberalization was gradual.  The first measure was Resolution 20 of January 
1991 which introduced partial price liberalization but left many areas of the economy 
under state control.  The resolution freed all prices except for 35 categories of goods, 
which still constituted about 50 percent of the CPI.  The second set of price liberalization 
measures was adopted in October 1991 as part of an IMF agreement when the number of 
controlled prices was cut from 35 to 17.  The share of controlled prices in consumer 
basket fell down to 20 percent. The third set of measures was adopted in March 1992, on 
the eve of donor’s meeting, with all prices except for flour, bread, and vodka which were 
rationed being freed.  The real money balances also provide evidence of gradual erosion 
until the first quarter of 1993 (Boone et al 1997).   Together with price liberalization, 
state acquisition orders gradually diminished and were abolished by the end of 1993.  The 
same gradual approach is true for exchange rate reforms, where separate exchange rates 
existed simultaneously for state transactions, barter trade, and black market both in 1991 
and 1992.  These were unified and freed in June 1993.  Thus, the Jasrai government 
continued and in many cases completed the core libera zation reforms.   
 
Another important continuation of the policies was further strengthening of the 




pension and social security, and social insurance systems as well as ownership, 
privatization, and company governance were approved r under discussion in the first 
nine months of the very first parliament.  Many of these laws were amended (mostly 
improved) and some new laws were introduced in 1992-1996, at the initiative of the 
government.    
 
Table below summarizes the major reform efforts undertaken during the two 
election periods: coalition government of 1990-1992 and MPRP government of 1992-
1996. 
 
Table 4.3 Economic reform measures in 1990-1992 and 1992-1996 
 
Reform measures  
Major reforms 
Sep 1990- Jun 1992  
Major reforms 
Jul 1992- Jun 1996 
Price and foreign 
exchange 
liberalization 
Gradual liberalization of retail 
prices, but retaining of price 
controls on foodstuff, medicine, 
utilities, and selected services; 
partial exchange rate liberalization 
in 1992 (devaluation of Togrog for 
commercial transactions)   
 
Adjustments to wages, pension 
benefits, and private savings 
deposits to soften impact of price 
increase; consumer rationing 
(Resolution 20 of 1991) 
 
Further price liberalization of 
essential foodstuff 
Full exchange rate liberalization in 
June 1993;  
 
Fare increase in gas, major utilities 
and public services;  
 
Elimination of consumer rationing 
(1992) 
Trade liberalization Negotiation of most-favored-nation 
trade agreements with countries in 
the convertible currency area;new 
Foreign Investment Law; 
Direct export rights granted to 
selected manufacturers, eliminated 
mandatory state orders for exports; 
Refraining from introducing export 
licensing and quotas; 




partial liberalization of issue of 
foreign trading licenses 
Fiscal reforms Dismantlement of plan, first major 
laws on taxation, social security, 
pensions, establishment of customs 
and tax offices; 
Rationalization of government 
ministries; elimination of the State 
Planning Commission 
Further revision of tax and customs 
laws, e.g., introduction of sales tax 
and excise tax on petroleum 
products; 
Establishment of treasury function 





Establishment of two-tiered banking 
system, passage of Banking Law, 
some commercial bank control 
measures; 
Establishment of the stock exchange 
 
Adoption of Securities Law (1995); 
Establishment of prudential 
guidelines for banks; termination of 




Removal of restrictions on private 
ownership of herds; 
Adoption of Privatization Law; 
Completion of small-scale 
privatization and agricultural 
privatization, initiation of large 
privatization with vouchers; 
Substantial reduction of budgetary 
subsidy for imported goods and to 
loss-making enterprises;  
Adoption of Bankruptcy Law 
Completion of voucher privatization 
(end of 1994); opening of secondary 
stock market (Feb 1995);  
New program for cash privatization;  
Elimination of remaining 
mandatory state orders (end of 
1993); establishment of new 
procedures of corporate governance 
for remaining state-owned 
enterprises  
Source: Author’s summary from various courses 
 
However, it should be noted that the two governments operated under very 
different political and global economic situations.  The Byambasuren government worked 
under extreme conditions and great uncertainty, both economically and politically as well 
as domestically and internationally.  Yet, it was able to introduce some major reforms.  
The Jasrai government functioned under much more certain and favorable conditions.  It 
maintained the reforms and introduced some more.  Table 4.4 below summarizes these 





Table 4.4 Political and economic circumstances of the two governments (1990-
1992 and 1992-1996) 
 
 Byambasuren Government  
(Sep 1990-Jun 1992) 
Jasrai Government  
(Jul 1992-Jun 1996) 
Duration  1 year 9 months (Sep 1990-Jun 
1992) 
4 years (Jul 1992-Jun 1996) 
General political 
situation 
Uncertain, too many changes going 
on simultaneously, interim rules 
New constitution was approved 
setting a new framework, more 
stability and less uncertainty 
Partisan politics No support on either side of the 
political spectrum, political isolation 
Full support of the MPRP-




Sharp output decline, hyperinflation, 
huge shock, a lot of uncertainty, 
many ad hoc measures, little 
knowledge of how things work 
under the market 
Initially decline but first growth in 
1994, no reversal of growth, 
continued hyperinflation which 
subsided later, more knowledge and 
experience, much less uncertainty 
Global economic 
outlook 
Mostly neutral, Mongolia was only 
starting to trade on global terms 
Positive, high prices on copper and 
gold, positive terms of trade in the 
second half of the period 
Relations with the 
outside world 
Collapse of CMEA, huge trade 
disruptions, abrupt withdrawal of 
Soviet aid, search for new donors, 
membership in IFIs, first emergency 
aid 
New trade partners found, steady 
inflow of aid  
Source: Author’s summary and judgment 
 
 
4.2. The Politics of Economic Reform 
 
 
Political parties differed in their perception of the new economic system.  This 
section reviews the economic agenda of political parties and the role played by various 
political players such as the parliament, government, IFIs and the general public in 





4.2.1 Economic Agenda of Political Parties 
 
 
The distinction of political parties in terms of their economic platform roughly 
reflected the major divide in the transition debate: radical vs. gradual approach.  The 
more conservative and even the center wing within te MPRP were cautious about 
proceeding with swift reforms and favored the gradual approach.     
 
Former top planner Namjim – who later became an academic – was an open critic 
of the radical reforms proposed and undertaken by the government in 1990-1992.  He 
was also the most industrious and serious critic of sh ck therapy.  Namjim wrote series of 
newspaper articles, and made presentations at academic and policy conferences in 1990-
1992 about a gradual transition approach.  For instance, his main podium became the 
conservative MPRP newspaper “Unen” where he published several articles on economic 
transition.  In his early book “Mongolia at the Crossroads of the Market Economy” 
(1991), Namjim argued that certain important prerequisites were needed before the 
country should embark on full-fledged market reforms.   
 
Namjim argued that the government embarked on radical reforms without proper 
analysis of the consequences, particularly the potential negative effect on the output and 
living standards of the people.  Namjim further argued that the transition process was 
mismanaged and done haphazardly without much thought about the consequences.  The 
reason for economic crisis in the early 1990s was related, in Namjim’s opinion, to the 
inability of the economy to sustain itself without foreign assistance and, most 




regulation, discipline, and rule of law.  The mismanagement led to abrupt disruption of 
economic ties among the suppliers and buyers, and the economic chaos that ensured as a 
result of the tearing the fabric of old economic institutions (Namjim and Itgel 2003, 154).  
The government leadership overestimated the possibility for success just by leaving the 
economy on its own without government intervention.  It was naïve to expect that an 
economy which was micromanaged under the central plan to spontaneously prosper just 
by withdrawing the state from all its economic activities.  More successful and less 
painful transition should have been managed gradually and cautiously, but Prime 
Minister Byambasuren failed to do so (ibid, 156).  
 
Namjim even argued that “Prime Minister Byambasuren’s a ti-Soviet sentiments 
were the main reason the Soviet Union (and later Russia) closed their borders and 
stopped supplying oil in 1991” (interview with Namji ).  He was also critical of 
Byambasuren’s handling of the public.  He argued that Byambasuren was not open about 
the real economic hardships the country was facing, a criticism shared by conservative 
members of the MPRP which became one of the reasons for calling Byambasuren to 
resign in 1992.   
 
He was the most outspoken conservative representative of the MPRP whose 
opinion, as he himself admitted, was largely ignored by the government (Namjim and 
Itgel 2003, 173-177).  Namjim’s sentiments were shared by the MPRP leadership, as 
evident from the roundtable of leaders of political p rties in July 1991.  Batkhishig, 




with market reforms as this may deepen the economic crisis.  In his view, it was 
important to sustain the existing state enterprises viable so that people are not deprived of 
the essential goods and this could largely be achieved by (at least temporary) state 
regulation and gradual introduction of the reforms.  Batkhishig noted that the MPRP “is 
now learning how to work with the State Small Khural.  However, due to the nature of its 
duties, it would be very difficult for the party toinfluence the policies of the government” 
(Ardyn Erkh, July 16, 1991, issue 113).  By the latter, Batkhishig mostly likely meant the 
relative insulation of the government from the popular pressure and pressure from the 
political parties, and greater powers vis-à-vis the parliament.  Korsun and Murrell (1995) 
noted that the Government Privatization Commission was in effect a subcommittee of the 
cabinet, headed by Ganbold, and commission staff “gined enormous powers deciding 
which enterprises would be privatized first and how large would be the residual 
government share in privatized enterprises” (476). 
 
However, the radical wing within the MPRP had a decisive voice during 1990-
1992.  The economic platform of the MPRP was largely d termined by this radical wing, 
comprised of some scholars and policymakers with vast experience in perestroika-type of 
reforms.  Core ideas of the radical faction within the MPRP were expressed in the famous 
“open letter of the 15 scholars to the Central Committee of the MPRP” published in the 
MPRP newspaper “Unen” on February 23, 1990.  Shortly af er, a group of radical 
economists which included several of the above 15 scholars developed “a concept of 
transitioning to a market economy.”  Most notably, Davaasambuu (Finance Minister of 




member of the MRPR, he joined the Democratic Party and served as the Prime Minister 
in 1996-1998), and MPRP Secretary of the Central Committee Batkhishig were among 
the 12 economists who developed the blueprint.  Theconcept document was published in 
the MPRP newspaper “Unen” on June 6, 1990.  The key concepts included gradual 
privatization of selected entities, which should start with lease of state property to the 
work collectives; partial price liberalization with state control over prices on the essential 
goods including basic foodstuff and electricity; establishment of a general tax system; 
reduction of budget revenue down to 50 percent of the national income; termination of 
subsidies to state enterprises; introduction of two-tier banking system and provision of 
credits based only on efficiency considerations; abandonment of the centralized state 
supply system, and adoption of a dozen of key economic laws (Unen, June 6, 1990, issue 
134).  All in all, this was a comprehensive and radic l proposal, although not as radical as 
proposed by the MNPP.  Several ways of transitioning to a market economy were 
proposed (from fast to slow) and a slower path was suggested as most preferred.  
 
However, the proposed concepts were not officially dopted by the MPRP.  
Rather, it served as the basis for (limited) public discussion and public education.  It also 
gave some ideas about the market and economic transition to fledgling new political 
parties which had little idea about the economic system other than they wanted a market 
economy (interview with Davaasambuu).  Thus, in 1990 there were at least two 
competing ideas – one for very slow and cautious transition and another more rapid but 
still cautious – about transitioning to a market system within the MPRP, but these ideas 




ideas of the MNPP.  Neither idea was officially adopted by the party.  In fact, the MPRP 
had not formulated yet its economic platform in 1990.  
 
One distinctive feature of the first free elections f 1990 was that political parties 
had no official election platform, neither political nor economic.  The old party just 
started reforming itself while new parties were just emerging.  The relatively “loose” 
ideologies of the parties were expressed in their new party documents – party programs 
or so-called party proclamations – which were very general and often vague documents.  
As Bold-Erdene et al (2011) argue, the period from 1990 till mid-1990s was the period of 
active search for the new ideologies for all parties.  The MPRP, for instance, adopted the 
democratic socialist (center of the left) ideology only in 1997 (111).  Thus, although 
every party claimed to be committed to the principles of democracy, no clear delineation 
was visible, especially during the first two elections.   
 
The economic platform of the political parties was even more vague.  Parties 
noted that they wanted to build ‘a free competitive market economy’, but very few knew 
what this entailed and what kind of policy actions were needed.  During the 1990 
elections the MPRP did not propose any official economic agenda, other than general 
claims of building a market economy.  Under these circumstances, the economic platform 
of the new government (1990-1992) had to rely on the ideas of the new political forces.  
Prime Minister Byambasuren had experience of dealing the perestroika reforms; he was 
the deputy head of the State Planning Commission and was the main implementer of the 




very far and understood that more solid basis was needed.  However, his party did not 
have a full-developed meaningful economic reform package.   
 
The initial economic platforms of some democratic parties were equally 
ambiguous.  The MDP, the first democratic movement and party, had very vague ideas 
about the economic reforms.  It was comprised largey of artists and journalists.  Dr. 
Nergui and Boshigt – the two economists among them – were the ones who compiled 
together the economic aspects of the reforms.  They aspired to build the “true socialism 
envisaged by Marx and Lenin.”  They believed that te socialist ideal was workable 
however it was implemented wrongly by the MPRP leaders.  The communist leaders built 
what they called “a barrack-style socialism” which relied too heavily on the common 
property and common activities.  Their socialist economic system would rely on private 
initiative and incentives.  In a way, Nergui’s ideas were similar to the perestroika reforms 
pursued by the MPRP.  The contract system and cost a counting principle were seen as 
workable alternatives to improve economic efficiency.  “Such outlook of the leading 
economists within the MDU forced other economists, namely those in the National 
Progress Party, to form a separate party instead of joining the MDU.  The radically 
minded young economists had a very different outlook which could not be reconciled 
with those of Boshigt and Nergui” (interview with Ganbold).  The focus of the MDU and 
MDP was the democratic political transition rather than economic transition.   
 
Social democratic movement rooted for the Western-European-style welfare state, 




economic platform either. The main policy document approved at the first congress of the 
MSDP (March 31, 1990) stated that no type of ownership (including private ownership) 
should dominate the economy (clause 13 of the Proclamation of the MSDP) and there 
should be a balance between the state and private own rship; market economic relations 
should be introduced gradually (clause 16); and securing the minimum living standards of 
the people should be the highest priority of the economic and social policy (clause 20) 
(from brochure “The First Congress of the Mongolian Social Democratic Party” issued 
by the MSDP, 1990, 29-30).  
 
The Mongolian National Progress Party had the most c mprehensive economic 
plan.  They demanded liberalization of foreign trade nd prices, privatization of all assets, 
two-tier banking system, etc.  Their economic program was very detailed and 
comprehensive.  The economic platform was adopted during the party’s first congress 
which took place on May 13, 1990.  The foundation of the economic platform was 
“complete and decisive rejection of the central plan” nd “swift transition to market 
relations” (from brochure “The First Congress of the Mongolian National Progress Party” 
issued by the MNPP, 1990, 20-21).  The transition pla  was very radical and even 
extreme: “Market transition is not something which could be learnt by observation from 
the sideways: it needed to be experienced firsthand.  At the same time, it would be wrong 
to perceive that every step towards markets should be well thought and correct.  We need 
to learn about markets by trial and error.  Experimnting with some elements of market in 
selected areas – as some political players suggested – is not the way to go.  Either we 





With regard to ownership structure, the MNPP also had a clear and diverging 
view.  While some parties stood for the dominance of state ownership, at least for the 
time being (MPRP), or at most “equal treatment of all types of ownership” (MSDP), the 
MNPP claimed that the fledgling private property and the associated ownership rights 
should be given greater privilege and nurturing, so that it could take root and develop into 
a dominant form of ownership (ibid, 38).  Although most political players shared the 
sentiment of rejecting the old economic system, the transition strategy was not yet clear 
or agreed upon by the parties.   The MPRP and MSDP were leaning towards gradual 
reforms and even some experiments with markets.  Thus, t e MNPP was in fact the only 
party in 1990 which proposed a radical reform route.  The MDP later followed the 
MNPP, but at the onset of the transition it did nothave a meaningful reform package.  It 
should be noted that the MNPP was probably in great advantage compared to others, by 
gaining due to their family, educational and language background and therefore access to 
the information otherwise not available.  At least they were able to convey to the others 
that they knew more about how to proceed.  However, th ir real understanding of 
economics and the realities of transition were poor ( bservation made by Peter Murrell 
who taught a seminar for high-ranking officials in early 1991 and first-hand observed 
policymaking in the early 1990s).  
 
Byambasuren saw that a meaningful economic package could only come from the 
National Progress Party as no other party had any clear ideas about how to proceed to the 




later adopt the economic reform package based on the market economy ideas of the 
National Progress Party came from Prime Minister Byambasuren.  Naturally there were 
debate and arguments within the ranks of the MPRP about forming the government, 
however Byambasuren – the radical reformer within te party – had a key influence in 
forming the coalition government.  There was general understanding among the MPRP 
members that the new government should be based on coalition in order to legitimize 
itself and keep the balance of powers and be a lasting institution.  The democratic forces, 
on the other hand, saw Byambasuren as a reasonable person to work with.  They valued 
his reformist outlook and ability to make compromises (interview with Ganbold).   
 
There was no written agreement (contract) between th  parties about the 
conditions of forming the coalition.  This was an “early romantic period” where 
agreements among political forces were implicit andmore of a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
rather than detailed written document.  The main document of forming the coalition was 
the minutes of meeting of Byambasuren with the leaders of the democratic parties 
(interview with Ganbold). This shows a large degree of ability to cooperate in the 
political sphere discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, because the agreement was 
essentially carried out.   
 
Later the Democratic Party developed its Economic Reform Policy and published 
it in a newspaper (Ardyn Erkh June 26, 1991, issue 101).  It was very much in line with 
the National Progress Party’s economic package. The Democratic Party criticized the 




market economy.   The party document claimed that i seems that both the parliament and 
the government are still in doubt in rapid transition to the market economy.  The party 
advocated fast reforms, as it was convinced that gradual transitioning would eventually 
destroy the economy.  
 
Democratic forces saw economic reforms and transitioning to the market 
economy as a guarantee for democratic political changes.  In its Economic Reform Policy 
(Ardyn Erkh, June 26, 1991, issue 101), MDP Chairman E. Bat-Uul claimed that making 
one government official to resign without changing the economic system would only 
result in appointment of another bureaucrat.  “The main purpose of democratic changes 
was thus to secure private property rights and through this secure individual political 
rights.  Economic freedom was the foundation of political freedom.”  Thus, the economic 
platform of the democratic forces consolidated in avery short period of time around the 
ideas proposed by the MNPP and gained political support of other democratic movements 
and parties.  The radical economic reforms were further promoted as the basis for the 
1992 parliamentary election platform.  However, the democratic forces faced a major 
defeat because the general public grew weary of the substantial short-term social costs 
imposed on by the radical measures.   
 
As a result, the MPRP’s was able to win the 1992 elections without a 
comprehensive economic platform.  The platform did not contain any structural reform 
proposals, other than one sentence stating that the party would continue the privatization 




1992 parliamentary elections approved by the 2nd plenary meeting of the Central 
Committee, brochure 1992, 7).  Other reform proposals uch as revising the tax law, 
promoting small and medium-size businesses, and supporting the agricultural sector and 
free trade were general and unclear.  The Mongolian Re aissance Party (MRP), a spin-off 
party of the radical wing within the MPRP, was established in February 1992 (newspaper 
Tenger, February 20-29, 1992, issue 1).  With more radical elements leaving the party, 
the MPRP became dominated by more conservative members. 
 
The core of the economic platform – it should be noted that this portion of the 
document was very brief – was focused on promoting economic recovery at any cost.  
The MPRP’s main trump was the economic decline allegedly caused by the too radical 
and not-well-thought-through reform agenda of the coalition government and the 
MRPR’s main intent was to amend the situation by slowing down the reforms and taking 
more aggressive direct state measures to ensure the economic growth.  It was claimed 
that the “shock therapy employed by the reformers in an attempt to save the economy 
was a distorted policy” (ibid, 2).  Therefore, the MPRP strived to bring about the 
economic recovery by employing direct state intervention.  The bulk of the economic 
measures proposed by the MPRP were to provide direct financing and other state 
intervention to secure economic self-sufficiency and economic security of the country by 
promoting technical innovation in selected industries, production levels in selected 
sectors such as agriculture, energy, and some import-substitution sectors as machinery 
and chemical production (ibid, 6-7).  A special atten ion was given to the livestock which 





Following the four years of cautious reform, the peo l ’s perceptions have 
changed.  There was growing realization that faster reforms were needed and the MPRP 
lacked a comprehensive reform package.  Jasrai’s government was seen as having 
procrastinated and becoming dependent on foreign aid rather than people’s initiative and 
entrepreneurship. The government was also perceived to be dishonest about the economic 
hardships and did not call for patience required to overcome the painful social and 
economic costs of transition (S. Amarjargal, sociologist, the Academy of Sciences of 
Mongolia, on public opinion survey, newspaper the Mongol Messenger, issue 36, 
September 11, 1996).  
 
To sum up, as the IMF noted, “the MPRP’s policies have favored market reforms, 
but with a strong role for the state sector. The main opposition party has been the 
Democratic Party, which also favors market reforms, but has closer links to the private 
sector” (IMF 2005, 5).   
 
4.2.2 Membership in IFIs and the Role of International Players 
 
 
When the reform program was launched in 1990, there w r  no international 
advisors or influential international players.  Mong lia was not yet a member of the IFIs, 
and had virtually no contact with other countries.  It was described as one of the most 
isolated – “certainly geographically, and possibly also in terms of trade and intellectual 





The very first talks of the Mongolian government wih the World Bank and the 
IMF about potential membership took place on May 2-4, 1990 in Washington DC.  
Byambasuren – at the time the first Deputy Prime Minister of the interim government – 
held the talks.  He admitted that he probably was the first Mongolian to ever meet the 
representatives of these major multilateral organizations.  Byambasuren recalled that the 
initial reaction of the IMF senior official during a very brief 5-minute meeting was that 
“communist Mongolia needed to change its political and economic system and secure 
support of a handful of advanced countries in order to consider membership in the IMF 
and the World Bank”.  Two days later, the senior official apologized for not being up to 
date about the events that already took place in Mogolia and ensured that membership 
issue was open for discussion (TV interview with Byambasuren, Channel 25, March 
2010, available on youtube.com). 
 
However, the actual action on the membership did not take place until the free 
elections and formation of the government.  Immediat ly following the formation of the 
new coalition government, Prime Minister Byambasuren started searching for “new 
friends” – new investors, trader partners, and markets – for Mongolia under the new 
political and economic circumstances.  His first place of visit – in October 1990 – was 
Washington DC, partially because he was seeking support of the United States in pushing 
the Soviet Union to continue supply petroleum to Mong lia (which was almost stopped at 
the time), and secondly, he also wanted to renew talks with the IMF an the World Bank 




During his visit to Moscow in June 1991, State Secretary James Baker39 effectively 
pressured the Soviet Union to increase its supply of petroleum to Mongolia.  During 
Byambasuren’s visit to Washington DC, Mongolia officially applied for a membership 
and it was granted a few months later, a record short period of time (TV interview with 
Byambasuren).  Another important visit was of Presid nt Ochirbat to the U.S. on January 
22-24, 1991.  President Ochirbat’s visit also accelerated processing of the membership in 
the IFIs and garnering support of bilateral donors (Ardyn Erkh, January 26, 1991, issue 
19).  On February 18, following President Ochirbat’s visit to Washington DC, Mongolia 
became a member of the World Bank and the Internatio l Monetary Fund.  This 
membership marked a new economic and political era in the country’s development.  The 
membership opened doors to new sources of financial and technical resources.  
 
Shortly after forming the new coalition government, First Deputy Prime Minister 
Ganbold led the first delegation of the Mongolian government to attend the annual 
meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos in February 1991.  The delegation 
consisted of two more people, the newly appointed director of the Mongolian Stock 
Exchange N. Zoljargal and banker D. Sukh-Erdene, both with some knowledge of the 
market economy and fluent in English.  Ganbold made a presentation introducing 
Mongolia as a new emerging country in the global economic community.  It was the time 
when the government had only one major document approved, the Action Plan.  All ideas 
presented by the Mongolian delegation in Davos – with regard to privatization and 
liberalization – were government plans only.  In Davos, Ganbold and his team met with 
                                                
39 State Secretary Baker visited Mongolia several times in 1990-1992 and later as a private citizen.  His first 
official visit to Mongolia was during the first free elections.  Baker developed good personal relations with 




Jeffrey Sachs and Stanley Fischer.  Sachs proposed hi  colleague from Harvard Peter 
Boone to help the new government to formulate the reform policies, which he later did 
(interview with Ganbold).  This probably was one of the first meetings where prominent 
academics got first exposed to and became interested in Mongolia’s political and 
economic transition.   By this time, a group of academics from the University of 
Maryland was giving their first seminar on market economy, which was financed by the 
USAID.  
 
The support of the international community was crucial during the early transition 
period.  The process of organizing support to Mongolia during these crucial years was 
championed by Japan.  Japan was among the first advanced countries to establish 
diplomatic relations with Mongolia February 1972.  The Japanese Embassy opened in 
June 1973 with only two staff members who operated from a hotel room in Ulaanbaatar.  
During the early years of diplomatic relations Japan’s support was limited, e.g., in 1975 
they helped with ambulance cars.  The most significant project was Gobi cashmere 
factory: economic cooperation agreement was signed in 1977 and the factory was 
completed in 1981.  Most notably, in February 1990 Prime Minister Sodnom was on a 
trip to Japan, his first visit of a western country.   As the Japanese Ambassador Mr. 
Kubota noted, with democratic changes looming large, “this visit marked the beginning 
of a new era in the relationship between the two countries” (quoted in Business Times, 





In 1991, Japan was not only a major donor herself – the largest bilateral donor and 
the second largest after the Asian Development Bank – but also managed to organize 
together several important donors.  These included major developed countries such as the 
U.S., several European countries as well as bigger players in the region such as Korea.  
Byambasuren recalled in a TV interview that in June 1991 in New York, after meeting 
the UN officials, there was an informal gathering of representatives of countries willing 
to help the “new democratic” Mongolia organized by the UNDP head office.  
Representatives of about a dozen advanced countries met with the Mongolian Premier 
and expressed their interest in helping Mongolia.  Notably, the representatives of the 
Soviet Union and China were not among the attendees (TV interview, Channel 25, March 
2010, available on youtube.com).  Formal support of advanced western countries was 
expressed in July 1991 during the G7 London Summit.   
 
The first consultative meeting of donors of Mongolia took place in Tokyo in 
September 1991 and was hosted by Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama and the 
World Bank China and Mongolia country director Mr. Burki (Ardyn Erkh September 20, 
1991, issue 161).  Representatives of 14 countries – ncluding Japan, the U.S., Germany, 
UK, France, South Korea – and major multilateral organizations – the World Bank, 
UNDP, IMF, and the Asian Development Bank – participated in the meeting.  Mongolia 
was exemplified as a country with the highest level of dependence on the CMEA 
arrangement nonetheless attempting unprecedented reforms, which was commendable 
and at the same time required substantial support from the international community (from 





Byambasuren recalled that financial support of international and bilateral donors 
was crucial in the early transition period.  It helped to offset abrupt withdrawal of the 
Soviet financial assistance and deal with severe shortage of foreign reserves to finance 
critical imports.  However, the actual amount of multilateral and bilateral assistance was 
never as high as that of the old Soviet Union (see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2).  
 
Foreign assistance differed in their emphasis, in line with the evolving stages of 
transition, the need to address emerging challenges, and priorities of different 
governments.  International community provided with three main types of support: (i) 
emergency assistance (balance of payment support) to tide the country over the 
immediate problems and assure basic needs to the urban population; (ii) provision of 
technical assistance to establish institutions for managing a modern economy; (iii) 
assistance in realizing the long term economic potential of the country (project 
financing).  The very first assistance (1991-1992) came in the form of balance of 
payment support and emergency food assistance.  Simultaneously, IFIs initiated technical 
assistance in institution building and structural refo ms.  Project financing materialized 
later, the first projects being developed in 1993 and 1994 in the energy sector and 
infrastructure development.  
 
The international community reacted promptly to the initial crisis in 1990.  The 
continued and increased assistance by the international community ameliorated the 




Immediately following the membership in IFIs, in April 1991 Mongolia requested 
emergency food aid and balance-of-payment support to finance critical imports.  In 1991 
Mongolia received total of $240 million equivalent i  financial aid.  In 1992-1993, 17 
countries and five international organizations agreed to provide  $320 million equivalent 
in aid (Hulan 1992, 6).  Subsequent years of cooperation saw steady financing, 
particularly long-term project financing.  Japan has been the single most important 
bilateral donor throughout the 1990s and beyond (see Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 for more 
details).   
 
The IMF has played a leading role in the stabilization and reform process of 
Mongolia while the role of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank was more 
focused on the sectoral development and poverty allevi tion.  Role of the IMF was 
particularly important in securing funds from other multi and bilateral donors.  Reaching 
an agreement with the IMF sent a signal that the government was committed to market 
reforms and was ready to take the necessary reform measures.  In fact, many donors 
required that the government entered into such an agreement (interview with 
Davaasambuu).  Therefore, it was important for the government to fulfill, at least 
partially, the conditionalities under the IMF programs (please see Appendix 6 for the 















Source: Ministry of Finance 
Note: Among “Others”, most notable donors include Germany, the Nordic Fund, South Korea, and 
Sweden 
 
Mongolia entered with the IMF into a Standby Agreemnt (SBA) for 1991-1992 
and an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) for 1993-1996 both aimed to 
assist the transition from a centrally planned command system closely linked to the 
Soviet Union to a market-based economy.  In the immediate aftermath of the early 
reforms and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance, th focus was on macroeconomic 
stabilization, namely containing the decline of output and bringing down inflation.  
Economic growth was broadly in line with projections, but inflation was difficult to 
contain because of monetary expansion needed to support the ailing state enterprises.  


















was severely off track, while also because some structu al measures were delayed due to 
a change in government (IMF 2005, 10).   
 
Figure 4.8 Soft loans and grants as a share of official development aid, in percent 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
The second program – ESAF – also depicted mixed performance.  After an 
auspicious start, implementation ran into difficulties as financial restraint weakened in 
1995 for reforms. Buoyant copper prices eased financi g constraints which helped to 
restore the output levels.  However, the envisaged reduction of inflation to single digits 
again was not achieved due to subsidies and credit expansion to state enterprises (ibid, 
11).  
 
Overall, involvement of the IFIs has been an important element in assisting the 

















but also key structure for reform as well as technial expertise that was not otherwise 
available.  As Davaasambuu admitted, in the early transition period very few had 
knowledge of the market economy and its institutions. The knowledge and expertise gap 
was filled by the technical assistance from the donors.   
 
There is a popular claim in the international academia and policymaking that the 
IFIs, particularly those located in Washington DC, often impose policies that are ill-
suited for the (usually developing) recipient countries.  Along this line, Rossabi (2004) 
argues that the agencies providing grants and loans insisted on Mongolia's adherence to a 
set of policies that did not generally take into account the country's unique heritage and 
society. Though the sale of state assets, minimalist government, liberalization of trade 
and prices, a balanced budget, and austerity were suppo ed to yield marked economic 
growth, Mongolia did not recover as expected.  The new policies have led to greater 
political freedom but also to unemployment, poverty, inequality, and deterioration in the 
education, health, and wellbeing of Mongolian society. 
 
How important were the international players in policymaking in Mongolia? How 
closely did the Mongolian authorities follow the advice of the international players?   
 
There is no doubt that the IFIs and bilateral agents played an important role in 
determining the reform steps in Mongolia.  Lack of expertise and the dire need for 
resources contributed to the receptiveness of the gov rnment to follow the policy 




Mongolia’s previous experience of following “the big brother” – the Soviet Union – in 
terms of policies (and financial aid) may have been co ducive to being more responsive 
to the policies advocated by the IFIs.   
 
However, it could be argued that the policy choices w re constrained not only by 
the international players but mostly domestic politics.  For instance, the very first radical 
reform agenda was formulated by the coalition government without external support.  In 
fact, the IFIs were cautious about the very radical steps taken by the government, e.g., 
some of them were warning against pursuing privatization without installing proper 
institutions such as securing property rights, etc.  They have favored quick price 
liberalization over too fast privatization, as the latter required significant institution 
building.  The IMF, for instance, noted that “there was much initial enthusiasm for 
reform on the part of the authorities, with the Fund at times even trying to slow the 
process so as to allow institution building to catch up” (IMF 2005, 5). Likewise, the 
conservative policies of the Jasrai government and particularly its policies of direct state 
intervention were also adopted based on the domestic constraints and beliefs.  The 
government also stalled unpopular policies.  For insta ce, the IMF and the World Bank 
long pressured the government to free prices on electricity and fuel.  The price reform 
was stalled until the new democratic government led by Enkhsaikhan finally liberalized 
the prices in September 1996 (UB Post, September 11, 1996, issue 19).  As senior 
economic advisor to the Prime Minister Ts. Batbold put it, “this harsh but necessary 
measure was long overdue … the previous low prices were distorted and causing more 





As noted earlier, performance of the government under the first two IMF 
programs was mixed at best, oftentimes going off-track and being delayed.  In many 
cases, it was difficult for the government to mainti  policy discipline, e.g., in the face of 
revenue windfalls or electoral cycles, due to the lack of institutional capacity and partial 
commitment to a policy course (IMF 2005, 23).    
 
Overall, international players provided a general policy framework and attempted 
measures to bring the policies back on track, once the policies went off-track.  The IMF 
concluded that in order “to avoid too strong strains o  the nascent political system, a 
cautious approach to economic liberalization was chosen. The decision to proceed 
gradually, while contributing to a relatively smooth adjustment, foreshadowed later 
lapses in performance, often associated with elections and frequent government changes” 
(IMF 2005, 5).  Thus, conditionalities imposed by the IFIs were not the only constraints 
in policy choices.  Oftentimes, the authorities pursued policies that were the result of their 
conviction and domestic political constraints.  
 
4.2.3 Popular Support of the Reform Agenda 
 
 
The period of 1990-1992 in Mongolia could be defined as a period of 
‘extraordinary politics’, to use the expression coined by Polish Finance Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz to describe the situation in Poland in 1989-1990.  Balcerowicz (1995) 




transition because of the period of ‘extraordinary politics’.  He assumes that after 
liberation from external powers or internal liberaliz tion, there is a “special state of mass 
psychology” which creates more political capital – a higher level of support for reform.  
This period will end gradually and, he argues, is “probably a non-renewable resource 
granted by history” (265).  If reformers do not reform at all or do not reform quickly 
during this period, they are not taking advantage of the period of extraordinary politics.   
 
Like in Poland and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the general 
public in Mongolia has been quite supportive of the initial reform effort of the 
government.  A public opinion poll was conducted on Ja uary 12 and 13, 1991 by the 
government Center of Public Policy and Social Issue about the reforms (a few days 
before the reforms began with Resolution 20).  The results of the survey were published 
in a daily newspaper. The sample consisted of about 500 respondents; however, no 
information about sampling was available.  Overwhelming majority of the sample – 87.6 
percent – was supportive of the government reform agenda.  The main issue of concern 
among the people was shortage of essential goods.  About 82 percent complained that 
supply of goods and services was poor.  About 29.5 percent of suggested to increase 
prices (with simultaneous increase in wages), another 29 percent suggested to introduce 
rationing system, while 23 percent suggested to tighten state control of supply of goods 
and services and introduce extraordinary regime in some enterprises.  In terms of the 
urgent economic reforms, high priority was given to price and wage reforms (24.2 
percent), privatization of state assets (22.2), educating the public about the market system 




agreed that the government is trying hard to implement reforms; 36.7 of respondents 
supported the reform efforts, 61 percent were critical but supportive, while 2.2 percent 
did not support the government actions (Ardyn Erkh, January 17, 1991, issue 12). 
 
Popular support still was high for the more drastic measure to increase wholesale 
prices of energy and agricultural products, increase interest rate on savings, and change 
the scale of money.  Public opinion was again investigated by the government research 
center after the issuance of Government Resolution 20.  Of almost 700 respondents in the 
capital city (again, no information was provided about sampling), about 21 percent were 
highly approving of the measure, two thirds approved, and only 7.8 percent of 
respondents thought the government action was wrong.   Although majority approved the 
government decision, they did not expect that the measure would positively affect the 
living standards of the people.  In fact, share of th se who thought the decision would 
positively affect the livelihood of people (14.6 perc nt) was lower than those who 
considered the measure would have a negative impact on the livelihood.  This indicates 
that, in spite of its negative consequences, the people initially were ready to bear the 
hardship as long as the policies were perceived right (Ardyn Erkh, January 22, 1991, 
issue 15). 
 
Unfortunately, there is no data available on public opinion of the reform efforts 
during the later years of (early) transition, particularly during 1992-1994.  Regular 
polling resumed with the establishment of the Sant Maral Foundation in 1995, a major 




attitude of the public towards democracy and market economy, including confidence in 
the government institutions and political party prefe nces.  However, no data is available 
on specific policy issues.   
 
Longitudinal polling data show that the overwhelming majority of the people – 
over 90 percent most of the time – consistently approved the transition to a democratic 
political system and market economy (Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 below).    
 
Figure 4.9 Public opinion on the democratic reform process and satisfaction with 
the political system (Sep 1995-Jan 2000, in percent) 
 
 
Source: Data from Prohl and Sumati 2009, 95-112 
Notes:  
- “Approve democratic reform process” - share of thse who agree that introducing democratic system in 
1990 was correct 
- “Satisfied with political system” - share of those who are very satisfied or satisfied with the current 
political system 










































However, this categorical approval of the transition did not necessarily mean that 
they were satisfied with the political system as it existed and economic performance.  
People felt more satisfied with the political system during the times of elections (e.g., 
1996), which also coincides with their positive opinion on the strong voters’ influence 
(Figure 4.9 above).    
 
Figure 4.10 Public approval of the market economy and perception about 




Source: Data from Prohl and Sumati 2009, 155-162 
Notes:  
- “Approve market economy” – share of those who agree that transition to a market economy in 1990 was 
correct 
- “Economy is improving” – share of those who believe that economy is improving as opposed to 
stagnating or declining 
 
 
Similarly, in spite of the almost universal approval of the transition to a market 
economy, the public held generally low opinion about the economic performance (Figure 












































economy was doing poorly, but, secondly, most people did not reject the transition to the 
market economy.   
 
Confidence in the Jasrai government was eroded by 1995 (the year where data is 
available).  In series of public opinion polls conducted by Sant Maral during September 
1995 – June 1996 (right before the elections of 1996), the public considered the (now 
united) Democratic Party and its predecessors to bebett r in solving major economic 
issues such as living standards and unemployment.  The percentage point disparity 
between those who considered the DP to be the best party to solve various economic and 
social issues and those who had more faith in the MPRP ranged from 7 to 22 percentage 
points.  In particular, the DP was considered especially strong in improving business (22 
percentage points more people favored the DP over the MPRP) and unemployment issues 
(20.8 percentage points) (data from Prohl and Sumati 2009, 234-246).  The data on the 
subsequent governments show similar trend: the electorate was less supportive of the 
government policies and had less trust in government institutions.   
 
It appears that the period of 1990-1992 was a special period in the reform politics.  
The data imply that the government generally enjoyed substantial popular support (please 
note that no comparable data exist for the periods of 1990-1992 and 1992-1996).  As 
Balcerowicz argued, radical reforms need to be forcefully implemented during this 
period, even though rapid reform appears to be political suicide at the time.  Regime 
transition in 1990 provided a unique opportunity for the coalition government to reform – 




organized enough or cognizant that it should block reform policies).  If the public was 
more likely to give politicians this window of opportunity to reform, politicians should 
implement far-reaching changes during that period.  This was largely what happened in 
Mongolia in 1990-1992.  Former Finance Minister Davaasambuu noted that “people went 
for months without salaries in the early 1990s, something which is unimaginable these 
days” (interview with Davaasambuu).  During the Jasrai government (1992-1996) the 
window of opportunity probably closed.  
 
 
4.3. Core Economic Reform: The Privatization Program 
 
The Action Plan of the coalition government was developed by the MPRP as well 
as other coalition government parties.  As discussed in more detail earlier, the economic 
package was mostly developed by the MNPP.  The governm nt apparatus – inherited 
from the old system and the only administrative resource available to the government at 
the time – initially developed a ‘traditional’ plan to incrementally increase production 
levels and improve productivity.  However, this plan was dismissed and criticized by the 
newly appointed First Deputy Prime Minister Ganbold.  He argued that “the issue of 
transitioning to the market economy is not a matter of setting incremental numerical 
targets but rather a systemic change that oftentimes could not be embodied in numbers.”  
The plan had to be reshuffled completely.  Although developed for the next four years, 
the new Action Plan was a rather short document compared to the previous plans, for two 
reasons: first, it did not contain the imperative production increase data and, second, it 




known at the time, even to the radical-minded economist group within the MNPP 
(interview with Ganbold). 
 
The economic part of the government program consisted of the price, taxation, 
credit and investment policies, as well as external economic relations.  However, the core 
of the program was its privatization agenda (Ardyn Erkh December 20, 1990, issue 68).  
In spite of the generality of the government agenda, the privatization program was 
unmistakable and fairly detailed.    
 
4.3.1 Privatization Program: The Debate and Launch (1990-1 91) 
 
 
The idea of privatization first emerged in 1990, following the first free elections 
in July and the decision to form a coalition government.  The authors of the privatization 
idea were young economists, members of the National Progress Party led by D. Ganbold 
who later became the First Deputy Prime Minister of the new coalition government.  The 
private sector in the early 1990 was negligible.  There was limited private livestock in 
hands of the herders but it was largely non-commercial, and the cooperatives which were 
allowed in 1988 by the new Cooperatives Law, were just emerging.  The radical 
reformers figured that a new market economy could not be built with such a small private 
sector and it would take years before it took root and became the driving force of the new 
economy.  Therefore, the only way to transition swiftly to the new economic system was 





In mid-1990, following the elections, the government declared that Mongolia 
would have a private sector but privatization was not yet a matter of public debate.  
Before the new coalition government was officially formed in September 1990, young 
reformists privately debated the nature of privatization, its procedures, and developments 
in Eastern Europe.  When Ganbold was appointed second in the rank in the new 
government, he took the debate to the national leve(Korsun and Murrell 1995, 475).   
 
A working group in charge of developing privatization concept was formed by the 
Government decision and it started functioning from November 1990.  The working 
group had 14 members in total all appointed from within the government agencies.  Since 
the notion of privatization was totally new, discussions went on for long hours, often 
fruitlessly.  Fewer and fewer members attended its meetings.  Some of the members left 
due to conceptual disagreement, as the idea of privatization unraveled.  Only a handful of 
reformers remained, mainly members of the National Progress Party.  English-speaking 
younger members of the working group collected relevant information and materials 
from international press (extremely scarcely available at that time), getting in touch with 
international experts in this field, while Russian speaking members were using Russian 
sources and some translated material available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
working mostly on financial calculations. The working group used valuable information 
and materials available at the Bank of Mongolia through its dealership networks.  Based 
on information gathered in this way and the calculations and projections made, the 
working group developed the voucher-based privatization concept.  The idea was to 




Togrogs) to every citizen, and the privatization itself would be in form of large and small 
privations.  Zoljargal, a banker in the Bank of Mong lia, played the major role in 
promoting this idea (interview with Bailiikhuu).  Thus, a privatization program was 
drafted in a matter of two weeks and soon thereafter the economists persuaded the Prime 
Minister to adopt it as a government program.   
 
Privatization of state assets was seen as a major structural and institutional 
reform. The first ideas of privatization were presented by Prime Minister Byambasuren in 
his speech to the State Small Khural where he sought approval of the government’s 
action plan.  The objectives of the privatization were declared to be reducing the role of 
the state in the economy and building the ownership foundations of a market economy.  
The other political objective to permanently change the balance of political power was 
not mentioned, although discussed among the reformers as being one of the most 
important goals.    
 
The government proposed to proceed on the following privatization principles:  
 
- All citizens of Mongolia were entitled to receive their share of state assets, 
because all of them contributed to creation of wealth in the country; this 
would ensure social justice and equality; 
- The main method of privatization would be distributng vouchers to all 
citizens;  




- Employees of state enterprises would have a privileged access to the assets of 
their enterprise; employees were encouraged to collectively own the enterprise 
and participate in its governance and management;  
- Privatization should start with medium-level (in terms of size, performance, 
and assets) enterprises; 
- Such important sectors as energy, railway, air transport, communication, mass 
media (radio and television) would remain in the state ownership; the state 
would continue to finance education, health, science, and cultural 
organizations; 
- Land, except for urban and arable land, and natural resources would remain in 
the state ownership; 
- Agricultural collectives should decide on their own ays of privatizing 
livestock and other agricultural assets (but not pas ure land) (from the speech 
of Byambasuren at the session of the State Small Khural, Ardyn Erkh, 
November 12, 1990, issue 48)  
 
There was a very brief article by economists (8 researchers at the National 
Academy of Sciences) on the privatization methods (Ardyn Erkh, December 22, 1990, 
issue 69).  The main idea of the article was to use diff ring methods of privatization 
depending on the size of the enterprise, its financial viability, industry, market potential, 
technological level, etc. The article outlined several methods of privatization, such as 




employees through long-term loans; initial lease of state assets by employees or outsiders 
and gradual buyout by the lessees; partial privatization with gradual transfer (sale) of 
state shares.  The method should facilitate the effici ncy of the enterprise after its 
privatization.  Current management and employees should have a priority in ownership.  
 
Dr. G. Purevbaatar, a prominent economist, was one of the very few scholars who 
frequently expressed his opinion about the economic reforms.  In particular, he opposed 
the government plan to use mass privatization where every citizen gets some portion of 
state assets. His main concern was the efficiency of privatized enterprises and corporate 
governance issues.  Purevbaatar claims that making numerous citizens who have little 
idea about the enterprise will not improve efficiency of enterprises.  In fact, it will be 
little different from the state ownership under socialism where the nominal “owners” – 
the people – were separated from their assets and did not have any control over the 
management of the enterprise.  Dispersed ownership will not resolve the issue of 
efficiency and performance.  Purevbaatar proposed alt rn tive privatization methods 
including direct sale, foreign ownership, and management and employee buyouts.  He 
argues that only few knowledgeable owners will be genuinely interested and able to make 
the management deliver good performance (Ardyn Erkh, January 5, 1991, issue 4), an 
argument commonly made in the West. 
 
Apart from few newspaper articles, no significant debate went on about the 
privatization. Academia was largely silent in this is ue, most likely due to the lack of 




role.  Other players such as workers managers of the state enterprises, professional 
associations, and the trade unions were more active, particularly the Union of 
Agricultural Cooperatives.  It pushed for special trea ment of agricultural collectives, 
negdels, and was largely successful.  However, the main player was the government, in 
particular a group led by Ganbold and his National Progress Party.  Ultimately they 
determined the path of privatization, although a few concessions had to be made.  These 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
In order to promote the idea of privatization among the general public, gain its 
support, and obtain the “intellectual mandate”, the government organized a national 
convention of economists in November 1990.  About 1,000 economists, finance 
specialists, and accountants from around the country gathered in Ulaanbaatar and in the 
course of three days discussed the various issues of transition to a market economy.  This 
remarkable degree of openness about a controversial p ogram so early in its formation 
was possible due to the ability to cooperate on a bro d basis which was discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Prime Minister Byambasuren, the First Deputy Prime Minister 
Ganbold delivered lengthy speeches on the current economic situation and the model of 
transitioning to a market economy during the convention (Ardyn Erkh November 29, 
1990, issue 59).  Naturally these new ideas attracted high attention and kicked off strong 
debate among the participants. The convention was icebreaking in the sense it put on the 
official agenda the need for transition from planned to market economy to support the 
political transformation.  Indeed, the main objectives of privatization were proclaimed to 





The national economic convention was organized to promote the privatization 
idea and economic reforms in general.  Initially, the idea of privatization came under 
fierce attack.  Some more conservative professionals did not believe that the private 
property and markets could solve the economic issues.  “Herders would kill privatized 
livestock and the country would starve”, they argued.  “Privatized housing would soon 
turn into ruins”, they argued further (memoirs of Yo. Gerelchuluun in Government 
Privatization Commission 2011, 111).  This little trust was understandable given the 
absence of experience of markets.  Others criticized th  methods and other peculiarities 
of the design.  They opposed vouchers as the dominant method of privatization (Ardyn 
Erkh, ibid).   
 
In spite of fierce criticism and heated debate, no viable alternative was offered.  
There were numerous other ideas expressed in the course f the debate – often opposing 
and contradicting –however, they all came under severe attack from fellow professionals, 
and eventually were mostly dismissed. In the end, the government’s idea was formally 
approved by the convention.  This “intellectual mand te” made it easier to defend the law 
and concepts at the State Small Khural (interview with Ganbold).   
 
The economics convention was largely an effort of the National Progress Party 
which was responsible for the economic package.  The main presentations about the 
privatization and discussions were led by active memb rs of the MNPP.  The MNPP 




was important not only in terms of hearing what the people had to say about the reforms, 
reflecting their ideas, and harnessing their support.  It also showed a new direction for the 
key economic and financial professionals, particularly from the rural areas, where the 
country was headed.  Information and knowledge about the market economy and reforms 
was extremely scarce and the convention exposed them to the new ideas.  It was 
fundamentally an “enlightening experience” for many.  Brand new words like 
privatization, voucher, and shares were forcefully introduced into the vocabulary of 
Mongolians (memoirs of S. Tsogsuren in Government Privatization Commission 2011, 
124-125) 
 
After the parliamentary approval of the action program, government immediately 
started the organizational measures.  On January 15, 1991, the government established a 
special Government Privatization Commission (GPC) and the stock exchange.  The 
Commission was headed by the First Deputy Prime Minister Ganbold and included 
several other cabinet members and mayor of Ulaanbaatar. On the same day, the 
Mongolian Stock Exchange was officially established – on a paper – and Zoljargal, a 
Hungarian trained young economist, was appointed th new director.  Yo. Gerelchuluun, 
the newly appointed Secretary of the Privatization Commission, and Zoljargal were to 
champion the privatization agenda of the government.  Before being appointed as a key 
figure at the GPC, Gerelchuluun gained his PhD in the Soviet Union and held a high-
ranking technocratic position in the Council of Ministers.  His doctoral research was on 
the new methods of contracting and cost accounting of the SOEs, which were 




Gerelchuluun admitted, the topic was definitely of high interest at the time and allowed 
the author to gain insight into the core property issues under the central plan and 
recognize the limitations of the perestroika-type of reforms. 
 
It was agreed that the Commission should have extraordinary powers in order to 
proceed with privatization without delay or other administrative or legal hurdles.  All the 
decisions of the Commission had to be implemented by all central and local level 
organizations, officials.  The Commission also established its branches in the capital city, 
all aimags, soums, and city districts.  Prime Minister Jasrai later called it “a government 
within the government” because of its comprehensive tructure and extraordinary powers.  
 
There were even different views and debates about the need of a legislation 
regulating privatization issues, some argued for rapid privatization without waiting for a 
law to be passed.  However, as Gerelchuluun argued, it was extremely important to have 
a legal mandate to put the process on a solid ground and make it irreversible.  Secondly, 
it proved invaluable when the successor Jasrai governm nt, based on allegations of fraud 
and mistakes, initiated inquiries into the privatizon decisions and actions.  Thus, a draft 
law was prepared swiftly and later passed by the parliament (interview with 
Gerelchuluun).  Another important legal provision was amendment to the Civil Code.  
Private ownership was prohibited by law.  However, p rtaining to establishing a market 
economy and privatization in particular, it was crucial that private ownership was 
legalized and protected by law.  Thus, in December 1990 the State Small Khural passed 




“Ownership of assets could be public or private.  The state shall ensure that all types of 
property are treated equally and property rights are protected by law.”  “Although a one-
sentence change, it proved to be historical in developing private ownership and the 
private sector.  It also provided the legal base for the privatization program of the 
government” (interview with Bailiikhhuu).   
 
The government was planning to start the privatization process itself in April 
1991, but the Law on Privatization was not approved y t.  In his meeting with the leaders 
of political parties on April 10, Prime Minister Byambasuren urged them to express their 
political support for the privatization program and push their respective members in the 
parliament approve the law and make amendments to other related laws so that the 
process can begin.  There was a sense of urgency and frustration in the remarks of the 
Prime Minister (Ardyn Erkh, March 12, 1991, issue 69).   
 
The Privatization Law was initially rejected when voted on May 18, 1991 in the 
State Small Khural.  The main reasons for rejection were related to objection to some 
specific clauses rather than the privatization concept itself.  For instance, some 
lawmakers objected to singling out vouchers as the only method of privatization.  
Ganbold firmly protected vouchers but eventually a more general clause on potential 
other forms of privatization was suggested by the Prime Minister and accepted by the 
parliament.  Further, another heated issue related to distributing vouchers to all citizens 
including children.  The debate went around the prope ty rights of certain groups of 




manage the property, family members and political followers of Tsedenbal (the last 
communist ruler), etc.  Eventually, all citizens born n or before May 31, 1991 were 
entitled to receive vouchers.  The next issue was the right to sell or transfer the vouchers 
to others.  The law proposed that the small privatization voucher (the so-called pink 
vouchers) could be sold while the large-scale privatization vouchers (the blue vouchers) 
could not be sold or transferred.  It was argued that no vouchers could be sold or 
transferred to others, on the assumption that such ale or transfer will lead to 
accumulation of assets in the hands of the more wealthy – as cash-desperate poor families 
would likely sell their vouchers for very low price – and the principle of social justice 
would be jeopardized.  However, the initial proposal w s retained.   
 
The Privatization Law specified that agricultural co lectives and state farms 
should decide on their own method of privatizing livestock and other assets.  Fee for 
vouchers and exemption for some citizens were to be det rmined by the government 
resolution.  Employees of enterprises were to receiv  a 10 percent discount on the auction 
price to be paid for assets under the small-scale privatization.  However, all shares of 
state enterprises under the large-scale privatization were to be sold through stock 
exchange and employees of enterprises had a privilege to buy the shares at the nominal 
(or issue) price (before the public bidding on the stock exchange).  
 
A few days after adoption of the Privatization Law, the government approved 
series of resolutions on such practical issues as et blishing local privatization 




establishing the privatization revenue funds and spending, and conducting auctions.  The 
local privatization commissions were to have privatization strategies (plans) and organize 
all administrative issues such as registration of state assets, evaluating assets, creating 
privatization infrastructure such as brokerage and consulting firms, creating databases, 
conducting training on privatization and market mechanisms, and providing overall 
guidance in the entire corporatization and privatization process (Ardyn Erkh June 11, 
1991, issue 90).  The government decided that the vouchers would be distributed for a fee 
of 200 Togrogs per person.  Low-income families andpensioners were exempt from this 
rule.  Under the pressure of conservatives, the govrnment also approved the list of 
enterprises which would remain under the state property or predominantly state-owned. 
The list included over 120 enterprises which would be state-owned – the railway, 
Mongolian Airlines, pharmaceutical company, gold mines, roads, etc – and some more 
which would be predominantly state-owned (Government Resolution 170 of June 7, 
1991).   
 
4.3.2 Privatization Methods 
 
 
The privatization program was not controversial in the sense that few opposed it 
openly.  Even the conservative members of the old party could not oppose it because, 
first, they needed to demonstrate that they were changing, and, second, they did not have 
a viable alternative, while the desire for significant market reforms was widespread both 
within the political parties and the society.  Thus, there was a broad consensus, both 
among the politicians and the general public that state assets should be privatized.  




first distinction was between the mass privatization or case-by-case privatization.  Mass 
privatization was a new phenomenon in transition economies.  Further, within the mass 
privatization more specific methods included the dir ct sale to the outsiders (the 
traditional method used in advanced market economies), preferential treatment of the 
managers and employees where they can buyout “their” enterprise for a (low) cost or 
even free of charge, and the voucher privatization.  Discussions in the general literature 
led to an agreement that the speed and methods depended on primary objective of the 
privatization and the constraints placed by the initial conditions that the policymakers 
faced.  
 

















Sale to outside owners 
+ - + + - 
Management-
employee buyout 
- + - - - 
Equal access voucher 
privatization 
? + ? - + 
Spontaneous 
privatization 
? ? - - - 
Source: the World Bank (1996) “World Development Report 1996: From Market to Plan”, p. 52 
 
Although objectives were multiple, they can generally be classified into two 
groups: political and economic.  Political objectives could include depoliticizing the 
economy (e.g., Boycko et al 1995), gaining popular support for the political reforms of 
democratization, thus strengthening the foundation of democracy and pluralism.  The 




become the new owners of the enterprises. The fundamental economic objective of 
privatization was to build the foundation of a market economy, which requires private 
property.  Other important economic objectives included raising government revenue 
through sale of state assets, improving the economic efficiency by restructuring the 
enterprises and building good corporate governance.   
In addition to the differing objectives, the choice of privatization strategy was 
subject to several constraints.  The people – the pot ntial new owners – lacked resources 
to buy the SOEs, i.e., there was an important financial or economic constraint.  State 
assets had be sold to foreign owners or the financial constraint had be resolved if 
domestic ownership was preferred.  Secondly, various groups – usually employees and 
managers of the SOEs – had initial claims to ownership and actual control over the 
enterprises.  These vested interests pressured for their own preferential treatment.  
Naturally, political and economic objectives could not be achieved simultaneously.  
Objectives themselves contradict each other and certain t adeoffs were necessary as the 
countries opted for one method or another.  The tabl  ove (Table 4.5) shows the 
tradeoffs of the various privatization strategies.  
Different countries had differing priorities and some wanted to proceed more 
quickly than others.  “Hungary, with its large foreign debt, has always viewed revenues 
as critical, the Czechs and the Romanians less so.  To Russian reformers a speedy break 
with the past was paramount, while the Poles have forgone speed and entered into long 
debates over fairness. The Czechs have consistently stressed privatization’s depoliticizing 
role, while Estonia’s privatization program sought ou “real” owners capable of bringing 





The government of Mongolia had to set its priorities and choose the most feasible 
methods of privatization.  Naturally, both political and economic objectives were claimed 
to be important for the reformers.  They wanted to ensure that the initial political gains of 
the democratic revolution – multi-party system and free elections – were supported and 
sustained by the economic system.  There was a need to “deprive the ruling elite of the 
resources” as they were still holding much of the power after the elections (interview 
with Gerelchuluun, former Secretary of the GPC). 
 
The need to harness the fledgling democracy with robust economic reforms was 
repeatedly stated by the new democratic parties.  Economic reforms were seen as the 
major insurance against the reversal of the democratic processes.  The people had to be 
turned from the “proletariat with nothing to lose” to the owners with a stake in a new 
political and economic system (interview with Ganbold).  Another important political 
issue was to gain popular support for the privatization.  The majority of the people had to 
gain from privatization and the methods had to ensure this outcome.  Fairness was 
another important objective.  The reformers continuously stressed the egalitarian aspects 
of the privatization program (Korsun and Murrell 1995, 474).   
 
In terms of the economic objectives, because the market could not function 
without a sizeable private sector, the Mongolian reformers considered privatization as the 
dominant means of creating the private sector.  Mongolia was the only communist 




GDP was in Poland (30 percent), followed by 20 percent in Hungary, 15 percent in 
Romania, 10 percent in Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, 5 percent in Russia, the 
Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (EBRD estimates).  The reformers seemed 
to have been less concerned with the pure economic bje tives of raising revenue or even 
enhancing the efficiency of the SOEs.  The issue of corporate governance and access to 
outside resources was scarcely discussed at all at the level of policymakers (interview 
with Ganbold).  Thus, the objectives were largely political and social rather than 
economic.   
 
In addition to the objectives, there were severe constraints on the methods to be 
chosen.  Direct sale for cash to domestic outsiders was virtually out of question, as the 
income levels of Mongolians were extremely low.  Propensity to save in socialist 
economies was generally low because of the high implicit taxes and the generous social 
safety net and free provision of education and healt  services.  Mongolians were equally 
poor across the board.  As the Government Privatization Commission estimated, savings 
of the Mongolian citizens were sufficient to buy only about 3 percent of all state assets 
(interview with Bailiikhuu).  The only outsiders who could potentially buy state assets in 
Mongolia were foreign investors.  However, due to the long closedness of the economy 
and extremely limited relations with non-socialist economic partners, it was doubtful that 
a meaningful number of foreign investors would be int rested in buying the (largely 
obsolete) state enterprises.  Also, the institutional e vironment – the legal framework to 
protect property rights – as well as infrastructure was virtually nonexistent to lure foreign 




(interview with Ganbold).  Although economically most preferred, the sale to outsiders 
method was not really feasible in Mongolia.   
 
Frydman and Rapaczynski were among the first who proposed the mass voucher 
scheme.  The authors, however, quickly realized that the type of ownership this would 
bring would not produce growth in the private sector (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1993, 
1994).  Nonetheless, the idea was advanced among policymakers in some transition 
countries, notably Czechoslovakia and Russia.  The idea of voucher privatization was 
first gleaned by the Mongolian reformers from the mdia and policy discussions in 
Russia and some Eastern European countries like Hungary.  It became highly popular 
among the reformers and was promoted as the most preferred method.  
 
Equal access voucher privatization principle had to be jeopardized to some extent 
because of the pressure exerted by the management and workers of the state enterprises 
and especially the agricultural collectives.  Thus, voucher privatization had to be 
combined with some elements of preferential treatmen  for the managers and employees 
of SOEs.  Privatization of agricultural collectives and state farms was the largest sector 
where the insiders received huge preferential treatm n , as it will be shown later.   
 
4.3.3 Privatization: The Process (1991-1996) 
 
Immediately following the approval of the law and related rules, the Privatization 
Commission started the privatization process.   The process started with extensive 




of the newly established Stock Exchange; members of the aimag and local privatization 
commissions; directors, economists, and accountants of SOEs.  Many international 
experts were involved in the training, particularly at the Mongolian Stock Exchange.  It 
was admitted that the public knowledge about privatization and private property in 
general was low.  However, “the government did not have the luxury of educating the 
people first and then privatizing.  The two processes had to go together” from interview 
with Gerelchuluun, Secretary of the Government Privatization Commission, on the 
launch of privatization in Ardyn Erkh, July 4, 1991, issue 107).  The local privatization 
commissions initiated a nationwide public awareness campaign.  It was also suggested 
that the economic incentives of citizens taking active interest in the privatization should 
be high, as it touches upon the basic right of ownership (ibid).    
 
A comprehensive list of all state enterprises as well as state and collective farms 
together with the total amount of assets was compiled.  The valuation of assets was based 
on the book value, which was highly distorted and did no reflect the market value.  
However, this was the best information available to the government.  The first 
privatization program envisaged to privatize over 22 billion Togrogs worth of state 
assets, which constituted about 44.2 percent of all st te assets (see Table 4.6 for detailed 
data on the assets to be privatized by sectors40).   
 
Table 4.6 Valuation of state assets (total and to be privatized) as of January 1, 
1990 
 
                                                
40 Note the discrepancy in the numbers, e.g., 22 billion vs. 20.4 billion in the table.  Later some minor 














Industry 17,783.4 4,931.25 12,852.1 5,530.4 43.0 
Construction  3,021.9 654.2 2,367.7 2,342.3 98.9 
Auto transport 983.0 522.6 460.4 220.4 47.9 
Mongolian Airlines 429.6 170.1 259.4 15.4 5.9 
Railway 4,264.0 839.7 3,424.3 - - 
Roads  894.3 38.7 855.5 246.9 28.9 
Communication  827.8 304.9 522.0 419.2 80.2 
Trade and state supply 
system  
2,104.9 644.0 1,460.2 1,320.0 90.4 
Housing and utilities 7,772.7 516.0 7,256.2 4,353.7 60.0 
Agriculture  8,274.8 2,346.9 5,927.9 5,927.9 100.0 
Non-material sectora 11,447.6 0.6  11,370.0 - - 
Total 57,803.2 10,968.95 46,755.7 20,376.2 44.0 
State assets per citizen (in MNT) 10,254 
Source: Calculations provided by Bailiikhuu, Advisor t  the State Property Committee who was 
responsible for making calculations in 1990.  
a Note: Non-material sector includes education, healt, social insurance, culture, etc.  
 
 
As noted earlier, the primary method of privatization was issuing vouchers to all 
citizens born on or before May 31, 1991.  Every citizen was entitled on payment of the 
fee to receive 10,000 Togrogs worth of state assets, which were distributed in the form of 
vouchers and were of two types: blue vouchers worth 7,000 Togrogs to purchase assets of 
large enterprise and pink vouchers of 3,000 Togrogs f r purchasing small-size assets.  
The amount of 10,000 Togrogs was estimated on a simple rule: roughly dividing the 
value of assets to be privatized (some 20 billion) by the population, approximately 2 
                                                




million at the time.  Table 4.6 above also shows how the voucher value of 10,000 Tog per 
citizen has emerged (see last row of the table).   
 
The privatization program itself consisted of three major elements: (i) small 
enterprises, usually in retail and services sector; (ii) big enterprises in the industrial sector 
and manufacturing; and (iii) agricultural sector, namely state farms and agricultural 
collectives.  
 
4.3.3.1 Privatization of small enterprises 
 
Small-scale enterprise was defined as a unit with assets less than three million 
Togrogs (equivalent of $50,000).  Auctioning with pink vouchers (and cash in cases 
where the small property was sold for) was the main privatization method with ownership 
rights going to the highest bidder.  The small-scale privatization was the least 
controversial and least difficult due to the sheer nature of the sectors involved.  The assets 
were small and usually a single owner (individual or family) could buy the retail shops, 
grocery stores, or repair shops.  Some of the small privatization was done using the pink 
vouchers while others were sold for cash (Table 4.7 below).  
 
The list of enterprises to be privatized in a particular year, both small and large, 
was prepared by the Government Privatization Commission and approved by the 




parliament).   The decision on the methods of privatization for small enterprises – 
vouchers or cash – was made by the GPC. 
 
Table 4.7 Privatized assets, small-scale privatization, by method (as of July 1, 
1996) 
 
 Vouchers Cash Loans Total 
Total assets(million MNT) 4,446.8 3,493.4 268.1 8,20 .3 
% in total 54.2 42.6 3.3 100.0 
Source: State Property Committee 2011 
 
 
The specific feature of the pink vouchers was that ey could be transferred or 
sold to others who could use them to purchase assets of a small enterprise.  The price 
turned out to be equal to a bottle of vodka.  Many families pooled together their pink 
vouchers to obtain shops or service units.  As noted earlier, the Privatization Law 
prescribed that employees of small enterprises had a privilege to buy the enterprise at the 
initial book price without outside bidders if the employees had a “lease agreement” prior 
to the privatization (clause 15.2).  The “lease agreement” was an experiment tested with 
small enterprises during the late communist period as part of perestroika reforms.  ‘Work 
collectives’ – the management and employees – entered into agreement with the line 
ministry or supervising government agency where they w re given discretionary powers 
in terms of determining output levels, input use and partially pricing, and become 
residual claimants of the profits the enterprise made.  The collectives on lease agreement 
paid a fixed fee for using the state assets.  The notio  was that the collective was leasing 
state assets to make profits and paid a fee for using the assets.  Those enterprises which 
had lease agreements had a privilege of buying off the enterprise without competition.  




they could receive a 10 percent discount on the final auction price, where assets were 
auctioned, i.e., where there was no lease agreement and the management did not want to 
buy the assets.  A significant share of the small-sca e enterprises was privatized on a 
preferential treatment to the employees.  In the capital city, about 60 percent of small 
enterprises were sold to their employees.  In the countryside, the number is even higher 
(Korsun and Murrell 1995, 485).  
 
The Government Privatization Commission later concluded that (Report of the 
Government Privatization Commission to the State Grat Khural, February 26, 1994) the 
preferential treatment of work collectives ended in many cases in poor governance and 
poor performance of the privatized entities.  Although without significant analytical part, 
this government study attempted to identify in a fair manner both achievements and 
drawbacks of the privatization process thus far and draw some lessons.  It was further 
noted that many entities were closed down and privatized assets divided among the new 
owners and sold off.   Because the assets were privatized at lower than the market price, 
apparently many considered it more profitable – in the short run – just to sell them at the 
market price for cash instead of continuing to run the business.  Many shops and transport 
services just disappeared with privatization.  This naturally exacerbated the already dire 
situation with shortage of goods and services as well as employment.  To mitigate the 
issue of shortage, the government issued a resolution (Resolution 5 of 1992) for the local 
government and local privatization commissions to establish an agreement with the 
newly privatized entities on continuous supply of gods and services and maintaining 




assets and discontinuing the production process.  Moreover, they were obliged to produce 
certain level and quality of output.  However, the owners argued that the government 
decision unlawfully restricted ownership rights and therefore the resolution could not be 
enforced (from the Report of the Government Privatization Commission to the State 
Great Khural, February 26, 1994).  Ultimately, this clause could not be enforced because 
of the conflict with the law and was withdrawn by the government (interview with 




Although extremely ambitious, it was decided to complete small-scale 
privatization within two years and the target was mostly achieved.  About 45 percent of 
small-size assets were privatized within a year from the launch of the privatization 
program (see Table 4.9).  The remaining 55 percent w re privatized the following year.   
 
4.3.3.2 Privatization of large enterprises 
 
 
Box 4.2 Two cases of small-scale privatization (cash bids) 
 
Two shops – a largersupermarket in a busy district and smaller shop on the outskirts of the city – were 
auctioned on July 2, 1991.  The initial bidding price of the larger shop was 1.2 million Togrogs.  There 
were six business entities participating in the bidding.  After 92 price bids and fierce competition 
between two companies, within 30 minutes the shop was sold for 7.4 million to the firm “Jaran”.  Owner 
of “Jaran” told in an interview that he was ready to offer 10 million, which, in his estimates, will be fully 
recovered within 2.5 years.  With price liberalizaton, the new owner saw a great potential in retail.  He 
planned to import goods from China.   
 
Another shop, a small shopping center in a remote area, was offered initially for 250,000 Togrogs.  A 
private company “Baishir” was the only bidder and became a new owner by paying the initial price.  
 





Privatization of large-scale enterprises was significantly more difficult.  The 
voucher privatization program was the first program nd was designed to be implemented 
within three years.  The privatization process consisted of several stages: preparation of a 
plan, corporatization, and the sale of shares for the vouchers.  In order to sell shares, 
some institutional reforms were needed.  Stock exchange and broker firms were the main 
infrastructure to be used in large privatization.  The first glimpse at how stock exchange 
operates was taken by some critical members of the newly established privatization 
commission and the stock exchange when they visited tock exchanges in Budapest and 
Vienna in January 1991 and got acquainted with the privatization that was taking place in 
Hungary (Ardyn Erkh, January 11, 1991, issue 8).  This was an eye-opening experience 
for many and helped to realize the amount of work that was necessary to accomplish in 
Mongolia before mass privatization could begin (interviews with Gerelchuluun and 
Bailiikhuu).   
 
 The first trading through the Mongolian State Exchange – with the public 
offering of 3 large enterprises for vouchers – took place in February 1992, only several 
months after passing the Privatization Law.  “After i ’s opening, the stock exchange 
continuously increased trading volume.  ... Within four months there were 34 companies 
listed on the exchange and their privatization was moving as planned.  As of June 2, 21 of 
these were fully privatized. The list included some prominent establishments such as 





Korsun and Murrell (1995) note the remarkable organizational alacrity with which 
the stock exchange and countrywide network of brokerag  houses were established in 
Mongolia in 1991.  This organizational success, combined with no limited technical 
problems and little allegations of corruption, contributed to the fact that privatization 
program was kept close to schedule and raised little po itical opposition (476).   
 
The management and employees of large enterprises enjoyed some privileges:  
they could buy off their shares (equal to the allocated value of vouchers) at the nominal 
price prior being sold on stock exchange (Article 20 of Privatization Law).  Alternatively, 
they could gamble on the stock exchange of they believed the actual price of shares is 
going to be lower than the nominal.  Many managers and employees took advantage of 
this clause.  “Markets, in which vouchers were exchanged for shares, determined the 
structure of an enterprise’s ownership.   Thus, although insiders and their families own 34 
percent of the average enterprise, this insider ownership was not a result of concessions – 
as in Russia, for example – but rather a consequence of the choices individual citizens 
made during the sale of shares for vouchers” (Anderson el al 2000, 530).    
 
Outside ownership was dispersed.  Because the blue (larg -scale) vouchers were 
nontradeable, mechanisms for outsider ownership concentration were almost absent, at 
least until August 1995 when the secondary trading of shares began.  The mutual funds 
used for instance in Russia and Czechoslovakia, although formally created by the 
Government Privatization Commission, were little usd and did not play a significant 




citizenry more directly in the people’s capitalism.  Free entry of mutual funds was not 
possible during the privatization process, in contrast to the situation in Russia or 
Czechoslovakia, for example” (ibid).  
 
Voucher privatization was the dominant method used in large privatization.  As of 
1 July, 1996, assets worth 24.9 billion Togrogs were privatized, out of which assets worth 
15.3 billion were privatized by blue vouchers (Table 4.7).   
 
Table 4.8 The structure of privatized assets, large-scale privatization, by sector 













4,044.6 12,615.3 16,659.9 15,252.3 1,352.0 55.6 
% of total 24.3 75.7 100.0 91.6 8.1 0.3 
Source: State Property Committee 2011 
 
 
Voucher privatization was designed to make every citizen owner of assets.  It 
largely succeeded in this aspect.  In January 1995, the government reported that 1.9 
million citizens received their voucher books and 1.1 million citizens have become new 
owners of formerly state assets.  For unidentified reasons, 113 thousand people did not 
receive their voucher books.  About 17.4 billion Togrogs worth of state assets were 
privatized leading to establishment of 466 joint stock companies, 1,297 limited liability 




privatization – using vouchers – was completed by the end of 1994 (from the Report of 
the Government Privatization Commission to the State Great Khural, January 15, 1995).    
 
The second phase in privatization started in August 1995 with the official launch 
of secondary trading of shares as well as the remaining blue vouchers.  This was far 
behind the initial schedule.  Many blamed the Jasrai government for stalling the 
privatization reforms.  The free trading of vouchers and shares accelerated the process of 
accumulation of majority of shares in the hands of fewer owners.  Post-1995 privatization 
saw some positive changes in the performance of privatized enterprises: improved 
management, increased investment, introduction of new technologies, increased 
industrial output, and improved quality of goods.  Cash privatization became the 
dominant method of privatization since the second half of 1995.  The legislative 
framework was improved by adoption of Anti-Trust Law, Law on Securities and the Law 
on State and Local Property (new law to replace the Privatization Law).  The 
Government Privatization Committee was enlarged into a State Property Committee 
(SPC) in line with the new law.  A new Center of Asset Evaluation – with newly trained 
staff – was established in 1995 within the SPC, with the technical support by the World 
Bank.  Its main objective was to establish market values of state enterprises to be 





4.3.3.3 Privatization in the agricultural sector 
 
Among the three components, privatization in the agricultural sector was probably 
most controversial and politically charged.  In 1990, there were 255 agricultural 
cooperatives, the negdels, mostly engaged in animal husbandry, and almost a hundred 
state farms, which supplied grains, vegetables, and fod er.  A little below half of the 
population lived in the negdels and state farms, which employed approximately 40 
percent of total workforce.  The agricultural sector owned a third of total production 
assets in the country and produced almost a quarter of national income.  The main asset 
of the negdels was livestock, while state farms owned land and machinery.  In other 
words, this was a large core sector which touched upon the livelihood of a million people.   
 
There were many stakeholders in the process of privatization.  First, there were 
agricultural collectives and state farms themselves, and their member families.  They 
largely supported privatization because they were likely to become the new owners of the 
livestock and probably arable land.  Directors of thenegdels opposed agricultural 
privatization, as their powers would virtually disappear with dismantlement of the 
collective farms.  They definitely opposed equal access privatization in the agriculture 
sector.  However, if privatization was to proceed, they wanted to receive not only 
preferential treatment with regard to collective property but themselves determine the 
privatization methods.  Although formally under a cooperative ownership of the 
members, “the negdels have become de facto state entities ruled by the party 




were represented by the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Negdels).  The Union was 
the major organizing force of the ruling elite of the collective farms.   
 
There were enterprises in the industrial sector that used agricultural raw materials.  
These enterprises had little trust that newly privatized agricultural farms would continue 
to supply raw materials.  The expectation was that prices of raw materials would rise.  
Even with increased prices, enterprises expected that with decentralized supply system 
the transaction costs of collecting the necessary raw materials would be much higher.   
 
However, the most controversial issue was the shortage of foodstuff.  It was 
feared that with privatization of state farms and herds, supply of food would reduce even 
further and the prices would increase jeopardizing the already very low living standards 
of city dwellers.  These concerns were expressed in an article by A. Bolat, member of the 
State Small Khural, on livestock and agricultural privatization (Ardyn Erkh April 3, 
1991, issue 62).  There was lack of confidence in the market in general, and agricultural 
supply in particular.   It was argued that once abolished, agricultural collectives which 
were the main suppliers of food and agricultural raw materials could not be replaced by 
decentralized individual herder families.  There would be disruptions of food supply and 
price increase.  Meat supplied to the state per head of private herds was four times lower 
than per head of collective herds. Therefore, it was estimated that 180 tons of meat 
annually procured by the state would be reduced down t  70 tons.  Private herders had 




doubtful that individual families would totally replace the collectives and become 
obedient suppliers of cheap goods. 
 
Bolat justly raised the issue of suppressed prices on agricultural products under 
the central plan.  The general policy has been to suppress the wholesale prices of 
foodstuff and agricultural products in order to promote industrialization and urbanization.  
Agricultural sector remained the most underprivileged sector in the old system.  Scholars 
argued that the socialist industrialization in Monglia was achieved at the expense of 
agriculture (Namjim 2004).  The policy has been criticized and partially revised during 
the late communist period when a major price reform took place in 1988, which increased 
by … percent agricultural wholesale prices.   
 
Another concern expressed was that individual herders would not have advantage 
of economies of scale in some collective activities such as preparation of fodder, 
vaccination and veterinary services, repair of winter shelters for animals, etc.  However, 
the argument was not strong in the sense that thesew re all activities which did not 
benefit from economies of scale.  For many, herders’ collectives served as an insurance 
against harsh weather, such as blizzards and draught.  It was argued that families with 
few herds faced with severe weather would fall intopoverty.  These arguments were used 
intensely by the agricultural lobby.   
 
Law on Privatization provided the legal framework for privatization of 




law specified that individual negdels themselves would decide how to privatize their own 
assets (Article 21).  With this new legal mandate, multitude of organizations, government 
or otherwise, issued their recommendations on the ways to proceed with privatization.  
Naturally, in many cases these recommendations and rules were inconsistent and tended 
to express divided interests.  Concepts papers, regulations, and recommendations 
developed during the national economics convention held in November 1990 as well as 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Union of Agricult ral Cooperatives, the Мongolian 
Union of Herders and Farmers were among the different documents adopted in 1990 and 
1991.  The Government Privatization Commission issued its own set of recommendations 
and political parties also had their own views.  
 
The Union of Agricultural Cooperatives held the most conservative views which 
could be summarized in three major points.  First, livestock should be transferred to the 
herders based on contracts or lease agreements.  In other words, initially there would be 
no direct private ownership of livestock.  Second, if privatization were to proceed, it was 
proposed to exclude from it some groups of rural people such as non-residents, non-
members of negdels, and evenadministrative staff and professionals suchas teachers and 
doctors, etc.  Thus it was proposed to privatize cooperative assets within a closed circle 
with preferential treatment of cooperative management and members.  Third, it was 
suggested to transfer livestock to herders without using vouchers, which could be used by 
rural dwellers in purchasing other state assets (from the concept of transferring the 




Union of Agricultural Cooperatives on June 14, in Ardyn Erkh, June 25, 1991, issue 
100).  
 
The agricultural lobby – which was organized under th  slogan “Do not attack the 
negdels” – was very strong.   They had big influence in the People’s Great Khural as well 
as the State Small Khural.  It was not surprising given that about 40 percent of the Great 
Khural was comprised of local directors of collective farms and local governors and the 
rural areas were overrepresented in the national assembly.  Within the State Small 
Khural, their influence was less profound but still ignificant.   
 
The Democratic Party called for selling the state assets to foreign companies and 
individuals, as this will be beneficial in gaining foreign exchange and financing the 
much-needed essential imported goods as well as gainin  access to foreign markets and 
technology.  The party was most critical about the government policy to allow individual 
agricultural cooperatives to choose their own methods f privatizing livestock and other 
assets.  They claimed that assets of the negdels (agricultural cooperatives) are not 
collective assets but de facto state assets and therefor  they should be privatized by the 
government, just like the state-owned enterprises.  Likewise, the Democratic Union – the 
mass democratic organization – was of the view to dismantle the negdels altogether; 
involve all interested parties – the n gdel members and non-members – in agriculture 
privatization process (i.e., use an open process); u e vouchers in the agricultural 
privatization and create voluntary cooperative unions after the full privatization of 




and dismantling of the Supreme Council of the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives for 
being the main obstacle in pursuing market reforms and privatization (Ardyn Erkh, 
March 12, 1991, issue 69).  
 
The Government Privatization Commission had a legal mandate to “provide 
guidance and advice” in agricultural privatization ssues.  As such, they promoted the 
basic principles it used in the industrial sector.  First, vouchers issued to farm members 
could be used to acquire collective property, which would be valued at the book values 
rather than market values of assets and herds when privatizing.  It also suggested that 
local privatization commissions evaluate all assets of agricultural collectives and state 
farms before they are privatized.  Winter shelters should be included in the assets and 
transferred to the herders; while such common resources as pastures and wells could be 
based on contractual arrangements (Government Privatization Commission 2011, 140).  
However, these proposals were advisory only.   
 
The privatization process took place amid this diversity of interests and 
organizational pressures.  In the end, agricultural collectives decided themselves which 
method to employ and how to divide the assets among its members.  Naturally, there was 
big discrepancy in the methods.  These depended on the general wealth – both in terms of 
amount and type of assets – of individual collectives, the powers exerted by the local 
governors and engagement of the members of the collctives.  All negdels used pink and 
blue vouchers in their privatization.  In some negdels professionals were excluded from 




collective (senior people being members for longer period of time), initial contribution to 
the collective assets by the family (historical records from the late 1950s when the 
negdels were established were pulled out in some cas s), position held by members 
(managers vs. herders), performance (good herders vs. bad herders), household size, and 
others were among the factors considered by the negdels in deciding who gets what.  
Because of the multiplicity of the players and diverging outcomes, there was certain level 
dissatisfaction among the rural citizens (interview with Bailiikhuu).   
 
“About 70-80 percent of complaints submitted to the Government Privatization 
Commission were related to agricultural collectives” (memoirs of S. Tsogsuren in 
Government Privatization Commission 2011, 126).  There were mostly related to the 
perceived incidences of injustice or breach of law in the agricultural privatization.  
Korsun and Murrell (1995) note that “in many cooperatives, the process deviated from 
the guidelines.  As a result, there have been persist nt allegations of corruption, focusing 
on local officials’ control of decision-making.  This brought the privatization process in 
disrepute in some rural areas, specially among rural professionals who were unable to 
secure ownership stakes since they were not negdel members” (481).   
 
The directors and top management of the negdels had an obvious advantage 
compared to the ordinary members of the collectives and took advantage of such 
privileges.  “Something similar to the Russian privat zation where the management and 
employees of state enterprises had a clear advantage in privatizing their own enterprises 




relatively fairly: they were mostly divided equally among the members of the collective.  
However, other assets, such as shelters, equipment, inventory, were not privatized in a 
very fair manner.  Also, the collective farms themslves differed in their assets.  There 
were relatively rich collective farms and relatively poor.  Therefore, members of different 
collectives received different number of livestock and other assets.  In this sense, 
privatization in the agricultural sector differed quite substantially from the more or less 
egalitarian approach which was implemented in other sectors.  However, the final 
outcome of agricultural privatization, especially livestock proved to be positive” 
(interview with Ganbold).  
 
To resolve these controversies, the GPC had to interfere and take the lead in 
privatization of cooperative farms.  In April 1992, the Government issued a resolution to 
undertake some corrective actions at local levels and develop across-the-board 
understanding and more or lees uniform approach to privatization of the negdels.  
Privatization of state-owned farms and fodder farms went relatively smoothly with less 
controversies and debates mainly due to the consiste cy of approaches by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the State Privatization Commission (memoirs of D. Ganjuur in 
Government Privatization Commission 2011, 142).   
 
Overall, the bulk of privatization – especially its initial phase – was complete by 
1996.  President Ochirbat (1996) noted that the Byambasuren government completed 
about 44 percent of the bulk of privatization work – including developing the program 




well as enormous organizational efforts setting up the commission and the stock 
exchange – in a matter of a single year.  The remaining 55 percent of accomplishments 
was completed in two and a half years by the Jasrai government, indicating some 
slowdown in the privatization process. Ochirbat argues that this slowdown led to the 
postponement of opening the secondary trading market for shares.   
 
Table 4.9 below summarizes the privatization efforts for 1991-1996.    
 
Table 4.9 Assets of privatized companies, as of July 1, 1996 
 























281 3,275.8 638 9,339.5 919 12,615.3 
Small 
privatization 
1,310 3,670.2 1,899 4,538.0 3,209 8,208.3 
Agriculture 
entities  
 4,044.6    4,044.6 
TOTAL 1,591 10,990.6 2,537 13,877.4 4,128 24,868.1 
Source: State Property Committee 2011 
 
 
4.3.4 Outcomes and Lessons of Mongolia’s Privatization 
 
 
Privatization was the cornerstone of the reform efforts of the Mongolian 
government.  It largely met its political and social objectives of dismantling the state 
sector and achieving more or less fair distribution of state assets to the general populace.  




during 1991-1996.  Since, 1996, the focus of privatization shifted from political 
objectives of dismantling the old system to more economic and efficiency-oriented ones, 
as raising government revenue, improving efficiency and governance.  Simultaneously, 
non-voucher methods were used to for privatizing the remaining state enterprises, 
particularly the so-called most valuable enterprises uch as the Gobi Cashmere Factory 
and Trade and Development Bank, among many others.  “F om 1996 to 2000, 942 
enterprises and assets were privatized through sealed bid auctions, English auctions, sales 
of shares through the Mongolian Stock Exchange and other methods, raising 
approximately 48 billion Togrogs (US$65 million) in revenue” (Marshall, Nixson, and 
Walters 2004, 10). 
 
Opinions vary as to the success or otherwise of the early privatization program.  
Supporters claimed that its results have been “impressive” and that Mongolia has 
implemented the “most successful privatization program” compared to all the republics 
of the former Soviet Union (quotations from Griffin, 1994, 9).  [There will be more 
quotations from other sources, e.g., EBRD, World Bank, Sachs, etc in Chapter 1; I will 
refer to them here.]  
 
Critics argued that its role in the transition to a m rket economy has been “greatly 
exaggerated” and that, in the specific context of Mngolia, it should have been given a 
lower priority (Griffin 1994, 10).  Stubbs et al (2000) argue that, with hindsight, the 
program “was hastily executed and seriously flawed, l aving it seriously discredited in 




“Although a partial administrative success, privatiz on did little to assist Mongolia 
through its transition difficulties” (9). 
 
However, diverging opinions could be reconciled andthe privatization process 
and outcomes could be summarized as follows.    
 
First, privatization (especially the early privatiztion program) in Mongolia had 
important political objectives, and it undoubtedly led to a shift in productive assets from 
the state to the private sector and was important in the development of that sector.  The 
objectives of speed as well as political goals were mostly achieved.  In this respect, swift 
– and universal and more just compared to some other countries – privatization in 
Mongolia could be considered success.  There was preferential treatment of the 
management and employees but this did not result in ma agement and employee buyouts 
like in Russia, where the employees enjoyed much greate  privileges: insiders could 
choose between receiving a minority of shares at no cost and purchasing a majority of 
shares at a large discount.  In the end, during 1992-1994 insiders acquired about two-
thirds of the shares in the 15,000 privatized firms in Russia (World Bank 1996, 55).   
 
Second, in spite of succeeding in achieving its prima y political goals, many 
interrelated issues were pending.  The report of the Government Privatization 
Commission “Privatization: Processes, Outcomes, and Prospects (1991-1994)” dated 
February 26, 1994 to the parliament noted that one of the lessons learned was that 




redistribution of state assets to the people, there was still “a vital need to restructure these 
companies (i.e., privatized enterprises), which waseven more important than 
privatization as per se.  There was also a need to revise and improve laws regulating the 
operations of the private companies, including laws on securities, company, bankruptcy, 
anti-monopoly law etc.”  
 
One main issue was institution building.  Korsun and Murrell (1995) and other 
international observers (e.g., Denizer and Gelb 1992) noted that the progress on 
privatization stood in a stark contrast to developments on other aspects of reforms that 
were complementary to privatization:  
 
“Mongolia provides a fascinating example of postsocialist reforms for a number of 
reasons.  The speed of privatization is puzzling, given that it occurred in the face of 
opposition from important elements of the party that controlled the government.  The 
degree of divergence between the progress on privatization and on other reforms is 
greater in Mongolia than in other countries, with Russia a possible exception.  In the 
future, Mongolia’s economy will provide interesting lessons on the patterns of 
development that result when there is great discrepancy between formal private 
ownership and the institutional underpinnings that give substance to formal rights” 
(Korsun and Murrell 1995, 473).   
 
Similarly, as noted earlier, the IMF warned the government against too speedy 
privatization without establishing proper institutional framework.  At the same time, it 
criticized the government for being too slow in liberalization efforts (IMF 2005).  The 





Third, although proper institutional and legal environment was absent or lagged at 
the initial phases of privatization, competitive business environment did exist and 
contributed to improving performance of privatized firms.  Anderson, Lee, and Murrell 
(2000) note that there are at least two benevolent forces that work to improve the 
efficiency of privatized enterprises, compared to the previous state ownership under the 
command economy: one is competition among the now private companies and the second 
one is the higher pressure from private owners to make profits (528).  However, as noted 
before, the ownership factor was rather weak in Mongolia.  Based on a mid-1996 survey 
of half of all privatized large enterprises, Anderson et al (2000) found that, in an 
environment of virtual absence of formal market insitutions, enterprises with residual 
state ownership performed better than those with insider (management and employee) or 
dispersed outsider ownership, because the state was the only effective owner who could 
pressure the enterprise management (547).  It was also found that most enterprises face 
competition – 77 percent face domestic competition and 73 percent face import 
competition, with only 3 percent admitting no competition – and competition had the 
strongest effect on the efficiency of enterprises (ibid, 529 and 545). 
 
Fourth, the very success in the speed and achieving its political goal also meant 
the goals of improving corporate governance issues were not met.  The government 
report of 1994 emphasized that “One of the main pitfalls was diffused ownership, and in 
some cases even what could be qualified as absence of an owner.  The former state assets 
now were owned by thousands of small diffused owners, so it often became unclear who 




there was no specific owner.  Now one can admit that the economic failure of the 
privatization process was the failure to concentrate majority shares by one or a group of 
owners.  To address this, the law on securities needs to be adopted in order to promote 
secondary market” (from the report of the Government Privatization Commission of 
February 26, 1994).  To give an example, “in the case of Ulaanbaatar Hotel, 12,000 
people obtained shares and the largest individual owner held only 0.07 percent of the 
total” (Denizer and Gelb 1992, 16).  
 
Diffused ownership inevitably lead to weak governance.  Subsequent 
consolidation of shares – which took place rather rapidly in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, for instance, which also adopted mass voucher privatization – was slow partly 
due to the delay in opening the secondary market.   
 
“A survey of over 200 enterprises in 1996 shows that ownership consolidation is 
proceeding only slowly, with 51 percent of enterprises surveyed reporting no net changes 
since 1993.  As a result, shareholder authority is nominal, and diffused ownership 
prevents outsiders from exercising effective control.  Good governance conditions such 
as regular shareholder meetings and exclusion of general directors from board 
membership are regularly violated.  Privatized enterprises continue to seek government, 
particularly local government, intermediation in commercial transactions and dispute 
resolution, and local government officials frequently sit on privatized enterprise boards of 
auditors” (Anderson et al 2000). 
 
Other technical issues such as asset evaluation and the need for sector specific 
approaches – instead of one-fits-all approach taken by the government – were mentioned 




evaluation was inadequate mostly due to the lack of reliable financial information and 
inadequate accounting records of former state owned e terprises.  Detailed records were 
there, to be sure, but they were distorted and had very little to do with the market values.  
However, the quality of asset evaluation was not of much significance during the early 
privatization, given the bidding with vouchers on the stock exchange.  In many cases, no 
restructuring policies preceded the privatization.  Relative success of privatization in 
some sectors and failure in others suggested that taking into sector specific structural 
changes and conducting feasibility studies would have resulted in more positive 
outcomes from the privatization process (interview with Gerelchuluun).  
 
4.4. Alternative Theoretical Explanations of Privatization: Special 
Interests and Collective Action 
 
 
Privatization of state assets has been the cornerstone of the economic and political 
program of the National Progress Party (MNPP).  It was supported in principle by other 
new democratic parties such as the Mongolian Democratic Party, but not especially 
emphasized by social democrats or the now reforming MPRP.  The MNPP’s privatization 
design has been quite radical both in terms of scope, comprising almost all economic 
activities, and methods, suggesting mass voucher privatization.  Although not widely 
supported by the MPRP, this radical plan found its way into the MPRP-led government 
reform policy in 1991.  
 
Political institutions argument provides only a vague insight into the economic 




establishment of a coalition government where a key economic policy position was given 
to a representative of the MNPP.  Formation of a coaliti n government was not a 
particular result of a given institutional arrangement; rather, it was conditioned by unique 
historical circumstances.  It was proposed individually by Prime Minister Byambasuren 
(although the spirit of power sharing did exist among the MPRP ranks) and accepted by 
the new political parties.   
 
Another interesting fact was that the MPRP gave substantial powers to the Prime 
Minister and the cabinet on economic policy issues.  Indeed, the role of political parties – 
both MPRP and democratic opposition – was limited in the government agenda setting, 
which was a great departure from the very recent party-dominated policymaking.  The 
government was implementing no one’s political platform, it had its own program which 
was a mixture of various ideas and proposals and an ambitious mass privatization 
program was part of it.  
 
The high level of uncertainty – economic, institutional as well as external – may 
have contributed to the minimal influence exerted by the political parties and especially 
the ruling majority.  Extreme economic conditions dictated by the collapse of the old 
economic regime forced the government to improvise policies that were thought to be the 
best response.  Introduction of food rationing is an example of one such policy.  The 
MPRP high level official admitted that, due to the nature of the issues the government is 
dealing with, it was difficult for the MPRP to influence its policies, thus alluding to the 





In an established parliamentary system with strong party discipline, the electoral 
competition among the parties would be fierce and the Prime Minister would implement 
the winning party’s electoral platform.  However, such a system was not in place in 1990, 
following the first parliamentary elections.  The political parties were still weak.  Even 
the MPRP with its 70 years of ruling experience wasin disarray.  There was no dominant 
ideology, multiple factions emerged, and the party was disintegrating, with some 
prominent members initially criticizing the party leadership and later leaving the party.  
With appointment of a reformist Prime Minister and without internal cohesion, the party 
could not enforce its more moderate policies, because there was no united policy as such. 
 
The point about the weakness of political parties is consistent with earlier 
evidence when multiple candidates were nominated from the same party and non-partisan 
entities could also nominate candidates in the 1990 elections.  As also noted earlier, the 
situation has changed in 1992, when political parties became more disciplined and better 
organized due to the change in the electoral rule, which is also evident from the policies 
of the Jasrai government of 1992-1996, which basically implemented the MPRP election 
platform.  The electoral rule and political instituon theories, thus, provide some vague 
insight into the economic policy choices in Mongolia.  The key reasons seem be related 
to the individuals and political and economic groups that dominated the Mongolian 





One area where the electoral rule proved to be important was privatization of 
agricultural collectives.  I mentioned in Chapter 3 that about 40 percent of the People’s 
Great Khural elected in 1990 were directors and top managers of collectives and state 
farms.  Their influence was weaker in the Small Khural but still relatively strong.  This 
became possible because of the electoral rule which was based on a simple majority 
principle and required that every one of the over 350 soums be represented in the 
People’s Great Khural, which led to overrepresentation of rural constituents.  As noted 
earlier, the average population of a soum was about 3,000.  There were remote soums 
with about 1000 people.  In the cities and urban centers, the electoral rule said that one 
deputy should represent about 10,000 residents, thu leading to disproportionately low 
representation.  The overrepresentation of rural interests in the parliament contributed to 
the strength of the agricultural lobby thus resulting in a greater concessions given to the 
negdels (agricultural collectives) in privatizing livestock.   
 
Collective action and special interest theories are most commonly used in 
explaining economic policy choices.  It is argued that government policies oftentimes are 
determined by the pressure exerted by some economic interests who are better able to 
impose their preferences on the government.  In the context of transition economies, “the 
ability of vested interests to influence the state and modify policy to their advantage has 
been a primary threat to economic reform” (EBRD 1999, 102).   Moreover, the nature of 
the early reforms has a significant effect on the distribution of power among interest 
groups at a later stage of reform.  Most notably, some social groups – e.g., parts of the 




of transition can create significant barriers to later reforms (ibid, 108).  The following 
subsections deal with these and other specific arguments and use them in explaining 
Mongolia’s economic reforms and privatization. 
 
4.4.1 Interest Groups and Gradual Economic Reforms 
 
 
Hellman (1998) and others argued that persistence of partial economic reforms in 
many postcommunist countries was often a result of vested interests who benefited from 
the initial partial reforms and attempted to lock them in so that further reforms are stalled.  
In many postcommunist countries, opposition to comprehensive market reforms came not 
from traditional short-term losers – unemployed, pensioners, displaced bureaucrats and 
the like – but from enterprise insiders, commercial bankers, local officials who benefited 
enormously from initial reforms and (temporary) distortions which were still in place.  
These actors were the earliest and biggest winners of the initial reforms. They “did not 
oppose the initiation of the reform process, nor have they sought a full-scale reversal of 
reform.  Instead, they have frequently attempted to block specific advances in the reform 
process that threaten to eliminate the special advantages and market distortions upon 
which their own early reform gains were based (Hellman 1998, 204-205). 
 
Although Mongolia is often pictured to have implemented shock therapy, close 
evidence provided in this chapter suggests that this was not the case.  “In the transition 
literature, top-level official pronouncements often become accepted as fact, while the 




liberalization reforms, although privatization was more swift.  Price, trade, and exchange 
rate liberalization was implemented in several stages in the course of 2-3 years.  For 
instance, the data show that 70 percent of officially decontrolled prices did not change in 
the first eight months after decontrol, despite the severe macroeconomic disequilibrium 
(Murrell et al 1996).  It is commonly argued that the protracted nature of liberalization 
efforts is generally bad for the economy and is often a result of interest groups who 
benefit from the opportunities of arbitrage between the reformed and non-reformed 
sectors that are provided by such reforms.  Do we observe the influence of interest groups 
on the gradual economic liberalization in Mongolia?   
 
Murrell et al (1996) argue that the gradual nature of liberalization efforts is 
conditioned more by the inherited cultural aspects of policymaking rather than rent 
seeking and other motivations. Evidence shows that price control was advocated and 
practiced by a variety of agents – and not only by those who would obviously benefited 
from such controls – including political parties, the central government, individual 
politicians, local governors, ministries, and even n wly established commodity 
exchanges.  In fact, it was difficult to find a Mongolian who opposed price control 
entirely, even among the ranks of the most radically minded elements.  Some form of 
control was always desirable.  This homogeneity is indicative of the underlying deeper 
commonality which is likely to be conditioned by the istory of policymaking in the 





Another evidence to support the lack of influence of vested interests is relatively 
quick passage of laws that established private property rights (although initially very 
underdeveloped) and other incentives that encouraged private initiative.  It is commonly 
argued that property rights usually encourage the fledgling private sector (and therefore 
market competition) and are slow to develop in countries with strong vested interests.   
 
As the records show, the State Small Khural passed an unprecedented number of 
economic laws in a very short period of time.  In the first nine months, it approved or 
presented 27 brand newlaws governing the private sector activities as well as the 
government economic policies.  Although the actual implementation and interpretation of 
these laws fell far behind the intentions of the parliament – an expected outcome in a 
situation of institutional collapse and void – these laws signaled the extent of economic 
and political change in the country more than anythi g else.   
 
Boone et al (1997) argue that early parliamentary elections proved instrumental in 
ensuring macroeconomic reforms.  “In a wave of euphoria after the elections, the new 
Parliament passed a long list of laws guaranteeing property rights, allowing free trade, 
and generally providing the legal basis for reforms and sending a clear signal that market 
reforms had begun.  The number of private enterprises skyrocketed in 1991 and 1992; 
many of these were small traders and commercial busines es.  These businesses played 
the important role of arbitrating prices and providing an outlet other than the state system 





As the failed attempt of the government to impose some government price and 
output restrictions in 1992 on the newly privatized enterprises show, the sense of private 
property and the associated rights was taking root very quickly.  In addition, there were 
no barriers to enter the private sector.  Individuals and business establishments were free 
to engage in economic activities.  Swift issuance of international passports to all citizens 
contributed to increased border trade and burgeoning private sector activities.  In the 
1990s, there was virtually no household in the urban areas where at least one member 
was not engaged in border trade.   
 
  Boone et al (1997) further argue as the number of traders grew the ability of the 
state to control prices and enforce state orders declined accordingly.  To some extent, the 
gradual pattern of reform reflects a de facto loss of the officials’ ability to enforce 
regulations.  “Without strict control on trading and private activities in place, the 
Mongolian example suggests that large-scale reform becomes inevitable” (ibid, 109).  
This implies that the gradual nature of reforms wasconditioned by the desire of the state 
to control the prices – in a hope to secure some minimum subsistence for the populace, 
restrict monopoly power and the associated windfall g ins, and also due to the inherited 
culture of policymaking in the country, rather than influence of entrenched interests to 
keep their rents.  Although reforms unraveled gradually, they were not postponed for 
long.  Most liberalization efforts were completed by 1994, while economic reforms were 
speeded up significantly in Russia and some other CIS countries in the wake of the 






4.4.2 Political and Other Interest Groups and Their Stake in Privatization 
 
There were multiple players that had some stake in the privatization program.  First, 
there were political parties that had diverging views on privation and private sector in 
general.  The MPRP preferred gradual and selected privatization.  The anti-privatization 
sentiment was voiced by the more conservative elements within the MPRP.  As discussed 
in Chapter 3, the MSDP did not prefer one type of ownership over the other and therefore 
did not push for mass privatization.  The MNPP had a very radical mass privatization 
scheme. The MDP had no specific economic platform at the very beginning but 
eventually supported the MNPP’s radical plan.   
 
Second, there were mid-level bureaucrats at the central and local level that 
administered the old plan.  They largely opposed th rapid privatization as this would 
jeopardize their administrative powers in determining the prices and subsidies and loans 
to the SOEs.  Third, the management and employees of the SOEs feared that they would 
be displaced and wanted to secure their management and employment privileges.  Fourth, 
professional associations – most notably trade unions and the Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives – wanted to secure their own privileges and opposed equal access mass 
privatization.  International players did not play  direct role in the design and launch of 
the privatization scheme.  Their influence was more subtle, through providing the needed 
infrastructure and information.  For instance, the MNPP members were most urbane and 
had access to the information through their knowledge of English.  Study tours were 




the support of some international organizations.  USAID was quite supportive of the 
privatization while keeping their distance for political reasons.  
 
Thus we have divided political parties and divided l adership within the MPRP.  
The MSDP did not oppose the privatization program although it did not support it 
actively either.  The MDP fully backed the privatiztion.  The one political force which 
opposed the radical privatization program was the conservative group within the MPRP.  
Lengthy newspaper articles by Namjim, the former top planner, about the perils of too 
quick privatization were the public voice of this group.  However, in 1990-1992 the 
radical wing within the MPRP led by Prime Minister Byambasuren was strong and 
dominated the reform agenda.  As argued earlier, th party’s influence – especially of the 
conservative group – over the government policies wa limited but not absent.  One 
major concession the government had to make to the political pressure of the more 
conservative group within the MPRP was the list of state enterprises not to be privatized 
or to be privatized only partially during the first stage.  The initial list that was proposed 
by the Government Privatization Commission included relatively few SOEs, mostly in 
the utilities and infrastructure which traditionally are run by governments in market 
economies (interview with Ganbold).  However, the list was significantly expanded at the 
government meeting to include about 120 enterprises such as the pharmaceutical 
company, gold mines, cashmere factory, etc., where the state would retain full or partial 
ownership, at least for the time being.  Nonetheless, a decision to privatize about 44 





Political will at the top level, as mentioned before, is usually not enough for 
successful privatization or any radical reforms.  There is ample evidence from transition 
and developing countries that even with strong politica  commitment, reforms can easily 
get stalled or diverted to reflect the interests of entrenched groups.  The groups that could 
potentially oppose privatization reforms were the mid-level bureaucrats, managers and 
workers of state enterprises, local governments, and professional associations.   In 
selected transition countries these groups were very strong and influenced privatization 
design and method to their advantage.  However, I argue that these groups in Mongolia 
were relatively weak due the centralized control of the MPRP and limited devolution of 
power to the lower levels of bureaucracy, notably SOEs and local governments.  We 
observe little collusion among the mid-level bureaucr ts and managers of the state 
enterprises against the center and this is related to the peculiarities of the economic 
system in Mongolia.   
 
4.4.3 Small and Large Privatization: Centralized Power Structure and 
Relative Weakness of Lower Level Bureaucracy 
 
Mid-level bureaucrats and local governments received ncreased powers towards 
the end of the central plan.  In accordance with the newly proclaimed principle of 
‘democratic centralism’ within the MPRP and in order to boost the initiative of the lower 
level bureaucracy, some decisions were now devolved to the lower levels.  Evidence 
below shows that the devolution occurred to a lesser extent to the ministerial bureaucracy 





The planning process was still very much a centralized process.  The State 
Planning Commission fully controlled all investment allocations and subsidies to 
individual enterprises and local governments.  The reforms of the late 1980s relaxed 
somewhat the credit policies and gave greater autonomy to the enterprises and the bank.  
In 1988, sectoral credit ceilings were replaced by the global credit ceilings and the state 
bank managers received a greater autonomy in distributing the credit, within this global 
ceiling.  “However, the basic principles and procedures remained the same and credit 
planning continued to be the major instrument of monetary control until September 1990 
when the credit planning practice was abandoned” (ADB 1992, 38).   
 
Local governments started exercising a greater fiscal role, steadily improving 
their share of total revenue and expenditure since 1985, reflecting the policy of the 
government to devolve more responsibilities to local governments, particularly in social 
development areas such as education and health.  The share of local governments in total 
revenue rose from 28 percent in 1985 to 53 percent in 1990 (see Figure 4.11 below).  
This increase was the result of the government’s new policy permitting local 
governments to retain greater portion of profit taxes generated by state enterprises within 
their districts.  This meant that the local officials would have wanted to protect their 
enterprises, but the fact that they had little power as crucial. 
 
Fiscal decentralization was more noticeable in increased spending powers at the 
local level.  The share of local governments in total budgetary spending has increased, 




this increased spending financed investments in schools, hospitals, and local 
infrastructure (World Bank 1992, 15-16). 
 
Figure 4.11 Share of local government revenue and expenditure in total 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Note: Total revenue does not include foreign borrowing.  
 
Influence of local governments over the policies was rather limited.  Although local 
governments have been given increasing responsibility for collecting and using taxes, the 
central government still held all powers of taxation ncluding scope of the tax, the tax 
base and tax rates.  There was no tax law per se, but taxation decisions were made by the 
cabinet at the recommendation of the Central Planning Commission.  Although we 
observe increased powers of local governments with regard to budget revenue and 
spending, total revenue and spending was subject to hard budget constraint.  All aimags, 
except for the capital city, received subsidies from the center.  Once approved, the central 
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State enterprises also had their own interests and wished to incorporate them into 
the privatization scheme.  In 1988, the government adopted the Law on State Enterprises.  
The new law reflected the spirit of the reforms to improve the economic incentives for 
the SOEs by giving greater discretion to draw the plans, find the markets, employ and 
reward the workers.  Law on State Enterprises becam effective in 1989.  The central 
principle that was promulgated by the new law was one f self-governance and self-
viability of the state enterprises, which echoed similar reforms in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. The new governance principles were introduced in an attempt to deal with 
lack of incentives and low efficiency.   
 
The management of the state enterprise – including the director (CEO) and 
managers of the sub-units – was now to be elected by the workers’ meeting instead of the 
previous practice of direct appointment by the ministry or planning commission.  The 
workers’ council – also elected by the general meeting of all workers – became the 
governing body of the enterprise in-between the general meetings and was responsible for 
making important decisions regarding the operation the enterprise.  These new governing 
bodies made important decisions about the plan and ru ning the entire enterprise.  The 
law resulted in reduced power of the state vis-à-vis the managers and workers of the 
SOEs.  As Bailiikhuu argues, before the passage of the Law on State Enterprises, the state 
or the principal exercised significant control over the behavior of the managers of the 
SOEs, removal being the ultimate measure.  The new law gave many powers without 





Nonetheless, the devolution reforms were in fact half- earted.  The newly legalized 
powers of SOEs were carefully constricted by compulsory state orders, expenditure 
normatives, wage and bonus ceilings, fixed prices, and investment decisions imposed by 
the central planners.  At the same time, hard budget constraints were never imposed on 
the enterprises.  The objective of the SOE was still to fulfill the plan at any cost, without 
worrying about the losses or efficiency.  The plan, s the bottom line of the enterprise 
performance was still there.  In the essence, the new management system was a slightly 
modified old system.  Even though the legal framework was more far-reaching, its actual 
implementation was limited.   Denizer and Gelb (1992) characterized the reform attempts 
during the late communist period as cautious and limited. 
 
So, why the bureaucracy and SOEs in Mongolia may not be as powerful as in the 
Soviet Union? All in all, we observe highly centralized economic decision making in 
Mongolia, even during the last years of communism.  The reasons could be related to 
several peculiarities of the Mongolian economy.  First, the sheer size of the economy was 
significantly smaller than in almost all centrally planned economies, not to mention the 
Soviet Union.  This means that coordination and resource allocation as well as state 
control problems were less severe and less daunting.  As Anderson et al (2000) note, in a 
small country such as Mongolia the communication betwe n enterprise and government 





Second, the economy relied heavily on the external fi ncial and technological 
resources and the Communist Party tightly controlled them.  The subordinate managers 
of the SOEs had little relative power not only in terms of acquiring the necessary inputs 
but also access to markets.  The markets for many raw materials and inputs as well as 
some outputs were foreign.  Most of the state enterprises depended on equipment, spare 
parts and critical inputs imported from the Soviet Union.  The state foreign trade 
companies were responsible for all exports and were the sole import purchasing agents.  
The entire foreign trade of the country was handled only by seven such companies42. 
 
State enterprises were allowed to establish cooperativ s attached to them.  McFaul 
(1995) noted that cooperatives attached to the SOEs became a major way of diverging 
public resources to the private hands of the enterprise directors in the Soviet Union. 
However, in stark contrast with the Soviet Union, there were (almost) no such 
cooperatives established.  Following the adoption of Law on Cooperatives, only about 
180 private mostly family cooperatives were established in 1988 and their number grew 
fast reaching 3000 in 1990, marking the emergence of the nascent private sector.  As 
Denizer and Gelb (1992) note, the main barrier to greater private activity was “almost 
total lack of access to goods and foreign exchange due to the combination of a continued 
state distribution system and the shrinking economy-wide resource envelope.”  In other 
words, SOEs struggled to get the minimal resources from the state distribution system 
                                                
42Mongolexport handled all exports; Tekhnikimport handled machinery and equipment; Materialimex 
handled construction-related trade; Avtoneftimport handled all imports of vehicles and petroleum products; 
and Raznoimpex handled consumer goods.  Further, Compleximport supervised trade related to turnkey 
projects from the Soviet Union, while trade with convertible currencies was handled exclusively by 




necessary for fulfillment of the state orders and there was very limited scope for any 
other activity.   
 
Third, the reforms which gave more power to the loca  governments and state 
enterprises were not only limited in scope but also implementation timeframe.  Mongolia 
embarked on the reform path a few years later than most Eastern and Central European 
countries and the Soviet Union.  Gorbachev formally nnounced his devolution policies 
in 1985, while Murrell and Olson (1991) ague that de facto devotion started much earlier.  
The reforms in Mongolia were partial and cautious and imed at improving the system 
within the old framework.  Batmunkh’s slow steps and his desire to design a reform 
which suited the size and structure of the Mongolian economy were criticized by some 
members among the top party leadership.  As shown in Chapter 2, the experimental stage 
took about two years.  The economy-wide reforms were experimented for only one full 
year (1989) meaning that the decentralization trend did not go very far and local 
governments and enterprises did not get to experience a full-scale freedom in decision 
making.  One could expect that, allowed more time with the new system, enterprises 
could have adjusted their behavior further by engaging in more opportunistic activities, 
given that the proper incentives and control system were not in place.   
 
The general trend of decentralized decision making was long observed in the 
Soviet Union even before the Gorbachev’s perestroika and the eventual collapse.  For 
example, Winiecki (1990) argued that the apparatchiks and economic bureaucrats gain 




the change most strongly.  Given the key positions of these groups in the Soviet-type 
economic system, Winiecki predicted a very high probability of failure of decentralizing, 
market-oriented, efficiency-increasing reforms (Winiecki 1990, 203).  And the reform 
process proved to be extremely difficult in Russia.  Due to some specific characteristics 
of the Mongolian economy, we do not detect the burea cratic collusion on such a grand 
scale as in the Soviet Union.   
 
When the mass privatization program was announced, it was not easily accepted by 
the mid-level bureaucracy at the center as well as localities.  This is evident from the 
national economic conference held in November 1990.  In fact, it could be argued that 
this conference played a crucial role in neutralizing, enlightening and pacifying the 
bureaucracy.  The conference gathered about 1000 representatives of bureaucracy from 
around the country, which included accountants, financial analysts, and economists from 
the central ministries, agencies, state enterprises, and local governments.  Their very first 
reaction was to harshly criticize and oppose the entire program.  However, it became 
clear that the government would not back off and the bureaucracy did not have a viable 
alternative – the spirit of change was widespread and status quo could not be a solution – 
so that they had to accept the government decision.  Si ce the center still had power, the 
decision made by the center eventually was accepted by the bureaucrats, especially at the 
ministerial level.   
 
In many Central Asian countries regional and other centrifugal forces were rather 




economic restructuring policies were oriented towards developing the country’s 
hydrocarbon resources while the traditionally strong ld Soviet industrial base was 
deprived of resources and left to die ‘of natural causes’.  This, in turn, allowed 
marginalizing the former Soviet economic nomenklatur  in the republic thereby 
depriving the Kazakhstani Russian of their previous privileged positions and their status 
of elite which was derived from the former industrial ole.  Throughout the region, 
economic resources were widely used for political purposes, where the threatened leaders 
(ethnically, regionally or otherwise) distributed valuable resources – mostly via 
privatization – to secure personal loyalties or coopt the opposition and other sub-national 
interests.  The oligarchy which emerged out these processes, with powerful vested 
interests and the money to protect them, gained new prominence in the shadow of formal 
political institutions (Matveeva 1999, 28).   
 
In contrast with these countries, in Mongolia there were no ethnic, regional or 
sectoral conflicts that hobbled the relatively quick realignment of property rights and 
political power during the reforms.  As noted in the previous chapter, ethnic homogeneity 
meant that no separatist groups mobilized politically and economically.  In terms of 
regional development, there were three major industrial centers in the country: around 
Darkhan and Erdenet in the northern part, the city of Choibalsan in the southeastern part 
of the country and Ulaanbaatar, the capital city.  The Erdenet cooper mine was partly 
controlled by the Soviet Union because of the ownership and was never on the 
privatization list.  Darkhan had several factories built with the CMEA investment and 




terms of political preferences, both towns were supportive of the democratic opposition.  
Choibalsan’s size was insignificant in terms of economic input.  Therefore, we do not 
observe strong regions and regional interests as inthe former Soviet Union.  The 
centralized nature of the economy prohibited regions from becoming self-sufficient and 
economically powerful.   
 
We do not observe any serious obstruction of the reforms at the sectoral and 
ministerial level bureaucracy.  Another important organizational factor was that, instead 
of relying on the old administrative structures, the Government Privatization Commission 
established its branches in all aimags and even soum .  Moreover, the GPC and its 
branches included some key bureaucrats from the central a d local agencies, one 
organizational element which helped to subside the bur aucracy.  For instance, both 
Gerelchuluun and Bailiikhuu – two key figures in the GPC – were high-ranking 
bureaucrats.  They had elevated mandate from the cent r and operated independently of 
the local governments.  On many occasions, there weclashes between the local 
privatization commission and local authorities and the issues had to be resolved with 
intervention from the Government Privatization Commission.  Thus, narrow interests of 
the bureaucracy were not strong to start with and they were successfully mitigated by 
clever organizational measures.  The interests and wellbeing of the bureaucrats who were 
now working or the GPC did not depend on the powers of line ministries and government 
agencies.  They were drawn from the powers of the commission, thus there was no issue 





State-owned enterprises and especially trade unions exerted some pressure on 
privatization methods.  The pure equal access mass privatization was not acceptable to 
them.  The interests of managers and workers of state enterprises were incorporated by 
providing a few privileges.  Employees of small enterprises enjoyed two privileges.  
Those small enterprises (often small shops) which were on lease agreement – a late 
communist period experiment attempting to improve effici ncy by making the employees 
residual claimants of the enterprises’ performance – were entitled to buyoff the 
enterprises without external competition.  The share of these enterprises was rather low.  
In those enterprises which were auctioned, employees could enjoy a 10-percent discount 
on the final auction price.  The bulk of small enterprises – 60 percent in the city and even 
more in the countryside – was sold to the insiders.  
 
Employees of large enterprises were granted one privilege.  They could buy off 
the shares at the nominal price before the shares being sold at the stock exchange.  For 
many enterprises this was a risky adventure as the actual price of shares turned out to be 
lower than the nominal and the employees did gamble on the stock markets.  However, 
many employees took advantage of this clause.  In the end, about a third of shares of 
privatized large enterprises ended up in the hands of the insiders and their families.  But 
this occurred not because the insiders were given massive advantage of primary buyouts 
at a low or even no cost as it happened in Russia – after all, the purchasing power of the 
employees was limited with the value of the blue voucher they held – but through a 
market mechanism where individuals made their own choices as to which shares to 




of their enterprises, thus showing immense collectiv  action, both among the employees 
as well as their extended families.   
 
World Bank (1997) classified the Mongolian privatiztion as equal access 
voucher privatization, although it was not.  However, the privileges given to the 
managers and employees were modest compared to other c untries in transition, where 
management-employee buyouts (MEBOs) became the dominant privatization method.  
This could be attributed to the significant pressure these interest groups were able to exert 
on the privatization policies, which was not the case in Mongolia.  The very small 
concessions given to the managers and workers are evid nce of their lack of political 
power.   Moreover, the initial stage of voucher privatization excluded the most valuable 
enterprises – for instance, in the mining and cashmere sector – and therefore reduced the 
stakes involved in the privatization process.   
 
4.4.4 Agricultural Privatization: Strong Vested Interests 
 
 
One area where organized special interests were particul ly strong in Mongolia 
was privatization of agricultural collectives.  The directors of the negdels were able to 
successfully mobilize through the Union of Agricultural Collectives, a professional 
organization with a long history and experience.  The Union of Agricultural Collectives 
opposed privatization of negdels at all.  They wanted to give livestock to herder families 
on lease agreements, and thus retain control over the collective assets.  However, under 
the pressure of herders, they had to give in and agree to privatization.  As noted earlier, 




action problems.  However, they were more successful at the negdel level.  Since the 
negdels – neither the central government nor even aimags – were officially the level 
where privatization decisions were made, it was much easier for the herders to pressure 
their local rulers.  Some negdels had only few hundred households.  It was definitely in 
their interest to push for privatization rather than lease agreements. Once the negdel 
managers could not retain the old power, they wanted to at least control the privatization 
process itself.   
 
First, they wanted to privatize livestock and other assets free of charge, even 
without using vouchers. Their main argument was that t e livestock and other assets were 
the property of the collectives and not of the state, lthough the more radically minded 
groups argued that negdel were de facto state entities ruled by the party nomenklatura 
rather than by the members of the collectives.  In was argued that as collective members, 
herders were entitled to collective assets and, as citizens, they were entitled to state 
assets, as everyone else.  However, this argument did ot proceed very far.   
 
Second, for the same reason, they opposed open access privatization (as in the 
industry and services sector) where everyone including city dwellers would have an 
access to the livestock, the main asset.  Moreover, th y wanted to exclude non-member 
rural dwellers such as professionals and administrative staff.  They also opposed uniform 
method of (closed) privatization for all negdels, a this would likely to be equal access for 
all collective members.  The directors wanted to exercise individual control over the 




agricultural privatization from the general Privatiz tion Law.  Moreover, they wanted to 
control the method of privatization in individual negdels.  And they largely succeeded in 
this argument.  The government could not dismiss the directors of the negdels because 
now their appointment was decided by the collective i s lf rather than the Ministry of 
Agriculture, as under the old regime.  
 
The Union of Agricultural Collectives included directors of all 255 negdels, a 
fairly small group compared to thousands of small and l rge state enterprises, not to 
mention almost a million of dispersed herders that were members of the collectives.  
Collective action problem was much easier to overcome within such a small group.  
Secondly, as noted before, the union was backed by the members of parliament, 
especially deputies of the People’s Great Khural.   
 
As expected, numerous allegations of corruption and unequal treatment of herder 
families were reported in the agricultural privatizon.  In the end, because of the 
numerous complaints from rural dwellers, the Governme t Privatization Commission had 
to step in and the government proposed some general rules for all negdels to follow.  
Because of their legal mandate to provide general guidance and advice only, the GPC had 
only some partial success in influencing livestock privatization.  
 
To sum up, privatization methods and outcomes differ significantly in different 
sectors.  In the sectors where special interests were ak or nonexistent, privatization 




and open methods dominated.  This was largely the cas in small privatization and to 
some extent large privatization, where relatively small privileges were given to the 
insiders and little corruption was registered.  However, in the agricultural sector where 
vested interests were strong and better organized, privatization led to domination of a 
small group of local authorities over the privatizaion practices, less equal distribution of 
assets, and more cases of corruption. 
 
4.5. Conclusion: Relative Success of Early Economic Reforms 
 
 
This chapter provided much greater detail about the economic reforms during the 
initial phase of Mongolia’s transition than any previous studies.  The new quantitative 
and qualitative evidence grants several observations which were previously overlooked.    
 
There are two dominant orthodoxies that describe Mongolia’s economic reforms. 
It is often argued that the period of 1990-1992 wasa period of shock therapy and 1992-
1996 was a period of slowing down of economic reforms.  There were some who argued 
that Mongolia took gradual reforms, most notably Murrell and Boone.  However, they 
were in the minority.  The new evidence I bring in weakens this orthodoxy.  One piece of 
critical evidence is the EBRD transition indices, which were not available until 2004 
when Mongolia became a member of the EBRD and the indices were backdated to 1989 
which gives an opportunity for comparative analysis.  These indices are usually 
considered more reliable than the CLI produced by the World Bank study by de Melo et 
al.  The data reveal that reforms were slower than believed during 1990-1992 and faster 




more careful analysis of reform measures proves that the pace of reforms was maintained 
throughout the more conservative government of Jasrai.  Moreover, many reforms 
initiated by the previous government were sustained of completed during this period.  For 
instance, foreign exchange rates were fully liberalized in 1993, prices were continued to 
be liberalized during this period, fiscal and monetary policies were tightened leading to 
lower inflation, institutional reforms were further advanced, etc.  
 
Second important observation is that the policies pur ued in the first six years of 
economic transition – and especially their random nature – were very much reflective of 
the huge economic uncertainty, the configuration of political forces, and the overall 
culture of policymaking.  The policies represent a peculiar mélange where rapid 
privatization was combined with gradual liberalizaton and series of war-like measures.  
This was especially true of the coalition government policies of 1990-1992, and the 
peculiar state of “triangulation” I mentioned earlie .  The radical elements dominated the 
policy agenda and were able to push forward an ambitious privatization program perhaps 
without fully realizing its repercussions and impact on the economy, politics and the 
society.  However, the ambitions of the radical elements were somewhat diluted by the 
more conservative elements which had better control of the parliament, resulting in 
slower reforms.   
 
Another important new observation pertains to the rol played by the international 
community and especially the IFIs in the economic policymaking.  It is commonly argued 




by the IMF and others.  Fritz (2000) argued that Mongolia’s was a “dependent 
democracy” and Rossabi (2004) argued that the IFIs were responsible for the cookie-
cutter policies imposed on the Mongolian government and the negative consequences of 
such policies.  Local observers – e.g., Baabar – also were critical that the Jasrai 
government was implementing IMF’s agenda rather than its own.  More careful analysis 
of the policy steps and the new evidence brought in in this dissertation contradict this 
orthodoxy.  Although international players did play an important role, their influence was 
by no means decisive.  The government actions – both of Byambasuren and Jasrai – were 
reflective more of the domestic interplay of political forces, popular sentiments, and the 
legacy of policymaking inherited from the previous regime.   
 
I provide a great deal of detail about how the privatization program was designed 
and adopted, and ultimately implemented, although many of the issues have been pointed 
out by others scholars before.  However, I believe the new details provide a clearer 
picture why mass voucher privatization was adopted and how it achieved its mostly 
political objectives. No studies conducted before explained why the privatization 
proceeded relatively fast and why certain methods were used.  The new details also 
highlight and explain the difference in the type of privatization that prevailed in the 
industry and services vs. the agriculture, and the nature of political struggle that went on 
in the agricultural sector.  Ultimately, privatization in agriculture proved to be successful 
mostly because of the peculiar type of assets involved (about 20 million animals).  The 
overall picture reinforces the previous arguments that Mongolia’s privatization was 




largely succeeded in its goal of transferring the assets to broader masses in a relatively 
fair manner and creating a private sector.  However, th  central lesson of privatization 
was that transfer of ownership rights alone is not sufficient to bring about the efficiency 
increases necessary for growth.  Outside ownership concentration, good governance, and 
a competitive environment are essential for efficien y gains. 
 
Previous analysis of economic reforms and privatization do not employ any 
specific theoretical approaches.  Therefore, one of the contributions of this dissertation is 
attempting to explain the policies through the lens of political economy 
arguments.Political institutions, however, explain little of the nature and methods as well 
as implementation of the privatization program in Mongolia, although one could find 
some factors that were favorable to pursuing an ambitious mass privatization scheme.  
Overrepresentation of rural interests in the parliament through the electoral rule also 
partially explains the big concessions provided in the agricultural privatization.  
 
The interest group theory is much more applicable to the issue of both economic 
reforms and especially privatization.  Ample evidenc  from developed and developing 
countries suggests that organized interest groups have significant advantage in the 
making of economic policy and especially privatization.  In this chapter I attempted to 
show that devolution of power from the center to the lower levels of administrative 
hierarchy was much less in Mongolia than in some oth r postcommunits countries, most 
notably the former Soviet Union. This had crucial implications for the privatization, as it 




much weaker in Mongolia than elsewhere.  Therefore, there was little resistance from the 
bureaucracy and fewer concessions were given to the managers and employees of state 
enterprises, although some privileges were given nonetheless.   
 
The experience of Mongolia also proves that whenever there is a strong organized 
group with a narrow interest, they would find a way to influence the policies, which was 
the case with agricultural privatization.  A strong group of the managers of the 
agricultural collectives mobilized through the Unio f Agricultural Collectives and 
aided by the disproportionately high representation of rural interests in the legislature, 
was able to exert significant power on the privatization methods and outcomes in the 
agricultural sector.  As a result, the privatization n this sector was less equal and more 





Chapter 5 Explaining Political and Economic Reforms in Mongolia 
 
 
This dissertation describes a political and economic transition that occurred in 
Mongolia in the early 1990s.  I argue that the Mongolian experience is unique in the 
sense that if one looks at the standard indicators of Mongolia’s politics, economics, 
geopolitical situation and resources, one would not have predicted a successful transition 
to democracy, development of relatively good institutions, and good economic 
performance.   
 
A variety of factors have been presented as having co tributed to the successful 
political and economic transition in Mongolia.  However, one is puzzled which ones have 
played a key role in the transition process.  Which factors constitute sufficient conditions 
for successful democratization and privatization in Mongolia? This chapter categorizes 
these factors and attempts to identify those that are believed to be most important in 
successful transition so that the existence of these factors was sufficient for such a 
success.    
 
5.1. Explanatory Factors of Democratic Political Transition 
 
I group the factors that were identified as having contributed to the successful 
democratic transition into five categories: external, historical, political, institutional, and 







The political events in Mongolia were triggered by the external developments that 
took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe since the second half of 
the 1980s.  Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost sparked series of major political and 
economic reforms that ultimately led to a greater systemic change.  Events in the late 
1980s in Eastern Europe were continuation of these d v lopments.  However, they took 
the changes to a qualitatively new level and ultimaely regime change.  It could be argued 
that without such a systemic motion, no changes were feasible in Mongolia, where the 
old party still had a strong grip over the political and economic system of the country.   
 
Beissinger (2002) argues that Gorbachev’s glasnost crea ed a mobilizational cycle 
in the Eastern Bloc and nationalism was one of its dimensions.  The concept of the 
mobilizational cycle was first developed by Tarrow (1989) and is defined as “a phase of 
heightened conflict and contention across the social system” involving “a rapid diffusion 
of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors.” (142).  As Tarrow 
(1989) noted, protest cycles emerge “through imitation, comparison, the transfer of forms 
and themes of protest from one sector to another, and direct reaction on the part of those 
whose interests had been affected by earlier protests.” (223).  
 
It could be argued that the mobilizational cycle on a systemic scale against the 
communist regime started with Gorbachev’s reforms, although unsuccessful attempts in 




impact on the later developments in the Eastern Bloc.  The cycle was not a Soviet 
phenomenon only and was initially meant to reinvent the old system.  However, it swept 
the entire socialist system and led to its demise.  Mongolia became part of this cycle due 
to its close political and economic ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  Events 
in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe wer  closely watched by the 
Mongolian leaders and especially young intellectuals who received degrees in these 
countries and had access to information.  The fact that the Soviet Union was leading these 
rapid changes meant that no Soviet tanks would be involved this time.  
 
Beissinger (2002) argues that the disintegration of the Soviet state materialized 
out of a “four-year period of “thickened” history in which events acquired a sense of 
momentum, transformed the nature of the political institutions, and assumed the 
characteristics of their own causal structure” (ibid, 36).  Many republics of the former 
Soviet Union took advantage of the changing environme t and became part of the 
nationalist (and separatist) tide, which ultimately l d to the collapse of the union.  
Mongolia became part of this mobilizational cycle.  Mass protests from December 1989 
through to spring of 1990 closely resemble the events taking place elsewhere in the 
socialist world and were inspired by those events.  Thus, I argue that the external factors 
that triggered the collapse of the socialist world were a necessary and critically important 
factor in the successful democratic transition in Mongolia.   
 
As evident from the experiences of several post-Soviet states and especially the 




democratic changes will occur in a given post-communist country.  Most post-socialist 
countries were placed in a similar external environme t (to the extent that information 
flows relatively freely, which could not be said of China, for instance), yet changes taken 
place in various countries vary dramatically.  Even countries that accomplished 
democratic transitions differ significantly in their paths to democratization.  Therefore, 





I argued that certain historical factors played an important role in Mongolia’s 
transition to democracy.  In particular, I noted the existence of a mild leader and weak 
military as factors that favorably influenced democrati  changes.  But, how important 
were these factors?  Would Mongolia have transitioned to democracy if there were a 
strong ambitious leader, akin Nazarbayev, and a strong army which he could control? 
 
Batmunkh is justly credited with quick dissolution f the politburo which laid 
foundation for the fast advancement of democratic political reforms.  Batmunkh was a 
mild leader, especially if contrasted with other strong leaders in the region, such as 
Russia and most Central Asian republics.  Mongolia itself had periods when a strong, 
imposing leader ruled the country.  Batmunkh was mild and more liberal compared to his 
predecessor, Tsedenbal.  Personal character may have played a role; however, I believe 
the key aspect of Batmunkh’s leadership style was conditioned by historical 
circumstances.  Batmunkh succeeded Tsedenbal in 1984, on the advent of Soviet 




from Tsedenbal’s.  Unlike Ceaușescu in Romania, Zhivkov in Bulgaria, Honecker in 
East Germany, and most of the incumbent leaders of the Soviet republics, Batmunkh’s 
entire leadership coincides with the perestroika and glasnost-type of efforts in the Soviet 
bloc as well as in Mongolia.  As Batmunkh admitted in his memoirs, the six years he 
ruled the country were marked with continuous questioning of the old ideology, revision 
of past practices and the history itself, great uncertainty as to where the system is headed, 
and search for something new yet unknown.  This was a period of great challenge and the 
biggest change the Soviet-type system had ever undergon .  Whether he wanted or not, 
Batmunkh had to be a different leader, because of the problems he faced and the ways 
these problems had to be tackled.   
 
The distinctive nature of the decision making process under the communist 
regime was its extreme centralization, where the top leader ultimately makes important 
decisions on an individual basis.  Under these circumstances, Batmunkh should be 
credited for a drastic decision to resolve the politburo.   The question arises: would the 
decision (and the course of the events) have been diff rent if there was a different leader?  
The answer is, yes, but probably not drastically so.  The decision most likely would have 
been made slower, with some use of force or threat to use force on the regime side.  
Politburo members admitted that Batmunkh’s decision came as a shock, i.e., it was fast.  
The MPRP’s commitment to non-violence would probably be weaker, but still strong.  
This would likely to lead to some violence, although probably limited and definitely not 
at the scale of prolonged clashes or civil war.  The dominant sentiment both within the 




unity was extremely strong.  Therefore, even if the military were stronger, violence 
would not have persisted.  I believe the underlying cultural factors – which will be 
explained later – would have been stronger than a will of an individual strongman, if 
there was one.  Therefore, the course of democratization would probably be sustained 







Earlier account of political events emphasized such political factors as the 
emergence of political opposition and its strengthening through mass mobilization, 
divided leadership among the MPRP, and brief dominance of radical elements within the 
ruling party as critical elements of political democratic reforms in Mongolia.  The 
experiences of transition countries – successful or otherwise – have shown that no 
political democratization is possible without democratic opposition.  There has to be a 
substantial, organized pro-democracy political force in order for the democratic change to 
proceed.  A strong pro-democracy opposition existed in all countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states which made succe sful transitions.  Pro-democracy 
opposition was very weak or absent in most Central Asian states – with the possible 
exception of the Kyrgyz Republic – where no democrati  transition has occurred.  
Mongolia’s pro-democracy opposition, initially rather weak, gathered strength and 
momentum by successfully staging anti-regime political protests and thus mobilizing the 
masses.  Therefore, existence of a (relatively) strong political opposition is a necessary 





Regime transitions require a large enough shock to precipitate either a change in 
the composition of governing elites or in their political identities.  Bratton and van de 
Walle (1994) argue that intra-elite competition was not sufficient to bring about a 
transition to democracy; it had to involve sustained mass mobilization and popular 
protest.  Therefore, behavior of mass publics becomes a necessary condition rather than 
merely a facilitating factor for democratization in si gle-party or patronage systems.  
 
The elites in Central and Eastern Europe have driven th ir respective countries 
down a much faster and successful road to democracy th n any of the Soviet successor 
states precisely because they interpreted sustained mass protest as a clear sign that their 
future political support was contingent on their present role in enacting substantive 
democratic reforms (Jones Luong 2002).  In contrast, the Central Asian states 
experienced the lowest degree of popular mobilization in the former Soviet Union 
(Beissinger 2002) and the legacy of the state socialism and patronage-style polities was 
much stronger in this part of the union.  The extreme personalization and concentration of 
power that characterized Central Asia’s political regimes at independence, therefore, 
made transition from above all the more unlikely there.  No coincidentally, they also 
experienced the lowest levels of elite turnover (Suny 1995, in Colton and Tucker 1995).      
 
Thus, in some countries, the opposition was strong and successfully led the 
changes.  In others it was virtually non-existent.  I  Mongolia, however, it was weak and 




to occur.  Therefore, I consider the fact that the MPRP leadership was divided – with 
fewer radical pro-democracy elements and the remainder who were more cautious and 
conservative, although also aiming at some sort of change – to be a critical component of 
the democratic transition.  Without apparent support of some leaders within the MPRP, 
democratic opposition would not have succeeded.  Moreover, these radical pro-
democracy elements dominated the political decision making in 1990 and during the first 
coalition government.  Thus, the political factors – which are not observed in Central 
Asia, for instance – seem to be critical in Mongolia’s success.  I consider these political 
factors to be among the necessary and sufficient conditi ns that made Mongolia a 






Scholars argued that electoral and other constitutional rules play a critical role in 
democratization.  As Huntington (1991) noted, “…[e]lections, open, free and fair, are the 
essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non.” Electoral systems are the basis on 
which founding elections in transition states occur. It was also argued that proportional 
representation – together with the parliamentary regim  type – best supports the 
democratic opposition and therefore the success of the democratization process.  I argued 
earlier that these institutional arrangements in Mongolia were mixed in Mongolia, but 
mostly inclusive and auspicious for democratic change.   
 
McFaul (1997) argued that the political institutional design depended on the 




democratic opposition opted for an electoral system and political regime that gives 
institutional advantages to the democratic forces, i. ., proportional representation in the 
national legislature and a parliamentary regime typ.  Jones Luong (2002) provides 
empirical evidence from Central Asia and argues that the relative bargaining power of the 
political players – center vs. the regions – explains the variation in the electoral systems 
in the three Central Asian republics.  The center was the weakest in Kyrgyzstan and 
therefore the electoral rule turned out to be relatively decentralized, while the opposite 
was the case in Uzbekistan.   
 
One could argue that the relative power of political forces and political factors 
played an important role in the design of political institutions.  We observe similar trends 
in Mongolia.  The mixed nature of the electoral rule was reflective, on the one hand, of 
the overall MPRP dominance which wanted to fully contr l the People’s Great Khural 
(the upper chamber) and, on the other hand, of a deal struck between the reformist 
elements of the MPRP and more moderate elements within the democratic opposition 
(hence proportional representation in the State Small Khural).  I argue that such an 
arrangement would not have been possible without certain political factors, namely 
relatively strong pro-democracy opposition and the political willof the radical elements 
within the old party.  Therefore, institutional factors were important in advancing the 
democratic course, but they were derivative of other factors, namely political factors, and 








Many phenomena in Mongolia’s democratization – lack of violence, effective 
collaboration on a national level, generally inclusive political institutions – could not be 
explained by pure historical or political factors.  One had to look deeper into the 
underlying cultural factors.  I identified several cultural factors as having played an 
important role in democratization in Mongolia.  Among them, I particularly emphasized 
two: a strong sense of national identity and social homogeneity.   
 
Robert Dahl (1971) argued that high levels of ethnic diversity make democracy 
much less likely, particularly in countries where one ethnic group can plausibly aspire to 
dominate a state.  Other authors identify strong ethnic passions with antidemocratic 
animus and a penchant for militarism, intolerance, violence, and even genocide.  Indeed, 
many argue that the exclusionist character of ethnic nationalism makes it a weak basis on 
which to build a democratic society, and that only a self-consciously civic nationalism is 
ultimately compatible with democratic development (e.g. Kohn 1945, Plamenatz 1973, 
Lipset 1963).   
 
However, Beissinger argues that the experience of the Soviet and post-Soviet 
world stands as a prime source of support for the idea that politically mobilized ethnicity 
and democracy can go together, provided that ethnic feelings are focused on ending 
foreign rule rather than fighting with other ethnic groups closer to home (Beissinger 
2008, 85).  For example, the three successful democracies to have risen from the rubble 




transitions to free self-government, whereas the absence of a strong national identity 
against the Soviet rule in Belarus has reinforced a we k civil society, provided a social 
base for the authoritarian rule of Lukashenka and helped to marginalize Belarusian 
democrats (Marples 1999).   
 
The importance of cultural factors becomes even more profound when one 
contrasts Mongolia with other Central Asian countries.  Mongolia is an ethnically and 
religiously homogeneous country.  Mongolia was also characterized by nationalistic 
sentiments and heightened spirit of self-governance d self-determination.  But 
Mongolia’s nationalism was focused on ending the Soviet rule.  It was a civic 
nationalism, rather than ethnic; ethnic mobilization was low and non-political.  I believe 
these factors provide the basis for high level of social cohesion: these sentiments were 
strong both among the incumbents and the opposition, as well as the general masses.  
High level of social cohesion lies at the roots of a strong civil society, inclusive 
institutional arrangements, absence of violence, and ultimately successful pact between 
the political parties.   I believe, without these important cultural factors, successful 
democratization would not have been possible in Mongolia.  
 
I have shown in the previous chapters that a plethora of factors have contributed 
to the successful democratization process in Mongolia.  However, various factors have 
played varying role in this process.  Table 5.1 below summarizes the discussion above.   
 
Table 5.1 Factors that contributed to democratic political trnsition in Mongolia 
 




1. External factors 
Perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet 
Union (1985-1989) and popular mass 
demonstrations in Eastern Europe and 
some parts of the Soviet Union (1989-
1990) 
 
Extremely important, led to the shift in the 
fundamental structure of the communist regime 
and ultimately regime change  
 
Necessary core condition, although does not 
guarantee success of democratic transformation 
 
Donor aid and pro-democracy 
international players (after 1990) 
 
 
Important in dealing with economic crisis and 
legitimizing the new regime, indirect influence on 
democratic transition 
Not sufficient condition 
2. Historical factors 
 
Removal of long-term leader Tsedenbal 
(1984) 
Important in weakening (mildly) authoritarian 
leadership style and extreme pro-Soviet orientation 
Not sufficient condition 
 
‘Mild’leader Batmunkh who governed 
through perestroika and made a swift 
decision for the Politburo to resign  
 
No strong leader to grab power 
Critical in speeding up the process and ensuring 
peaceful changes in the system, but probably less 
critical for the ultimate goal of democratic 
transition 
Important but not sufficient condition 
 
Weak military  Helped the democratic opposition, important in the 
decision of the regime not to use force against the 
demonstrators, however not the most critical reason 
of peaceful changes 





No need to build the nation-state from scratch, 
however not unique to Mongolia (e.g., the Baltic 
and other states successfully resolved the 
sovereignty issue) and does not mean that 
democratic changes will follow 
Important but not sufficient condition 
 
3. Political factors 
 
Emergence of a strong democratic 
opposition (initially few intellectuals, 
later popular support)  
 
Very important, not observed in Central Asia 
Conditioned partly by external factors 
 
Necessary and sufficient condition 
 
Divided leadership among the MPRP 
 
 
Very important for success of democratic 
opposition, but hardly unique to Mongolia, yet not 
present in some Central Asian countries  





Dominance of radical elements within 
the MPRP during 1990-1992 
 
Extremely important for success of democratic 
opposition and democratization 
(collaboration of the radical elements within the 
MPRP with moderate elements within the 
democratic opposition, coalition government, 
radical reforms) 
Important and sufficient condition 
 
4. Institutional factors 
 
Mixed electoral rule – majority for the 
People’s Great Khural and proportional 
for the State Small Khural (full 
legislative powers) 
 
Important for strengthening new political parties 
and their influence in policymaking  
Critically important after the democratic 
breakthrough  
Not sufficient condition, derived from political 
factors 
 
Other electoral rules – early elections, 
party nominations 
 
Important for strengthening new political parties  
Not sufficient condition 
Regime type – parliamentary during 
1990-1992 and semi-presidential with 
strong parliament since 1992 
 
Favorable for the democratic opposition 
 
Not sufficient condition 
5. Cultural factors  
 
Ethnic, religious, and social homogeneity 
 
Important for narrowing down the agenda and 
therefore for successfully reaching a pact. 
Important for successful national level collective 
action and cooperation 
Sufficient condition 
 
Strong national identity and pride 
 
Very important in greater social cohesion and 
successful collaborative effort 
Sufficient condition 
 
Small population and tight elite  
 
Makes a pact easier to reach, also makes collective 
action less costly 
Not sufficient condition 
 
Historical precedence of decentralized 
leadership (as opposed to historical 
dominance of strong centralized 
leadership in Russia and Central Asia) 
 
Played some role, especially in installing a 
parliamentary type of system (collegial decision-
making) 
Not sufficient condition 
 
Pastoral nomadism and dispersed rural 
population 
 
Although there exists a dominant paradigm of 
nomadic free spirit, egalitarian clan-based 
horizontal structure, etc. historical evidence shows 




much hierarchical.  However, the dispersed rural 
population made it prohibitively costly to organize 
on a mass basis, therefore, more conservative 
nomads were removed from active political 
engagement 
Not sufficient condition 
 




5.2 Explanatory Factors of Economic Reforms and Privatization 
 
 
I have shown earlier that economically Mongolia performed relatively well 
compared to many other transition countries.  Scholars argued that this was partially due 
to favorable initial conditions such as the small size and low level of industrialization as 
well as good economic policies including (relatively) fast reforms and privatization.  This 
dissertation did not explain the relative macroeconomic performance of Mongolia.  
Instead, it aimed at explaining why certain policies – and especially the mass 
privatization scheme – were adopted.  It was emphasized that, contrary to the common 
belief, liberalization and stabilization efforts during the initial period took place relatively 
slowly and gradually.  Yet, privatization was fast nd radical.  It was shown that multiple 
factors contributed to the adoption and relative success of economic reforms and 
especially implementation of a far-reaching privatiz ion program in Mongolia.  
 
External Factors  
 
 
The initial changes in the central plan started in 1987 following Gorbachev’s 




This external influence had an important impact on he initiation of economic reforms, 
and especially streamlining the planning process and decentralization.  However, the 
actual implementation of the reforms lagged behind compared to most of these countries, 
particularly in devolution of decision making to the lower levels of government and 
enterprises.  The Central Asian republics were also m ng the ones who lagged behind in 
implementing the Gorbachev-Ryzhkov reform agenda.  Some economic experiments took 
place in the Baltic republics, parts of the Russian Republic and elsewhere.  However, the 
economies of the Central Asian republics were among the least reformed ones (Pomfret 
and Anderson 2001) and their leaders were considered the most conservative within the 
union.   Therefore, the extent of this external factor – Soviet-induced experimental 
reforms – varies greatly among the countries and its impact on the subsequent market 
reforms is ambiguous.  
 
Another external factor that influenced the economy and therefore 
implementation of the market economic reforms was the economic shock associated with 
trade disruption within the CMEA system and aid withdrawal by the Soviet Union.  I 
argued that the economic shock forced the Mongolian authorities to look outside the 
Soviet bloc for new economic partners which, in turn, was conducive to advancing the 
market reforms.  One could reason that the degree of shock – and therefore the need for 
refomrs – was expecially high among those countries which depended on the intra-union 
and intra-CMEA transfer of resources.  Yet, most of the Central Asian republics with 




undertake market reforms, with the exception of the Kyrgyz Republics in the earlier 
stages of transition and to some extent Kazakhstan.   
 
External shock led the country’s leaders to look for new economic partners and 
new markets.  As part of this process, Mongolia became a member of major international 
financial institutions.  It is commonly argued, and justly so, that financial support 
provided by the IFIs was crucial in dealing with the economic shock and economic crisis 
which became imminent after the withdrawal of financi l assistance by the Soviet Union.  
It was further argued that these international players contributed to the adoption and 
implementation of the political and economic reforms.  The only country in Central Asia 
which received a strong support of the IFIs and most n tably the IMF and the World 
Bank was Kyrgyzstan.  Not surprisingly, it was considered as one the most dynamic 
reformers among the former Soviet republics, successfully curbing hyperinflation in 1995 
and becoming the first one join the WTO.  Yet, it was not able to sustain and advance on 
the initial bacis reforms and establish a well-functioning market economy (Pomfret and 
Anderson 2001).   
 
I argued earlier that, although critically important, donor assistance and influence 
over the domestic policies in Mongolia is occasionally overemphasized by the scholars.  
Mongolia’s democracy is not a dependent democracy which was imposed and/or 
sustained by external players.  Evidence shows that the Mongolian democracy probably 
would have prevailed without external financial assistance.  However, the economic 





Overall, I argue that the external factors played an important role, in particular, 
financial and technical support provided by bilaterl and multilateral donors.  This 
support was not available in most of the Central Asian economies (again, with the 
exception of the Kyrgyz Republic), or came in relatively late.  Nonetheless, the role of 
external factors does not explain why relatively fast reforms were undertaken and mass 
privatization was adopted in Mongolia.  In Kyrzystan, for instance, we observe reversal 
of the early privatization and price liberalization efforts (Abazov 1999).  One, therefore, 
needs to look into domestic structural, economic, and political factors.   
 
 
Historical and Structural Factors 
 
 
There are several historical and structural factors that distinguish Mongolia from 
some postcommunist countries.  The Mongolian economy is characterized by high degree 
of aid and trade dependency.  The economy was undiversified and could not survive 
without the CMEA trade regime.  This situation is similar to most of the Central Asian 
economies which were net recipients of resources within the Soviet Union and relied on 
few – if not one – natural resources (e.g, cotton in Uzbekistan, oil in Kazakhstan, and gas 
in Turkmenistan).  However, reform path diverged greatly in spite of these structural 
similarities.  
 
Mongolia implemented perestroika-type of reforms relatively late and on a limited 




only one year.  Moreover, unlike most countries in Eastern Europe, Mongolia did not 
have any experience with market economy.  In the 20th century, it transitioned from a 
semi-feudal, largely self-sufficient pastoral nomadic society with negligible market 
activities straight to central plan.  The situation s again quite similar to some Central 
Asian economies and creates extremely unfavorable conditions for market-type of 
reforms.  The virtual absence of historical experience compounds the difficulties created 
by the limited nature of market-oriented during thelat  communist period.   
 
However, I argued that the limited reforms in the late 1980s helped the 
communist party to retain centralized authority andthus limit the powers of the regions, 
directors of SOEs, local government officials, and the bureaucrats in line ministries.  
Furthermore, the very fact of aid dependency helped th  center to control the inflow of 
foreign capital and intermediate goods.  Thus, little devolution occurred in the second 
half of the 1980s, which is quite different from the experiences of the Soviet Union (or at 
least some parts of it) and Central and Eastern Europe.   
 
I argue that the fact that the center was able to control the resources does not 
guarantee that market reform will be advanced or (more or less equal access) mass 
privatization will be implemented.  On the contrary, in some places where the center was 
in full control of resources, no reforms occurred in the early-to-mid transition period, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan being cases to the point.  Yet, these historical and 
structural peculiarities of the Mongolian economy and politics created the balance of 







I believe that the political breakhthrough and dominance of radical elements in the 
government during 1990-1992 were extremely important for launching market reforms in 
Mongolia.  Without democratically oriented leadership, no postcommunist country 
implemented far-reaching market reforms in the early transition period43.   Cross-country 
empirical evidence from the early transition period shows that political reform was the 
strongest predictor of economic reforms in the mid-1990s (de Melo et al 1997).  
Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Turkmenistan with their ext emely conservative communist 
incumbent leadership never had a chance of early market reforms.  Uzbekistan’s gradual 
approach to economic reforms is most likely conditioned by political factors, more than 
anything else (Abazov 1999).  Nevertheless, experiences with partial market reforms in 
many parts of the postcommunist world – especially Russia – demonstrates that 
democratic political leadership does not guarantee that good policies will be 
implemented.   
 
Political will at the highest level was often not enough to pull through the policy 
measures.  It is a necessary but not sufficient conditi  for the successful reforms.  Much 
depends on the degree of resistance to the reform agend  demonstrated by the lower level 
bureaucrats, at the ministerial, local government, a d enterprise level.  The level of 
                                                
43 China proves that market reforms are possible without democratic political change.  Later experiences of 
some Central Asian republics, e.g., Uzbekistan, also show that economic reforms could (eventually) 
proceed under an authoritarian leadership.  However, th  common picture of almost all Soviet-block 




resistance, in turn, depended on the relative power f these agents.  I have shown in 
Chapter 4 that, unlike in most CIS countries, the sp cial interests represented by state 
enterprises and local governments were rather weak in Mongolia.  This was explained by 
the structure of the economy and the nature of the reforms during the late communist 
period.  At the same time, agricultural interests represented by the Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives were relatively strong.  Untimatley, this configuration of power among the 
critical political and economic players determined the methods and path of privatization 
and the course of economic reforms in general.  Therefore, I consider political factors to 
be critically important and sufficient conditions for economic reforms.  
 
Institutional and Cultural Factors 
 
I also mentioned several institutional and cultural factors as having influenced the 
nature of economic reforms and privatization.  In particular, Murrell et al (1996) argued 
that the culture of price setting during the communist period was critical in explaining the 
gradual price liberalization that took place in theearly 1990s in Mongolia.  However, I do 
not detect any other cultural dimensions that strongly influenced the privatization 
scheme.  Even the privatization of livestock seemed to have been determined by the 
interplay and relative strength of various political players.  Overrepresentation of rural 
interests in the legislature was mentioned as an institutional factor that helped the 
agricultural interests to get substantial privileges.  But, again, I do not consider this factor 
to be critically important.  The rural interests were significantly overrepresented in the 




main legislative body.  Therefore, institutional and cultural factors played only a marginal 
role in the adoption of the economic reform agenda i  Mongolia.   
 
Table 5.2 below summarizes the above discussion about the relative importance 
of various factors in determining the economic refoms.   
 
Table 5.2 Factors that contributed to economic reforms and fst privatization in 
Mongolia 
 
Factors How important? 
1. External factors 
Economic reforms in Eastern Europe 
and Soviet Union 
 
Important in launching perestroika type of reforms in 
the late communist period 
Necessary but not sufficient condition 
Membership in IFIs and donor aid  
 
 
Important in dealing with economic crisis and getting 
technical support, improving the legitimacy of the 
new regime 
Necessary but not sufficient condition  
 
2. Historical and structural factors 
 
Late launch of devolutionary reforms 
 
Centralized practices persisted, although some 
devolution occurred, but mid-level bureaucracy did 
not gather as great strength as in the former Soviet 
Union, therefore little resistance from the lower lvels  
Not a necessary condition, but critically important in 
the power arrangement of various actors, especially 
strong center and weak lower level bureaucracy 
 
Geographical concentration of 
economic activity in few locations 
 
Contributed to the strong centralized state  
Not necessary but critically important and related to 
the above point 
 
Aid dependency and centralized 
control over external sources 
 
Also important for centralized control 
Not necessary but critically important and related to 
the above point 
 




Very important and proved to be one of the most 




however does not guarantee that economic reforms 
will proceed 
Necessary but not sufficient condition 
 
Lack of vision within major political 
parties – most notably within the 
MPRP – on market economic reforms 
(idea vacuum) 
 
This allowed greater influence of the more radical 
MNPP to determine the reform agenda, particularly 
privatization. Yet does not guarantee fast reforms 
Necessary but not sufficient condition  
 
Weak interests among SOEs and local 
government 
 
This is conditioned by historical and structural factors 
Derives from historical and structural factors, but
critically important and sufficient condition 
 
Strong Union of Agricultural 
Collectives 
 
This is also conditioned by historical factors and was 
key to special treatment of the negdels 
Sufficient condition 
 
Greater influence of herders in the 
localities (although not at the national 
level) 
 
Allowed the herders to fight against the directors f 
the collectives to impose other forms of 
decentralization, e.g., lease agreements 
Sufficient condition 
 
4. Institutional factors 
 
Overrepresentation of rural interests 
in the legislature 
 
Helped to pass the specific provision on excluding 
agricultural privatization from the general 
privatization law 
Not a sufficient condition 
 
5. Cultural Factors 
 
Legacy of central plan and the culture 
of policymaking 
 
Led to gradual liberalization 
Neither necessary condition nor sufficient condition 
 






The stated aim of this dissertation was to shed some light on the “puzzle” of 
relative success of Mongolia in its political and economic transition from an authoritarian 




Specifically, the aim was to understand why Mongolia performed better on many 
dimensions of transition compared to countries with s milar initial conditions and 
structural background.  In answering this question, I provided a detailed narrative of the 
political and economic circumstances that were present at the end of the communist 
regime, the events that took place in the early 1990 which led to the collapse of the 
regime, and the subsequent political and economic reform policies that were undertaken 
to install a new political and economic order.  This nuanced narrative is based on ample 
primary data, a great deal of which was uncovered and used for the first time in an 
academic analysis.   
 
A more detailed and closer look at the actors, events, and circumstances reveals 
that Mongolia did have favorable conditions for undertaking a successful regime change. 
In particular, the configuration of domestic and inter ational powers, cultural and 
institutional setting, and the legacy of the prior egime were such that the regime 
challengers gained strength and the reformist elements within the incumbent regime 
exercised substantial influence at the onset of transition, which allowed them to reach an 
agreement and lead the radical reforms.  This is especially apparent when I bring in some 
evidence from the Central Asian states.  In many of these countries, democracy and 
marketization never had a chance to succeed (Åslund 2007).   
 
I identified a host of factors that have contributed one way or another to the 
successful transformation of Mongolia’s politics and economy.  In this chapter I 




cultural factors.  I also attempted to prioritize th m and pinpoint those which played a 
critical role, in the sense that without these factors Mongolia’s transition would have been 
impossible.  
 
Analysis of democratization is more complicated than privatization.  There are 
numerous factors that influenced the political processes in Mongolia.  Closer look at the 
factors reveal that various factors played an important role at the various stages of 
democratic transition.  I show that external factors – glasnost and perestroika, mass 
protests in Eastern Europe – were crucially important in laying the foundation for 
changes and at the very initial stage of the democratic political process, when the first 
mass protests started and gained momentum.  The democratic “revolution” itself was 
conditioned by political factors – namely the ability of the new democratic opposition to 
garner strength through mass mobilization, turn into a real political force, and 
successfully cooperate with the reform-minded faction within the MPRP.   
 
I argue that certain historical factors – mild leadr, weak military, and pre-existing 
sovereignty etc – did play a role in smooth transition ng to democracy, i.e., making the 
revolution smooth and successful.  However, they were conditioned by broader cultural 
factors, such as a strong sense of national identity and resolve for self-determination.   
 
I argue that, once the politburo was dismantled, institutional factors played an 
important role in advancing democracy.  They were inclusive and therefore conducive for 




the democratic opposition to influence the policies and thereby advance political reforms 
and strengthen itself.   Institutional factors were important in adopting a new democratic 
constitution.   
 
But, again, I argue that favorable institutions were rooted in deeper-seated cultural 
factors, such social cohesion conditioned by a strong unifying national identity and 
homogeneity.  Figure 5.1 below summarizes these points.  The bottom line conclusion is 
that external factors triggered the entire democratization process, and were aided by 
political factors and favorable cultural determinants.   
 
The analysis of factors that influenced the nature of the economic reforms and 
privatization in particular, leads us to believe certain external factors – prior economic 
dependence and the ensuing crisis due to withdrawal of aid – did play a role in rejecting 
the old economic system. Yet, these conditions were present in all post-communist 





Figure 5.1 Importance of various factors at different stages of democratic transition in Mongolia 
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The political breakthrough and dominance of reformist elements in the MPRP-led 
government were critically important in launching the market reforms.  I argue that 
without the political will and democratically disposed leadership Mongolia would not 
have advanced economic reforms.  However, political will alone is often not enough for 
successful economic reforms.  Because the reforms impose certain costs, it is often 
opposed by various groups within the society, and especially by strong entrenched 
interest groups. 
 
Fortunately for Mongolia, these groups were weak, which is conditioned by 
historical and structural factors, namely the centralized nature of the national economy 
and late launch of perestroika-type of devolution refo ms.  Although not a necessary 
condition for successful economic reforms and fast privatization, these happened to shape 
the relative power of political and economic players in such a way that reforms could 
proceed without major obstruction.   Thus, I conclude that the political factors seemed to 
have played a core function in the nature and extent of economic reforms, and these were 








Appendix 1 The First Petition of the Mongolian Democratic Union t  the MPRP 
leadership 
 
A letter by the members of the Mongolian Democratic Union, participants of the meeting 
convened on the occasion of the International Day on Human Rights, to the 7th Plenary 
Session of the MPRP and the 8th Session of the People’s Great Khural of the People’s 
Republic of Mongolia  
 
Ulaanbaatar city       December 10, 1989 
 
We, the participants of the Meeting, fully supporting the perestroika initiated by 
the MPRP, expressing our commitment to honestly provide our inputs to this process, 
being dissatisfied with the pace of perestroika, the country’s current social, political and 
economic situation, and the inability to take quick measures to solve pressing societal 
problems, are hereby putting forward the following as the political requests by the 
Mongolian Democratic Union: 
 
1. Make the following amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
Mongolia  
 
1. Eliminate party centered management of the country’s government affairs, establish 
the legal foundation of the multiparty political system by approving appropriate 
laws, and approve the Law on political parties.  
2. Ensure that the universal rights of the human being proclaimed in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights are respected by the stat , government organizations 
and political parties.  
3. Change the People’s Great Khural as a parliament with regular sessions and other 
organizational forms and set up a publicly elected ouncil on human rights as 
parliament unit.  
4. The Khurals should make decisions on social, political and economic the issues that 
represent the national interests of the country by holding open public debates and 
local communities debates on the matters important to these communities, 





2. Take the following urgent measures to speed up perestroika and reform processes: 
 
- Change radically the People’s Great Khural election system, and convey 
extraordinary general elections in the first half of 1990.  
- Develop and publicly debate the concept of socially oriented market economy as 
the key factor for economic development. 
- Expand the banking system, separate it from the Ministers’ Council, and set up a 
separate body reportable to the People’s Great Khural.  
- Ensure freedom of the press.  
- Eliminate party nomenklatura’s special welfare benefits. 
 
3. Take the following actions in order to draw a conclusion about the social 
development the People’s Republic of Mongolia: 
 
a. Set up a public commission with the aim to detect and pass judgment on 
individuals who have been obediently implementing Kh.Choibalsan and 
Yu.Tsedenbal’s orders and supporting their authoritarian management style, thus 
worsening the wrong doings.  
b. Find, identify by name and rehabilitate all progressive minded politicians and 
activists, ordinary people, practitioners of traditional medicine, Buddhist lamas and 
educated people who were repressed by ruling party du ing the recent history of the 
People’s Republic of Mongolia, ensure that the MPRP apologies to those political 
repressed citizen, and to pay compensation for theifamilies.  
c. The MPRP to make political conclusion about the decisions made by this party 
regarding the forced collectivization, its support t  he armed invasion in the 
Peoples Republic of Hungary in 1956 and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in 
1968, respectively, and condemn its decision that lead to the destruction of 
approximately 700 Buddhist temples, objects of histor cal and cultural heritage and 
scriptures.  
d. The Mongolian Democratic Union requests the MPRP to give a thorough reply 
letter to the official requirements put forward by the MDU. The participants of the 
Meeting propose to celebrate the International Day on Human Rights as the 
national day of democracy.  
 






Appendix 2 Abbreviated Minutes of the meeting of the politburo and cabinet members 
on March 9, 1990 (the original official text is taken from Batmunkh 2003) 
 
The meeting began at 15:00 pm and finished at 16:11 pm.   
Issue on the agenda: discussion and decision on the draft resolution to take 
forceful action against the hunger strikers in Ulaanbaatar city and restore public order.  
The meeting was chaired by J. Batmunkh.   
Ts. Gotov, Secretary of the Presidium of the People’s Great Khural, read out the 
text of the draft resolution.  
J. Batmunkh announced the names of the officials who drafted the resolution and 
requested them to briefly explain the content of the draft, and requested the participants 
to ask questions regarding the draft.  
 
L. Rentsen, Chief Judge:  
 - We co-drafted the resolution. The last edited version of the text seems good. It is 
not possible to predict the final consequences. In case the resolution is approved, it 
should be implemented.  
 
D. Zundui, First Deputy Minister of Justice and Arbitration: 
 - We discussed the resolution thoroughly. From the legal perspective, it is 
possible to issue such a resolution. The resolution will not declare a state of emergency as 
per se. However there will be some major restrictions. We do not know how international 
community will find the approval of such a resolution. We need to think about how to 
implement the resolution.  
 
J. Baljinnyam, Prosecutor General: 
 - I think, there is no need for using force in such situations. Police and internal 
troops do not have enough personnel to protect the area of a big city circle. There is a 
shortage of police forces.  
 
B. Dejid, Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee: 
 - Shall we let the party and the people be insulted in such a way?  
 
J. Baljinnyam, Prosecutor General: 
 - I have consulted with my collegium. People will not understand if we use force. 
We need to negotiate. It is important to come to an agreement. Yesterday I was in favor 





J. Batmunkh, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP and 
Chairman of the Presidium of the People’s Great Khural: 
 - Are there any other comments? Anyone who supports the resolution?  
 
G. Khuderchuluun, Governor of the State Bank: 
 - In case the resolution is approved, what will happen to the participants of the 
hunger strike? It [the resolution] will be an act of using force.  
 
J. Batmunkh, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP and 
Chairman of the Presidium of the People’s Great Khural: 
 - You answered to your own question.  We may leave the hunger strikers where 
they are.  
 
S. Batkhuyag, Minister of Fuel and Energy: 
 - In case of using force, do the police and internal troops have enough personnel?  
 
J. Batmunkh, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP and 
Chairman of the Presidium of the People’s Great Khural: 
 - In case the resolution is approved, the law enforcement agencies will have to 
implement it.  However, it will be difficult for few police officers allocated in a street to 
dissolve many demonstrators and protectors.  
 
S. Batkhuyag, Minister of Fuel and Energy: 
 - It seems power stations and transport will have to be stopped. From yesterday’s 
negotiations it looks like the representatives from the opposition forces are not able to 
properly represent themselves. Workers and public offi ials are not fully performing their 
jobs, instead they are discussing what will happen next. We have to approve the 
resolution and explain it to the people.  
 
N. Jantsan, Head of the Department of the MPRP Central Committee: 
 - We need to consider what will happen if the resoluti n is not approved. It is 
difficult to predict any consequences of either approving or not approving the resolution. 
It may be a right decision to approve the resolution if the interests of the people are to be 
protected. In case there are major negative consequences, the proponents of this 
resolution should not be blamed for such consequences. It is about protecting the interests 
of the people and defending the state. It is getting difficult to convene the plenary 





Ts. Gombosuren, Minister of External Affairs: 
- Is the failure of negotiations conclusive? The approval of the resolution will be 
regarded as a step back from solving the issues throug  means of peaceful negotiations. It 
is not appropriate to pass the resolution when there is a street turmoil and hunger strike. I 
think negotiations are the right option.  
 
A. Jamsranjav, Minister of Public Safety: 
 - It is difficult to say that the resolution will be enforced once it is approved. We 
do not have enough police force to be deployed in all streets. We are ready to protect the 
streets even now. Power stations and prisons are prot cted. I do not think that order will 
be restored with just an approval of this resolution. How will the resolution be accepted 
both domestically and internationally? The resolutin is to be enforced in Ulaanbaatar 
city.  What will happen in case a similar political situation emerges in aimags and other 
cities? Shall we pass separate resolutions for every aimag? The state of emergency could 
be declared only if the necessary gradual (peaceful) actions are unsuccessful.  Please 
consider that a resolution will not be received well under the current circumstances where 
there is no clear delineation between the party and the state.  Once we make this 
distinction clear, the state’s action to restore order may be received more favorably. In 
terms of timing, the deadline of July 1 should be reconsidered. Even if the order is 
restored temporarily, what if the situation worsens by the Naadam celebrations (i.e., July 
11-13)?  I think holding public (transparent) negotiations is most important. Many people 
are criticizing me for not being decisive and strongly pushing to use force. If you think I 
am not decisive and bold enough, please accept my resignation.  
 
S. Batkhuyag, Minister of Fuel and Energy: 
 - I am requesting to pass a resolution prohibiting strikes at power stations, water 
reservoirs and other special objects.   
 
J. Batmunkh, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP and 
Chairman of the Presidium of the People’s Great Khural: 
 - The day before yesterday we had a meeting and agreed on taking certain gradual 
measures. Some officials from legal and law enforcement organizations agreed to draft a 
resolution which they did. The upcoming party plenary meeting will be held in a critical 
political situation. An extreme method of political resistance is chosen and hunger strike 
is declared, which is disturbing. We had a press meeting which was broadcast by TV and 
radio stations. Political negotiations and meetings are going on. We heard the views of 
the representatives of law enforcement organizations as well as views of other colleagues. 
Just before this meeting we had a discussion at the politburo. My proposal is to continue 
with the negotiations, have discussions transmitted by TV. How about the ministers and 
heads of the departments taking part in these negotiations? I think it is even necessary. 




worsen the situation just like adding oil to fire. Not only the members of the [Democratic] 
Union but the ordinary people might negatively accept the resolution. The political 
meetings and protests might spread over in other places away from the central square, 
and street violence might break out. However some agr ed measures should be 
implemented, for example, a declaration by the Prosecutor’s Office should be issued. Let 
us take certain measures in aimags, cities and organizations. Let us consider having 
enforced security measures at special objects, be prepared to deploy forces in case the 
state of emergency is declared. Ministry of Public Safety should take proper measures to 
protect power stations and other special objects. Each ministry, department should take 
measures to protect their property. The party committee of Ulaanbaatar city, mayor’s 
office, the national TV and radio committee should implement public awareness 
measures, parents should guide their children, and a special news group need to be 
established. We should avoid a situation where a resolution is passed however it cannot 
be enforced and be blamed for using force. Let us give special power to police and the 
Ministry of Public Safety to reinforce armed forces as needed. Most importantly let us 
proactively engage in the negotiations. The politburo is taken as a political hostage, but 
we are not afraid of it. The politburo may resign, but the ordinary people should not 
suffer under any circumstances. The prosecutor issued a warning notice, however, it is 
necessary to think about the right wording, and the information should be disseminated 
properly. We have to lead our people using appropriate methods.  There are many young 
people from aimags who want to speak out at the mass eetings. However, I wonder if 




Appendix 3 The questionnaire of the survey conducted following the first elections 
(1990) 
 
1. Are you confident in the newly elected parliament (i  terms of composition)? 
Fully confident – 221, Doubtful (uncertain) – 351, no confidence at all – 28 
 
2. Will the first session of the newly elected parliament be critically important in 
determining the future of the reforms?  
Yes – 288, Uncertain – 291, No – 21 
 
3. Can the newly elected parliament reflect the interests of the various strata in our 
society? 





4. Will the newly elected parliament be critically important in establishing a new 
democratic political system? 
Yes – 263, Uncertain – 259, No – 78 
 
5. Can the newly elected parliament appoint a trustful State Small Khural 
(permanent chamber)? 
Yes – 251, Uncertain – 254, No – 95 
 
6. Can the newly elected parliament and the State Small Khural appoint a trustful 
government (cabinet)? 
Yes – 233, Uncertain – 302, No – 65 
 
7. How successful will the first session of the newly elected parliament be? 
Successful (cooperative) and effective – 223, controversial but less effective – 
352, not effective at all – 25 
 
Appendix 4 Cumulative Liberalization Index 
 
De Melo et al (1996) constructed a Cumulative Liberalization Index (CLI) which 
is calculated as the sum of a country’s LIs over a period of time, namely from 1989 till 
1994.  Based on the CLIs, 26 transition countries ar  r nked and grouped into four 
groups: advanced reformers (CLI>3), high intermediate reformers (2<CLI<3), low 
intermediate reformers (1.3<CLI<2), and slow reforme s (CLI<1.3).  Table 1 below 
shows the CLIs and other macroeconomic indicators for all transition countries.  
 
















Reformers Poland  4.14 34 4.2 6.00 
Hungary 4.11 21 0.0 6.50 
Czech Republic 3.61 16 0.8 6.50 
Slovakia  3.53 19 0.4 5.50 




Bulgaria  2.96 81 -1.4 6.00 
Estonia 2.93 69 0.9 5.50 
Lithuania  2.62 231 -7.3 6.00 
Latvia 2.39 73 -4.4 5.50 
Romania  2.35 194 2.2 4.50 
Albania  2.30 57 9.5 4.50 
Mongolia  2.27 164 0.6 5.50 




Russia  1.92 558 -13.5 4.50 
Kyrgyzstan  1.81 744 -13.2 4.50 
Moldova  1.62 558 -17.0 4.00 
Kazakhstan  1.31 1870 -18.5 2.50 
Averages 1.67 933 -15.6 3.88 
Slow  
Reformers  
Uzbekistan  1.11 640 -2.5 1.00 
Belarus 1.07 1694 -16.6 4.00 
Ukraine  0.80 2789 -18.6 4.00 
Turkmenistan  0.63 2751 -15.0 1.00 
Averages 0.90 1968 -13.2 2.63 
Affected 
by War 
Croatia  4.02 807 -0.7 4.00 
FYR Macedonia 3.92 157 -10.7 4.50 
Armenia 1.44 4595 -7.4 4.50 
Georgia 1.32 10563 -24.6 3.00 
Azerbaijan 1.03 1167 -17.7 2.00 
Tajikistan 0.95 1324 -26.3 1.00 
Averages 2.11 3102 -14.5 3.17 




China  3.08 13 11.7 1.00 
Averages 3.25 11 10.2 1.00 





Appendix 5 The Questionnaire of the Survey 
 
8. Are you confident in the newly elected parliament (i  terms of composition)? 
Fully confident – 221, Doubtful (uncertain) – 351, no confidence at all – 28 
 
9. Will the first session of the newly elected parliament be critically important in 
determining the future of the reforms?  
Yes – 288, Uncertain – 291, No – 21 
 
10. Can the newly elected parliament reflect the interests of the various strata in our 
society? 
Yes – 186, Uncertain – 299, No – 115 
 
11. Will the newly elected parliament be critically important in establishing a new 
democratic political system? 
Yes – 263, Uncertain – 259, No – 78 
 
12. Can the newly elected parliament appoint a trustful State Small Khural 
(permanent chamber)? 
Yes – 251, Uncertain – 254, No – 95 
 
13. Can the newly elected parliament and the State Small Khural appoint a trustful 
government (cabinet)? 





14. How successful will the first session of the newly elected parliament be? 
Successful (cooperative) and effective – 223, controversial but less effective – 






Appendix 6 Quantitative and structural conditionalities imposed by the IMF on the 


























Appendix 7 List of people interviewed (names and dates of interview) 
 
 Name of the 
interviewee  
Current position Previous position(s) Date of 
interview 
1.  D. Baasankhuu Advisor, Rio Tinto 
Group 
Head of Department, 
Ministry of Finance; Advisor 
to the Executive Director, 
the World Bank 
Oct 2011 
May 2012 
2.  D. Bailiikhuu Advisor, the State 
Property Commission 




3.  B. Batbayar 
(Baabar) 
Publicist Chairman of the Mongolian 
Social-Democratic Party; 
Member of the Parliament; 
Minister of Finance 
Apr 2012 
Jul 2012 
4.  C. Bavuu Retired Director of the Legal 
Department of the People’s 
Control and Inspection 
Commission (1972-1981) 




5.  A. Bazarkhuu Retired Minister of Finance (1990-










7.  D. Byambasuren Retired Prime Minister (1990-1992) 
Deputy Prime Minister 
(1989-1990), Deputy 
Chairman of the Planning 
Commission (1988-1989) 
May 2010 
8.  G. Davaasambuu Advisor to the Speaker 
of the Parliament 





9.  D. Ganbold Deputy Mayor of 
Ulaanbaatar City 
First Deputy Prime Minister 
(1990-1992) 
Jan 2012 
10.  Yo. Gerelchuluun Senior official, Office 
of the President  




11.  R. Gonchigdorj Member of the 
Parliament 
Vice President (1990-1992) Sep 2011 
12.  N. Luvsanjav Chairman, the State 
Election Commission 
Director of Legal 





Control and Inspection 
Commission (1981-1987), 
and Responsible Secretary of 
the Commission (1987-
1990) 
13.  T. Namjim Advisor, the 
Parliament 
First Deputy Chairman of 
the State Planning 
Commission (1986-1988) 
Oct 2010 
14.  D. Sodnom Advisor, MAK LLC Prime Minister (1984-1990) 
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